"'  -'^ 

'    -^^v^. 


Wofh  bf  Dr.  M'Cosli. 


h     THE   METHOD  OF  THE   DIVINE  GOVERNMENT, 
PHYSICAL  AND   MORAL.    8vo.   $2.50. 

"  It  is  refreshing  to  read  a  work  so  distinguished  for  originality  and  sound- 
ness of  thinking,  especially  as  coming  from  an  author  of  our  own  country."  — 
Sir  William  Hamilton. 

"Dr.  M' Cosh's  work  is  of  the  compact  cast  and  thought-eliciting  com 
plexion  which  men  do  not  willingly  let  die ;  and  we  promise  such  of  our 
readers  as  may  possess  themselves  of  it  much  entertainment  and  instruction 
of  a  high  order,  and  a  fund  of  solid  thought,  which  they  will  not  soon  ex- 
haust." —  Hugh  Miller,  in  "  Witness." 

"  This  work  is  distinguished  from  other  similar  ones  by  its  being  based  upon 
Ei^horough  study  of  physical  science,  and  an  accurate  knowledge  of  its  present 
condition,  and  by  its  entering  in  a  deeper  and  more  unfettered  manner  than  its 
predecessors  upon  the  discussion  of  the  appropriate  psychological,  ethical,  and 
theological  questions.  The  author  keeps  aloof  at  once  from  the  a  -prion 
idealism  and  dreaminess  of  German  speculation  since  Schelling,  and  from  the 
one-sidedness  and  narro-vvness  of  the  empiricism. and  positivism  which  have  so 
px'evailed  in  England.  In  the  provinces  of  psychology  and  ethics  he  follows 
conscientiously  the  facts  of  consciousness,  and  draws  his  conclusions  of  them 
commonly  with  penetration  and  logical  certainty."  —  Dr.  Ulrici,  in  Zeitschrifi 
fur  Philosophie. 

2.  TYPICAL  FORMS  AND  SPECIAL  ENDS  IN  CREA- 
TION.  By  James  M'Cosh,  LL.  D.,  and  Dr.  Dickie. 
8vo.    $2.50. 

"It  is  alike  comprehensive  in  its  range,  accurate  and  minute  in  its  details, 
original  in  its  structure,  and  devout  and  spirited  in  its  tone  and  tendency.  It 
illustrates  and  carries  out  the  great  principle  of  analogy  in  the  Divine  plans 
and  works  far  more  minutely  and  satisfactorily  than  it  has  been  done  before ; 
and  while  it  presents  the  results  of  the  most  profound  scientific  research,  it 
presents  them  in  their  higher  and  spiritual  relations."  —  Argns 


WOBKS   Bl    DB,    J\rCOSH. 

3.    THE   INTUITIONS   OF   THE  MIND.     New  and  Im 
PROVED  Edition.  8vo.   $3. 

"I  have  f^ivcn  an  approving?  notice  of  Dr.  M' Cosh's  'Intuitions  of  the  Mind' 
in  my  '  Jahrl)ucher  liii-  Deutsche  Thcologie'  (1861).  I  value  it  for  its  large  ac- 
quaintance with  English  riiilosopiiy,  which  has  not  led  him  to  neglect  the  great 
Gcrjnan  works.  I  admire  the  moderation  and  clearness,  as  well  as  comprehen- 
sion, of  the  author's  views.  iVhile  entertaining  a  great  respect  for  the  Masters 
of  the  Scottish  Philosophy,  such  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  this  has  not  restrained 
his  independent  judgment,  or  kept  him  stationary." —  Dr.  Dorner,  of  Berlin. 

"  The  undertaking  to  adjust  the  claims  of  the  sensational  and  intuitional 
philosophies,  and  of  the  a  posteriori  and  a  priori  methods  is  not  only  legitimate, 
but  acooniplished  in  this  work  with  a  great  amount  of  success." — Westminster 
Review,  April,  1865. 

"No  philosopher,  before  Dr.  M'Cosh,  has  clearly  brought  out  the  stages  b; 
which  an  original  and  individual  intuition  passes  first  into  an  articulate  but  still 
individual  judgment,  and  then  into  a  universal  maxim  or  principle ;  and  no  one 
has  so  clearly  or  completely  classified  and  enumerated  our  intuitive  convictions, 
or  exhihited  in  detail  their  relations  to  the  various  sciences  which  repose  on 
them  as  their  foundations.  The  amount  of  summarized  information  which  it 
contains  is  very  great ;  and  it  is  the  only  work  on  the  very  important  subject 
with  which  it  deals.  Never  was  such  a  work  so  much  needed  as  in  the  present 
day.  It  is  the  only  scientific  work  adapted  to  counteract  the  school  of  Mill, 
Bain,  and  Herbert  Spencer,  which  is  so  steadily  prevailing  among  the  students 
of  the  present  generation."  —  London  Quarterly  Review,  April,  1865. 

"  Though  treating  of  the  intuitions  of  the  mind,  and  thus  laboring  in  that  par- 
ticular division  of  philosophy  which  is  most  liable  to  degenerate  into  imagina- 
tive, or  at  best  merely  speculative  notions.  Dr.  M'Cosh  preserves  a  cleai-,  calm, 
and  sober  intelligence.  The  history  of  many  philosophic  opinions,  and  the  pe- 
culiarities of  many  philosophical  schools,  are  also  passed  in  review  in  the  notes 
to  the  work,  in  a  concise  yet  thorough  manner ;  and  the  criticisms  that  ai-e 
made  upon  several  of  the  celebrated  theories  of  the  past  are  candid  and  ex- 
haustive."—  Dr.  Shedd  in  Introduction  to  Second  American  Edition. 

'■*  When  the  original  edition  of  this  work  appeared,  we  characterized  it  in 
terms  of  strong  recommendation,  such  as  we  rarely  bestow  on  any  work,  and 
pointed  out  at  some  length  its  distinctive  merits.  We  will  just  say  here,  that, 
in  regard  to  all  the  greatest  issues  between  Mill  and  Hamilton,  indeed,  all  the 
p-fjit  issues  raised  by  either  of  these  eminent  authors,  or  their  respective  philo- 
sophical schools ;  and  in  regard  to  nearly  every  great  issue  raised  between  the 
philosophic  scepticism  and  the  Christian  philosophy  of  our  day,  Dr.  M'Cosh 
quite  generally  takes  the  right  side." —  Princeton  Review,  Oct.  1865. 


AN  EXAMINATION 


Mr.  J.  S.  MILL'S   PHILOSOPHY; 


BEING 


A  DEFENCE  OF  EIJNDAMENTAI  TRUTH. 


BY 


JAMES  M'COSH,   LL.D., 

PROFESSOR  OP  LOGIC  AND  METAPHYSICS,   QUEEJf's   COLLEGE,  BELFAST  ;   AUTHOR  OP   "  THE 
METHOD   OF  DIVINE  GOVERXHEXT,"   "INTUITIONS   OF  THE  MIND,"   ETC. 


SECOND   EDITION,    WITH   ADDITIONS. 


NEW    YORK: 
ROBERT    CARTER   &    BROTHERS, 

6  30  B  RO  A  D WAT. 

1  869. 


Cambridge :  Presswork  by  John  WUson  and  Son. 


PEEFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


IN  reading  lately  the  Memoirs^  Letters,  and  Remains  of 
Alexis  De  Tocqueville,  who  has  speculated  so  profoundly 
on  the  causes  and  consequences  of  national  character,  I  was 
much  struck  with  the  following  :  — 

"  The  ages  in  which  metaphysics  have  been  most  cultivated,  have 
in  general  been  those  in  which  men  have  been  most  raised  above 
themselves.  Indeed,  though  I  care  little  for  the  study,  I  have  always 
been  struck  by  the  influence  which  it  has  exercised  over  the  things 
which  seem  least  connected  with  it,  and  even  over  society  in  general. 
I  do  not  think  that  any  statesmen  ought  to  be  indifferent  as  to 
whether  the  prevailing  metaphysical  opinions  be  materialistic  or 
not.  Condillac,  I  have  no  doubt,  drove  many  people  into  material- 
ism, who  had  never  read  his  book ;  for  abstract  ideas,  relating  to 
human  nature,  penetrate  at  last,  I  know  not  how,  into  public 
morals." 

Had  De  Tocqueville's  studies  run  in  that  direction,  it  would 
not  have  been  difficult  for  him  to  unfold  the  causes  of  the  phe- 
nomena which  he  has  so  carefully  noted.  These  phenomena 
are  three  in  number.  First,  a  taste  for  philosophic  specula- 
tion is  a  mark  of  an  elevated  age.  It  is  the  sign  of  a  time 
which  believes  that  there  is  as  much  above  the  surface  of  the 
earth,  and  beneath  it,  as  there  is  on  it ;  and  is  seeking  suc- 
cessfully or  unsuccessfully  to  gauge  the  height  of  the  heavens, 
in  order  to  draw  down  influences  from  it ;  or  to  penetrate  the 
ground  in  the  hope  of  discovering  mines  from  which  unseen 
wealth  may  be  dug.     The  age  which  comprised   Socrates, 


iv  PREFACE   TO   SECOND  EDITION. 

Plato,  and  Aristotle,  in  Greece  ;  the  age  of  Cicero  in  Rome ; 
the  seventeenth  century  in  France,  England,  and  Holland ; 
the  last  part  of  the  eighteenth  and  the  first  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth centuries  In  Scotland  and  in  Germany,  have  been  the 
peculiarly  philosophic  ages  of  these  countries,  and  have  been 
the  times  of  deepest  and  brightest  thought  in  all  departments 
of  literature  and  science.  Whatever  may  be  said  against  the 
age  in  which  we  live,  It  is  clear  that  it  is  one  in  which  the 
deepest  speculative  questions  are  discussed ;  and  it  is  char- 
acterized by  high  literary  attainment  and  boundless  scientific 
and  political  enthusiasm.  The  second  fact  noticed  is,  that 
metaphysics  exercise  a  mighty  influence  on  the  things  least 
connected  with  them,  in  fact  over  society  in  general.  This 
can  be  accounted  for.  Men's  deep  and  abiding  convictions, 
—  religious,  ethical,  and  philosophic, — when  they  have 
such,  or  the  restlessness  gendered  in  hearts  emptied  of  all 
credences,  and  wdth  pretended  satisfactions  rushing  in  on 
every  side  to  fill  the  vacuum,  exert  a  far  greater  power  over 
them  and  their  age,  than  outward  circumstances  or  floating 
impulses.  De  Tocqueville  recommends  statesmen  carefully 
to  watch  the  philosophy  of  their  day,  which  is  always  sowing 
seed  to  produce  fruit  for  good  or  for  evil  in  the  age  that  fol- 
lows. I  may  add  that  the  friends  of  religion  should  also 
guard  those  springs  out  of  which  the  streams  of  action  flow. 
For  De  Tocqueville  tells  us,  thirdly,  that  a  materialistic  phi- 
losophy penetrates  into  public,  and  I  may  add  private,  morals  ; 
and  this  among  persons  who  never  looked  into  a  work  on 
metaphysics.  He  refers  specially  to  the  Sensational  philoso- 
phy of  France,  which  exercised  so  fatal  an  influence  on 
French  character  and  politics,  in  the  latter  half  of  last 
century,  giving  a  direction  to  public  sentiment  which  culmi- 
nated in  the  mad  excesses  of  the  French  Revolution,  and 
then  sank  into  the  stagnant  indifference  of  the  first  Empire. 
When  we  look  from  this  point,  we  see  that  we  have  dark 
days  and  fearful  conflicts  before  us  in  France  and  in  England  : 
for  we  have  a  prevailing  philosophy  of  quite  as  earthward  a 
character  and  tendency  as  that  of  Condillac  and  the  Encyclo- 


PREFACE   TO   SECOND  EDITION.  v 

p^dists  ;  with  qualities  fitted  to  stimulate  a  wild  enthusiasm ; 
entertained  by  earnest  and  able  men  eager  to  propagate  their 
opinions,  supporting  each  other  in  important  literary  organs, 
and  at  the  present  moment  buoyed  up  by  the  hopes  of  victory. 
Happily  Ave  have  in  this  country  (it  is  different,  I  fear,  under 
the  new  Empire  in  France)  many  forces  —  unfortunately 
unconnected  and  distracted  —  to  meet  this,  both  in  the  hio-h- 
toned  philosophy  which  still  lingers  among  us,  and  in  a  fer- 
vent religion  widely  spread,  and  fitted,  I  think,  to  keep  the 
materialistic  psychology  from  attaining  to  so  great  a  sway  as 
it  reached  in  last  century,  and  may  still  reach  in  this,  on  the 
continent.  But  the  contest  in  England  is  a  very  serious  one 
— the  religious  public  being  quite  unaware  of  its  importance, 
and  not  likely  to  be  aroused  till  they  see  the  practical  effects, 
when  it  is  too  late  to  avert  them.  Thinking  men,  however, 
feel  that  they  have  a  part  to  act  in  this  crisis.  I  introduce 
my  readers  to  one  of  the  skirmishes  of  the  great  warfare. 

In  May,  1865,  Mr.  Mill  published  an  Examination  of 
Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  in  which  he  unfolds 
principles  fitted,  as  I  think,  to  undermine  fundamental  truth. 
In  the  beginning  of  the  following  year,  I  published  this  work 
as  a  reply.  In  the  third  edition  of  his  work,  published  in 
1867,  Mr.  Mill  replied  to  his  critics,  including  myself.  I 
place  in  Appendix  II.  to  this  edition  my  answer  to  Mr.  Mill's 
strictures.  The  combatants  are  now  brought  to  very  close 
quarters.  We  now  see  clearly  what  are  the  questions  at 
issue.  The  Appendix  may  be  regarded  as  forming  a  sort 
of  resume  of  the  whole  controversy,  not  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
Hamilton,  but  as  it  bears  on  what  is  far  more  important,  — 
the  fundamental  truth  which  Mr.  MiU  has  assailed. 


OOI^TENTS, 


CHAPTER   I. 

PA61 
IXTRODUCTION  —  SiR  WiLLIAM  HAMILTON  AND  Mh.  MiLL,     .  .  7 


CHAPTER    IL 
The  Method  or  Investigation, '        31 

CHAPTER    m. 
Ms.  Mill's  Admissions, 95 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Sensations, 79 

CHAPTER   V. 
Mind,  Personality,  Personal  Identity,  Substance,         .        .  88 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Body, .       112 

CHAPTER  VII. 
The  Physiology  of  the  Senses, 159 


vm 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


Memory,  Association  op  Ideas,   Belief,  and  Unconscious 

Mental  Opebations, 187 


CHAPTER  IX. 
Judgment  ok  Comparison 215 

CHAPTER    X. 
Relativity  of  Knowledge,   ...  ....        231 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Man's  Power  of  Conception  as  a  Test  op  Truth,      .        .        .        251 

CHAPTER  XIL 
Self-Evidence  and  Necessity,  the  Tests  op  Intuition,  .        -.        259 

CHAPTER   Xin. 
Causation, 274 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
The  Logical  Notion, 286 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Logical  Judgment, .        .        305 

CHAPTER  XVL 
Reasoning, 318 

CHAPTER  XVIL 

Secondary  Logic;  or  Thought  as  Directed  to  Particular 

Classes  of  Objects,  339 


CONTENTS.  is 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 
Logical  Discussions  :  The  Province  of  Logic,        .        .        .         350 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
What  is  Truth  1     Criteria  op  Truth, 372 


CHAPTER   XX. 
Utilitarianism, 335 


CHAPTER  XXI. 
Natubal  Theology, ^  a\k 

APPENDIX. 

I.  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy, 433 

II.  Reply  to  Mr.  Mill's  Strictures  in  his  Third  Edition,  .       435 


AJ^   EXAMmATIOI^ 


MR.  J.  S.  MILKS  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTION  —  SIR  W.   HAMILTON  AND  MR.   MILL. 

IF  any  one  competent  to  offer  an  opinion  on  such 
a  subject  were  asked,  Who  are  the  most  influen- 
tial philosophic  thinkers  of  Britain,  in  this  the  third 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century?  he  would  at 
once  and  unhesitatingly  name  Sir  William  Hamilton 
and  Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill.  For  the  last  twenty  or 
thirty  years  the  former  has  had  great  authority  in 
Scotland,  and  considerable  power  in  Oxford  and 
among  the  Dissenting  colleges  of  England;  has 
been  much  admired  in  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica ;  has  been  favorably  known  in  France,  and  heard 
of  even  in  Germany,  where  few  British  metaphysi- 
cians attain  a  name.  Mr,  Mill  has  quahties  which 
specially  recommend  him  to  the  Enghsh  mind,  and 
of  late  years  he  has  got  a  firm  hold  of  the  rising 
thought  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  where  young 
minds,  in  the  recoil  from  the  attempt  to  impose  the 
mediaeval  forms  upon  them,  have  taken  refuge  in 


8  INTBODUCTIOm 

the  Empiricism  and  Utilitarianism  so  lucidly  ex- 
pounded by  him;  Avhile  writers  bred  at  the  great 
English  Universities  have,  in  certain  portions  of  the 
London  press,  been  constantly  and  apparently  sys- 
tematically quoting  him,  or  referring  to  him,  as  pos- 
sibly tlie  only  philosopher  kno^vn  to  them,  or  at 
least  appreciated  by  them.  It  should  be  added  that 
he  is  known  in  France  as  the  English  representa- 
tive of  their  own  Positive  School;  and  his  clear 
logical  expositions  have  been  esteemed  by  not  a 
few  in  Germany,  anxious  to  escape  from  the  inex- 
tricable toils  of  Kant  and  Fichte,  Schelling  and 
Hegel. 

These  two  men  are  alike  in  the  greatness  of  their 
intellectual  power,  and  in  the  range  of  their  attain- 
ments. But  they  differ  widely  in  their  peculiar 
mental  endowments  and  predilections,  in  the  man- 
ner in  which  they  have  been  trained,  and  the 
influences  under  which  their  opinions  have  been 
formed.  Hamilton  is  known  to  have  received  a 
thoroughly  complete  collegiate  education  in  classics 
and  pliilosophy ;  to  have  afterwards  had  his  logical 
powers  sharpened  by  the  study  of  law,  and  his  ex- 
tensive information  widened  by  his  researches  when 
Professor  of  History ;  while  his  pursuits  were  made 
finally  to  centre  in  mental  science  by  his  appoint- 
ment as  Professor  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in  the 
University  of  Edinburgh.  Eeceiving  his  early  col- 
lege training  in  Glasgow,  where  the  influence  of 
Reid  was  predominant,  he  retained  throudi  life  a 


HAMILTON  AND  MILL.  9 

profound  reverence  for  the  common-sense  philoso- 
pher. Completing  his  academic  education  at  Ox- 
ford, he  fell  under  the  sway  of  Aristotle,  and  found 
in  him  much  that  was  congenial  to  his  own  intel- 
lectual nature,  and  was  led  to  study  his  philosophy 
not  only  in  his  own  writings,  but  in  the  pages  of 
his  commentators,  and  in  the  modification  of  his 
logic  constructed  by  the  schoolmen.  In  the  course 
of  his  multifarious  reading  he  could  not  but  fall  in 
with  constant  references  to  Emmanuel  Kant  as  a 
profound  thinker,  and,  as  he  entered  upon  the  study 
of  his  works,  could  not  but  be  impressed  with  the 
vast  logical  power  of  the  German  metaphysician. 
These  three,  Reid,  Aristotle,  and  Kant,  are  the  men 
who  have  exercised  the  greatest  influence  on  the 
studies  and  the  thoughts  of  the  Scottish  philosopher. 
But  in  his  vast  and  rare  reading  he  delighted  to 
find  truth  scattered  like  gold  dust  in  the  pages  of 
forgotten  writers  of  all  ages  and  countries,  and, 
rejoicing  in  the  discovery,  he  often  magnified  its 
value  as  he  hastened  to  bring  it  forth  to  the  public 
view  in  an  age  and  country  which  seemed  to  liim 
greatly  deficient  in  scholarship. 

His  intellectual  features  stand  out  very  promi- 
nently. A  discerning  ej'e  might  have  seen  from 
the  begmning  that  his  mdependent  and  impetuous 
miad  would  impel  him  to  follow  a  course  of  his 
own ;  and  that,  while  probably  destined  to  lead,  he 
would  not  be  led  —  certainly  would  not  be  driven 
by   others.     He   is   evidently  moved   by   a   strong 


10  INTBODUGTION, 

internal  appetency  to  master  all  learning,  and  lie 
spent  his  life  in  accumulating  stores  which,  after  all, 
fell  immeasurably  beneath  his  high  ambition.  Along 
with  this  he  has  a  masterly  capacity  of  retention 
and  power  of  arrangement.  His  skill  in  seizing  the 
opinions  of  the  men  of  all  ages  and  countries :  the 
ancient  Greeks,  the  philosophic  fathers  of  the 
Church,  the  schoolmen,  the  thinkers  of  the  age  of 
the  Revival  of  Letters,  —  such  as  Scaliger,  and  of 
the  continental  metaphysicians  from  the  days  of 
Descartes  to  about  the  year  1830,  has  never  been 
equalled  by  any  British  philosopher.  His  powers  of 
logical  analysis,  generahzation,  and  distribution  are 
scarcely  surpassed  by  those  of  Aristotle  or  Thomas 
Aquinas  or  Kant.  I  have  to  add,  that  while  he  has 
also  superior  powers  of  observation,  he  has,  like  most 
metaphysicians,  often  overridden  and  overwhelmed 
them  by  logical  processes,  and  hastened  by  dissec- 
tion, division,  and  criticism  to  construct  prematurely 
a  completed  system  of  philosophy  —  such  as  is  to 
be  built  up,  only  as  systems  of  physical  science  are 
formed,  by  the  careful  inductions  of  successive  in- 
quhers  conducting  their  work  through  successive 
ages.  In  this  respect  he  has  imbibed  the  spirit  of 
Kant,  and  has  not  followed  the  examples  set  by  the 
more  cautious  school  of  Reid  and  Stewart. 

His  manner  and  style  are  very  decided  and  very 
marked.  Any  man  of  sharp  discernment  could 
easily  recognize  him  at  a  great  distance,  and  detect 
him  under  the  most  rigid  incognito.     To  some  ears 


HAMILTON  AND   MILL.  11 

his  nomenclature  may  sound  micoutli  and  crabbed, 
being  coined  out  of  the  Greek  or  borrowed  from  the 
Germans;  but  these  persons  forget  that  chemistry 
and  geology  and  anatomy  have  all  been  obliged  to 
create  a  new  terminology,  in  order  to  embody  the 
distmctions  which  they  have  established.  Hamilton 
is  certainly  without  the  power  of  poetical  or  orator- 
ical amplification  for  which  Brown  and  Chalmers  of 
the  same  University  were  distinguished ;  and  he  is 
deficient  in  the  aptness  of  illustration  in  which  such 
writers  as  Paley  and  Whately  excel ;  still  his  man- 
ner of  writing  has  attractions  of  its  own.  His 
phraseology,  if  at  times  it  sounds  technical  or  pe- 
dantic, is  always  carefully  explained  and  defined, 
and  is  ever  scholarlike  in  its  derivation  and  artic- 
ulate in  its  meaning.  His  style  is  never  loose,  never 
tedious,  never  dull ;  it  is  always  clear,  always  terse, 
always  masculine,  and  at  times  it  is  sententious, 
clinching,  and  apothegmatic.  In  reading  his  works, 
the  reader  need  entertain  no  fear  of  being  led  into 
a  Scotch  mist,  or  being  met  by  a  fog  from  the 
German  Ocean.  Not  unfrequently  dogmatic,  at 
times  oracular,  resolute  in  holding  by  his  opinions 
when  attacked,  and  on  certain  occasions,  as  in  his 
assaults  on  Luther,  Brown,  Whately,  and  De  Mor- 
gan, giving  way  to  undue  severity  and  passion,  he  is 
ever  open,  manly,  and  sincere.  He  uses  a  sharp 
chisel  and  strikes  his  hammer  with  a  decided  blow, 
and  his  ideas  commonly  stand  out  before  us  Hke  a 
clean  cut  statue  standing  firmly  on  its  pedestal  be- 


12  intboduction: 

tween  us  and  a  clear  sky.  Indeed,  we  might  with 
justice  describe  his  style  as  not  only  accurate,  but 
even  beautiful  in  a  sense,  from  its  compression,  its 
compactness,  its  vigor,  and  its  point.  His  thoughts, 
weighty  and  solid  as  metal,  are  ever  made  to  shine 
with  a  metallic  lustre.  At  the  places  at  which  his 
speculations  are  the  most  abstract  and  his  words  the 
baldest,  he  often  surprises  us  by  an  apt  quotation 
from  an  old  and  forgotten  author ;  or  a  sudden  hght 
is  thrown  upon  the  present  topic  by  rays  coming 
from  a  hundred  points.  If  we  have  not  the  flowers 
or  the  riches,  we  are  at  the  same  time  without  the 
sultriness  of  a  tropical  climate ;  and  in  the  arctic  re- 
gion to  which  he  carries  us,  if  the  atmosphere  feels 
cold  at  times,  it  is  always  healthy  and  bracing,  and 
the  lights  in  the  sky  have  a  bright  and  scintillating 
lustre. 

Mr.  MiU's  characteristics  are  of  a  different  kind. 
It  is  understood  that  he  received  no  collegiate 
education  :  but  it  is  clear  that  he  has  been  instruct- 
ed with  care,  and  I  should  suppose  upon  a  system, 
in  the  various  branches  even  of  academic  learning. 
K  not  so  technically  erudite  as  Hamilton,  it  is 
evident  that  he  is  weU  acquainted  with  the  various 
departments  of  physical  science ;  that  he  is  exten- 
sively read  in  all  historical  and  social  questions ; 
and  that  he  is  competently  conversant  with  the 
opinions  of  philosophers  and  logicians  in  different 
ages.  His  thinking  has  many  of  the  qualities  of 
a  self-educated  man :  that  is,  it  is  fresh  and  indepen- 


HAIIILTON  AND   MILL.  13 

dent,  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  often  exclusive  and 
angular,  in  consequence  of  its  not  being  rubbed  and 
polished  and  adjusted  by  being  placed  alongside  of 
the  philosophic  and  religious  msdom  of  the  great 
and  good  men  of  the  past.  Taught  to  think  for 
himself  from  his  boyhood,  he  has  prepared  opinions 
on  all  subjects ;  he  has  published  many  of  these  in 
his  writings,  and  has  evidently  many  more  to  ad- 
vance in  due  time,  as  circumstances  may  seem  to 
require,  and  the  world  is  able  to  bear  them.  He 
received,  I  rather  think,  his  first  mtellectual  im- 
pulse from  his  o^vn  father,  of  whom  he  always 
speaks  with  profound  reverence,  —  a  circumstance 
creditable  alike  to  the  father  and  the  son.  But  Mr. 
James  Mill,  though  a  clear  and  independent,  was  by 
no  means  (so  I  think)  a  comprehensive  or  profound 
thinker.  The  title  of  his  philosophical  work.  Anal- 
ysis of  the  Phenomena  of  the  Human  Mindj  indi- 
cates its  character  and  its  contents ;  it  is  an  analysis 
of  the  operations  of  the  mind  into  as  few  elements 
as  possible,  and  preceded  by  no  careful  observation 
of  the  nature  and  peculiarities  of  the  mental  phe- 
nomena which  he  seeks  to  decompose.  One  so 
trained  could  not  but  have  his  attention  drawer  to 
the  speculations  of  Dr.  Thomas  BroT\Ti,  who,  largely 
following  the  Sensational  School  of  France,  had 
shown  his  ingenuity  in  deriving  the  complex  phe- 
nomena of  the  mind  from  a  few  ultimate  laws.  Like 
the  older  Mr.  Mill  (in  tliis  respect  unlil^e  Dr. 
Brown),  the  younger  Mr.  Mill  dehghts  to  trace  ideas 


14  INTBODTJCTIOm 

to  sensations ;  like  BroTVTi  and  James  Mill,  he  rep- 
resents all  our  mental  states  as  "  feelings,"  and  like 
them  he  generates  om^  ideas  by  means  of  sugges- 
tion or  association. 

These  are  evidently  Mr.  Mill's  immediate  prede- 
cessors in  psychology.  In  historical  speculation  he 
was  early  seized  with  an  admiration  of  the  general 
principles  of  the  philosophy  of  M.  Auguste  Comte, 
who  was  becoming  knowT:i  to  a  select  few  at  the 
time  when  the  character  of  the  young  Englishman 
was  bemg  formed;  and  M.  Littre  claims  Mr.  John 
Mill  as  the  first  who  gave  "  a  public  adhesion  to  the 
method  of  the  positive  philosophy."  Not  that  he 
has  followed  the  founder  of  the  Positive  School  in 
every  respect ;  in  particular,  he  has  been  prevented 
by  his  adherence  to  his  father's  metaphysics  from 
follomng  M.  Comte  in  his  denunciations  of  all  a1> 
tempts  to  study  the  human  mind  by  consciousness. 
But  he  was  led  by  the  influence  of  this  teacher  to 
regard  it  as  impossible  for  the  mind  to  rise  to  first 
or  final  causes,  or  to  know  the  nature  of  things; 
and  to  adopt  his  favorite  method  of  procedure, 
which  is  hy  deduction  from  an  hypothesis,  which  he 
endeavors  to  show  explains  all  the  phenomena. 
Though  a  fairly  informed  man  in  the  history  of 
philosophy,  he  has  attached  himself  to  a  school 
which  thinks  it  has  entirely  outstripped  the  past ; 
and  so  he  has  no  sympathy  with,  and  no  apprecia- 
tion of,  the  profound  thoughts  of  the  men  of  former 
tunes:   these   are  supposed  to  belong  to  the  theo- 


HAMILTON  AND   MILL,  15 

logical  or  metaphysical  ages,  which  have  forever 
passed  away  in  favor  of  the  positive  era  which  has 
now  dawned  upon  our  world.  Bred  thus  in  a  rev- 
olutionary school  of  opinion,  his  predilections  are 
in  all  things  in  favor  of  those  who  are  given  to 
change,  and  against  those  who  think  that  there  is 
immutable  truth,  or  who  imagine  that  they  have 
discovered  it.  His  expressed  admiration  of  Cole- 
ridge may  seem  to  contradict  this  statement,  but  it 
does  so  only  in  appearance,  for  he  has  no  partiaHty 
for  any  of  the  favorite  principles  of  that  defender  of 
transcendental  reason ;  it  is  clear  that  he  delights  in 
him  chiefly  because  his  speculations  have  been  actr- 
ing  as  a  solvent  to  melt  do^^^i  the  crj^stallized  philo- 
sophical and  theological  opinions  of  England.  The 
school  of  Comte  has  hitherto  had  no  analyst  of  the 
mind  (the  founder  of  it  was  a  phrenologist,  and 
studied  the  mind  through  the  brain) ;  and  Mr.  jNIill 
may  be  regarded  as,  for  the  present,  the  recognized 
metaphysician  of  the  school,  and  will  hold  tliis  place 
till  he  is  superseded  by  the  more  comprehensive 
system,  and  the  bolder  speculative  grasp  of  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer. 

With  an  original  clearness  of  intellectual  appre- 
hension, his  whole  training  has  disposed  him  towards 
distinct  enunciations  and  practical  results.  Engaged 
for  many  years  in  a  public  office,  he  has  acquired 
habits  which  enable  him  to  understand  the  business 
of  life  and  the  condition  of  society.  He  is  partic- 
ularly fitted   to    excel   in   the    exposition  of  those 


16  INTBODUCTIOJS'. 

media  axiomata  upon  which,  according  to  Bacon, 
"depend  the  busmess  and  fortune  of  mankind." 
With  an  Engiish  love  of  the  concrete,  he  has  a 
French  skill  in  reducing  a  complex  subject  into 
sunple  elements,  and  a  French  clearness  of  expres- 
sion. He  is  ever  able  to  bring  out  his  views  in 
admirable  order,  and  his  thoughts  lie  in  his  style 
hke  pebbles  at  the  bottom  of  a  transparent  stream, 
so  that  we  see  their  shape  and  color  without  no- 
ticing the  medium  through  which  we  view  them. 
I  have  to  add,  that  in  his  love  of  the  clear,  and  his 
desire  to  translate  the  abstract  into  the  concrete,  he 
often  misses  the  deepest  properties  of  the  objects 
examined  by  him ;  and  he  seems  to  me  far  better 
fitted  to  co-ordinate  the  facts  of  social  science  than 
to  deal  with  the  first  principles  of  fundamental 
philosophy.  As  to  his  spirit,  there  are  evidences  of 
a  keen  fire,  of  enthusiasm,  perhaps  of  passion,  burn- 
ing within,  but  the  surface  is  ever  still  and  ever 
green. 

These  two  eminent  men,  whose  systems  evidently 
stood  all  along  so  widely  apart  from  each  other, 
have  now  been  brought  into  violent  collision  by  the 
publication  of  Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  William 
Ilarrdlton's  Fhilosojohy.  Such  a  collision  was  inev- 
itajjle.  Hamilton  was  the  ablest  and  most  learned, 
I  do  not  think  the  wisest  or  most  consistent,  de- 
fender of  intuitive  or  a  priori  truth  in  our  country 
in  the  past  age.  It  was  felt  to  be  absolutely  neces- 
sary, in  these  circumstances,  by  the  British  section 


HAMILTON  AND   MILL.  17 

of  the  school  of  M.  Comte,  that  the  fundamental 
positions  of  Hamilton  should  be  removed  out  of  the 
way  of  the  advancing  deductive  empiricism.  I 
rejoice  that  the  attack  has  been  made  by  Mr.  Mill 
himself,  so  that  we  see  all  that  can  be  advanced  by 
the  acutest  representative  of  the  experiential  or 
sensational  philosophy  in  our  age  and  country.  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  formidable  assault  will  be 
met  by  some  disciple  of  Hamilton  who  has  caught 
the  spirit  and  who  understands  the  system  of  his 
master.  As  the  result,  the  student  of  philosophy 
will  be  in  circumstances  to  decide  what  he  should 
receive  with  gratitude,  and  what  he  should  refuse 
or  reject  with  regret,  in  the  philosophy  of  the  last 
of  the  great  Scottish  metaphysicians. 

In  the  title  of  his  work,  Mr.  Mill  announces  it  as 
an  examination  of  "  the  principal  philosophical  ques- 
tions discussed  in  his  writmgs;"  and  in  his  intro- 
ductory remarks  he  declares,  "  My  subject,  therefore, 
is  not  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  but  the  questions  which  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  discussed."  It  is  this  circumstance 
which  makes  the  work  so  important  in  the  view  of 
the  students  of  mental  science  generally,  and  which 
has  induced  me  to  review  it.  In  examining  his 
opponent,  Mr.  Mill  has  taken  the  opportunity  of 
developing  his  o^vn  philosophic  system,  and  has  put 
us  in  a  position  to  judge  of  its  prmciples  and  re- 
sults. It  is  true  that  we  had  the  germs  of  that 
system  embedded  in  his  treatise  on  Logic,  and  ger- 
minating there.  No  doubt  he  is  continually  telling 
2 


18  INTBODUCTION. 

US  in  that  work  that  he  avoids  metaphysics,  but 
there  is  a  metaphysical  system  underlying  and  run- 
ning throughout  all  the  deeper  discussions.  He  re- 
fers, and  evidently  adheres  to  a  large  extent,  to  a 
sensational  theory  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  in 
his  chapter,  "  Of  the  Things  denoted  by  Names ; " 
he  seeks  to  undermine  all  intuitive  truth  in  his 
chapters  on  "  Demonstration  "  and  "  Causation  ; " 
and  he  has  exposed  with  a  special  zest  the  errors  of 
the  a  priori  school  in  his  book  on  "  Fallacies."  He 
has  thus  been  preparing  those  who  have  studied  his 
logic  for  accepting  his  metaphysics.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances I  rejoice  that  in  his  recent  work  he  has 
furnished  us  with  the  means  of  thoroughly  esti- 
mating his  theory  of  the  mind,  of  which  we  had 
only  hints  and  glimpses  in  his  logical  treatise.  It 
is  this  theory  which  I  profess  to  examine  in  this 
volume. 

In  performing  this  special  task  it  is  not  necessary 
to  enter  into  the  controversy  between  Mill  and 
Hamilton.  For  more  important  questions  than  the 
merits  of  the  individuals  have  been  started.  I  cer- 
tainly do  not  feel  that  it  is  a  duty  devolving  on  me 
to  offer  a  defence  of  the  philosophy  of  Hamilton. 
Since  the  year  1854,  when  I  reviewed  his  doctrines 
of  the  "  Relativity  of  Knowledge  "  and  of  '-  Causar 
tion,"  in  an  appendix  to  the  fourth  edition  of  my 
work  on  the  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,  I 
have  been  opposing  certain  of  his  favorite  principles. 
I  offered  my  strictures  with  excessive  reluctance,  as 


HAMILTON  AND    MILL.  19 

feeling  a  profound  reverence  for  the  vast  erudition 
and  logical  power  of  the  Edinburgh  professor,  and 
cherishing  a  lively  gratitude  for  the  services  he  had 
rendered  to  philosophy  in  refuting  old  and  widely- 
received  errors  and  estabHshing  important  truth. 
I  advanced  my  criticisms  while  he  was  yet  alive, 
and  I  have  continued  them  in  articles  in  reviews, 
and  in  my  work  on  The  Intuitions  of  the  Mind,  while 
his  reputation  was  at  its  greatest  height,  and  his 
disciples  were  indignant  at  any  attempt  to  dispute 
the  infallibility  of  their  master. 

Hamilton,  as  it  appears  to  me,  was  never  able  to 
weld  into  a  consistent  whole  the  realistic  matter  he 
got  from  Reid  with  the  subjective  forms  he  took 
from  Kant.  In  his  review  of  M.  Cousin,  he  took  up 
a  negative  position,  which  did  not  leave  him  free  to 
follow  thoroughly  the  positive  revelations  of  con- 
sciousness. In  liis  Discussions  he  developed  a  the- 
ory of  causation  which  prevented  him  from  rising 
from  the  phenomena  of  the  world  to  a  behef  in  the 
existence  of  Deity ;  and  he  expounded  a  doctrine 
as  to  the  relativity  of  knowledge  which  makes  us 
perceive  objects  under  forms,  and  with  additions  im- 
posed by  the  perceiving  mind,  which  landed  him 
avowedly  in  a  system  of  nescience.  Kant  is  claimed, 
with  some  truth,  by  M.  Littre  as  in  fact  a  precursor 
of  the  school  of  Comte.  I  have  felt  all  along  that 
Hamilton  adopted  principles  from  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy which  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  stand 
up  for  the  trustworthiness  of  our  faculties  and  the 


20  INTBOBUCTION. 

reality  of  things,  which  yet  as  a  follower  of  Reid  he 
seemed  to  be  estabUshing.  I  declared  oj)enly  and 
repeatedly,  and  in  a  number  of  places,  that  the  ad- 
missions he  made  would  sooner  or  later  be  followed 
to  their  logical  consequences ;  that  without  meanmg 
it,  he  was  preparing  the  way  for  a  nihilist  philos- 
ophy; and  that  it  would  be  seen  that  he  had  not 
left  himself  ground  from  which  successfully  to  repel 
the  attacks  of  scepticism.  When  Dr.  Mansel  pub- 
Hshed  his  famous  Bampton  Lectures,  On  the  Limits 
of  Religious  Thought^  notwithstanding  my  great 
reverence  for  his  erudition,  his  acuteness,  and  his 
high  character,  I  immediately  opposed  his  applica- 
tion of  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  the  unconditioned  to 
our  knowledge  of  God  and  of  good  and  evil,  which  I 
represented  as  being  fraught  with  disastrous  logical 
consequences.  As  having  anticipated  Mr.  Mill  in 
many  of  his  objections  to  Hamilton's  philosophy, 
and  having  advanced  others  against  doctrines  which 
Mr.  Mill  applauds  and  turns  to  his  own  uses,  and 
beUeving  it  to  be  impossible  to  defend  fundamental 
truth  from  the  positions  assumed  by  Hamilton,  I 
feel  that  it  is  not  for  me  to  propose  to  defend  the 
philosophy  of  the  Scottish  metaphysician  from  the 
assaults  of  Mr.  Mill.^ 

At  the  same  time,  I  cannot  give  my  adherence  to 
many  of  the  objections  which  have  been  taken  by 
his   new   opponent.     Notwithstanding  incongruities 

1 1  have  placed  in  an  Appendix  to    tions  I  have  taken   to   Sir  William 
this  volume  a  summary  of  the  objec-    Hamilton's  Philosophy. 


HAMILTON  AND   MILL,  21 

in  some  parts  of  his  system,  lie  has  furnished  more 
valuable  contributions  to  speculative  philosophy 
than  any  other  British  writer  in  this  century.  No 
man  has  ever  clone  more  in  clearing  the  hterature 
of  philosophy  of  commonplace  mistakes,  of  thefts 
and  im230stures.  He  has  shown  that  it  is  dangerous 
to  quote  without  consulting  the  original,  or  to  adopt 
without  exammation  the  common  traditions  in  phi- 
losophy ;  that  those  who  borrow  at  second-hand  will 
be  detected,  and  that  those  who  steal  without  ac- 
knowledgment will  sooner  or  later  be  exposed.  He 
seems  to  experience  a  dehght  in  strip23ing  modern 
authors  of  then  borrowed  feathers,  and  pursuing  sto- 
len goods  from  one  hterary  thief  to  another,  and 
giving  them  back  to  their  original  o^mer.  More 
than  any  other  Enghshman,  Scotchman,  or  Irishman, 
for  the  last  two  centuries,  he  has  wiped  away  the 
reproach  from  British  pliilosophy  that  it  is  narrow 
and  insular.  For  years  past  ordinary  authors  have 
seemed  learned,  and  for  years  to  come  will  seem 
learned,  by  drawing  from  his  stores.  In  incidental 
discussions,  in  foot-notes,  and  notes  on  foot-notes,  he 
has  scattered  nuts  which  it  will  take  many  a  scholar 
many  a  day  to  gather  and  to  crack.  It  will  be  long 
before  the  rays  which  shme  from  him  will  be  so 
scattered  and  difilised  through  philosophic  hteratm^e, 
—  as  the  sunbeams  are  through  the  atmosphere,  — 
that  they  shall  become  common  property,  and  men 
wiU  cease  to  distinguish  the  focus  from  which  they 
have  come.     By  his   admirable  powers  of  division 


22  INTBODUGTION. 

and  subdivision  he  has  placed  the  philosophic  sys- 
tems of  various  ages  and  countries  into  appropriate 
compartments,  which  enable  us  at  once  to  see  the 
form  and  the  nature  of  each.  Mr.  Mill  regrets  that 
he  "  did  not  write  the  history  of  philosophy."  I  am 
not  sure  whether  the  Scottish  professor  had  all  the 
qualifications  necessary  for  such  a  work;  whether, 
in  particular,  he  could  always  enter  sjonpathetically 
into  the  spirit  of  the  times  in  which  the  philosojoher 
lived,  and  whether  he  could  have  given  us  an  easy 
and  continuous  narrative.  But  every  student  should 
be  grateful  to  him  for  what  he  has  actually  per- 
formed; for  arranging  under  proper  heads,  and  stat- 
ing, always  with  admirable  brevity,  and  commonly 
with  unimpeachable  accuracy,  the  opinions  of  philos- 
ophers, ancient  and  modern,  on  most  of  the  topics 
of  speculative  interest  which  still  continue  to  be  ag- 
itated. Looking  to  his  original  contributions  to  phi- 
losophy, his  defence  of  the  principles  of  common 
sense  is  characterized  at  once  by  extensive  learning, 
by  unsurpassed  logical  acumen  and  consummate 
judgment.  His  immediate  theory  of  sense-percep- 
tion, if  it  does  not  remove  all  difficulties,  appears  to 
me  to  be  more  consistent  than  any  other  with  the 
facts  both  of  psychology  and  of  physiology.  His 
logic  is  too  Kantian  in  its  manner  and  spirit,  and 
will  require  to  be  carefully  sifted;  but  I  beheve  it  is 
the  most  important  addition  made  in  our  day  to  the 
analytic  of  the  laws  of  thought.  I  am  persuaded 
that  his  distribution  of  the  mental  faculties,  given  in 


HAMILTON  AND   MILL.  23 

the  second  volume  of  liis  Meta^ohysics^  is  upon  tlie 
whole  the  best  we  yet  have,  and  any  one  who  would 
unprove  it  must  make  extensive  use  of  it.  Nor  is  it 
to  be  forgotten  that  he  has  introduced  fresh  topics 
mto  British  philosojDhy,  and  has  always  thro^vn  light 
upon  them  even  when  he  has  not  succeeded  in  set- 
thng  them. 

I  am  sure  Mr.  Mill  means  to  be  a  just  critic  of  his 
rival.  But  from  havmg  attached  himself  to  a  nar- 
row and  exclusive  school  of  j)hilosophy  and  of  his- 
tory, he  is  scarcely  capable  of  comprehending,  he  is 
certainly  utterly  incapable  of  appreciating,  some  of 
Hamilton's  profounder  discussions.  It  could  be  shown 
that  not  a  few  of  the  alleged  inconsistencies  of  Ham- 
ilton arise  from  misapprehensions  on  the  part  of  his 
critic.  I  have  observed  that  some  of  the  supposed 
contradictions  are  merely  verbal,  and  originate  in  his 
using  a  phrase  in  its  usual  acceptation,  perhaps  to  a 
promiscuous  class  in  one  place,  and  employing  it  in 
a  more  technical  sense  after  explanation  m  another. 
Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten  that  the  writings  published 
by  himself  appeared  in  the  form  of  articles  in  re- 
views, and  of  notes  and  appendices  to  works  edited 
by  him;  and  that  his  Lectures,  which  contain  his 
com23lete  system,  though  carefully  edited  by  Profes- 
sors Mansel  and  Yeitch,  had  not  the  advantage  of 
being  reduced  to  thorough  consistency  by  himself 
It  has  to  be  added,  that,  being  willing  to  take  a 
thought  that  struck  him  as  true  or  important  from 
any  quarter,  he  was  not  always  able  to  join  the  ma- 


24  INTBODUCTION. 

terials  he  had  gathered  into  a  harmonious  structure. 
Hence  his  philosophy  takes  the  appearance  of  a 
squared  and  diamonded  mosaic,  in  which  it  is  not  al- 
ways easy  to  discover  the  unity  of  the  plan.  But  I 
verily  beheve  that  Hamilton  had  after  all  a  complete 
system,  which,  with  some  hiatuses  and  incongruities, 
and  some  fatal  errors  adopted  from  Kant,  is,  as  a 
whole,  consistent,  and  contains  valuable  truth.  His 
critic,  from  his  training  and  sectarian  predilections, 
is  incapacitated  for  forming  a  due  estimate  of  many 
of  his  higher  excellences,  and  everywhere  examines 
him  from  his  own  standpoint,  which  is  very  narrow, 
and  by  his  own  experiential  system,  which  is  lameni> 
ably  defective.  But  I  leave  the  work  of  defending 
Hamilton  to  his  pupils  and  disciples,  and  I  rejoice  to 
beheve  that  in  many  points,  and  these  very  impor- 
tant ones,  their  defence  will  be  triumphantly  suc- 
cessful. 

In  that  curious  retribution  which  we  often  discov- 
er in  the  affairs  of  this  world,  we  find  that  those  who 
are  severe  in  judging  others,  may  come  in  the  end 
to  be  severely  judged  themselves.-^  The  late  Sir  "W. 
Hamilton  was  often  harsh,  at  times  I  think  unjust 
(not  intentionally)  in  his  censures  on  those  who  had 

1  Have  we  an  illustration  of  this  in  are  examined  from  the  standpoint  of 

the  manner  in   which  Plato,  who  is  M.   Comte,  Mr.   Mill,  and  Professor 

supposed  to  have  treated  the  Sophists  Bain !     Is  there  no  living  Archer  But- 

with  injustice,  is  himself  treated  in  his  ler  among  British  scholars  to  defend 

turn  by  Mr.  Grote,  in  his  Plato  and  Plato's  high  aspirations,  and  to  show 

the  other  Companions  of  Socrates  i    The  that  he  had  glimpses  of  great  verities 

exposition  of  the  Search  Dialogues  in  which  have  never  disclosed  themselves 

that  able  and  learned  work  is  admira-  to  the  view  of  the  ancient  Sophists  or 

ble,  but  the  positive  doctrines  of  Plato  modern  Positivists  1 


HAMILTON  AND   3£ILL.  25 

possession  of  the  philosophic  ear  of  the  country  at 
the  time  when  he  was  forcmg  himself  into  public 
notice  in  opposition  to  the  spirit  of  the  age.  In  say- 
ing SO;  I  do  not  refer  so  much  to  his  able  and  manly^ 
though  not  altogether  successful,  criticism  of  M. 
Cousin,  or  to  his  non-recognition  of  any  special  merit 
in  Mr.  James  Mill  (of  which  his  son  complains),  so 
much  as  to  the  censorious  manner  in  which  he  refers 
to  Dr.  Brown  and  Archbishop  Whately,  who,  if  not 
very  profound  or  erudite,  were  certainly  fresh,  acute, 
and  honest  thinkers.  He  has  now  been  repaid  for 
all  this  in  his  own  coin,  by  one  who  has  a  great  ad- 
miration of  Whately,  and  who  has  sprung  from  the 
school  of  Brown  and  Mill,  and  who  writes  as  if  he 
had  public  wrongs  to  avenge,  and  an  accumulation 
of  accepted  errors  to  scatter.  The  time  will  come, 
I  doubt  not,  when  the  avenger  may  himself  have  to 
suffer  for  the  excess  of  punishment  he  has  inflicted. 
But  I  beg  to  say  that  this  is  not  the  spirit  in  which  I 
have  written  this  review.  I  have  really  no  pleasure 
in  exposing  the  inconsistencies,  the  misunderstand- 
ings, and  mistakes,  to  be  found  in  Mr.  Mill's  Exami- 
nation, or  any  of  his  other  works.  Acuter  minds, 
or  more  pugnacious  spirits,  or  earnest  souls  irritated 
as  they  see  the  evils  which  must  arise  from  the  prev- 
alence of  a  philosophy  which  undermines  funda- 
mental truth,  will,  I  suspect,  rejoice  to  do  this,  and 
may  be  tempted  to  do  it  in  excess.  But  I  have  no 
personal  antipathies  to  gratify,  no  wrongs  to  avenge. 
The  deepest  feehng  which  I  entertain  towards  Mr. 


26  INTBODUCTIOm 

Mill  is  that  of  admiration  of  his  talents,  and  grati- 
tude for  the  clear  exposition  which  he  has  given  of 
many  important  principles.-^  My  aim  in  this  work  is 
simply  to  defend  a  portion  of  primary  truth  which 
has  been  assailed  by  an  acute  thinker  who  has  ex- 
tensive influence  in  England. 

Some  of  his  admirers  claim  for  Mr,  Mill,  that  he  is 
the  genuine  philosophical  descendant  of  Locke.  I 
acknowledge  that  in  some  respects  he  resembles  our 
great  English  metaphysician.  He  is  like  him  in  his 
clearness  of  thought  and  diction.  Both  are  careful 
to  avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  abstruse  arguments  and 
technical  phrases.  Both  have  a  name  in  other  de- 
partments as  well  as  mental  philosophy,  —  Locke 
having  thought  profoundly  on  political  questions, 
and  Mr.  Mill  having  given  us  one  of  the  best  works 
we  have  on  political  economy.  Both  have  written 
on  toleration  or  liberty,  and  defended  views  in  ad- 
vance of  those  generally  entertained  in  their  own 
times.  I  am  inclined  further  to  admit  that  Mr.  Mill 
has  quite  as  much  influence  in  our  day  in  England 
as  Locke  had  in  his.  But  with  these  points  of  like- 
ness there  are  important  points  of  difference.  Locke 
had  an  originality,  a  shrewdness,  a  sagacity,  and  a 
high-principled  wisdom  and  caution  which  have  not 
been  equalled  by  the  later  speculator.     Locke  avows 


1  Simply  to   illustrate  this,   I  may  corresponding  professors  in  Cork  and 

mention   that   the   part  of  his   Logic  Gahvay,  has  a  place  in  the  examina- 

which  treats  of  induction  has  a  place  tion  for  the  Bachelor's  and  Master's 

in  my  college  classes,  and  on  my  rec-  degree  in  the  Queen's  University  in 

ommendation,  joined   to  that  of   the  Ireland. 


HAMILTON  AND   MILL.  27 

extreme  enough  views  in  ojDposing  the  doctrines  of 
professed  metaphysicians,  but  he  is  saved  by  his 
crowning  sense,  and  his  rehgious  convictions,  ac- 
quired in  Puritan  times,  from  taking  up  positions 
adverse  to  the  sound  sense  of  mankind.  Vehement 
enough  in  opposing  a  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  sup- 
posed to  be  held  by  philosophers,  and  laboring  in 
vain  to  derive  all  our  ideas  from  sensation  and  re- 
jflection,  we  do  not  find  him  falling  back  on  such  ex- 
treme positions  as  those  of  Mr.  Mill,  when  he  en- 
deavors to  draw  our  higher  ideas  out  of  sensation  by 
means  of  association,  and  maintains  that  we  can 
know  nothing  of  mind  except  that  it  is  a  series  of 
sensations,  aware  of  itself,  or  of  matter,  except  that 
it  is  a  possibility  of  sensations.  I  believe  that  Locke 
abandoned,  without  knowing  it,  some  important  fun- 
damental truths ;  but  he  resolutely  held  by  many 
others,  as  that  man  has  high  faculties  working  on  the 
original  materials,  and  that  in  particular  he  has  an 
intuitive  knowledge  "  which  is  irresistible,  and,  like 
bright  simshine,  forces  itself  immediately  to  be  per- 
ceived, as  soon  as  ever  the  mind  turns  its  view  that 
way,  and  leaves  no  room  for  hesitation,  doubt,  or  ex- 
amination, but  the  mind  is  presently  filled  with  the 
clear  hght  of  it."  {Essay,  B.  iv.  c.  2.)  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill 
is  the  successor  and  the  hving  representative  of  an 
important  British  school,  but  it  is  that  of  Hobbes,  of 
Hartley,  of  Priestley,  of  David  Hume,  and  of  James 
Mill.  I  have  studiously  left  Thomas  Brown  out  of 
this  list,  because,  while  adopting  much  from  Hume, 


28  INTBOBUGTION, 

he  carefully  separates  from  him  on  the  subject  of  in- 
tuition, maintaining  that  we  have  original  and  irre- 
sistible beliefs  in  our  personal  identity,  and  in  causa- 
tion. It  will  be  seen  as  we  advance  how  close  the 
philosophy  of  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  comes  to  that  of  Hume. 
I  rather  think  Mr.  Mill  is  scarcely  aware  himself  of 
the  extent  of  the  resemblance,  as  he  seems  to  have 
wrought  out  his  conclusions  from  data  supplied  him 
to  some  extent  by  Brown,  but  to  a  greater  extent 
by  Mr.  James  Mill,  both  of  whom  drew  much  from 
the  Treatise  of  Human  Nature.  But  even  on  the 
supposition  that  Mr.  Mill  is  the  Locke  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  it  w^ould  be  necessary  to  examine 
and  correct  his  views.  For  while  the  Essay  on  the 
Human  Understanding  evolved  much  truth,  and  ex- 
ercised, upon  the  whole,  a  healthy  influence,  it  con- 
tained very  grave  defects  and  errors,  which  issued  in 
very  serious  consequences  both  in  France  and  in  this 
country ;  in  the  former  landing  speculation  in  a  mis- 
erable sensationalism,  and  in  the  latter  originating 
the  wire-drawn  attempts  to  fashion  all  our  ideas  out 
of  one  or  two  primitive  sources  by  means  of  associ- 
ation. I  have  already  intimated  that  I  believe  the 
errors  of  Mr.  Mill  to  be  far  more  numerous  and  fun- 
damental than  those  of  Locke ;  and  should  his  sen- 
sational and  nescient  system  come  to  be  adopted,  it 
will  be  followed,  both  in  theory  and  in  practice,  with 
far  more  fatal  results  than  any  that  ensued  from 
the  combined  idealistic  and  realistic  philosophy  ex- 
pounded in  Locke's  great  work. 


HAMILTON  AND    MILL.  29 

Among  a  considerable  portion  even  of  tlie  read- 
ing and  thinking  people  of  England,  there  is  a 
strong  aversion  to  all  professedly  metaphysical  spec- 
ulation, —  which  they  regard .  as  a  net  of  sophistry 
spread  out  to  catch  them.  But  in  avoiding  an 
avowed  and  elaborate  discussion  of  fundamental 
truth,  it  often  happens  that  they  are  taken  in  by  a 
plausible  smartness,  which  is  really  metaphysics,  but 
bad  metaphysics,  —  treating  every  profound  subject 
in  a  superficial  way.  In  this  respect  some  of  our 
countrymen  act  very  much  like  those  excessively 
cautious  and  suspicious  persons  to  be  met  wdth  in 
the  world,  who  are  so  afraid  of  everybody  cheating 
them,  that  they  become  the  dupes  of  those  more  de- 
signing schemers  who  are  ever  warning  them  against 
the  dishonesty  of  others.  There  are  readers  of 
Hobbes,  who,  on  perceiving  how  free  he  is  from 
mysticism,  and  how  readily  he  seems  to  explain  all 
our  ideas  by  sensation,  and  all  our  actions  by  selfish- 
ness, are  tempted  to  think  that  this  man  who  speaks 
so  clearly  and  dogmatically  must  be  speaking  truly. 
They  are  about  as  wise  as  the  excessively  far-sighted 
individuals  who  so  easily  account  for  all  extraordi- 
nary actions  on  the  simple  principle  that  all  mankind 
are  fools,  or  rogues,  or  madmen  f  The  Enghshman 
is  thus  often  led  astray  by  a  deception  which  pre- 
tends to  be  simplicity  itself  I  abhor  as  miich  as 
any  man  the  introduction  of  metaphysics  into  the 
discussion  of  commonplace  or  practical  subjects. 
But  there  is  another  error,  quite  as  common,  and  to 


30  J.NTBODTJCTION. 

be  equally  dreaded,  and  that  is  the  introduction  of 
superficial  metaphysics  furtively,  by  those  who  would 
gain  your  confidence  by  telling  you  that  they  avoid 
metaphysics.  If  we  are  to  have  metaphysics,  let 
them  avow  that  they  are  metaphysics,  and  let  the 
investigation  be  conducted  scientifically  and  system- 
atically. By  all  means  let  us  have  clear  metaphys- 
ics, just  as  we  would  wish  to  have  clear  mathemat- 
ics and  clear  physics.  But  clearness  to  the  extent 
of  transparency  is  of  no  value,  provided  it  be  af>- 
tained,  as  in  the  case  of  the  French  sensational 
school,  only  by  omitting  all  that  is  high  or  deep  in 
man's  nature.  I  certainly  do  not  look  on  Mr.  Mill 
as  a  superficial  writer.  On  the  contrary,  on  subjects 
on  which  he  has  not  been  led  to  follow  Mr.  James 
Mill  or  M.  Comte,  his  thoughts  are  commonly  as  soHd 
and  weighty  as  they  are  clearly  expressed.  But, 
speaking  exclusively  of  his  philosophy  of  first  prin- 
ciples, I  believe  he  is  getting  so  ready  an  acceptance 
among  many  for  his  metaphysical  theories,  mainly 
because,  like  Hobbes  and  Condillac,  he  possesses  a 
delusive  simplicity  which  does  not  account  for,  but 
simply  overlooks,  the  distinguishing  properties  of 
our  mental  nature. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   IVIETHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION. 

M  COUSIN  brings  it  as  a  charge  against  Locke, 
•  that  in  his  Essay  on  the  Human  Understand- 
ing, he  treats  of  the  origin  of  ideas  before  inquir- 
ing into  their  nature.  Locke  thus  announces  his 
method :  "  1st.  I  shall  inquh-e  into  the  original  of 
those  ideas,  notions,  or  whatever  else  you  please  to 
call  them,  which  a  man  observes,  and  is  conscious  to 
himself  he  has  in  his  mind,  and  the  ways  whereby 
the  understanding  comes  to  be  furnished  with  them." 
(Introd.  s.  3.)  Upon  this,  his  French  critic  remarks 
that  there  are  here  "  two  radical  errors  in  regard  to 
method:  1st.  Locke  treats  of  the  origin  of  ideas 
before  having  suf&ciently  studied  these  ideas.  2dly. 
He  does  more,  he  not  only  puts  the  question  of  the 
origin  of  ideas  before  that  of  the  inventory  of  ideas, 
but  he  entirely  neglects  this  last  question."  {Lec- 
tures on  Locke,  ii.)  M.  Cousin  seems  to  lay  down  an 
important  principle  here,  and  to  be  so  far  justified  in 
blaming  the  English  philosopher  for  neglecting  it. 
In  order  to  be  able  to  settle  the  very  difficult  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  we  must  begin,  and,  I 

(31) 


32  THE    METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION. 

believe,  end,  with  a  careful  inspection  of  their  pre- 
cise nature.  In  the  very  passage  In  which  Locke 
proclaims  his  mode  of  procedure,  he  speaks  of  in- 
quiring into  the  original  of  those  ideas  which  a  man 
"  observes,  and  is  conscious  to  himself"  The  obser- 
vation by  consciousness  should  certainly  precede  any 
attempt  to  furnish  a  theoretical  decomposition  of 
ideas.  I  am  convinced  that  in  the  construction  of 
his  theory,  that  all  our  ideas  are  derived  from  sensa- 
tion and  reflection,  Locke  did  not  patiently  and  com- 
prehensively contemplate  all  that  is  in  certain  of  the 
deepest  and  most  characteristic  ideas  of  the  human 
mind.  I  do  not  ground  this  charge  so  much  on  the 
fact  that  he  treats,  in  the  First  Book,  of  the  Origin 
of  Ideas,  before  coming,  in  the  Second  Book,  to  dis- 
cuss the  Nature  of  Ideas,  as  on  the  circumstance  that 
in  the  Second  Book  he  is  obliged  to  overlook  some 
of  the  profoundest  properties  of  our  ideas,  in  order 
to  make  them  fit  into  his  preconceived  system.  But 
we  find  Mr.  Mill  justifying  Locke,  and  condemning 
Cousin.  "  I  accept  the  question  as  M.  Cousin  states 
it,  and  I  contend  that  no  attempt  to  determine  what 
are  the  direct  revelations  of  consciousness  can  be 
successful  or  entitled  to  regard,  unless  preceded  by 
what  M.  Cousin  says  ought  to  follow  it,  —  an  inqui- 
ry into  the  origin  of  our  acquired  ideas."  {Exam, 
p.  145.) 

Mr.  Mill  at  this  place  examines  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
constant  appeals  to  consciousness.  Sir  WiUiam  would 
often  settle  by  consciousness  alone  questions  which  I 


THE   METHOD   OF  INYESTIGATIOJS:  33 

suspect  must  be  solved  by  a  more  complicated  and 
difficult  process.  It  is  thus,  for  instance,  —  that  is, 
by  an  appeal  to  consciousness,  —  that  he  would  de- 
termine that  we  know  immediately  an  external  or 
material  world.  In  language  often  of  terrible  se- 
verity, he  charges  Brown,  and  nearly  all  philoso- 
phers, with  disregarding  consciousness  :  "  But  it 
is  thus  manifestly  the  common  mterest  of  every 
scheme  of  philosophy  to  preserve  hitact  the  in- 
tegrity of  consciousness.  Almost  every  scheme  of 
philosophy  is  only  another  mode  in  which  this 
integrity  has  been  violated."  (3Ieta2:)hysics,  vol.  i. 
p.  283.)  Mr.  jVIill  shows  successfully  (as  I  think) 
that  the  question  between  Hamilton  and  his  oppo- 
nents is  often  not  one  of  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness, but  of  the  interpretation  of  consciousness: 
"We  have  it  not  in  our  power  to  ascertain,  by 
any  direct  process,  what  consciousness  told  us  at 
the  time  when  its  revelations  were  in  their  prim- 
itive purity.  It  only  offers  itself  to  our  inspection 
as  it  exists  now,  when  these  original  revelations 
are  overlaid  and  buried  under  a  mountainous  heap 
of  acquired  notions  and  perceptions."  (pp.  145, 
146.)  Mr.  Mill  then  goes  on  to  explain  his  own 
method,  which  he  calls  the  Psychological:  ^'^And 
here  emerges  the  distinction  between  two  differ- 
ent methods  of  studying  the  problems  of  meta- 
physics, forming  the  radical  difference  between 
the  two  great  schools  mto  which  metaphysicians 
are  fundamentally  divided.  One  of  these  I  shall 
3 


34  THi:   METHOD   OF  INVESTIGATION. 

call  for  distinction  the  Introspective  method,  the 
other  the  Psychological."  He  rejects  the  Intro- 
spective method :  "  Introspection  can  show  us  a 
present  belief  or  conviction,  attended  with  a  great- 
er or  less  difficulty  in  accommodating  the  thoughts 
to  a  different  view  of  the  subject;  but  that  this 
belief  or  conviction  or  knowledge,  if  we  call  it  so, 
is  intuitive,  no  mere  introspection  can  ever  show." 
He  therefore  resorts  to  the  other  method :  "  Being 
unable  to  examine  the  actual  contents  of  our  con- 
sciousness until  our  earliest,  which  are  necessarily 
our  most  firmly  knit  associations,  those  which  are 
most  intimately  interwoven  with  the  original  data 
of  consciousness,  are  fully  formed,  we  cannot  study 
the  original  elements  of  mind  in  the  facts  of  our 
present  consciousness.  Those  original  elements  can 
only  come  to  light  as  residual  phenomena,  by  a 
previous  study  of  the  modes  of  generation  of  the 
mental  facts  which  are  confessedly  not  original,  — 
a  study  sufficiently  thorough  to  enable  us  to  apply 
its  results  to  the  convictions,  beliefs,  or  supj)osed 
intuitions  which  seem  to  be  original,  and  deter- 
mine whether  some  of  them  may  not  have  been 
generated  in  the  same  modes,  so  early  as  to  have 
become  inseparable  from  our  consciousness  before 
the  time  at  which  memory  commences.  This  mode 
of  ascertaining  the  original  elements  of  mind  I  call 
Psychological,  as  distinguished  from  the  simply 
Introspective  mode."  (pp.  147,  148.)  These  quota- 
tions furnish  a  sufficiently  clear  view  of  his  account 


THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION.  35 

of  the  two  metliods,  and  of  his  reasons  for  rejectmg 
the  one  and  adojDting  the  other. 

I  have  long  been  of  opmion,  and  I  have  en- 
deavored to  show  elsewhere/  that  Sh  WiUiam  Ham- 
ilton's use  of  "  consciousness  "  is  very  unsatisfactory. 
He  avows  that  he  employs  the  phrase  in  two  dis- 
tinct senses  or  appHcations.  First,  he  has  a  gen- 
eral consciousness,  discussed  largely  in  the  first 
volume  of  his  MetcqjJij/sics.  This  he  tells  us  can- 
not be  defined  (vol.  i.  p.  158);  "but  it  comprehends 
all  the  modifications,  all  the  phenomena  of  the 
thinking  subject."  (p.  183.)  "Knowledge  and  behef 
are  both  contained  under  consciousness."  (p.  191.) 
Again,  "  consciousness  is  co-extensive  with  our  cog- 
nitive faculties;"  "om^  special  faculties  of  knowl- 
edge are  only  modifications  of  consciousness."  (p. 
207.)  He  shows  that  consciousness  imphes  discrim- 
ination, judgment,  and  memory,  (pp.  202-206.)  This 
is  wide  enough  ;  still  he  imposes  a  limit,  for  con- 
sciousness "  is  an  immediate,  not  a  mediate  knowl- 
edge." (p.  202.)  Already,  as  it  seems  to  me,  in- 
consistencies are  beginning  to  creep  in ;  for  whereas 
he  had  before  told  us  that  consciousness  includes 
"all  the  phenomena  of  the  thinking  subject,"  now 
he  so  modifies  it  as  to  exclude  "  mediate  knowl- 
edge," which  is  surely  a  modification  of  the  think- 
ing subject.  Throughout  these  passages  he  uses  the 
phrase  in  the  wide,  loose  sense  given  to  the  German 

1  Particularly  in  a  re\new  of  Hamilton's  Metaphysics  in  the  Dublin  University 
Magazine  for  August,  1859. 


36  THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION, 

Bewusstsein  by  the  school  of  Wolf.  He  stoutly  main- 
tarns,  what  no  one  will  deny,  that  this  general  con- 
sciousness is  not  a  special  faculty;  but  when  he 
comes  to  draw  out  a  list  of  mental  powers,  in  the 
second  volume  of  his  Metaphysics^  he  turns  to  the 
Scottish  use  of  the  phrase,  and  he  includes  among 
them  a  special  faculty  which  he  calls  consciousness, 
but  to  which,  for  distinction's  sake,  he  prefixes  selfy 
and  designates  it  self-consciousness  It  is  the  office 
of  this  special  faculty  to  "  afford  us  a  knowledge  of 
the  phenomena  of  our  minds."  (vol.  ii.  p.  192.)  It  is 
an  inevitable  result  of  using  the  phrases  in  such  am- 
biguous senses,  that  we  are  ever  in  danger  of  pass- 
ing inadvertently  from  the  one  meaning  to  the 
other,  and  making  affirmations  in  one  sense  which 
hold  good  only  in  another.  Hamilton  is  ever  ap- 
pealing to  consciousness,  as  Locke  did  to  idea,  as 
Brown  did  to  suggestion,  and  as  Mr.  Mill  does  to 
association,  but  without  our  being  always  sure  that 
the  various  affirmations  are  made  in  the  same  sense 
of  the  term.  His  appeal  to  consciousness,  both  in 
estabhshing  some  of  his  own  positions  and  in  sum- 
marily setting  aside  those  of  his  opponents,  is  often 
far  too  rapid  and  dogmatic.  He  represents  the  prin- 
ciples of  common  sense  as  being  emphatically  "  facts 
of  consciousness,"  whereas  they  are  not  so  any  more 
specially  than  our  acquired  and  derived  beliefs, 
which  are  equally  under  consciousness.  In  fact, 
these  principles  are  not  before  the  consciousness  as 
principles.      The    individual    manifestations   are   of 


TBE  METHOD  OF  INVESTIGATION.  37 

course  before  the  consciousness  (though  not  more 
so  than  any  other  mental  exercise),  but  not  the 
principles  themselves,  which  are  derived  from  the 
individual  exercises  by  a  reflex  process  of  abstrac- 
tion and  generalization.  Consciousness  cannot  de- 
cide directly  which  of  our  convictions  are  intuitive. 
Consciousness  reveals  only  the  present  state  of 
mind,  and  it  cannot  say  whether  it  is  original  or 
derived.  That  state  is  probably  a  very  complex 
one,  and  may  embrace  secondary  beliefs  mixed  up 
with  the  primary  ones ;  and  if  we  are  to  separate 
these  and  fix  on  the  true  primitive  convictions,  we 
must  subject  the  whole  to  a  process  of  analysis. 
Again,  consciousness  can  reveal  to  us  only  the  sin- 
gular, only  the  present  state  as  an  individual  per- 
ception ;  but  in  psychology,  as  in  every  other  science, 
we  are  in  search  of  the  principle,  and  if  we  would 
gather  the  law  out  of  the  particulars,  we  must  gen- 
erahze.  In  order,  then,  to  the  discovery  even  of  an 
"  intuitive  principle,"  there  must  be  what  Bacon  calls 
"the  necessary  rejections  and  exclusions,"  or  what 
Dr.  Whewell  calls  the  "  decomposition  of  facts,"  and 
then  the  co-ordination  of  the  facts  into  a  law  by 
induction.  In  order,  then,  to  the  construction  of 
metaphysics,  more  is  required  than  a  simple  exer- 
cise of  consciousness  or  introspection ;  there  is  need 
of  discursive  processes  to  work  the  facts  into  a  sci- 
ence.^    It  is  of  the  utmost  moment  to  remove  these 

1  I  may  be  permitted  to  mention  that    ary  rules  in  The  Intuitions  of  the  Mind, 
I  have  fully  wrought  out  these  caution-    Part  First. 


38  TBE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION. 

misapprehensions  out  of  the  way,  as  Mr.  Mill,  with 
his  usual  acuteness,  has  taken  advantage  of  them; 
and  after  he  has  shown  that  introspection  cannot 
do  everything,  he  leaves  upon  us  the  impression  that 
it  can  do  nothing. 

But  consciousness,  after  all,  is  the  main  instru- 
ment in  determining  what  are  first  principles.  Let 
us  endeavor  to  ascertain  its  precise  province.  The 
method  followed  by  Mr.  Mill  in  his  psychology  (and 
also  in  his  political  economy)  is  evidently  what  he 
calls  the  deductive,  and  which  he  represents  in  his 
Logic  (B.  iii.  chap.  xi.  sect,  i.)  as  consisting  of  three 
operations :  "  The  first  one  of  direct  induction ;  the 
second  of  ratiocination;  and  the  third  of  verifica- 
tion." Now,  of  these  three  steps  the  first  and  the 
third  are,  properly  speaking,  inductive ;  they  depend 
entirely  on  observed  facts.  In  physical  science  the 
agent  of  observation  is  the  senses,  aided,  it  may  be, 
hy  artificial  instruments,  and  corrected  by  careful 
methods  as  enjoined  by  modern  accuracy.  In  men- 
tal science  the  observing  agent  is  consciousness. 
We  bend  back  the  mental  eye,  and  observe  what  is 
passing  within  as  it  passes.  As  this  is  often  a  very 
difficult  and  delicate  operation,  more  particularly 
when  thought  is  rapid  and  feeling  intense,  we  must 
resort  to  other  operations,  but  in  which  conscious- 
ness is  still  the  main  instrument.  We  must  by 
memory  bring  up  the  past  as  much  as  possible  in  its 
entirety,  and  notice  all  that  is  in  it.  Not  only  so  ; 
in  order  to  correct  the  narrowness  of  our  personal 


THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION.  39 

observations,  we  must  look  to  external  quarters ;  we 
must  gather  what  are  the  convictions  of  other  men 
from  their  deedS;  ever  passing  under  our  notice,  and 
as  recorded  in  history  \  and  from  their  conversation 
and  their  writings,  as  the  expression  of  hmnan 
thought  and  sentiment.  This  may  not  be  introspec- 
tion in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  term ;  still  it  is  in- 
spection of  the  soul  of  man,  and  it  may  be  referred 
in  a  general  way  to  self-consciousness,  for  it  is  by 
what  we  feel  within  ourselves  that  we  are  enabled 
upon  evidence  to  comprehend  the  experience  of 
others. 

But  let  it  be  observed  that  consciousness,  imder- 
stood  in  this  enlarged  sense,  has  to  take  the  first 
step,  and  the  final  step  in  the  process.  It  has  to  ob- 
serve and  gather  the  original  facts  which  suggest 
the  law.  It  has  again  to  collect  and  notice  the  veri- 
fying facts  which  estabhsh  the  law.  In  comparison 
with  these,  the  intermediate  step,  the  ratiocination, 
is  a  subordinate  and  a  dependent  one.  If  the  com- 
mencing and  closing  inductions  are  conducted  im- 
properly, the  reasoning  which  issues  fi:om  them  or 
leads  to  them  will  only  bind  the  blunders  more 
closely  together.  Thus,  if  in  the  original  observa- 
tions part  of  the  Hght  has  been  obstructed,  conse- 
quential deductions  will  only  widen  the  shadow,  — 
as  the  mistake  of  a  wrong  datum  is  only  increased 
by  multiplying  it.  "VYe  see  this  strikingly  illustrated 
in  most  of  our  rational  systems  of  philosophy,  —  as 
for  instance;  in  that  of  Spinoza,  who  began  with  an 


40  THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION', 

ill-observed  account  of  substance,  and  ended  in  the 
bogs  of  a  horrid  pantheism.  Again,  if  in  the  final 
observations  the  facts  are  mutilated  in  order  to  fit 
them  into  an  ingenious  hypothesis,  the  error  is 
thereby  confirmed,  and  the  system-builders  feel 
themselves  justified  in  adhering  the  more  resolutely 
to  a  creation  of  their  own  minds.  We  see  this  ex- 
hibited in  the  history  of  most  of  those  systems  of 
empiricism  which,  as  Bacon  characterizes  them,  leap 
and  fly  at  once  from  j)articular  facts  to  universal 
princi23les,  which  are  supposed  to  explain  all  the 
phenomena,  and  can  easily  get  instances  quoted  to 
support  them,  found  by  "  a  vague  and  ill-built "  ob- 
servation. 

In  conducting  this  work  of  observation  by  con- 
sciousness, there  is  a  constant  temptation  to  over- 
sight, to  hasty  conclusions  and  distorted  representa- 
tions. In  physical  investigation  there  is  less  room 
for  conscious  or  unconscious  deception,  as  modern 
research  insists  on  having  the  phenomena  weighed 
or  measured  in  some  way:  that  we  cannot  apply 
such  a  corrective  to  the  alleged  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, constitutes  one  of  the  disadvantages  imder 
which  psychology  labors.  No  doubt,  we  have  im- 
mediate access  at  once  to  the  facts  as  being  in  our 
minds,  —  and  this  seems  to  entitle  every  man  to  be 
a  metaphysician ;  but,  from  the  impossibiHty  of  em- 
ploying a  numerical  test,  there  is  room  for  great 
looseness  in  the  observation  and  inaccuracy  in  the 
statement,  and  these  issue  in  augmented  errors  in 


THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION.  41 

the  results  reached  by  deduction.  In  these  circum- 
stanceSj  there  is  great  need  in  mental  science  of  in- 
tellectual shrewdness,  to  keep  us  from  mistaking  one 
fact  for  another,  and  still  greater  need  of  high 
moral  qualities,  such  as  a  spirit  of  self-restraint  and 
caution,  of  integrity  and  candor.  In  particular, 
great  pains  must  be  adopted  to  guard  against  taking  a 
part,  and  overlooking  and  rejecting  the  rest,  because 
it  may  not  fit  into  a  preconceived  theory  to  which 
the  individual  may  have  committed  himseE  In 
order  to  secure  this  we  must  as  it  were  go  round 
the  mental  phenomena  and  view  them  on  all  sides, 
and  in  all  their  aspects,  both  in  our  oayu  minds  and 
in  those  of  others.  We  must  mark  their  various 
properties,  adding  none  and  subtracting  none,  les- 
sening none  and  magnifying  none,  disguising  none 
and  correcting  none,  but  making  each  stand  out  in 
its  own  form,  in  its  proper  action,  and  with  its 
natural  accompaniments.  We  ought,  as  Hamilton 
expresses  it,  to  exhibit  each  "in  its  individual  in- 
tegrity, neither  distorted  nor  mutilated,  and  in  its 
relative  place,  w^hether  of  pre-eminence  or  subordi- 
nation." (Appendix  to  ReicVs  Works,  p.  747.)  Till 
this  careful  and  candid  observation  has  been  com- 
pleted, we  are  not  at  liberty  to  begin  to  analyze  or 
theorize.  When  we  venture  on  these  processes,  aU 
we  can  do  is  to  dissect  the  concrete,  to  generahze 
the  individual,  or  find  out  the  producing  cause.  But 
the  errors  will  only  multiply  upon  us  in  these  steps  if 
we  have  not  commenced  with  accurate  observations. 


42  THE   METHOD    OF   INVESTIGATION, 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  says,  '^  Philosophy  is  wholly  de- 
pendent on  consciousness."  {Beid's  Works,  p.  746.) 
This  is  going  too  far,  as  philosophy  cannot  be  con- 
structed without  discursive  processes.  But  Mr.  Mill 
has  committed  a  far  more  serious  error,  when  he 
says  that  "Locke  was  therefore  right  in  believing 
that  the  origin  of  our  ideas  is  the  main  stress  of  the 
problem  of  mental  science,  and  the  subject  which 
must  first  be  considered  in  forming  the  theory  of 
the  mind."  (p.  147.)  M.  Cousin  seems  to  me  to  be 
altogether  right  when  he  lays  it  down  as  a  rule,  that 
in  psychology  we  must  begin  with  a  painstaking 
inquiry  into  the  actual  nature  of  our  ideas.  Mr. 
Mill  has  thus  reversed  the  order  of  things,  placing 
that  which  is  first  last,  and  that  which  is  last  first,  — 
putting  the  theory  of  ideas  before  the  observation 
of  the  ideas,  which  evidently  holds  out  great  temp- 
tations to  him  to  determine  their  nature  by  his 
theory. 

Not  that  we  are  precluded  fi:om  making  an  in- 
quiry into  the  origin  of  ideas.  This  is  a  very  fair 
subject  of  investigation,  provided  always  that  we 
acknowledge  its  difficulties  and  its  uncertainties,  and 
proceed  in  a  cautious  manner  and  in  the  proper 
method.  But  even  here  the  main  agent  must  be 
consciousness,  in  the  sense  which  has  been  ex- 
plained, that  is,  as  giving  us  directly  a  knowledge 
of  our  own  mental  operations,  and  indirectly  an 
acquaintance  with  those  of  others.  In  order  to  the 
successful  resolution  of  ideas  into  their  originals,  we 


THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION.  43 

have  two  objects,  or  classes  of  objects,  to  look  at. 
We  have,  first,  to  consider  the  ideas  or  convictions 
which  we  would  seek  to  account  for,  and,  secondly, 
the  elements  into  which  we  would  resolve  them. 
The  &st  of  these  operations  must  be  done  by  con- 
sciousness exclusively.  Even  in  the  other  and  more 
complicated  and  perplexing  mquiry,  introspection 
must  be  the  main  agent.  No  doubt  it  is  possible 
that  some  light  may  be  thrown  on  the  origin  of  cer- 
tain ideas  by  the  brain  and  nerves,  and  in  this  phys- 
iological investigation  the  instruments  must  be  the 
eye  and  the  microscope.  But  no  unconscious  action 
can  account  for  conscious  ideas.  The  attempt  to 
explain  ideas  must  always  proceed  by  deriving  the 
more  complex  from  the  simpler  mental  phenomena. 
But  in  the  determination  of  the  precise  nature  of 
the  simpler  mental  affections,  we  are  again  thrown 
back  on  consciousness.  Suppose  that  the  attempt 
be,  as  m  the  school  of  Mr.  Mill,  to  get  our  ideas 
from  sensations,  and  associations  of  sensation,  we 
must  begin  to  determine  what  sensations  are,  and 
what  the  laws  of  association  are,  by  the  internal 
sense.  I  am  quite  willing  to  adopt  Mr.  Mill's  psy- 
chological method,  but  only  on  the  condition  that 
we  take  introspection  as  our  main  instrument  of 
observation. 

Mr.  Mill  tells  us  that  "  the  proof  that  any  of  the 
alleged  Universal  Beliefs  or  principles  of  Common 
Sense  are  affirmations  of  consciousness,  supposes  two 
things,  —  that  the  beliefs  exist,  and  that  they  can- 


44  THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION. 

not  possibly  have  been  acquired."  (p.  147.)  I  have 
no  objection  to  accept  these  two  conditions,  with  an 
explanation  of  the  one  and  a  correction  of  the 
other. 

As  to  the  first  ride,  there  are  some  points  which 
consciousness  can  settle  at  once.  It  lets  us  know 
what  is  our  present  idea  or  conviction.  This  is  alto- 
gether competent  to  it,  this  in  fact  is  its  office ;  its 
revelations  carry  their  own  evidence  with  them,  and 
from  them  there  is  no  appeal.  This  is  admitted  by 
Mr.  Mill :  "  Introspection  can  show  a  present  belief 
or  conviction."  "If  consciousness  tells  me  that  I 
have  a  certain  thought  or  sensation,  I  assuredly 
have  that  thought  or  sensation."  (p.  141.)  Now,  in 
the  mature  mind  there  are  a  vast  number  and 
variety  of  ideas  and  convictions.  We  have  percep- 
tions, apprehensions,  and  beliefs,  about  matter  and 
mind,  about  time  and  space,  about  things  changing 
and  things  abiding,  about  the  near  and  the  remote, 
the  past  and  the  future,  about  activity  and  efficiency, 
about  priority  and  succession,  about  cause  and  effect, 
about  right  and  wrong,  eternity  and  immensity. 
Now,  it  is  the  office  of  consciousness  to  reveal  all 
that  is  in  these  ideas,  and  psychology  should  begin 
with  attending  to  its  revelations.  Mr.  Mill  refers 
particularly  to  the  alleged  universal  beliefs.  The 
word  "  belief"  is  unfortunately  a  very  vague  one, 
and  may  stand  for  a  number  of  very  different  men- 
tal affections.  When  I  am  speaking  of  first  or  in- 
tuitive  principles,  I  use   the   term   to   signify  our 


THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION,  45 

conviction  of  the  existence  of  an  object  not  now 
present,  and  thus  I  distinguish  "primitive  faith" 
from  "primitive  knowledge,"  in  which  the  object  is 
present.  But  however  wide  we  may  make  the  ap- 
phcation  of  the  phrase,  it  does  not  embrace  all  that 
is  before  consciousness.  Thus  we  are  capable  of 
immediate  knowledge ;  we  have  such  in  every  ex- 
ercise of  self-consciousness,  and  I  maintain  also  in 
all  perception  through  the  senses.  The  mind,  also, 
is  ever  pronoimcing  judgments,  declaring,  for  in- 
stance, that  things  agree,  or  that  they  differ,  or  that 
this  change  indicates  a  cause.  We  have  not  only 
intellectual  operations,  we  form  moral  perceptions, 
and  pronounce  moral  judgments,  —  as  when  we 
decide  that  kindness  is  a  virtue  and  cruelty  a  sin. 
If  we  would  construct  a  science  of  psychology,  we 
must  survey  carefully  these  apprehensions,  beliefs, 
and  decisions.  K  we  would  establish  or  dis-establish 
any  metaphysical  point,  we  must  view,  firstly  and 
finally,  and  all  throughout,  what  is  in  the  mind's 
notion  and  conviction.  Or  if,  what  is  more  to  our 
present  review,  we  woiild  resolve  any  idea  into  sim- 
pler elements,  we  must  determine  all  that  is  in  the 
idea  by  a  searching  introspection.  Consciousness 
has  thus  not  only  to  settle  that  certain  ideas  or 
behefs,  or  convictions  "exist,"  but  ascertain  for  us 
all  that  is  in  them.  Now,  it  has  been  repeatedly 
brought  as  a  charge  against  the  school  to  which  Mr. 
Mill  belongs,  that,  so  far  as  the  deeper  notions  and 
behefs  of  the  mind  are  concerned,  they  have  never 


4B  THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION. 

carefully  observed,  weighed,  and  measured  the 
phenomenon  which  they  seek  to  explain  by  means 
of  such  elements  as  sensations.  I  beheve  that  this 
accusation  is  just,  and  I  hope  to  substantiate  it  in 
the  course  of  this  review. 

Mr.  Mill's  second  rule  of  proof  can  be  admitted 
only  with  a  restriction.  I  allow  that  it  is  not  so 
easy  a  matter  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  imagines  to  de- 
termine what  is  a  first  principle ;  and  that  this  can- 
not be  done  by  an  immediate  introspection.  But  is  it 
not  demanding  too  much  to  require  that  we  are  not 
to  accept  any  beliefs  as  universal  till  it  has  been 
shown  '^^that  they  cannot  possibly  have  been  ac- 
quired" ?  The  burden  of  proof  seems  rather  to  lie 
on  those  who  maintain  they  are  acquired.  Were 
any  man  of  science  to  affirm  that  hydrogen  is  not 
an  element,  chemists  would  be  quite  prepared  to 
listen  to  him,  but  they  would  insist,  as  a  condition 
of  their  giving  a  positive  assent,  that  he  should  de- 
compose the  substance,  and  nntil  this  is  accom- 
plished they  would  continue  to  regard  hydrogen  as 
at  least  provisionally  an  elementary  body.  On  a 
like  principle,  we  should  be  quite  ready  to  attend  to 
Mr.  Mill  when  he  maintains  that  he  can  resolve  our 
idea  of  moral  good  into  simpler  elements,  but  until 
he  brings  forward  his  components,  and  shows  them 
to  be  quite  sufficient  to  produce  the  result,  we  may 
surely  be  allowed  to  hold  that  our  sense  of  duty  is 
an  ultimate  principle. 

But  instead  of  thus  throwing  the  onus  prohandi 


THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATIOJS^  47 

from  one  side  to  another,  I  think  it  better  to  avow 
broadly  that  the  question  is  not  to  be  settled  by 
possibilities  or  impossibilities,  by  may  he  or  cannot 
he,  but  by  the  ordinary  rules  of  evidence.  On  the 
one  hand,  persons  are  not  to  be  allowed  to  imagine 
that  they  have  resolved  an  alleged  fundamental  idea 
into  something  else,  unless  they  can  explain  all  that 
is  in  the  idea  by  means  of  some  principle  competent 
to  produce  the  idea  with  all  its  peculiarities.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  are  not  to  assume  a  conviction 
to  be  ultimate  till  it  has  been  tried  by  clear  and 
sufficient  tests.  Such  tests,  I  believe,  can  be  had. 
Almost  all  philosophers  have  appealed  to  them.  'We 
shall  find  Mr.  Mill  uuphcitly  admitting  them.  "We 
shall  be  able,  I  hope,  to  reach  a  precise  expression 
of  them  as  we  advance.  Following  these  general 
principles,  the  following  rules  of  proof  may  help  at 
once  to  guide  and  guard  inquiry  :  — 

I.  iVb  one  is  to  he  allowed  to  imagine  that  he  has 
made  a  successful  resolution  into  simpler  elements,  of 
an  idea,  helief  or  conviction,  unless  he  can  explain 
all  that  is  in  the  mental  phenomenon.  It  is  necessary 
to  enunciate  this  rule,  from  the  circumstance  that  it 
has  so  often  been  violated.  Hobbes,  and  the  sensa- 
tional school  of  France,  were  able  to  derive  all  om* 
ideas  from  sensation,  simply  by  refusing  to  look  at 
and  to  weigh  such  ideas  as  those  which  we  have  of 
substance  and  power,  moral  good  and  infinity,  so 
different  from  mere  sensitive  affections.    It  has  been 


48  THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION. 

shown  again  and  again  against  Hume,  that  all  our 
ideas  are  not  copies  of  impressions,  —  that  we  have 
convictions  of  the  existence  of  things,  of  personal 
identity,  and  of  power,  which  cannot  be  traced  to 
impressions,  whatever  be  the  meaning  attached  to 
that  vague  phrase.  I  am  convinced  Mr.  Mill  has 
been  guilty  of  like  oversights,  when  he  would  draw 
all  our  ideas,  even  those  we  have  of  mind  and  body, 
extension,  personal  identity,  causation,  and  moral 
obligation,  from  sensations,  and  associations  of  sen- 
sations :  he  can  appear  to  himself  and  his  admirers 
to  be  successful,  solely  by  not  noticing  the  charac- 
teristic qualities  of  these  profound  and  peculiar 
ideas.  In  these  dissections,  this  school  of  mental 
anatomists  destroys  the  life,  and  then  declares  that 
it  never  existed.  Mr.  Mill  defines  mind  as  a  series 
of  sensations :  we  shall  see  that  the  phenomenon  to 
be  explained  is  the  consciousness  of  self;  that  even 
in  sensation  we  are  conscious  of  seE  He  describes 
our  conviction  of  personal  identity  as  a  series  of 
sensations,  with  the  mind  being  aware  of  itself  as  a 
series  :  I  shall  show  that  we  know  in  consciousness 
a  present  self  and  in  memory  a  past  self,  and  that 
in  comparing  the  two  we  declare  them  to  be  the 
same.  He  makes  body  the  possibility  of  sensations  : 
it  will  be  proven,  that  in  his  hypothetical  explana- 
tion, he  utterly  fails  to  render  any  account  of  that 
idea  of  externality  which  we  attach  to  matter.  He 
resolves  our  idea  of  extension  into  length  of  time, 
and  length  of  time  he  makes  identical  with  a  series 


THE   3IETH0D    KiJf    INVESTIGATIONS  49 

of  muscTilar  sensations :  it  will  not  be  difficult  to 
establish  the  essential  difference  of  the  three  phenom- 
ena which  are  thus  confounded.  In  treating  of 
ethical  questions,  he  shows  that  we  might  be  led  to 
do  good  by  motives  derived  from  pleasure  and  pain : 
but  he  has-  failed  to  account  for  the  very  pecuhar 
ideas  involved  in  such  phrases  as  "  duty/'  "  ought," 
^'  obhgation,"  "  sin,"  and  "  reproach." 

It  has  been  resolutely  maintained  by  the  pro- 
foundest  philosophers  of  all  ages,  that  there  are 
certain  convictions  in  the  mind  which  have  the 
characters  of  self-evidence  and  necessity.  These 
constitute  the  "  residual  phenomena,"  which  cannot 
be  explamed  by  a  gathered  experience,  and  to  ac- 
count for  wliich  we  must  call  in  a  new  cause.  We 
know,  or  believe,  or  judge  so  and  so,  on  the  bare 
contemplation  of  the  objects ;  we  must  do  so,  we  can- 
not do  otherwise.  Mr.  Mill  has  looked  at  this  men- 
tal phenomenon,  and  has  endeavored  to  account 
for  it  in  accordance  with  his  general  theory  by  two 
principles,  which  it  can  be  shown  miss,  and  utterly 
fail  to  account  for,  the  peculiarities  of  our  convic- 
tion. We  may  here  look  at  these  for  a  moment,  as 
illustrating  the  importance  of  our  rule,  reserving  the 
more  thorough  discussion  of  them  to  future  chapters. 

It  is  alleged  by  the  whole  school,  that  our  belief 
in  certain  general  principles,  supposed  to  be  ulti- 
mate, can  be  accounted  for  by  experience.  But  the 
word  "  experience "  is  a  very  uncertain  one,  and 
may  cover  a  number  of  very  different  mental  ac- 


50  THE   METHOD   OF  INVESTIGATION. 

tions  and  affections.  Everything  that  has  been 
within  our  consciousness,  all  that  we  have  seen  or 
felt,  may  be  said  in  a  vague  general  sense  to  have 
fallen  under  experience.  In  this  sense  our  intuitions 
of  sense  and  consciousness,  our  original  beliefs  and 
primitive  judgments,  all  come  within  our  expe- 
rience. But  thus  understood,  experience  can  ex- 
plain nothing,  can  be  the  cause  of  nothing.  The 
thing  experienced  may,  but  not  the  experience, 
that  is,  the  mere  consciousness  or  feeling.  As  to 
the  thing  experienced,  it  should  not  be  called  ex- 
perience ;  and  as  to  what  it  may  produce,  we  must 
determine  this  by  looking  at  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
and  not  at  our  experience  of  it.  But  there  is  a 
sense,  and  this  a  very  important  one,  in  which  ex- 
perience can  furnish  us  with  a  principle,  and  this 
may  be  mistaken  for  an  intuitive  one.  Thus  we 
have  observed,  not  once,  or  twice,  or  thrice,  or  ten 
times,  but  a  hundred,  a  thousand  times,  that  our 
friends  have  been  in  the  habit  of  speaking  the  truth, 
and  we  expect  them  to  do  so  in  time  to  come  as 
they  have  done  in  time  past.  There  have  been  met- 
aphysicians who  regarded  our  trust  in  testimony  as 
an  original  instinct  of  our  nature.  But  it  is  surely 
quite  competent  for  persons  to  attempt  to  show  that 
the  conviction  can  be  explained  by  an  early,  a 
lengthened,  and  a  uniform  observation ;  and  they 
may  be  allowed  to  be  successful  when  they  have 
proven  that  the  experience  is  capable  of  producing 
the  conviction  entertained.     Let  it  be  observed,  that 


THE   METHOD   OF  INVESTIGATION.  61 

when  thus  employed  experience  means  an  induction 
of  instances  to  establish  a  general  rule  or  law.  And 
I  take  this  opportunity  of  stating,  that  when  I  have 
occasion  to  refer  to  this  power  of  experience,  I  call 
it  a  gathered  experience^  to  distinguish  it  from  a  mere 
individual  feeling.  I  admit  freely  that  a  gathered 
experience  can  generate  a  strong  conviction,  such  as 
the  trust  we  put  in  testimony,  and  our  behef  in  the 
uniformity,  or  rather  uniformities,  of  nature  ;  that  is, 
it  will  account  for  all  the  marks  of  our  convictions 
on  these  subjects,  for  their  gradual  formation,  for 
their  extent  and  their  limits,  —  as  when  we  allow 
that  our  friends  may  at  times  commit  mistakes  in 
their  testimony,  or  that  there  may  have  been  mirac- 
ulous occurrences  in  the  midst  of  the  regularities 
of  nature.  But  then,  it  is  said  that  there  are,  and  I 
hope  to  show  that  there  are,  convictions  of  a  very 
different  nature,  which  are  as  strong  in  early  youth, 
and  in  early  stages  of  society,  as  in  later  life  and  in 
more  advanced  communities,  and  which  allow  of  no 
Hmitation  or  exception.  As  examples,  we  may  give 
mathematical  axioms,  as  that  two  straight  lines  can- 
not enclose  a  space,  and  moral  maxims,  as  that  in- 
gratitude for  favors  deserves  reprobation.  Our  con- 
victions of  this  description  sprmg  up  on  the  bare 
contemplation  of  the  objects,  and  need  not  a  wide 
collection  of  instances ;  and  their  necessity  and  uni- 
versahty  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  a  gathered  ex- 
perience. The  school  to  which  Mr.  Mill  belongs 
explains  the  phenomena  only  by  failing  to  distin- 


52  THE  METHOD  OF  INVESTIGATION, 

guish  between  two  sorts  of  convictions,  and  neglecir 
ing  to  mark  the  characteristics  of  those  which  an- 
nounce themselves  as  self-evident,  necessary,  and 
universal. 

But  Mr.  Mill  has  another  principle,  by  which  he 
thinks  he  can  explain  the  necessity  and  the  unlimi1> 
ed  expectation ;  this  is  the  law  of  the  association  of 
ideas.  When  we  have  often  thought  of  two  things 
together,  the  idea  of  the  one  comes  invariably,  in 
the  end  necessarily,  to  call  up  the  other.  Thus  Mar- 
tinus  Scriblerus,  having  never  seen  a  lord  mayor 
without  his  fur  gown  and  gold  chain,  could  never 
think  of  a  lord  mayor  without  also  thinking  of  his 
appendages.  But  here  again  Mr.  Mill  has  missed 
the  characteristic  of  the  mental  phenomenon.  "  If 
we  find  it  impossible  by  any  trial  to  separate  two 
ideas,  we  have  all  the  feeling  of  necessity  the  mind 
is  capable  of"  (p.  264.)  But  this  is  to  confound  two 
things  which  are  very  different,  the  association  of 
two  ideas,  so  that  the  one  calls  up  the  other,  with 
the  judgment,  which  declares  that  the  two  things 
are  necessarily  related.  When  he  heard  the  lord 
mayor  named,  Martin  could  not  but  think  of  his 
gown  and  chain;  but  he  did  not  therefore  decide 
that  the  mayor  and  his  wig  had  always  been  to- 
gether, that  they  would  always  be  together,  that  it 
had  never  been  otherwise,  and  could  not  be  other- 
wise. The  laws  of  association  may  account  for  the 
rise  of  one  idea  along  with  another,  or  immediately 
after  another,  but  they  do  not  come  near  explaining 


THE   METHOD   OF  INVESTIGATION.  63 

the  self-evidence  and  necessity  of  certain  cognitions, 
beliefS;  and  judgments  which,  may  rise  on  the 
contemplation  of  single  objects  perceived  for  the 
first  time,  or  on  the  hnmediate  comparison  of  two 
objects. 

n.  In  resolving  an  alleged  fundamental  idea  or 
conviction  into  certain  elements^  we  must  assume  only 
known  elements,  and  we  must  not  ascribe  to  them 
more  than  can  he  shoicn  to  he  in  them.  To  illustrate 
what  I  mean :  It  is  quite  competent  to  any  one  to 
attempt  to  explain  chemical  action  by  mechanical 
causes,  or  vital  action  by  mechanical  and  chemical 
forces.  But  if  he  understand  the  problem  which  he 
hopes  to  solve,  and  grapple  with  it  fairly,  he  must 
not  give  to  mechanical  action,  or  mechanical  and 
chemical  action  combined,  more  than  is  in  them. 
The  whole  attempt  would  be  denounced  as  a  mere 
pretence  if  he  gave  a  chemical  afl&nity  to  the  me- 
chanical power,  or  a  power  of  assimilation  and  ab- 
sorption to  the  mechanical  and  chemical  action. 
Now  we  are  surely  entitled  to  impose  a  like  restric- 
tion upon  the  analyst  of  the  human  mind.  It  is 
perfectly  competent  to  him  to  attempt  to  resolve 
such  convictions  as  those  of  identity,  causation,  and 
moral  good  into  any  other  principle.  But  we  can 
require  of  him  to  specify  the  principle,  to  prove  that 
it  actually  works  in  the  mind,  to  unfold  its  nature 
and  its  laws,  and  to  show  from  its  ascertained  action 
that  it  is  quite  sufficient  to  produce  the  conviction. 


54  THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATIOIT, 

In  particular,  he  must  not  be  allowed,  when  he  starts 
with  an  element,  to  add  new  properties  to  suit  his 
purpose  as  he  goes  along.  Or  if  he  does  so,  he  must 
formally  announce  the  introduction  of  the  new 
power,  specify  its  nature,  and  honestly  avow  it  to  be 
a  new  element. 

This  is  a  rule  which  has  been  habitually  neglected 
by  that  school  of  metaphysicians  who  delight  to 
reduce  all  the  operations  of  the  mind  to  a  very  few 
principles.  Locke  succeeded,  to  his  own  satisfaction, 
in  deriving  all  our  ideas  from  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion, but  it  has  been  shown  by  distinguished  philos- 
ophers, British  and  Continental,  that  in  accounting 
thus  for  such  ideas  as  substance,  and  time,  and 
power,  he  changed,  without  perceiving  it,  the  sensa- 
tions and  reflex  perceptions  into  something  entirely 
different.  It  can  be  proven  that  Mr.  Mill  is  ever 
fallmg  into  a  like  error.  The  operation  by  which 
he  derives  all  our  ideas  and  beliefs  from  a  few  ele- 
ments, is  a  sort  of  jugglery,  in  which  he  alters  the 
elements  without  its  being  discovered  •  and  it  may 
be  added,  that  in  the  product  which  he  shows,  he 
has  not  the  real  phenomenon  which  he  professes  to 
have  explained. 

The  main  elements  which  he  employs  are  sensa- 
tions and  associations  of  sensation.  But  he  works 
up  sensations  into  convictions  of  mind  and  body,  of 
space  and  time,  of  personality  and  personal  identity, 
of  infinity  and  obligation  to  do  good,  which  are  not 
contained   in  the  nature  of  sensations,  and  which 


THE   IIETHOB    OF  INVESTIGATION.  55 

could  be  imparted  to  tliem  only  by  a  new  power 
superinduced,  which  power  would  require  to  have  a 
jDlace  allotted  to  it  in  his  system,  and  its  laws  enun- 
ciated, and  its  significance  estimated.  Again,  it  will 
be  shown  that  Mr.  Mill  has  made  an  unwarrantable 
use  and  application  of  the  laws  of  association.  These 
are  the  laws  of  the  succession  of  our  ideas,  and 
nothing  more.  Give  us  two  ideas,  and  place  these 
two  ideas  together  in  the  mind,  and  association  will 
tend  to  bring  them  up  once  more  in  union.  But  it 
is  not  the  office  of  association  to  give  us  the  ideas 
which  must  first  be  furnished  to  it.  We  shall  see 
that  Mr.  Mill  is  forever  giving  to  association  a 
power,  which  does  not  belong  to  it,  of  generating 
new  ideas  by  an  operation  in  which  we  see  sensar 
tions  go  in,  and  a  lofty  idea  coming  out,  solely  by 
the  idea  being  surreptitiously  mtroduced,  without 
any  person  being  expected  to  notice  it.  The  pro- 
cess carried  on  by  this  whole  school  of  analysts  is 
like  that  of  the  alchemists,  who,  when  they  put 
earth  mto  the  retort,  never  could  get  anything  but 
earth,  and  could  get  gold  only  by  introducing  some 
substance  containing  gold.  The  philosoj)her's  stone 
of  this  modern  psychology  is  of  the  same  character 
as  that  employed  in  mediaeval  physics.  If  we  put  in 
only  sensations,  as  some  do,  we  have  never  anything 
but  sensations,  and  a  "dirt  philosophy,"  as  it  has 
been  called,  is  the  product.  If  we  get  gold  (as  cer- 
tainly Mr.  MiU  does  at  times),  it  is  because  it  has 


5Q  THE   METHOD    OF  INYE8TIGATI0K. 

been  quietly  introduced  by  the  person  who  triumph- 
antly exhibits  it. 

m.  Tests  may  he  furnished  to  try  intuitive  truths. 
From  the  days  of  Aristotle  down  to  the  present 
time,  it  has  been  asserted  that  there  are  first  truths, 
the  support  of  other  truths,  while  they  themselves 
require  no  support.  Profound  thinkers  have  sys- 
tematically or  incidentally  been  striving  to  give  us 
the  marks  of  such  truths.  Amidst  considerable  dif- 
ference of  nomenclature  and  confusion  of  thought 
and  statement  (such  as  we  might  expect  in  the  first 
efforts  to  catch  and  express  the  exact  truth  in  so 
difficult  an  investigation),  there  has  been  all  along  a 
wonderfully  large  amount  of  agreement  in  the  cri- 
teria fixed  on.  These  have  been  such  as  self-evidence, 
necessity,  and  universality.  Some  have  fixed  on  one, 
and  some  on  another  of  these,  as  their  favorite  test- 
ing principle,  and  have  overlooked  the  others. 
Some  have  employed  two,  overlooking  the  third. 
But  these  three  are,  in  fact,  the  tests  which,  in  a 
loose  or  more  stringent  form,  have  been  announced 
or  applied  by  the  great  body  of  deep  and  earnest 
thinkers.  It  could  be  shown  that  Aristotle  had  at 
least  glimpses  of  all  of  them.  In  modern  times, 
Locke  formally  propounded  the  self-evidence,  refer- 
ring incidentally  from  time  to  time  to  the  necessity 
and  universality.  Keid  was  in  the  way  of  referring, 
not  always  in  a  very  clear  or  satisfactory  way,  to  aU 
the  three.     Leibnitz  brought  out  prominently  the 


THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION.  57 


necessity ;  and  Kant,  followed  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
conjoined  necessity  and  universality, —  all  three 
overlooking  the  self-evidence,  in  consequence  of  their 
keeping  away  very  much  firom  reaUties,  and  dwell- 
ing among  mental  forms.-^  We  shall  find  Mr.  Mill 
employing  all  of  them,  without,  however,  fully  ap- 
prehending their  character  or  seeing  their  signifi- 
cance. 

As  we  proceed,  we  shall  gather  these  tests  into 
heads,  and  establish  theu^  validity,  and  give  them 
theu-  proper  expression.  We  shall  show  that  asso- 
ciation of  ideas,  which  is  supposed  to  work  such 
wonders,  cannot  give  these  characters  to  any  appre- 
hension or  proposition.  No  ex]Deriential  or  derived 
truth  can  stand  any  one,  or  at  least  the  whole,  of 
these  tests.  A  general  truth  discovered  by  a  gather- 
ed experience,  as  that  night  succeeds  day,  cannot  be 
said  to  be  self-evident.  Nor  can  it  be  represented 
as  having  any  necessity  in  thought,  for  we  can  easily 
apprehend  it  to  be  otherwise.  Nor  can  it  be  de- 
scribed as  universal,  for  the  time  may  come  when,  in 
consequence  of  a  change  of  mundane  arrangements, 
the  day  or  the  night  may  cease. 

Following  out  these  principles,  I  mean,  in  discuss- 
ing the  questions  started  by  Mr.  Mill,  to  proceed  in 
the  followmg  method :  — 

(1.)  I  allow  him  to  try  his  power  of  analysis,  ac- 
cording to  his  psychological  method,  on  all  alleged 

1  These  tests  will  be  eonsided,  infra,    review  of  them  will  be  found  in  The 
Chap.  xii.    A  historical  and  critical    Intuitions  of  the  MindjVsccti.'B.n.c.Z. 


58  THE   METHOD    OF  INVESTIGATION, 

fundamental  truth,  without  reserving  any  exception. 
This  is  what  Sir  W.  Hamilton  would  not  have  done, 
as  he  regarded  consciousness  as  deciding  the  whole 
question  at  once,  and  authoritatively  and  conclusive- 
ly. I  hold  that  consciousness  has  a  most  important 
part  to  act.  It  has  to  disclose  to  us  what  are  the 
ideas  and  convictions  in  the  mind  when  it  begins  to 
reflect,  and  what  is  the  precise  nature  of  the  ele- 
ments into  which  we  would  resolve  them.  But  I 
admit  that  in  the  mature  man  all  is  not  intuitive 
that  is  spontaneous  and  apparently  instantaneous. 
And  so  I  freely  permit  Mr.  Mill  to  attempt  to  de- 
compose any  idea  into  simpler  composites.  But  as 
he  does  so,  I  claim  the  right  to  sit  by  and  watch 
him,  lest  he  unconsciously  change  the  elements  in 
the  process;  and  at  the  close  I  carefully  inquire 
whether  he  has  explained  all  the  characteristics  of 
the  idea  and  conviction. 

(2.)  When  he  fails,  as  I  believe  it  will  be  found 
that  he  does  fail,  in  regard  to  certain  mental  prin- 
ciples, then  I  hold  that  these  principles  which  the 
acute  intellect  of  Mr.  Mill  cannot  decompose,  may 
be  regarded  as  elementary,  at  least  provisionally  so ; 
that  is,  till  some  abler  man  (which  is  not  likely  to 
happen)  makes  the  attempt  and  succeeds. 

(3.)  I  bring  the  alleged  first  truths  to  the  test  of 
self-evidence,  necessity,  and  universaHty,  and  when 
they  can  stand  these  criteria,  I  pronounce  them  con- 
clusively to  be  original  and  primary  and  funda- 
mental. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ME.    mill's    admissions. 

THE  common  impression  regarding  Mr.  Mill's 
philosophy  is  that  it  needs  no  intuitive  prin- 
ciples ;  that  the  author  of  it  does  not  presuppose  or 
allow  that  there  is  anything  innate  in  the  mind. 
Some  of  his  admirers  give  him  credit  for  weaving  a 
rich  fabric  without  any  material  except  sensations, 
and  with  no  machmery  except  experience.  Mr. 
Mill's  cavils  against  those  who  support  fundamental 
truth,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  expounds  his 
own  system,  are  fitted  to  leave  this  impression.  He 
begins  the  construction  of  his  theory  with  sensa- 
tions ;  he  goes  on  to  fashion  them  into  various  forms 
by  association  of  sensations ;  he  allows  among  the 
series  of  sensations  a  memory  of  the  past,  an  expec- 
tation of  the  future,  and  a  power  of  observing  co- 
existences and  successions,  resemblances  and  differ- 
ences between  sensations ;  and  he  makes  the  mmd 
as  it  advances  receive  powerful  aid  from  the  artificial 
instrumentality  of  language.  These  seem,  at  least 
to  a  cursory  observer,  to  constitute  the  matter  and 
the  agency  by  which  he  ingeniously  constructs  tho 

(69) 


60  MB.  MILVS   ADMISSIONS. 

ideas,  many  of  them  so  grand  and  far-ranging,  which 
the  mind  of  man  is  capable  of  forming.  But  while 
these  seem  to  be  the  original  furniture  of  the  mind 
and  the  sum  of  the  assumptions  he  has  to  make,  we 
find  if  we  look  more  carefully  that  in  rearing  his 
fabric  he  is  ever  and  anon  calhng  in  other  principles, 
some  of  them  openly  and  avowedly,  and  others  un- 
consciously and  furtively ;  and  that  these  form  when 
placed  together  a  huge  but  ill-fashioned  and  in- 
congruous body  of  what  are  in  fact,  whatever  he 
may  call  them,  intuitive  principles  or  metaphysical 
truth. 

It  will  be  found,  indeed,  that  the  mental  analysts, 
whose  ambition  it  has  been  to  reduce  the  original 
capacities  of  the  mind  to  a  very  small  number,  have 
been  obliged  to  bring  in  a  vast  body  of  assumptions 
and  new  elements  as  they  advance.  Locke  satisfied 
himself  that  he  had  derived  all  our  ideas  from  sensa- 
tion and  reflection,  but  then  he  called  in  faculties  to 
work  upon  the  materials  thus  furnished;  he  finds 
ideas  "  suggested "  as  these  powers  operate ;  he 
gives  an  important  function  to  "  intuition,"  and  sup- 
poses the  mind  capable  of  discovering  "  necessary  " 
relations.  Even  Hume,  who  of  all  metaphysicians 
is  disposed  to  make  fewest  admissions,  remarks  in 
criticising  Locke,  "  I  should  desire  to  know  what  can 
be  meant  by  asserting  that  self-love,  or  resentment 
of  injuries,  or  passion  between  the  sexes,  is  not  in- 
nate." ( Works ^  vol.  iv.  p.  23.)  The  Sensational 
School  made  all  our  ideas  transformed  sensations  5 


3fB.  MILL'S   ADMISSIONS.  61, 

but  in  order  to  get  such  ideas  as  those  of  personal 
identity,  power,  and  duty,  they  quietly  gave  the 
transforming  act  a  power  of  transmuting  one  thing 
into  another.  I  am  now  to  show  how  many  prin- 
ciples Mr.  Mill  has  been  obliged  to  call  in,  as  he  goes 
along,  in  order  to  explain  the  actual  phenomena  of 
the  mind  on  his  hypothesis.  I  must  give  consider- 
able extracts  in  order  to  do  justice  at  once  to  his 
views  and  my  argument.  The  admissions  are  no 
doubt  candidly  made,  and  they  are  always  clearly 
stated.  Our  readers  must  judge  as  to  how  far  they 
affect  the  apparent  simplicity  and  modify  the  logical 
consistency  of  his  system.  As  I  may  have  occasion 
to  refer  to  them  in  the  course  of  the  discussion,  I 
number  and  designate  them  by  the  letters  of  the 
Greek  alphabet. 

a.  There  is  cm  immediate  and  intuitive  knowledge. 
His  language  is  express.  "  We  do  know  some  things 
immediately  and  intuitively."  (p.  126.) 

/5.  From  the  truths  known  by  intuition,  others  are 
inferred.  ^^  Truths  are  known  to  us  in  two  ways ; 
some  are  known  directly  and  of  themselves,  and 
some  through  the  medium  of  other  truths.  The 
former  are  the  subject  of  intuition  or  consciousness, 
the  latter  of  inference.  The  truths  known  by  intui- 
tion are  the  original  premises  from  which  aU  others 
are  inferred."  [Logic,  Introd.  §  4.) 

/.  Reasoning  carries  us  hack  to  intuition,  from 
which  it  derives  its  ultimate  premises.  He  thus  fol- 
lows up  the  passage  last  quoted  :  "  Our  assent  to  the 


62  3£B.  MILL'S   ADMISSIONS. 

conclusion  being  grounded  upon  the  truth  of  the 
premises,  we  never  could  arrive  at  any  knowledge 
by  reasoning,  unless  something  could  be  known  an- 
tecedently to  reasoning."  And  in  the  work  more 
immediately  under  review :  "  Unless,  therefore,  we 
knew  something  immediately,  we  could  not  know 
anything  mediately,  and  consequently  could  not 
know  anything  at  all."  (p.  126.)  Elsewhere  he  says 
First  Principles  cannot  be  proven :  "  To  be  incapable 
of  proof  by  reasoning  is  common  to  all  first  prin- 
ciples :  of  our  knowledge  as  well  as  of  our  con- 
duct." ( Utilitarianism,  p.  51.) 

These  statements  are  very  satisfactory  as  to  the 
existence  of  intuition,  and  the  place  occupied  by  it, 
and  the  purpose  served  by  it.  He  does  not  in  these 
passages  state  the  grounds  on  which  he  admits  in- 
tuition, nor  the  tests  by  which  he  would  try  it. 
These,  however,  may  come  out  incidentally  as  we 
advance.  Let  us  inquire  what  he  represents  as  ex- 
ercises of  intuition. 

d.  Consciousness  is  a  form  of  intuition.  This  is 
implied  throughout,  and  will  be  shown  to  be  so  by 
the  passages  quoted  under  other  heads. 

£.  Whatever  consciousness  reveals  is  to  he  received. 
'^  According  to  all  philosophers  the  evidence  of  con- 
sciousness, if  only  we  can  obtain  it  pure,  is  con- 
clusive." (p.  126.)  "  If  consciousness  tells  me  that  I 
have  a  certain  thought  or  sensation,  I  assuredly  have 
that  thought  or  sensation."  (p.  141.) 

^.    Consciousness  and  intuitive  convictions  are  ar- 


MB.  JIILrS   ADJUSSIOXS.  63 

biters  from  Tvliich  there  is  no  appeal  "  The  yerdict 
of  consciousness,  or,  in  other  words,  our  immediate 
and  intuitive  conviction,  is  admitted  on  all  hands  to 
be  a  decision  ^thout  appeal."  (p.  127.) 

7J.  The  truth  revealed  hy  consciousness  rests  on  its 
own  evidence,  ''All  the  vrorld  admits,  with  our  au- 
thor, that  it  is  impossible  to  doubt  a  fltct  of  internal 
consciousness.  To  feel,  and  not  to  know  that  we 
feel,  is  an  impossibihty.  But  Sir  ^Vilham  Hamilton 
is  not  satisfied  to  let  this  truth  rest  on  its  own  evi- 
dence. He  wants  a  demonstration  of  it.  As  if  it 
were  not  sufficiently  proved  by  consciousness  itself, 
he  attempts  to  prove  it  by  a  reductio  ad  ahsurdurn.'' 
(p.  132.)  He  then  criticises,  I  think  justly,  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton's  proof,  which  he  says  carries  us 
"round  a  long  circuit  to  retin^n  to  the  poiut  fi'om 
which  we  set  out."  "  He  has  deduced  the  trust- 
worthiness of  consciousness  from  the  veracity  of  the 
Deity ;  and  the  veracity  of  the  Deity  can  only  be 
known  from  the  evidence  of  consciousness."  (p.  138.) 
Mr.  ^IlU  himself  would  have  the  truth  "  rest  on  its 
own  evidence."  I  rejoice  in  this  appeal  For 
what  is  tliis  ultimate  test  but  that  of  Self-Evidence, 
so  often  enunciated,  or  at  least  referred  to  and  im- 
pHed  in  the  writings  of  profound  thinkers,  from  Ai'is- 
totle  downwards,  and  among  others,  very  expressly 
by  Locke  ?  Xothing  can  be  clearer  or  more  satis- 
factory than  Mr.  Mill's  language  :  ^'  We  know  intui- 
tively what  we  know  by  its  own  evidence,  —  by  ih- 
rect  apprehension  of  the  fact." 


64  MB.  MILL'S   ADMISSIONS. 

^.  It  is  imjjossihle  to  doubt  or  deny  the  facts  made 
known  hy  consciousness.  "  A  real  fact  of  conscious- 
ness cannot  be  doubted  or  denied."  (p.  134.)  What 
is  this  but  the  other  famous  test  of  first  truths,  the 
test  of  Necessity  appealed  to  by  Plato,  Aristotle, 
Leibnitz,  Kant,  and  so  many  other  profound  thinkers 
of  ancient  and  modern  times?  Already,  then,  we 
have  the  two  tests  of  Self-Evidence  and  Necessity 
sanctioned.  In  the  passage  quoted  under  last  head 
he  had,  as  most  philosophers  have  done,  mixed  them 
up  together  as  being  intimately  connected.  "  It  is 
impossible  to  doubt  a  fact  of  internal  consciousness. 
To  feel,  and  not  to  know  that  we  feel,  is  an  impos- 
sibility : "  and  so  he  would  have  the  truth  "  rest  on 
its  own  evidence."  The  law  of  necessity  is  repeatedly 
appealed  to.  "  The  facts  which  cannot  be  doubted 
are  those  to  which  the  word  consciousness  is  by  most 
philosophers  confined;  the  facts  of  internal  con- 
sciousness; the  mind's  own  acts  and  affections. 
What  we  feel,  we  cannot  doubt  that  we  feel.  It  is 
impossible  for  us  to  feel,  and  to  think  perhaps  that 
we  feel  not,  or  to  feel  not,  and  think  perhaps  that 
we  feel."  (p.  132.)  Sir  WiUiam  Hamilton  has  no- 
where made  a  more  decisive  use  of  the  law  of  neces- 
sity and  principle  of  contradiction  than  Mr.  Mill  has 
done  in  these  passages. 

L.  No  man  ever  doubted  of  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness. "  Consciousness  in  the  sense  usually  attached 
to  it  by  philosophers,  consciousness  of  the  mind's 
own  feelings  and  operations,  cannot,  as  our  author 


Mlt.  IflZrS   ADMISSIONS.  65 

truly  says,  be  disbelieved.  The  inward  fact,  the  feel- 
ing in  our  minds,  was  never  doubted,  since  to  do  so 
would  be  to  doubt  that  we  feel  what  we  feel."  (p. 
141.)  As  in  a  passage  previously  quoted,  the  tests 
of  self-e\ddence  and  necessity  were  joined,  so  in  this 
the  tests  of  Necessity  and  Unwerscdity  (universality 
of  conviction)  are  combined,  and  the  universahty  is 
traced  to  the  necessity.  The  fact  "  was  never  doubt- 
ed," since  to  do  so  would  be  to  doubt  that  we  feel  what 
we  feel,  which  is  represented  as  impossible.  We  thus 
find  the  tests  of  intuition,  as  I  cursorily  sketched  them 
in  last  chapter,  and  mean  to  unfold  them  more  fully 
in  a  future  chapter,  employed  by  Mr.  Mill,  and  in  the 
very  logical  order  m  which  I  have  placed  them.  He 
makes  an  appeal  to  self-evidence ;  the  truth  "  rests 
on  its  own  evidence."  He  tests  this  by  the  principle 
that  "  to  feel,  and  not  to  know  that  we  feel,  is  an 
impossibility."  And  now  we  find  him  appealing  to 
cathoHcity  or  common  consent,  and  founding  it  on 
necessity :  the  fact  "  was  never  doubted,"  since  it 
"  cannot  be  disbeheved." 

X.  In  arguing  loitli  the  sceioticiceare  entitled  to  ccdl 
in  the  assurance  of  immediate  hioioledge  as  a  test. 
"I  put  to  him  (the  sceptic)  the  simplest  case  conceiv- 
able of  immediate  knowledge,  and  ask,  if  we  ever 
feel  anything  ?  If  so,  then,  at  the  moment  of  feel- 
ing, do  we  know  that  we  feel  ?  Or  if  he  will  not 
call  this  knowledge,  will  he  deny  that  we  have  a 
feeling,  we  have  at  least  some  sort  of  assurance,  or 
conviction,  of  having  it?      This  assurance  or  con- 

6 


66  MB.  MILL'S   AI)MISS10J}fS. 

viction  is  what  other  people  mean  by  knowledge.  If 
he  dislikes  the  word^  I  am  willing,  in  discussing  with 
him,  to  employ  some  other.  By  whatever  name  this 
assurance  is  called,  it  is  the  test  to  which  we  bring 
all  our  convictions."  (p.  126.)  This  passage  has  not 
the  logical  power  of  some  of  Hamilton's  arguments, 
but  it  is  altogether  after  his  manner.  I  have  quoted 
it  to  show,  that  Mr.  Mill  thinks  himself  justified  in 
appealing  to  the  assurance  of  consciousness  as  an 
ultimate  and  decisive  test. 

X.  The  reveIatio7is  of  consciousness,  together  with 
what  can  he  inferred  from  them,  constitute  the  sum  of 
our  knowledge.  ^^What  consciousness  directly  re- 
veals, together  with  what  can  be  legitimately  in- 
ferred from  its  revelations,  composes,  by  universal 
admission,  all  that  we  know  of  the  mind,  or  indeed 
any  other  thing."  (p.  107.)  I  do  not  admit  that  this 
statement  is  correct,  unless  he  make  consciousness 
synonymous  with  intuition,  and  include  the  senses 
and  our  primitive  beliefs,  which  also  contribute,  and 
this  largely,  to  what  we  know.  I  quote  it  to  show 
how  deep  a  place  our  author  allots  to  the  revelations 
of  consciousness. 

These  admissions  all  relate  to  Consciousness,  the 
word  being  used,  however,  now  in  a  wider  and  now 
in  a  narrower  sense ;  sometimes  being  coextensive 
with  intuition,  as  when  (see  t.)  he  speaks  of  "  con- 
sciousness, or  in  other  words,  immediate  and  intuitive 
conviction;"  and  in  other  passages  meaning  (see  i.) 
"  consciousness  of  the  mind's  own  feehngs  and  opera- 


MB.  MILL'S   ADMISSIONS.  67 

tions."  In  the  heads  that  follow,  his  admissions  re- 
late to  facts  it  may  be  attested  by  consciousness,  but 
not  beyond  it. 

fi.  We  may  he  sure  of  what  we  see  as  well  as  of 
what  we  feel.  "What  one  sees  or  feels,  whether 
bodily  or  mentally,  one  cannot  but  be  sure  that  one 
sees  or  feels."  {Logic,  Introd.  §  4.)  This  is  a  satis- 
factory statement,  but  he  afterwards  detracts  from  it 
by  observing  that  we  often  suppose  that  we  see  what 
we  do  not  see,  and  he  is  evidently  doubtful  whether 
we  see  anything  beyond  ourselves.  This  topic  will 
require  to  be  carefully  examined  in  a  future  chapter. 
Meanwhile  I  bring  forward  the  statement  to  show, 
that  if  it  can  be  proven  that  we  do  intuitively  see 
external  objects,  and  that  our  intuitions  of  external- 
ity and  extension  are  not  resolvable  into  anything 
simpler,  then  we  must  be  prepared  to  grant  that  the 
objects  exist.  Speaking  elsewhere  of  the  "  first 
premises  of  our  knowledge,"  he  says,  that  "being 
matters  of  fact,  they  may  be  the  subject  of  a  direct 
appeal  to  the  faculties  which  judge  of  fact,  namely, 
our  senses  and  our  internal  consciousness."  ( Utilita- 
rianism, p.  51.) 

V.  We  hiow  existence,  and  make  assertions  about 
existence.  Thus  he  places  existence  among  his  cate- 
gories, and  does  not  attempt  to  resolve  it  into  any- 
thing else.  "  Besides  the  propositions  which  assert 
sequence  or  Co-existence,  there  are  some  which 
assert  simple  existence,"  etc.  {Logic,  B.  i.  v.  §  5,  6.) 

|.   We  are  capable  of  experiencing  and  knowing 


68  MB.    MILL'S  ADMISSIOJS'S, 

sensations.  We  need  not  produce  passages  or  refer- 
ences to  prove  thiS;  for  the  evidence  of  it  runs 
throughout  his  works. 

o.  Pleasure  and  pain  are  what  we  feel  them  to  he, 
and  nothing  else.  Speaking  of  these,  he  says  of 
Hamilton,  that  ^^he  is  not  so  much  the  dupe  of 
words  as  to  suppose  that  they  are  anything  else 
than  what  we  feel  them  to  be."  (p.  479.) 

TT.  Extension  is  an  essential  part  of  the  concept  of 
hody.  "The  truth  is,  that  the  condition  of  space 
cannot  be  excluded ;  it  is  an  essential  part  of  the 
concept  of  body,  and  of  every  kind  of  bodies."  (p. 
327.)  This  is  not  an  adequate  statement,  but  it  im- 
plies that  man  has  at  least  one  necessary  concept  as 
to  body,  and  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  that  this  can- 
not be  resolved  into  sensation  or  association. 

q.  There  is  evidently  an  ultimate  fact  in  memory. 
^^  Our  belief  in  the  veracity  of  Memory  is  evidently 
ultimate  :  no  reason  can  be  given  for  it  which  does 
not  presuppose  the  belief,  and  assume  it  to  be  well- 
grounded."  (p.  174.)  This  statement  appears  in  a 
foot-note,-^  and  our  author  does  not  even  try  to  show 

1  Mr.  Mill  makes  the  admission  answer  (as  they  most  certainly  will) 
frankly  and  candidly,  but  he  was  driv-  that  they  do  include  past  experience  as 
en  to  it  by  a  criticism  of  Dr.  Ward  :  —  well  as  present,  then  again  I  deny 
"  I  would  ask  of  these  philosophers  their  allegation,  that  they  build  their 
(those  who  build  wholly  upon  Expe-  philosophy  wholly  on  experience, 
rience),  do  they  mean  by  '  experience'  "  How  can  you  even  guess  what  your 
the  experience  of  the  present  moment,  past  experience  has  been  ?  By  trust- 
or do  they  include  past  experience  ing  memory.  But  how  do  you  prove 
also  1  If  they  say  the  former,  I  reply  that  those  various  intuitive  judgments, 
it  is  obviously  false  that  they  do  in  any  which  we  call  acts  of  memory,  can 
sense  build  their  philosophy  wholly  or  rightly  be  trusted  ?  So  far  from  this 
chiefly  on  experience.     But  if  they  being  provable  by  past  experience,  it 


MB.   MILL'S   ADMISSIONS. 


how  it  fits  into  his  system.  The  justification  of  the 
principle  will  fall  nnder  our  notice  under  another 
head.  Meanwhile  I  call  attention  to  the  admission. 
He  declares  that  memory  carries  with  it  its  own 
veracity,  and  that  our  behef  in  that  veracity  is  "  ul- 
timate/' and  "  evidently  ultimate."  I  shall  endeavor 
to  show  that  the  full  facts  of  memory  are  not  em- 
braced in  this  brief  statement.  But  there  is  much 
stated,  and  there  is  more  imphed.  He  here  concedes 
fully  that  there  is  a  "  veracity  "  in  at  least  one  other 
faculty  of  the  mind  besides  internal  consciousness, 
that  there  is  a  "  behef"  that  can  be  trusted,  and  that 
this  belief  is  "ultimate,"  is  in  fact  "evidently  ul- 


must  be  in  each  case  assumed  and  taken 
for  granted  before  you  can  have  any 
cognizance  whatever  of  your  past  ex- 
perience." "  As  it  is  most  desirable 
to  bring  this  point  quite  clearly  home, 
I  will  cite  and  apply  a  passage  in 
which  Mr.  Stuart  Mill  states  his  own 
philosophical  doctrine.  *  There  is  no 
knowledge  a  priori ;  no  truths  cog- 
nizable by  the  mind's  inward  light,  and 
grounded  on  intuitive  evidence.  Sen- 
sation and  the  mind's  consciousness 
of  its  own  acts  are  not  only  the  ex- 
clusive sources,  but  the  sole  materials 
of  our  knowledge.'  Let  us  test,  then, 
by  these  principles  an  act  of  memory. 
I  am  at  this  moment  comfortably 
warm ;  but  I  call  to  mind  with  great 
clearness  the  fact,  that  a  short  time 
ago  I  was  very  cold.  What  datum 
does  '  sensation  '  give  me  1  Simply 
that  I  am  now  warm.  What  datum 
does  '  consciousness '  give  1  that  I 
have  the  jrresent  impression  of  having 
been  cold  a  short  time  ago.  But  both 
these  data  are  altogether  wide  of  the 
mark.  The  question  which  I  would 
earnestly  beg  Mr.  Mill  to  ask  himself 


is  this  :  —  What  is  my  ground  for  be- 
lieving that  I  ivas  cold  a  short  time 
ago  1  *  I  have  the  present  impression 
of  having  been  cold  a  short  time  ago  ;  * 
this  is  one  judgment.  'I  was  cold 
a  short  time  ago ; '  this  is  a  to-! 
tally  distinct  and  separate  judg- 
ment. There  is  no  necessary,  nor 
even  any  probable,  connection  be- 
tween these  two  judgments,  —  no 
ground  whatever  for  thinking  that  the 
truth  of  one  follows  from  the  truth  of 
the  other,  —  except  upon  the  hypoth- 
esis that  my  mind  is  so  constituted  as 
accurately  to  represent  past  facts.  But 
how  will  either  *  sensation  '  or  '  con- 
sciousness,' or  the  two  combined,  in 
any  way  suffice  for  the  establishment 
of  any  such  proposition  1  "  {On  Na- 
ture and  Grace,  1860,  pp.  26-28.)  The 
Philosophical  Introduction  is  the  work 
of  a  mind  of  extraordinary  acuteness, 
and  has  unfolded  many  important 
philosophical  truths,  Puhlished  at  the 
same  time  as  the  first  edition  of  my 
work  on  The  Intuitions  of  the  Mind, 
both  Dr.  Ward  and  myself  have  noticed 
curious  coincidences  in  the  two  works. 


70  3£B.    MILL'S   ADMISSIOJ^S, 

timate."  He  who  allows  so  much  might  have  in- 
quired whether  there  may  not  be  other  beliefs  of  the 
same  kind,  and  equally  veraciouS;  involved  in  the 
exercise  of  other  faculties  of  the  mind.  Mr.  Mill  is 
constantly  and  terribly  severe  in  his  strictures  on  the 
Intuitive  School  of  Philosophy ;  but  it  is  clear  he 
himself  belongs  to  an  intuitive  school^  without  know- 
ing or  at  least  avowing  it.  Admitting  an  intuitive 
consciousness  and  an  ultimate  belief^  he  makes  no 
attempt  to  show  how  far  they  modify  his  empirical 
philosophy,  and  he  enters  upon  no  scientific  investi- 
gation of  the  nature,  the  laws,  or  the  mode  of  oper- 
ation of  these  elements  of  our  nature. 

o.  The  mind,  whatever  it  he,  is  aware  of  itself  is 
aware  of  itself  as  a  series  of  feelings,  is  aware  of  it- 
self as  past  and  present.  The  statements  he  makes 
are  very  curious :  "  Our  notion  of  Mind,  as  well  as 
of  Matter,  is  the  notion  of  a  permanent  something, 
contrasted  with  the  perpetual  flux  of  the  sensations 
and  other  feehngs  or  mental  states  which  we  refer 
to  it."  (p.  205.)  "If  we  speak  of  the  Mind  as  a  se- 
ries of  feehngs,  we  are  obhged  to  complete  the  state- 
ment by  calhng  it  a  series  of  feelings  which  is  aware 
of  itself  as  past  and  future."  Again,  if  but  a  series 
of  feehngs,  it  "  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series." 
(pp.  212, 213.)  I  shall  have  to  subject  this  language 
to  a  sifbing  examination  in  the  two  next  chapters, 
where  it  will  be  shown  that  it  does  not  fairly  or  fully 
embody  the  facts  of  which  we  are  conscious.  I  quote 
it  at  present  to  show  that  Mr.  Mill  is  obliged  to 


^  MB.    MILL'S   ADMISSIONS.  71 

allow  that  there  is  something  permanent  in  mind, 
and  that  the  mind  is  in  a  sense  aware  of  itself  and 
of  this  permanence. 

The  above  seem  to  be  very  much  of  the  nature 
of  those  first  or  origmal  principles  which  the  Intui- 
tive School  of  Metaphysicians,  to  which  Mr.  Mill  is 
so  much  opposed,  are  in  the  way  of  putting  forward. 
Those  that  I  am  now  to  state  seem  to  be  of  the 
nature  of  laws  or  faculties  operating  in  the  mind. 
No  doubt,  as  we  are  ever  being  told,  we  prove  that 
they  exist  by  observation.  But  while  it  is  by  ex- 
perience we  discover  them  and  learn  their  nature, 
they  must  operate  prior  to  our  experience,  and  in- 
dependent of  it. 

T.  There  is  a  native  law  of  expectation.  He  tells 
us  that  the  psychological  method  which  he  adopts 
"  postulates,  first,  that  the  human  mind  is  capable  of 
Expectation.  In  other  words,  that  after  having  had 
actual  sensations,  we  are  capable  of  forming  the  con- 
ception of  Possible  sensations  ;  sensations  which  we 
are  not  feeling  at  the  present  moment,  but  which  we 
might  feel,  and  should  feel  if  certain  conditions  were 
present,  the  natm-e  of  which  conditions  we  have,  in 
many  cases,  learnt  by  experience."  (p.  190.)  Almost 
aU  metaphysicians  have  postulated,  that  the  mind 
has.  a  capacity  and  a  tendency  which  promj^t  it  to 
look  forward  from  the  past  and  present  to  the  future. 
They  have  done  so  because  internal  observation 
shows  that  there  must  be  some  such  principle,  and 
they  have  endeavored  to  give  the  proper  expression 


72  MB.   MILL'S   ADinSSION'S. 

of  it :  some  describing  it  (unfortunately,  as  I  think) 
as  an  expectation  that  the  future  will  resemble  the 
past ;  others  (also  unfortunately,  as  I  think)  as  a  be- 
lief in  the  uniformity  of  nature  ;  by  others,  more 
philosophically,  as  a  behef  in  the  identity  of  self  and 
of  other  objects,  together  with  a  conviction  that  the 
same  agents,  acting  as  a  cause,  will  produce  the 
same  effects.  But  it  does  not  concern  us  at  jDresent 
to  inquire  what  is  the  accurate  and  adequate  expres- 
sion of  the  law  (this  discussion  will  be  taken  up  as 
we  advance) ;  only,  I  may  remark,  that  Mr.  Mill's 
version  seems  to  me  to  be  about  the  most  defective 
and  confused  I  have  met  with,  experience  being  the 
arbiter,  for  he  makes  a  series  of  feelings,  each  one 
of  which  must  pass  away  before  another  appears, 
expect  something  of  itself  It  is  satisfactory,  how- 
ever, to  find  him  granting  that  there  is  such  a  law ; 
and  surely  he  cannot  object  to  others  making  a  like 
postulate,  and  endeavoring  to  give  an  account  of  it 
which  they  regard  as  being  more  in  accordance  with 
our  conscious  experience. 

V,  There  are  original  laws  of  association.  The 
psychological  theory  "  postulates,  secondly,  the  laws 
of  the  Association  of  Ideas."  Then  foUows  an 
enumeration  of  these  laws.  It  is  unnecessary  to 
give  it  at  this  place ;  it  will  subsequently  fall  under 
our  notice  and  review.  It  does  not  seem  to  me  to 
be  the  best  in  our  language ;  and  we  shall  find  that 
he  enormously  exaggerates  the  power  of  association. 
I  refer  to  it  at  present  to  show  that  he  is  admitting 


MB.  MILL'S   ADMISSIOJS'S,  73 

at  this  place  a  new  law,  or  rather  group  of  laws 
operating  in  the  mind. 

(p.  The  mind  can  form  very  lofty  ideas  as  to  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute.  In  this  respect  he  adopts 
deeper  and  in  some  respects  juster  views  than  those 
of  Hamilton.  "Something  infinite  is  a  conception 
which,  hke  most  of  our  complex  ideas,  contains  a 
negative  element,  but  which  contains  positive  ele- 
ments also.  Infinite  space,  for  instance :  is  there 
nothing  positive  m  that?  The  negative  part  of 
this  conception  is  the  absence  of  bounds.  The  posi- 
tive are,  the  idea  of  space,  and  of  space  greater  than 
any  finite  space,  so  of  infinite  duration,"  etc.  Again, 
"  Absolute,  in  reference  to  any  given  attribute,  sig- 
nifies the  possession  of  that  attribute  in  finished  per- 
fection and  completeness.  A  being  absolute  in 
knowledge,  for  example,  is  one  who  knows,  in  the 
literal  meaning  of  the  term,  everything.  Who  will 
pretend  that  this  conception  is  negative  or  unmean- 
ing to  us  ?  "  (pp.  45, 47.)  This  is  a  very  just  account, 
so  far  as  it  goes,  of  our  apprehension  of  the  infinite 
and  perfect-^  —  a  better  phrase  than  the  absolute. 
Mr.  Mill  does  not  say  that  this  conception  impHes 
any  intuitive  capacity ;  in  fact,  he  neglects  to  tell  us 
how  it  is  formed.  Whether  ultimate  or  not,  it  is 
acknowledged  that  the  mind  has  such  a  conception ; 
and  Mr.  Mill,  if  he  accoimt  for  it  on  his  psychological 

1 1  have  endeavored  to  show  {Intui-  Deity,  and  that  we  regard  that  thing 

tions  of  the  Mind,  Pt.  ii.  B.  ii.  c.  3)  as    (1.)   ever   exceeding   our    widest 

that  we  have  a  positive  notion  of  some  image  or  notion,  and  (2.)  such  that 

thing  as  infinite,  say  space,  or  time,  or  nothing  can  be  added  to  it 


74  MB.   MILL'S   ADIflSSION'S, 

theory,  will  require  to  bring  in  something  much 
deeper  than  the  sensations  and  associations  of  sensa- 
tion, from  which  he  seems  to  draw  our  ideas. 

We  have  yet  to  look  at  some  other  laws  which 
look  excessively  like  the  first  or  ultimate  truths, 
which  metaphysicians  of  the  Intuitive  School  have 
been  in  the  way  of  enunciating  and  employing. 

/.  Beliefs  are  ultimate  when  no  reason  can  he  given 
for  them  which  does  not  imply  their  existence  and 
veracity,  I  have  already  (see  q.)  given  the  passage 
which  authorizes  this  law.  After  stating  that  belief 
in  the  veracity  of  memory  is  evidently  ultimate,  he 
adds,  "  No  reason  can  be  given  for  it  which  does  not 
presuppose  the  belief,  and  assume  it  to  be  well  ground- 
ed." After  announcing  this  principle,  he  might  have 
been  expected  to  inquire  whether  it  does  not  sanc- 
tion other  cognitions  and  beliefs,  such  as  those  which 
we  have  of  the  externality  and  extension  of  bodies, 
and  the  existence  of  time  and  of  an  abiding  self  It 
can  be  shown  that  every  attempt  to  derive  these 
from  other  elements  presupposes  the  ideas  and  the 
convictions. 

If.  There  are  truths  implied  in  other  truths  neces* 
sarily,  and  according  to  an  ultimate  law,  internal  or 
external  He  is  speaking  of  logical  Proprium,  and 
of  its  being  involved  in  the  attribute  which  the 
name  ordinarily  or  specially  connotes ;  and  he  afiirms, 
that  "  whether  a  Proprium  follows  by  demonstration 
or  by  causation,  it  follows  necessarily ;  that  is  to 
say,  it  cannot  hut  follow  consistently  with  some  law 


3fE.   IflLL'S   AD3nSSI0]SrS.  75 

which  we  regard  as  a  part  of  the  constitution  either 
of  our  thinking  faculty  or  of  the  universe."  {Logic, 
B.  I.  c.  vii.  §  7.)  As  I  understand  this  statement^  it 
impHes  that  when  a  Proprium  follows  by  demonstra- 
tion, it  does  so  according  to  a  law  which  is  part  of 
the  ^^  constitution  "  of  our  "  thinking  faculty."  The 
language  reminds  us  of  that  of  Eeid  and  Hamilton. 
(0.  Any  assertion  which  conflicts  with  the  Funda- 
mental Laios  of  Thought  is  to  us  unhelievable,  and 
this  may  very  j)ossihIy  j^roceed  from  the  native  struc- 
ture of  the  mind.  His  language  is  very  remarkable. 
He  is  speaking  of  the  three  Fundamental  Laws  of 
Thought,  —  those  of  Identity,  Contradiction,  and 
Excluded  Middle,  and  he  thus  comments  upon  them  : 
"  Whether  the  three  so-called  Fundamental  Laws  are 
laws  of  our  thoughts  by  the  native  structure  of  the 
mind,  or  merely  because  we  perceive  them  to  be 
universally  true  of  observed  phenomena,  I  will  not 
positively  decide ;  but  they  are  laws  of  our  thoughts, 
now  and  invincibly  so.  They  may  or  may  not  be 
capable  of  alteration  by  experience,  but  the  condi- 
tions of  our  existence  deny  to  us  the  experience 
which  would  be  required  to  alter  them.  Any  asser- 
tion, therefore,  which  conflicts  with  one  of  these 
laws,  —  any  proposition,  for  instance,  which  asserts 
a  contradiction,  though  it  were  on  a  subject  wholly 
removed  from  the  sphere  of  our  experience,  is  to  us 
unbehevable.  The  belief  in  such  a  proposition  is,  in 
the  present  constitution  of  nature,  impossible  as  a 
mental  fact."    (p.  418.)     The   language  is  cautious 


76  MB.   MILL'S  ADMISSIOJSrS. 

and  hesitating.  It  is  evident  that  he  would  fain  ex- 
plain the  incapacity  of  believing  contradictory  prop- 
ositions by  his  favorite  law  of  association.  We  shall 
see  as  we  advance  that  this  law  cannot  explain  our 
peculiar  conviction,  but  meanwhile  it  is  interesting 
to  notice  that  he  will  not  decide  whether  these 
fundamental  principles  may  not  be  "laws  of  our 
thoughts  by  the  native  structure  of  the  mind."  The 
hesitation  implies  a  doubt  of  the  whole  system  of 
empiricism. 

Some  of  my  readers,  in  looking  at  these  passages 
thus  brought  into  convenient  (or  inconvenient)  jux- 
taposition, may  require  to  be  assured  that  I  have  not 
taken  them  from  Hamilton's  works,  instead  of  the 
Examination  of  Hamilton  and  other  works  of  Mr. 
Mill.  And  were  it  not  that  in  the  expression  of 
them  they  have  not  the  homeliness  and  depth  of 
Keid,  nor  the  clinching  logical  grasp  of  Hamilton, 
they  might  be  mistaken  for  utterances  of  the  two 
great  Scottish  metaphysicians.  I  have  allowed  Mr. 
Mill  to  speak  for  himself  All  that  I  have  done  is 
to  cull  out  the  scattered  statements  as  to  ultimate 
truth,  and  present  them  in  relievo,  that  students  of 
philosophy  may  mark  their  significance.  I  mean  to 
refer  to  them  from  time  to  time  in  the  coming  dis- 
cussion ;  but  I  do  not  make  use  of  them  simply  as 
concessions  by  Mr.  Mill.  I  would  not  think  it  worth 
while  employing  a  mere  argumentum  ad  hominem. 
I  feel  no  pleasure  in  pointing  out  real  or  seeming 


3flt.    MILL'S   ADMISSIO^''S.  T7 

incongruities  in  the  metaphysical  system  of  an  emi- 
nent thinker,  who,  in  other  departments,  such  as  politr 
ical  economy  and  inductive  logic,  has  done  so  much 
to  advance  knowledge.  I  employ  these  admissions 
because  they  contain  important  truth,  not  always  in 
the  best  form,  but  capable  of  being  fully  vindicated. 

Mr.  Mill,  I  beheve,  would  urge  that  many  of  the 
admissions  thus  made  are  not  separate  and  distinct 
from  each  other,  and  that  several  of  them  might  be 
included  mider  one  head.  Be  it  so,  it  is  nevertheless 
of  advantage  to  have  them  spread  out  in  the  several 
shapes  in  which  they  are  presented,  the  more  so  that 
some  of  these  imply  very  important  principles  with 
far-looking  results. 

The  first  principles  thus  avowed  in  the  course  of 
his  exposition  should  have  had  a  formal  place  allot- 
ted them  in  the  system,  say  at  the  commencement 
or  the  close.  Had  this  been  done,  it  would  have  ut- 
terly destroyed  the  apparent  simplicity,  and  I  believe 
also  the  s^nnmetry  of  his  system,  which  would  have 
been  seen  to  be  a  very  complex  and  heterogeneous 
one.  Seemingly  a  continuation  of  the  philosophies 
of  Hobbes,  Condillac,  and  Hume,  it  contains  as  many 
assumptions  as  are  demanded  by  the  Scottish  meta- 
physicians, who  ajopeal  to  fundamental  laws  of 
thought,  or  by  the  German  metaphysicians,  who 
stand  up  for  a  priori  forms. 

It  will  not  be  difficult  to  show,  as  we  proceed  to 
take  up  one  special  topic  after  another,  that  these 
admissions  logically  imply  vastly  more  than  is  con- 


78  MB.  MILL'S  ADMISSION'S. 

ceded  in  the  metaphysical  system  constructed.  In 
particular,  it  will  be  proven  that  they  are  made  on 
avowed  or  imphed  principles,  such  as  those  of  the 
veracity  of  consciousness,  and  of  ultimate  beliefs, 
such  as  those  of  self-evidence,  necessity,  and  univer- 
sality, which  require  that  vastly  more  be  conceded. 

Already  it  is  clear  that  the  question  between  Mr. 
Mill  and  the  school  he  opposes  cannot  be  said  to  be 
one  as  to  the  existence  of  intuition.  I  am  not  sure 
that  any  judicious  defender  of  fundamental  truth 
would  demand  or  postulate  a  greater  number  of  first 
principles  than  those  allowed  by  the  most  influential 
opponent  of  necessary  truth  in  our  day.  The  ques- 
tion is  not  one  as  to  the  reality,  but  as  to  the  nature 
and  significance  of  ultimate  truth. 

Of  this  I  am  sure,  that  the  pressing  philosophical 
want  of  our  day  is  an  exposition,  with  an  enumera- 
tion and  classification  of  the  intuitions  of  the  mind 
which,  we  have  seen,  must  be  admitted  even  by 
those  who  are  supposed  to  deny  them.  It  is  time 
that  those  who  allow  them  incidentally  should  be 
required  to  avow  them  openly  and  formally,  and 
give  a  separate  place  to  them.  A  flood  of  light  will 
be  thrown  on  metaphysics,  and  a  world  of  logomachy 
between  rival  schools  scattered,  when  we  have  an 
earnest  attempt,  by  one  competent  for  the  work,  to 
,unfold  the  laws  of  our  intuitions  and  their  mode  of 
operation. 


CHAPTER   lY 


SENSATIONS. 


IN  the  school  to  which  Mr.  Mill  has  attached  him- 
self, there  is  a  perpetual  reference  to  Sensation. 
Those  who  look  into  their  works  with  the  view  of 
discovering  the  deeper  properties  or  higher  affections 
of  the  mind,  are  wearied  by  the  everlastmg  recur- 
rence of  the  word,  and  by  the  perpetual  obtrusion 
of  the  thing  denoted  by  it.-^  Some  members  of  the 
school  seem  to  be  incapable  of  comprehending  any- 
thing but  matter,  and  the  sensations  excited  by  mat- 
ter. I  bring  no  such  charge  against  Mr.  Mill.  He 
is  clearly  capable  of  mounting  into  a  higher  and 
more  spiritual  region.  But  even  he  is  often  dragged 
down  to  the  dust  of  the  earth  by  the  weight  of  the 
theory  which  he  has  undertaken  to  support.     As  we 


1  The  mental  sciences  elevate  those  School,  and  that  they  be  kept  from  so 

who  study  them  in  proportion  as  they  setting  their  questions,  as  to  encourage 

exhibit  the  higher  faculties  and  ideas  the    reading    only   of   the   works    of 

of  the  mind.    This  leads  me  to  remark,  writers  belonging  to  that  school.     In 

that  in  the  Competitive  Examinations  those  departments  in  which  the  men- 

which  now  exercise  so   great  an   in-  tal   sciences   have   a  place,  they   are 

fluence  on  the  studies  of  our  young  surely  meant  to  stimulate  and  to  test 

men,   care   should  be  taken  that  the  a  different  order  of  tastes  and  talents 

Examiners  in  Morals  should  not  be  from  those  called  forth  by  the  physical 

taken  mainly   from   the    Sensational  and  physiological  sciences. 

(79) 


80  SENSATIONS. 

are  threatened  with  a  revival,  under  a  new  and  dis- 
guised, and  somewhat  more  elevated  form,  of  the 
Sensational  system  which  wrought  such  mischief  in 
France  at  the  end  of  last  century,  it  is  essential  that 
we  inquire  what  sensation  is,  and  settle  what  it  can 
do,  and  what  it  cannot  do.  In  other  words,  let  us, 
with  the  internal  sense  as  our  informant,  look  care- 
fully at  the  original  matter  out  of  which  Mr.  Mill 
draws  our  higher  ideas,  with  the  view  of  determining 
whether  the  seed  is  fitted  to  yield  such  fruit. 

What,  then,  is  Sensation  ?  It  is  allowed  on  aU 
hands  that  it  cannot  be  positively  defined.  This 
arises  from  its  being  a  simple  quality,  and  there  is 
nothing  simpler  into  which  to  resolve  it.  All  we 
can  do  in  the  way  of  unfolding  its  nature,  is  to  bid 
every  man  consult  his  consciousness  when  any  bodily 
object  is  affecting  his  senses  or  sensibility.  But  while 
we  cannot  furnish  an  affirmative  definition,  we  can 
offer  some  explanations  to  remove  misapprehensions, 
and  some  decided  denials  to  oppose  accepted  errors. 

It  should  be  understood  that  the  word  is  employed 
to  denote  an  affection  of  the  conscious  mind  (what- 
ever that  may  be),  and  not  of  the  mere  bodily  frame. 
It  should  further  be  borne  in  mind  that  it  does  not 
include  that  knowledge  of  bodily  objects,  of  their 
externality  and  extension,  which  is  now  denoted  by 
the  phrase  '^  sense-perception."  It  is  of  special  im- 
portance to  press  attention  to  the  circumstance  that 
sensation  is  not  a  separately  existing  object  hke  this 
stone,  this  tree,  or  this  bird,  but  is  an  attribute  of 


SEiriSATIOIlS.  81 

an  object.  At  this  point  we  are  coming  in  collision 
with  Mr.  Mill.  Elsewhere  {Logic,  B.  i.  c.  iii.)  he  has 
an  ingenious  distribution  of  namable  things  or  real- 
ities into  substances^  attributes,  and  feelings,  the  last 
of  course  includmg  sensations.  "  Substances  are  not 
all  that  exist :  attributes,  if  such  things  are  to  be 
spoken  of,  must  be  said  to  exist,  —  feelings  certainly 
exist."  "  Feelings,  or  states  of  consciousness,  are  as- 
suredly to  be  counted  among  reahties,  but  they  can- 
not be  reckoned  among  substances  or  attributes." 
This  distribution  of  realities,  especially  this  separa- 
tion of  feelings  from  substances  or  attributes,  seems 
to  me  to  be  curious :  I  have  not  met  with  it  else- 
where. It  is  favorable  to  Mr.  MiU's  purpose,  which 
we  did  not  so  well  know  when  we  had  only  his  work 
on  Logic,  but  with  which  we  are  now  made  fuUy  ac- 
quainted by  the  fuller  exposition  of  his  views  in  the 
Examination  of  Hamilton:  that  purpose  being  to 
banish,  to  as  great  a  distance  as  possible,  substance 
and  attribute,  and  leave  only  feelings.  We  are  not 
yet  sufficiently  advanced,  in  these  discussions,  to 
deal  with  the  confused  metaphysics  of  substance  and 
attribute.  The  present  topic  is  sensation,  and  sensa- 
tion I  maintain  is  an  affection,  that  is  an  attribute, 
of  the  conscious  mind. 

But  Mr.  Mill  tells  us  that  "  the  sensations  are  all 
of  which  I  am  directly  conscious."  (Logic,  B.  i.  c.  iii. 
§  7.)  This  mode  of  representing  our  conscious  states 
was  introduced  by  Hume,  who  derived  his  scejDtical 
conclusions  from   it.     He   maintained  that  we   are 


82  SEJSSATIOIiS. 

conscious  only  of  impressions  and  ideas,  the  ideas 
being  merely  fainter  impressions.  Hume  took  care 
never  to  enter  into  any  explanation  as  to  what  he 
meant  by  "  impression ; "  whether  it  implies,  as  it 
should  do  if  it  has  any  meaning,  a  thing  impressing 
and  a  thing  impressed.  The  doctrine  of  the  school 
of  Mill  is  that  we  are  conscious  merely  of  feelings, 
and  among  these,  the  first  and  all  along  the  main 
place  is  given  to  sensation.  Now,  in  opposition  to 
these  defective  statements,  I  maintain  that  we  are 
conscious,  not  of  a  mere  impression,  but  of  a  thing 
impressed,  not  of  sensation  apart,  but  of  self  as  sen- 
tient. On  hearing  this  statement,  metaphysicians 
will  be  disposed  to  ask  with  amazement,  perhaps  with 
scorn,  "What!  are  we  really  then  conscious  of 
self?"  And  they  will  tell  us  that  the  child  has 
never  said  to  itself,  "  This  is  I."  If  they  think  it 
worth  while  going  any  further,  they  may  then  in 
condescension,  or  compassion  towards  our  ignorance, 
explain  to  us  that  the  Ego  is  a  metaphysical  notion, 
the  product  of  advanced  reflection.  But  I  disarm 
all  this  at  once,  by  allowing  that  we  are  never  con- 
scious of  a  self,  apart  from  self  as  sentient,  or  as 
engaged  in  thinking,  willing,  or  some  other  opera- 
tion. And  I  balance  this  statement  by  another,  that 
we  are  just  as  little  conscious  of  the  sensation,  or 
the  impression,  or  the  thought,  or  volition  apart  from 
self.  The  child  has  never  said  to  itself,  "  This  is  I ; " 
but  just  as  little  has  it  said,  "This  is  an  impression;" 
"This  is  a  sensation."     "We  are  in  fact  conscious  of 


SEJSrSATIOJSS.  83 

both  in  one  concrete  act;  ever  conscious  of  self  in 
its  present  affection,  conscious  of  self  as  affected. 
Mr.  Mill  uses  language  which  imj^lies  this  when  he 
says  (§  4)  that  "  sensations  are  states  of  the  sentient 
mind ; "  and  everybody  employs  like  expressions  if 
he  does  not  happen  to  be  upholding  a  special  theory. 
He  who  leaves  out  either  of  these  elements  is  not 
giving  a  correct  interpretation  of  consciousness. 
We  may,  by  abstraction,  separately  contemplate  the 
two,  and  important  intellectual  purposes  are  served 
by  such  a  process.  Each  of  the  things  we  thus  dis- 
tinguish in  thought  has  a  real  existence ;  the  one  as 
much  as  the  other :  the  sensation  or  feeling  has  an 
existence,  but  so  has  also  the  seE  Not  that  either 
has  a  separate  existence,  or  an  independent  exist- 
ence, or  an  existence  out  of  the  other.  As  the  one 
is  an  abstract,  so  is  also  the  other.  If  you  call  the 
one,  say  the  self,  a  metaphysical  entity,  you  should 
in  consistency  describe  the  other,  the  sensation,  as  in 
the  same  sense  a  metaphysical  entity.  The  correct 
statement  is  that  we  are  conscious  of  the  sensation  as 
a  sensation  of  self  and  of  the  self  as  under  sensation. 
And  as  we  can  never  be  conscious  of  the  self,  except 
as  sentient  or  otherwise  affected,  so  we  can  never  be 
conscious  of  a  sensation  except  as  a  sensation  of  a 
sentient  self  It  is  high  time,  when  physiologists 
and  metaphysicians  are  drawing  such  perverted  con- 
clusions, to  put  this  seemingly  insignificant  and  yet 
really  important  limitation  upon  the  common  state- 
ment. 


84  SENSATIOJS'S. 

I  am  quite  willing  that  Mr.  Mill  should  apply  the 
sharp  razor  of  his  Psychological  Method  to  sensation. 
I  have  called  in  consciousness  to  declare  what  is  in 
sensation,  but  I  do  not  allow  consciousness  to  decide 
at  once,  and  without  further  inquiry,  that  sensations 
are  and  must  be  primary  and  elementary.  I  freely 
allow  the  mental  analyst  to  put  them  in  his  crucible, 
and  to  try  if  he  can  decompose  them.  No  such  at- 
tempt has  been  made ;  I  beheve  no  such  attempt 
will  ever  be  made.  Mr.  Mill  and  his  school  acknowl- 
edge that  they  are  unresolvable  and  ultimate.  I  am 
glad  to  have  one  element  allowed,  —  it  may  prepare 
the  way  for  the  admission  of  others  on  the  same  title. 
In  particular,  the  self  (I  will  show  in  next  chapter) 
may  turn  out  to  be  quite  as  unresolvable  as  the  sen- 
sations of  self 

As  so  much  is  made  of  sensations  by  this  whole 
school  of  philosophy,  we  must  be  careful  to  inquire 
what  is  really  embraced  in  them,  and  not  allow  any- 
thing to  be  drawn  from  them  which  is  not  truly  in 
them.  It  is  necessary  in  these  times  to  utter  even 
such  a  truism  as  this,  that  a  sensation  is  a  sensation, 
and  is  nothing  more.  A  sensation  is  not  a  thing  ex- 
tended, is  not  extension,  is  not  space.  A  sensation 
being  only  momentarily  under  consciousness,  is  not 
the  same  as  time,  which  has  a  past  and  a  future.  A 
sensation  is  not  matter  or  body,  which  is  extended 
and  occupies  space.  A  sensation  may  be  preceded 
by  resistance,  but  is  not  itself  resistance,  which  im- 
plies one  body  opposing  the  movement  of  another. 


SEJS'SATIOJ^S.  85 

It  is  important  even  to  make  the  forther  statement, 
that  we  are  conscious  of  many  other  mental  acts  and 
affections  which  are  not  identical  with  sensations. 
A  sensation  is  not  memory,  say  the  remembrance  of 
my  reading  Mr.  Mill's  book  at  a  particular  time.  A 
sensation  is  not  expectation,  the  expectation  which 
I  cherish  that  truth  will  in  the  end  prevail  over  error. 
A  sensation  is  not  an  imagination,  as  when  I  paint  a 
glorious  ideal  of  beauty  or  of  virtue.  A  sensation 
is  not  judgment,  even  when  that  judgment  is  about 
sensation,  as  when  I  decide  that  the  sensations  pro- 
duced by  a  noise  are  not  so  pleasant  as  those  excited 
by  music.  Certainly,  sensation  is  not  reasonmg,  as 
when  I  argue  that  mere  sentient  affections  cannot 
yield  our  higher  ideas  and  deeper  convictions.  Sen- 
sation is  not  even  the  same  as  emotion,  as  when  I 
fear  that  the  sensational  philosoj)hy  is  to  prevail  for 
a  time  in  this  country.  A  sensation  is  something  far 
lower  than  sentiment  or  affection,  as  when  I  would 
love  God  and  my  neighbors,  —  even  those  from 
whom  I  differ  in  most  important  points.  A  sensa- 
tion is  not  a  vohtion,  as  when  I  resolve  to  do  my 
best  to  oppose  prevailing  error,  —  even  when  coun- 
tenanced by  influential  names. 

But  may  not  sensation  be  the  cause  of  something 
else  ?  I  can  answer  this  question  only  after  giving 
an  explanation.  In  ordinary  mundane  action,  an 
effect  is  always  the  result  of  the  operation  of  more 
than  one  agent  or  antecedent.  "  A  man,"  says  Mr. 
Mill,  '^  takes  mercury,  goes  out  of  doors,  and  catches 


86  SENSATIOirS. 

cold.  We  say,  perhaps,  that  the  cause  of  his  taking 
cold  was  exposure  to  the  air.  .  .  .  But  to  be  accurate, 
we  ought  to  say  that  the  cause  was  exposure  to  the 
air  while  under  the  effect  of  mercury."  [Logic,  B.  iii. 
e.  V.  §  3.)  I  agree  with  this  doctrine  of  Mr.  Mill  (it 
will  be  expounded  more  fully  in  chapter  xiii.  of  this 
treatise),  and  I  would  apply  it  to  the  supposed  causa- 
tive influence  of  sensations.  Sensation  may  be  one 
of  the  antecedents  which  go  to  make  up  the  cause, 
but  it  cannot,  properly  speaking,  be  a  cause  in  itself; 
it  is  a  condition  or  occasion,  and  can  produce  an 
effect  only  when  conjoined  with  some  other  agent. 
A  sensation  may  be  the  occasion  of  something  else,  — 
say  of  a  violent  derangement  of  a  bodily  organ ;  but 
that  derangement  is  not  the  sensation,  and  in  ac- 
coimting  for  it  we  must  look  not  merely  to  the  sen- 
sation, but  the  properties  of  the  organ  affected.  A 
sensation  may,  in  like  manner,  be  the  occasion  of  a 
new  thought  arising,  but  the  thought  should  not  be 
confounded  with  the  sensation ;  the  sensation  is  not 
even  the  cause  of  the  thought.  Such  a  sensation  in 
a  plant  (supposing  it  to  be  capable  of  feeling),  such 
a  sensation  in  one  of  the  lower  animals,  would  give 
rise  to  no  such  thought.  The  sensation  can  origin- 
ate the  thought  only  by  stirring  up  a  mental  ca- 
pacity in  the  soul,  which  mental  potency  is  to  be 
regarded  as  the  main  element  in  the  complex  cause. 
And  yet  this  essential  element  is  inexcusably,  cul- 
pably overlooked  by  the  Sensational  School,  when 
they  derive  all  our  thoughts  from  sensations.     They 


SEJSSATIOJSS.  87 

make  the  mere  auxiliary  or  stimulating  condition 
the  producing  power,  as  if,  to  use  a  homely  illustra- 
tion, we  should  make  the  setting  of  the  pointer, 
which  roused  the  attention  of  the  sportsman,  the 
cause  of  the  IdUing  of  the  bird  shot  by  him.  The 
mind  of  man,  consciousness  being  the  witness,  does 
entertain  a  vast  variety  of  ideas,  some  of  them  of  a 
very  elevatmg  character,  such  as  those  we  entertain 
of  God,  and  good,  and  eternity.  I  doubt  whether 
these  are  the  product  of  sensations  in  any  sense.  Of 
this  I  am  sure,  that  they  do  not  proceed  from  sen- 
sations except  when  sensations  are  employed  and 
moulded  by  lofty  mental  faculties,  which  faculties, 
and  not  the  sensations,  are  the  main  agents  in  the 
production  of  the  effect ;  and  they  should  have  their 
nature,  laws,  and  modes  of  action  unfolded  by  any 
one  who  would  give  us  a  correct  theory  of  our  men- 
tal operations. 

By  insisting  on  such  points  as  these,  we  lay  an 
effectual  arrest  on  those  rash  speculations  of  our  day 
which  derive  man's  loftiest  ideas  from  so  low  and 
subordinate  an  agent  as  sensation. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

MIND,  PERSONALITY,   PERSONAL   IDENTITY,   SUBSTANCE. 


M' 


"R  MILL  admits  fully  the  veracity  of  conscious- 
ness and  the  reahty  of  the  facts  attested  by  it 
(see  d,  8,7].)  But  his  view  of  the  objects  of  which 
it  is  cognizant  is  very  defective.  It  seems  to  be  de- 
rived, through  Mr.  James  Mill  and  Dr.  Thomas 
Brown,  from  Hume  and  the  Sensational  School  of 
France.  CondiUaCj  and  those  who  followed  him, 
designated  all  the  states  of  the  mind  by  the  words 
sentir  and  sensihilite,  which  conveniently  embraced 
two  such  different  things  as  sensations  excited  by  out- 
ward objects,  and  mental  emotions,  such  as  hope  and 
fear.  We  have  no  such  pliable  word  in  our  tongue, 
and  Brown,  who  caught  so  much  of  the  French  spirit, 
had  to  adopt  a  narrower  phrase  when  he  habitually 
represents  all  states  of  mind  as  Feelings :  thus  he 
speaks  of  "  feelings  of  relation "  and  "  feehngs  of 
approbation,"  both  of  which  imply  judgment.  Mr. 
James  Mill  says,  "  In  the  very  word  feeling,  aU  that 
is  implied  in  the  word  consciousness  is  involved." 
And  now  we  find  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  declaring  ^^  a  feehng 
and  a  state  of  consciousness  are,  in  the  language  of 

(88) 


MIND,   PEBSONALITY,   ETC.  89 

philosopliy "  [that  is,  in  the  philosophy  of  Thomas 
Brown  and  James  Mill],  "  equivalent  expressions : 
everything  is  a  feeling  of  which  the  mind  is  con- 
scious ;  everything  which  it  feels,  or,  in  other  words, 
which  forms  a  part  of  its  own  sentient  existence." 
Again,  "  Feeling,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  is 
a  genus  of  which  Sensation,  Emotion,  and  Thought 
are  the  subordinate  species."  {Logic,  B.  i.  c.  iii.  §  3.) 
Of  course  Mr.  Mill  is  at  liberty  to  choose  his  own 
nomenclature,  and  use  it  in  the  signification  he  thinks 
fit  to  attach  to  it.  But  others  have  an  equal  hberty 
to  reject  it  and  give  their  reasons.  It  seems  to  me 
an  unwarrantable  use  of^  the  phrase  to  make  Feel- 
ings embrace  Thought,  and  I  may  add  YoUtion  -,  and 
those  who  so  use  it  will  be  found,  in  spite  of  them- 
selves, and  of  all  explanations,  understanding  the 
word  in  its  habitual  and  proper  signification ;  and 
when  all  other  ideas  and  resolutions  are  spoken  of 
as  "  feelings,"  the  impression  will  be  left  that  they 
are  part  of  our  sentient  and  (at  best)  emotional 
nature. 

Mr.  Mill  claims  the  liberty  of  examining  all  the 
facts  of  consciousness,  and  of  resolving  them  if  he 
can  into  simpler  elements.  I  freely  grant  him  this 
power.  Our  sensations,  he  grants,  are  simple  and 
original.  But  I  have  argued  that  when  we  are  con- 
scious of  a  sensation,  we  are  always  conscious  of  self 
as  sentient.  Now  I  am  quite  ready  to  allow  Mr. 
Mill  or  any  other  to  reduce  the  self  to  something 
more  elementary.     But  I  am  sure  no  components, 


90  MIND,    PEBSOJS'ALITY, 

which  did  not  contain  self,  could  give  us  seE  Surely 
our  perception  of  self  could  not  be  given  by  mere 
sensations,  that  is,  by  sensations  in  which  self  is  not 
mixed  up.  We  are  as  conscious  of  the  self  as  of 
the  sensation ;  and  the  sensation  could  as  little  give 
us  the  self  as  the  self  could  give  the  sensation.  It 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  this  self  appears  in  all 
our  other  mental  exercises,  —  thus  showing  that  it 
is  more  essential  than  our  very  sensations;  it  is 
found  in  our  memories,  beliefs,  imaginations,  judg- 
ments, emotions,  and  volitions.  We  are  conscious 
of  these  not  separately  or  as  abstracts ;  but  of 
self  as  remembering,  self  as  believing,  self  as  imag- 
ining, self  as  judging,  self  as  under  feeling,  self  as 
willing. 

This  self  is  what  I  call  a  Person.  Thus  under- 
stood, it  is  altogether  correct  to  say  that  we  are  con- 
scious of  ourselves  as  persons.  Not  that  we  are 
conscious  of  personality  as  a  separate  thing ;  we  are 
conscious  in  one  concrete  act  of  this  person  as  sen- 
tient, or  as  thinking,  or  resolving.  I  believe  that  the 
infant,  that  the  child,  does  not  separate  the  two. 
Even  the  mature  man  seldom  draws  the  distinction 
unless,  indeed,  he  be  addicted  to  reflection,  or  has  to 
speak  of  the  ego  and  the  7ion  ego.  It  is  only  on  our 
remembering  the  self,  and  finding  it  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  various  states  of  self,  and  on 
our  discovering  that  there  are  other  conscious  beings 
besides  ourselves,  that  we  ever  think  of  forming  to 
ourselves  the  abstraction  personahty,  or  taking  the 


PEBSONAL    IDENTITY,    SUBSTANCE.  91 

trouble  to  affirm  that  we  are  the  feame  persons  to- 
day as  we  were  yesterday^  or  that  we  are  different 
from  all  other  persons. 

So  milch  for  our  consciousness  of  our  present  self, 
or  of  ourselves  as  persons.  The  truth  now  evolved 
enables  us  to  develop  the  exact  psychological  nature 
of  our  conviction  of  personal  identity.  In  all  our 
waking  moments  we  have  a  consciousness  of  a 
present  self  But  in  every  exercise  of  memory  we 
have  a  remembrance  of  a  past  self  We  remember 
the  event  as  in  past  time.  We  remember  it  as  an 
experience  of  self  Thus,  in  remembering  that  we 
visited  the  London  Exhibition,  we  recollect  not  mere- 
ly the  Exhibition,  but  ourselves  as  seeing  it.  True, 
this  recollection  of  ourselves  may  be  very  faint  in 
comparison  with  that  of  the  brilliant  objects  wit- 
nessed ;  and,  from  laws  of  memory  to  be  afterwards 
referred  to,  it  may  very  much  disappear ;  still  it  is 
there  wrapt  up  in  one  concrete  act  with  the  image 
of  the  external  things.  In  this  remembrance  of 
ourselves  we  have  more  than  a  recollection  of  a  past 
thought  or  a  past  feeling,  say  of  the  feeling  we  had 
when  visiting  the  Exhibition ;  we  remember  the  feel- 
ing as  a  feeling  of  self  Here,  as  in  so  many  other 
cases  which  will  come  under  our  notice,  Mr.  Mill  has 
failed  to  apprehend  and  unfold  all  that  is  in  the  fact 
of  consciousness.  "  The  feeling  I  had  yesterday,"  is 
his  account  {Logic,  B.  i.  c.  iii.  §  2),  "is  gone  never  to 
return ;  what  I  have  to-day  is  another  feeling  ex- 
actly Hke  the  former,  but  still  distinct  from  it."    This 


92  MIND,   PEBSONALITY, 

is  not  the  correct  statement.  What  I  had  yesterday 
was  a  conscious  self  under  one  affection,  say  grief; 
what  I  have  to-day  is  also  a  conscious  self  under,  it 
may  be,  a  like  affection  of  grief,  or  it  may  be  under 
a  different  affection,  say  joy.  Having  thus  a  past 
self  brought  up  by  memory,  and  a  present  self  un- 
der consciousness,  we  compare  them  and  affirm  that 
they  are  the  same.  This  is  simply  the  expression  of 
the  fact  falling  under  the  eye  of  consciousness.  Let 
Mr.  Mill,  if  he  choose,  try  his  sharp  analysis  upon  it. 
K  he  does  so,  he  will  find  the  edge  of  his  instrument 
bent  back  as  he  would  cut  it.  It  is  a  rock,  itself 
needing  no  support,  but  fitted  to  act  as  a  foundation. 
It  is  a  self-evident  truth,  attained  by  the  bare  con- 
templation of  the  objects ;  and  no  one  can  be  made 
to  come  to  any  other  decision,  or  to  allow  that  he 
is  a  different  person  now  from  what  he  was  when 
he  recollects  himself  at  some  given  instant  in  the 
past. 

We  see  what  is  meant  by  personality  and  personal 
identity.  We  can  express  both  these,  without  wrap- 
ping them  in  that  awful  mystery  in  which  they  have 
so  often  been  made  to  appear.  Personality  is  the 
self  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  every  mental  act. 
Personal  identity  is  the  sameness  of  the  conscious 
self  as  perceived  at  different  times.  The  phrases  do 
not  point  to  some  unknown  essence,  apart  from  or 
behind  the  known  thing.  They  simply  designate  an 
essential,  an  abiding  element  of  the  thing  known. 
A-S  the  personaHty  and  personal  identity  appear,  we 


FEBSONAL    IDENTITY,    SUBSTANCE.  93 

are  entitled  to  insist  that  they  be  brought  out  to 
view  and  expressed  in  every  proper  science  of  psy- 
chology. One  of  Aristotle's  definitions  of  the  soul 
is  "that  (tovto)  by  which  we  live,  and  feel,  and  un- 
derstand."-^ Some  have  charged  him  with  intro- 
ducing an  unmeaning  phrase  when  he  mentions  not 
only  certain  quahties  of  the  soul,  but  a  that  by  which 
we  exercise  the  quaUties.  But  Aristotle  was  far  too 
comprehensive  and  accurate  a  thinker  to  omit  the 
TovTOy  by  which,  no  doubt,  he  meant  to  designate  a 
thing,  an  existence,  or  rather  a  thing  having  exist- 
ence, and  capable  of  Hving,  feehng,  understanding. 
As  we  advance,  we  shall  see  that  Mr.  Mill  is  obliged 
to  use  similar  phrases  to  denote  the  permanent  thing 
that  abides,  amid  the  changes  of  attribute  or  ex- 
ercise. In  ordinary  circumstances,  no  doubt,  our  at- 
tention is  directed  most  forcibly  to  the  changing 
element,  to  the  action  and  new  manifestation,  and 
may  allow  the  other,  which  is  ever  the  same,  to  fall 
very  much  into  what  Mr.  Mill  calls  "  obhviscence." 
But  it  is  the  office  of  the  careful  psychologist  to  ob- 
serve it ;  to  bring  it  out  from  the  shade  in  which  it 
hes ;  and  to  give  this  conscious  self,  this  remembered 
self,  this  identical  self,  the  same  place  in  his  system 
as  it  has  in  the  mind  of  man. 

We  are  now  in  circumstances  to  judge  of  Mr. 
Mill's  account  of  mind,  and  his  psychological  theory 
of  the  nature  and  genesis  of  the  idea  we  form  of  it. 

I'H  ipvxv  ^^  TovTO  L)  ^w^ev,  KOI  alada-     2,6yo^  Tig  av  elrj  Koi  eldog,  akV  ovx  ^^'f 
vofieda,   KOL  6iavovojj.£da   npoTuc;'  cjcts     Kal  to  .vTzoKeifia^ov. —  De  Anima,  u.  2. 


94  MIND,   PEBSONALITY, 

In  framing  these  he  has  neglected  to  look  carefully 
and  patiently  at  the  actual  facts  of  consciousness, 
both  in  regard  to  the  idea  and  conviction,  and  the 
elements  out  of  which  he  would  fashion  it.  He  ac- 
knowledges that  mind  involves  some  sort  of  notion 
of  what  Kant  calls  Perdurability.  He  begins,  indeed, 
by  telhng  us  that  "  we  neither  can  know  nor  imagine 
it,  except  as  represented  by  the  succession  of  mani- 
fold feelings  which  metaphysicians  call  by  the  name 
of  states  or  modifications  of  mind."  (p.  205.)  I  have 
put  in  italics  the  words  which  Mr.  Mill  uses,  must 
use,  to  express  the  facts ;  the  words  which  correspond 
to  the  TovTo  of  Aristotle.  He  goes  on  to  say,  "  It  is 
nevertheless  true  that  our  notion  of  Mind,  as  well  as 
of  Matter,  is  the  notion  of  a  permanent  something 
contrasted  with  the  perpetual  flux  of  the  sensations 
and  other  feelings  or  mental  states  which  we  refer  to 
it ;  a  something  which  we  figure  as  remaining  the 
same,  while  the  particular  feelings  through  which  it 
reveals  its  existence  change."  This  is  an  inadequate 
account  of  the  idea  and  conviction  entertained  by  us 
in  mature  life.  We  do  not  refer  the  mental  states 
to  it,  we  know  it  in  a  particular  state.  We  do  not 
figure  self  as  remaining  the  same,  we  judge  or  de- 
cide the  conscious  self  of  to-day  to  be  the  same  as 
the  conscious  self  of  yesterday  remembered  by  us. 
It  does  not  reveal  itself  through  feehngs,  we  know 
it  as  feeling,  the  one  being  as  immediate  as  the  other. 
Nevertheless  his  account,  though  confused  and 
never  exactly  hitting  the  facts,  is  a  very  remarkable 


PEBSONAL   IDENTITY  J    SUBSTANCE.  95 

one.  We  must  look  at  it  carefully :  —  "  Besides 
present  feelings,  and  possibilities  of  present  feeling, 
there  is  another  class  of  phenomena  to  be  mcluded 
in  an  enumeration  of  the  elements  making  up  our 
conception  of  mind.  The  thread  of  consciousness, 
which  composes  the  mind's  phenomenal  life,  consists 
not  only  of  present  sensations,  but  likewise  in  part 
of  memories  and  expectations.  Now,  what  are 
these  ?  In  themselves,  they  are  present  feelings, 
states  of  present  consciousness,  and  in  that  respect 
not  distinguished  from  sensations.  They  all,  more- 
over, resemble  some  given  sensations  or  feehngs,  of 
which  we  have  previously  had  experience.  But 
they  are  attended  with  the  peculiarity,  that  each  of 
them  involves  a  beHef  in  more  than  its  own  exist- 
ence. A  sensation  involves  only  this :  but  a  remem- 
brance of  sensation,  even  if  not  referred  to  any 
particular  date,  involves  the  suggestion  and  belief 
that  a  sensation,  of  which  it  is  a  copy  or  representa- 
tion, actually  existed  in  the  past :  and  an  expectation 
involves  the  belief,  more  or  less  positive,  that  a  sen- 
sation or  other  feeling  to  which  it  directly  refers, 
will  exist  in  the  future.  Nor  can  the  phenomena  in- 
volved in  these  two  states  of  consciousness  be  ade- 
quately expressed,  without  saying,  that  the  belief 
they  include  is,  that  I  myself  formerly  had,  or  that  I 
myself,  and  no  other,  shall  hereafter  have,  the  sensa- 
tions remembered  or  expected.  The  fact  behoved  is, 
that  the  sensations  did  actually  form,  or  will  here- 
after form,  part  of  the  self-same  series  of  states,  or 


96  MIND,   PEBSONALITY, 

threads  of  consciousness,  of  which  the  remembrance 
or  expectation  of  those  sensations  is  the  part  now 
present.  If,  therefore,  we  sjDcak  of  the  mind  as  a 
series  of  feehngs,  we  are  obUged  to  complete  the 
statement  by  calling  it  a  series  of  feelings  which  is 
aware  of  itself  as  past  and  future  :  and  we  are  re- 
duced to  the  alternative  of  believing  that  the  Mind, 
or  EgOy  is  something  different  from  any  series  of 
feelings  or  possibilities  of  them,  or  of  accepting  the 
paradox,  that  something  which  ex  liyioothesi  is  but  a 
series  of  feelings,  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  series." 
(pp.  212,  213.)  This  surely  is  an  excessively  round- 
about and  far-fetched  account  of  a  very  clear  fact,  in 
order  to  suit  it  to  an  empirical  theory.  Making  the 
mind  "  a  thread  of  consciousness,"  "  a  series  of  feel- 
ings," he  is  obliged  to  give  to  this  thread  or  series  a 
set  of  attributes,  such  as  that  it  is  aware  of  itself,  in 
order  to  make  it  even  in  appearance  embrace  the 
obvious  phenomena.  He  prefaces  the  above  by  an 
acknowledgment  that  "  the  theory  has  intrinsic  diffi- 
culties [they  are  those  stated]  which  it  seems  to  me 
beyond  the  power  of  metaphysical  analysis  to  re- 
move." The  intrinsic  difficulties  are  very  much  the 
creation  of  the  theorist.  We  decline  certainly  being 
shut  up  to  the  position,  that  the  mind  is  "  a  series  of 
feelings  aware  of  itself,"  for  if  thus  aware  of  it- 
self, it  is  more  than  a  series;  the  genuine  fact 
is  that  the  mind  is  aware  of  itself  as  abiding. 
But  as  little  do  we  consent  to  take  the  other 
alternative,    that    the    mind    is    something   differ- 


PEBSONAL   IDENTITY,   SUBSTANCE.  97 

ent  fi^om  the  series  of  feelings ;  it  is  an  abiding  ex- 
istence with  a  series  of  feelings. 

He  adds,  "  the  truth  is,  we  are  here  face  to  face 
with  that  final  inexphcabihty  at  which,  as  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton  observes,  we  inevitably  arrive  when 
we  reach  ultimate  facts."  As  finding  himself  shut 
up  to  such  an  issue,  he  should  have  exercised  more 
patience  in  deahng  with  those  who,  like  Eeid,  Kant, 
and  Hamilton,  have  been  j)ainfully  striving  to  give 
an  adequate  account  of  these  ultimate  facts.  If  he 
says  they  are  beyond  investigation  or  expression,  I 
meet  him  with  a  direct  denial.  The  ojDerations  are 
within  consciousness,  and  we  can  observe  and  co- 
ordinate them.  The  fact  is,  Mr.  Mill  himself  has 
been  trying  to  unfold  them,  but  has  given  a  very  in- 
sufficient and  perplexed  rendering.  "  The  true  in- 
comprehensibility perhaps  is,  that  something  which 
has  ceased,  or  is  not  yet  in  existence,  can  still  be  in 
a  manner  present :  that  a  series  of  feelings,  the  in- 
finitely greater  part  of  which  is  past  or  future,  can 
be  gathered  up,  as  it  were,  into  a  single  present  con- 
ception, accompanied  by  a  belief  of  realit}^  I  think, 
by  far  the  wisest  thing  we  can  do,  is  to  accept  the 
inexplicable  fact,  without  any  theory  as  to  how  it 
takes  place."  This  is  a  most  circuitous  and  made- 
quate,  I  believe,  indeed,  an  inaccurate  statement  of 
the  fact.  That  which  has  ceased  to  exist  is  not 
present  -,  it  is  the  remembrance,  which  is  a  very  dif- 
ferent thing,  that  is  present.  The  future  is  not 
gathered  into  the  present  3  we  at  the  present  antic- 


98  MIND.   PEBSONALITY, 


ipate  the  future.  We  cannot,  of  course,  give  a 
theory  of  the  proclviction  of  an  ultunate  fact,  but  we 
can  state  it  correctly,  and  even,  I  beheve,  seize  and 
express  its  law. 

Let  us  inquire  what  he  makes  of  the  fact  accord- 
ing to  his  Psychological  Method.  We  shall  find  him 
accumulating  statements  which  bring  in  new  ideas, 
without  his  being  able  to  reduce  them  even  to  an 
apparently  consistent  system,  or  to  resolve  them  into 
simpler  elements.  "  The  belief  I  entertain  that  my 
mind  exists,  when  it  is  not  feeling,  nor  thinking,  nor 
conscious  of  its  own  existence,  resolves  itself  into  a 
belief  of  a  Permanent  Possibility  of  these  states. 
If  I  think  of  myself  as  in  dreamless  sleep,  or  in  the 
sleep  of  death,  and  believe  that  I,  or  in  other  words 
my  mind,  is  or  will  be  existing  through  these  states, 
though  not  in  conscious  feeling,  the  most  scrupulous 
examination  of  my  belief  will  not  detect  in  it  any 
fact  actually  believed,  except  that  my  capability  of 
feeling  is  not  in  that  interval  permanently  destroyed, 
and  is  suspended  only  because  it  does  not  meet  with 
the  combination  of  outward  circumstances  which 
would  call  it  into  action :  the  moment  it  did  meet 
with  that  combination  it  would  revive,  and  remains, 
therefore,  a  Permanent  Possibility."  (p.  205.)  It 
could  be  shown  that  at  this  place  we  are  brought 
very  nearly  to  the  doctrine  of  Hume,  who  represents 
the  mind  as  "  a  bundle  or  collection  of  different  per- 
ceptions," to  which  we  are  led,  by  certain  tendencies, 
to  give  a  fictitious  identity.     (See  Works,  vol.  i.  pp. 


PEBSONAL    IDENTITY,    SUBSTANCE.  99 

318-334.)  But  we  have  here  to  do  not  with  Hume 
but  with  Mr.  Mill,  who  represents  mind  as  a  series 
of  feelings,  with  a  beUef  of  the  permanent  possibiHty 
of  its  states.  It  is  admitted,  then,  that  there  is  more 
than  feehngs,  more  than  even  a  series  of  feehngs, 
there  is  belief  Surely  Mr.  Mill  might  have  inquired 
more  particularly  into  the  nature  of  this  behef,  and 
he  might  then  have  seen  that  it  is  quite  as  note- 
worthy a  phenomenon  and  quite  as  essential  to  the 
mind  as  the  very  feelings  themselves ;  he  might  have 
found  that  it  is  quite  as  "  ultimate "  as  the  behef 
in  the  veracity  in  memory  is  acknowledged  to  be 
(see  ().) ;  or  rather  he  might  have  fomid  it  involved 
in  that  ultimate  belief 

Observe  how  mental  attributes  are  growing  in 
number,  without  an  attempt  to  reduce  them  to  sim- 
pler elements.  He  seems  to  allow  that  they  cannot 
be  resolved  into  sensation.  "  They  are  attended 
with  the  peculiarity  that  each  of  them  involves  a 
belief  in  more  than  its  own  present  existence.  A 
sensation  involves  only  this."  There  is  a  "  behef,"  a 
"  permanent "  something.  Mark  that  we  have  now 
Time.  He  has  stolen  in  imperceptibly  (time  always 
does  so),  but  we  should  notice  him  now  that  he  is 
in ;  and  we  are  entitled  to  ask  him  what  he  is  and 
whence  he  has  come ;  and  he  is  far  too  important  a 
personage  to  allow  himself  to  be  dismissed  at  our 
wish.  It  is  a  permanent  possibility,  we  decide  that 
there  may  he  things  in  this  enduring  time.  Observe 
what  we   have   now  gathered  together.     We  have 


100  MI2TD,   PEBSONALITY, 

sensations ;  we  have  a  series  of  sensations ;  we  have 
a  behef;  we  have  a  behef  in  time;  a  beUef  in  time 
as  permanent;  and  of  possibilities  in  time.  These 
are  evidently  different  from  each  other,  conscious- 
ness being  witness.  The  behef  is  not  the  same  as 
the  sensations,  or  the  series  of  sensations.  The  per- 
manence is  not  identical  with  the  belief  The  possi- 
bility is  different  from  the  permanent.  I  know  no 
philosopher  who  has  called  in  so  many  unresolved 
instincts  to  account  for  our  convictions  of  memory 
and  personal  identity  as  Mr.  Mill  has  done.  His 
psychological  method  is  multiplying,  instead  of  di- 
minishing, ultimate  elements.  His  system,  so  far 
from  being  simple,  is  in  reality  very  complex ;  and 
its  apparent  simplicity  arises  merely  from  his  never 
summing  up,  or  distinctly  enunciating,  the  original 
principles  he  is  obliged  to  postulate  and  assume. 

But  I  would  not  have  objected  to  his  system 
merely  because  of  its  complexity,  provided  it  had 
embraced  all  the  phenomena.  But  I  deny  that  he 
has  noticed,  or  stated  correctly,  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness. No  doubt  there  is  a  belief;  but  it  is  a  belief 
in  my  past  existence,  conjoined  with  a  knowledge 
of  my  present  existence.  There  is  time,  an  idea  of 
time,  and  a  conviction  of  the  reality  of  time ;  but  it 
is  in  the  form  of  a  belief  that  I  existed  in  time  past. 
There  is  more  than  a  behef,  there  is  an  immediate 
decision,  that  the  present  self  known  is  the  same  with 
the  past  self  remembered.  There  is  more  than  an 
idea  of  mere  possibility,  there  is  the  assurance  that 


FEBSOJS''AL    IDENTITY,    SUBSTANCE.  101 

I  did  exist  at  a  particular  time,  and  that  I  who  then 
existed  do  now  exist.  I  acknowledge  that  I  have 
no  intuitive  certainty  that  I  existed  every  moment 
of  a  dreamless  sleep.  I  have  intuitive  assurance  that 
I  existed  when  I  fell  asleep,  and  that  I  exist  now 
when  I  have  awoke,  and  I  am  led  by  the  ordinary 
rules  of  evidence  to  believe  that  I  existed  in  the  in- 
terval. Here  it  is  that  Mr.  Mill's  permanent  possi- 
bihty  of  feeling  comes  in  :  I  believe  that  had  I  been 
awakened  sooner,  I  should  have  been  consciously 
active  as  I  now  am.  But  these  very  possibihties  all 
proceed  on  an  mtuitive  remembrance  of  self,  and  an 
intuitive  decision  as  to  the  identity  of  self 

Mr.  Mill  labors  to  prove  that  his  psychological 
theory  leaves  the  doctrines  that  our  fellow-men  exist, 
and  that  God  exists,  and  that  the  soul  is  immortal, 
where  it  found  them.  For  we  look  on  other  people's 
minds  as  but  a  series  of  feehngs  Hke  our  own  •  and 
we  may  regard  the  Divine  Being  as  '^  a  series  of  the 
Divine  thoughts  and  feelings  prolonged  throughout 
eternity;  "  and  our  immortal  existence  to  be  "a  suc- 
cession of  feehngs  prolonged  to  eternity."  (p.  207- 
211.)  Now  we  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  inquire 
(which  is  the  aU-important  question)  whether  Mr. 
Mill's  theory  admits  of  the  usual  arguments  for  the 
existence  of  our  fellow-men,  and  of  God,  and  of  an 
immortal  life  ;  or  whether,  if  it  cannot  adopt  the  old 
arguments,  it  furnishes  new  ones.  But  before  leav- 
ing our  present  subject  I  may  remark,  that  the  com- 
mon doctrine,  which  I  beheve  to  be  the  true  one, 


102  MIND,   PERSONALITY, 

and  which  I  have  endeavored  to  enunciate  philosoph- 
ically, is  much  more  in  accordance  with  our  cher- 
ished convictions  and  sentiments  than  the  subtle  one 
defended  by  Mr.  Mill.  As  believing  that  I  myself 
am  more  than  a  series  of  feelings,  that  I  have  a  per- 
manent existence  amid  all  mutations,  I  can,  on  evi- 
dence being  adduced  of  their  existence,  take  the 
same  view  of  my  fellow-men,  of  my  friends,  and  my 
family ;  that  is,  I  can  look  upon  them  as  having  not 
only  a  permanent  possibility  of  feelings,  but  a  perma- 
nent personality,  round  which  my  affections  may  clus- 
ter and  which  leads  me  to  treat  them  as  responsible 
beings  Hke  myself  He  says  elsewhere  [Logic^  B.  iii. 
c.  xxiv.  §  1) :  "My  belief  that  the  Emperor  of  China 
exists  is  simply  my  behef  that  if  I  were  transported 
to  the  imperial  palace,  or  some  other  locahty  in  Pekin, 
I  should  see  him.  My  belief  that  Julius  Csesar  ex- 
isted is  my  belief  that  I  should  have  seen  him  if  I 
had  been  present  in  the  field  of  Pharsalia,  or  the 
senate-house  at  Kome."  This  is  to  reverse  the 
proper  order  of  things,  and  to  confuse  all  our  con- 
ceptions. Looking  on  ourselves  as  persons  with  a 
permanent  being,  on  evidence  produced  of  their  ex- 
istence, we  take  the  same  view  of  the  Emperor  of 
China  and  Julius  Cgesar,  and  thus  believe  that  if  we 
were  in  Pekin  we  should  see  the  one,  and  that  if  we 
had  been  in  the  battle  of  Pharsalia  we  should  have 
seen  the  other.  The  picture  presented  of  the  Divine 
Being,  in  this  new  philosophy,  will  appear  to  the 
great  body  of  mankind   to  be   unattractively  bare 


PEBSONAL   IDENTITY,   SUBSTANCE,          103 

and  unmeaning,  or  rather  in  tlie  highest  degree 
shadowy,  uncertain,  and  evanishing;  and  they  will 
rejoice  when  they  are  invited  to  contemplate  Him 
instead  as  Jehovah,  I  am  that  I  mi,  the  independent 
and  self-existent  One.  I  am  not  mclined  to  urge 
om*  conviction  of  personahty  and  personal  identity 
as  in  itself  a  proof  of  our  immortality ;  but  in  con- 
structing the  cumulative  argument,  and  cherishing 
the  hope  of  a  life  beyond  the  grave,  I  feel  it  satisfac- 
tory to  regard  myself,  I  beHeve  on  sufficient  evidence, 
not  as  a  permanent  possibility  of  feeHng,  but  a  per- 
manent being,  the  same  in  the  world  to  come  as  in 
this. 

We  may  now  combine  the  results  which  we  have 
reached.  In  every  conscious  act  we  know  an  exisi> 
ing  thing,  which  when  we  begin  to  reflect  we  learn 
to  call  self,  manifesting  itself  in  some  particular  way 
which  we  are  taught  to  regard  as  an  attribute. 
Again,  in  all  remembrance,  we  recollect  self  as  exer- 
cising some  particular  attribute  in  time  past,  and  we 
know  self  as  now  remembering ;  and  on  comparing 
the  two  we  decide  that  they  are  the  same.  This  is 
a  bare  statement  of  the  facts,  as  they  daily  present 
themselves.  I  defy  Mr.  Mill,  or  any  other  mental 
analyst,  to  reduce  these  facts  of  consciousness  to 
fewer  or  simpler  elements.  In  all  consciousness,  I 
have  a  knowledge  of  self  as  a  person ;  in  all  remem- 
brance, a  recollection  of  self  as  a  person;  and  in 
the  comparison  of  the  two  a  perception  of  their 
identity. 


104  MIND,   PEBSONALITY, 

And  let  it  be  observed^  that  both  in  the  conscious 
self  and  the  recollected^  we  have  the  self  perceived 
by  us  as  operating  in  a  great  number  of  ways,  with 
thoughts  and  emotions  in  infinite  variety.  We  come, 
too,  to  discover  (in  a  way  which  will  come  under  our 
notice  below)  that  there  are  other  beings  besides 
ourselves,  who  have  the  same  personality  and  iden- 
tity, and  the  like  incalculable  number  and  diversity 
of  ideas,  wishes,  and  feelings.  As  we  begin  to  re- 
flect on  all  tliis,  and  as  we  would  speak  about  it,  and 
make  ourselves  intelligible,  we  find  it  convenient  to 
have  a  word  to  denote  that  which  abideth  in  us,  and 
is  the  same  in  us  and  in  others.  We  have  such  a 
word  in  Substance,  and  we  say  that  "  mind  is  a  sub- 
stance." In  saying  so,  we  mean  nothing  more  than 
this,  that  in  us  and  in  others  there  is  (1.)  an  exist- 
ing thing;  (2.)  operating;  (3.)  with  a  permanence. 
But  in  saying  this,  we  say  much,  that  is,  we  make  a 
statement  full  of  meaning.  By  multiplying  words 
of  description  or  explanation  we  should  only  con- 
fuse and  perplex  the  subject,  which  may  be  clearly 
discerned  if  only  we  look  steadily  at  it,  and  weigh 
the  several  parts  which  make  up  the  indissoluble 
whole. 

And  here  I  feel  myself  called  on  to  state  that  no 
doctrine  of  modern  philosophy,  not  even  the  ideal 
theory,  or  theory  of  representative  ideas,  so  con- 
demned by  Reid  and  exposed  by  Hamilton,  has 
wrought  such  mischief  in  speculation  as  that  of 
Locke  in  regard  to  substance.   His  statements  on  this 


PUBSONAL   IDENTITY,    SUBSTANCE.  105 

subject  are  unsatisfactory  tlirougliout,  and  when 
they  were  attacked  by  Stillingfleet,  he  defended 
them  by  a  sparring  and  fencing  unworthy  of  such 
a  lover  of  truth ;  he  employed  himself  in  repellmg 
the  objections  of  his  opponent,  instead  of  seeking  to 
make  his  own  views  clearer.  "  So  that  if  any  one 
will  examine  himself  concerning  the  notion  of 
pure  substance  in  general,  he  will  find  he  has  no 
other  idea  of  it  at  all,  but  only  a  suj)position  of  he 
knows  not  what  support  of  such  qualities,  as  are 
capable  of  producing  simple  ideas  in  us."  [Essay,  B. 
n.  c.  xxiii.  §  2.)  In  the  controversy  he  affirms  and 
re-af&rms  that  he  does  not  deny  the  existence  of 
substance,  or  that  we  have  an  idea  of  it,  and  is  very 
indignant  mth  Stillingfleet  for  saying  that  he 
does.  But  he  makes  it  to  be  "the  support,"  but 
"  unknown  "  support,  of  qualities.  As  the  support 
was  something  unknown,  Berkeley  in  the  next  age 
did  a  good  service  to  philosoj)hy  by  discarding  it 
altogether,  so  far  as  matter  is  concerned.  But  in  the 
succeeding  age  the  avenger  came,  and  Hume  took 
away  the  unkno^vn  substratum  from  mind,  as  Berke- 
ley had  done  from  body.  Reid  rushed  in  to  save 
fundamental  truth ;  but  he  did  not  show  his  usual 
shrewdness  and  wisdom  when  he  retained  Locke's 
"substratum,"  and  argued  so  tenaciously  that  the 
known  quality  intuitively  suggests  an  unknown  sub- 
stance. We  should  have  been  saved  a  world  of  con- 
fused and  confusing  controversy  if  Reid,  when  aban- 
doning Locke's  "idea,"  had  also  rejected  his  "un- 


106  JfJJVD,    PEBSONALITY, 

known  support  of  qualities."  Kant  met  the  Scottish 
sceptic  in  a  still  more  unsatisfactory  manner,  when 
he  allowed  that  by  the  outward  senses  and  by  the 
internal  consciousness  we  perceive  only  the  phenomr 
enon,  and  then  referred  us  to  some  noiimenon  beyond. 
In  the  schools  which  have  ramified  from  Kant,  the 
question  has  ever  since  been,  Is  there  merely  a 
phenomenon,  or  is  there  a  noumenon  also?  Sir 
William  Hamilton  in  this,  as  in  so  many  other  topics, 
has  endeavored  to  combine  Reid  and  Kant.  He 
identifies  the  phenomenon  of  the  German,  with  the 
quality  of  the  British,  philosophy;  he  argues  that 
the  quality  impHes  the  substance,  and  the  phenom- 
enon the  noumenon,  but  makes  the  substratum  or 
noumenon  unknowable.  Mr.  Mill  takes  much  directs 
ly  or  indirectly  from  Hume ;  he  favors  in  Kant  all 
that  is  destructive ;  he  allows  to  Hamilton  all  his 
negative  positions :  and  so  we  find  him  building  on 
the  miserably  defective  views  which  they  have  given 
of  substance.  "  As  our  conception  of  body  is  that 
of  an  unknown  exciting  cause  of  sensations,  so  our 
conception  of  mind  is  that  of  an  unknown  recipient  or 
percipient  of  them,  and  not  of  them  alone,  but  of  all 
our  other  feelings.  As  body  is  the  mysterious  some- 
thing which  excites  the  mind  to  feel,  so  mind  is  the 
mysterious  something  which  feels  and  thinks."  [Logic, 
B.  I.  c.  iii.  §  8.)  He  finds  no  great  difficulty,  as 
Hume  had  done  before  him,  in  putting  aside  this  un- 
known and  mysterious  something.  And  it  is  high 
time,  I  think,  that  those  metaphysicians  who  defend 


PEBSONAL   IDENTITY,    SUBSTANCE,         107 

radical  truth  should  abandon  this  unknown  and  un- 
knowable substratum  or  noumenon,  which  has  ever 
been  found  a  foundation  of  ice,  to  those  who  would 
build  upon  it.  Sir  William  Hamilton  having  handed 
over  this  imknown  thing  to  faith,  Mr.  Herbert  Sj^en- 
cer  has  come  after  him,  and  consigned  religion  to  it 
as  to  its  grave,  —  and  there,  it  may  safely  be  said,  it 
will  disturb  no  one,  not  even  by  sending  out  a  ghost 
from  its  gloomy  chambers. 

We  never  know  quality  without  knowing  sub- 
stance, just  as  we  cannot  know  substance  mthout 
knowing  quality.  Both  are  known  in  one  concrete 
act.  We  may,  however,  separate  them  in  thought. 
In  contemplating  any  given  object,  such  as  the  think- 
ing self,  we  may  distinguish  between  the  "  thinking  " 
which  changes,  and  the  "  existence "  which  abideth. 
As  both  are  known  in  the  concrete,  so  both  may  be 
said  to  have  an  existence,  not  an  independent  exist- 
ence, but  an  existence  in,  or  in  connection  with,  each 
other.  The  one  always  implies  the  other ;  that  is,  the 
thinking  always  impHes  a  thinking  existence,  and 
the  thinking  existence  is  always  exercised  in  some 
thought.  Mr.  Mill  gets  a  momentary  glimpse  of  this 
doctrine,  but  does  not  follow  it  out.  "  We  can  no 
more  imagine  a  substance  without  attributes,  than 
we  can  imagine  attributes  without  a  substance." 
{Logic,  B.  I.  c.  iii.  §  6.)  Taking  this  view,  we  cannot 
without  protest  allow  persons  to  speak  of  substance 
as  being  something  imknown,  mysterious,  lying  far 
down  in  a  depth  below  all  human  inspection.     The 


108  MIND,   PERSONALITY, 

substance  is  known,  quite  as  much  as  the  quahty. 
True,  the  substance  is  never  known  alone,  or  apart 
from  the  quahty,  but  as  httle  is  the  quahty  known 
alone,  or  apart  from  a  substance.  Each  should  have 
its  place,  its  proper  place,  neither  less  nor  more,  in 
every  system  of  the  human  mind. 

Much  the  same  may  be  said  of  "  phenomenon  "  and 
"  noumenon,"  which,  however,  have  a  still  more  mys- 
terious meaning  than  "  quality  "  and  "  substance." 
Phenomenon  means  an  appearance,  but  appearance 
is  an  abstract  from  a  concrete ;  we  never  see  an  ap- 
pearance apart  from  a  thing  appearing.  It  is  the 
object  appearing  to  the  subject  seeing  it.  If  the 
phrase  is  to  be  retained  in  philosophy,  let  us  under- 
stand what  is  meant  by  it.  Let  us  not  as  we  employ 
it  deceive  ourselves  by  imagining  that  we  have,  or 
can  have,  an  appearance  apart  from  a  thing  appear- 
ing. A  phenomenon  is  a  thing  manifesting  itself  to 
us,  as  a  quality  is  a  thing  in  action  or  exercise.  As 
to  the  "  noumenon,"  it  is  not  so  easy  to  determine 
what  can  be  meant  by  it.  If  it  signifies  the  thing 
perceived  by  the  mind,  this  is  neither  less  nor  more 
than  the  phenomenon.  If  it  means  a  thing  per- 
ceived by  no  mind,  I  allow  that  there  are  certainly 
things  existing  not  perceived  by  the  human  mind, 
but  then  these  things  may  be  perceived  by  other 
minds,  —  I  suppose  must  certainly  be  perceived  by 
the  Divine  Mind.  But  if  the  noumenon  means 
something  acting  as  the  ground  of  the  thing  mani- 
festing itself,  or  behind  it  as  a  support,  I  declare  that 


PEBSONAL    IDENTITY,   SUBSTANCE.  109 

we  have  no  evidence  of  there  being  such  a  thing, 
and  I  can  see  no  purpose,  philosophical  or  practical, 
to  be  served  by  it  in  the  way  of  hypothesis  or  other- 
wise. Here  Mr.  Mill  seems  to  me  altogether  right : 
"  This  unkno^vn  somethmg  is  a  supposition  without 
evidence."  But  I  abandon  it,  because  we  have  a 
known  something ;  in  the  case  of  mind  a  thing  ex- 
isting, acting,  and  permanent. 

But  then  it  is  said  we  do  not  know  the  thing  in 
itself  {Ding  an  sicJi).  It  is  high  time  to  insist  on 
knowing  what  is  meant  by  this  phrase,  taken  from 
Kant,  and  with  which  of  late  years  so  many  meta- 
physicians have  been  conjuring.  It  cannot  be  al- 
lowed to  play  a  part  any  longer  till  it  explains  itself 
It  seems  full  of  meaning,  and  yet  I  believe  that  if 
we  prick  it,  it  will  be  found  to  be  emptiness.  I  un- 
derstand what  is  meant  by  the  thing  ;  it  is  the  ob- 
ject existing.  But  what  is  meant  by  in  itself?  I 
acknowledge  no  itself  beside,  or  besides,  or  beyond 
the  thing.  I  confess  to  be  so  stupid,  as  not  to  be 
able  to  form  any  distinct  idea  of  what  is  meant  by 
the  thing  m  itself  If  it  mean  that  the  thing,  the 
whole  thing,  is  within  the  thing,  I  have  about  as 
clear  a  notion  of  what  is  signified  as  I  have  of  the 
whale  that  swallowed  itself  If  it  mean  that  there 
is  a  thing,  in  addition  to  the  thing  as  it  manifests  it- 
self, and  as  it  exercises  property,  I  allow  that,  for 
aught  I  know,  there  may  be  many  such  things.  My 
knowledge  of  the  thing,  of  aU  things,  nay,  of  any 


110  MIND,   PEBSOIfALITY, 

one  thing,  is  confessedly  limited.  As  to  what  may- 
be beyond  the  phenomenon,  the  thing  as  it  appears 
to  me,  and  to  others  who  may  report  to  me,  I  ven- 
ture to  say  nothing,  as  I  can  know  nothing  about  it. 
But  beheving  that  no  other  man  knows  anything 
about  it  any  more  than  I  do,  I  protest  against  its 
being  represented  as  being  a  support  of  the  thing 
known,  or  in  any  way  essential  to  it.  Though  I 
were  to  get  new  faculties  and  know  that  great  un- 
known, I  am  not  sure  that  it  would  make  the  thing 
known  the  least  clearer,  in  any  way  more  mysterious 
or  less  mysterious  than  it  now  is.  As  it  is  confessed- 
ly unknown,  I  can  trace  no  relation  of  dependence, 
or  of  anything  else  between  it  and  the  known. 
Lying  as  it  does  in  the  region  of  darkness  which 
compasses  the  land  of  light,  I  think  it  best  to  leave 
it  there. 

We  are  thus  brought  to  the  doctrine  which  com- 
mends itself  to  our  first  thoughts,  that  we  know 
self  immediately  as  existing,  as  in  active  operation, 
and  with  a  permanence.  This  primitive  knowledge 
furnishes  a  nucleus  round  which  we  may  gather 
other  information,  by  experience  and  by  reasoning, 
till  we  come  at  last  to  clothe  mind  with  qualities  so 
many  and  varied  that  it  is  difficult  to  classify  them. 
I  confess  I  grudge  the  school  of  Comte  the  epithet 
"  Positive."  It  is  a  title  which  they  have  no  right  to 
appropriate  to  their  crude  system,  which  observes 
only  the  more  superficial  facts  in  these  two  wondroua 


FEBSOJSAL    IDENTITY,    SUBSTANCE.  Ill 

worlds  of  mind  and  matter.  I  have  in  these  two 
last  chapters  stated  what  I  believe  to  be  true  positive 
doctrine  in  regard  to  mmd,  that  is,  the  expression 
of  the  facts  without  addition  or  omission  or  hy- 
pothesis. 


CHAPTEK    YI 


BODY. 


WE  have  now  to  face  a  more  perplexing  subject, 
the  idea  and  conviction  which  we  have  in  re- 
gard to  an  external  world,  the  way  in  which  we  reach 
these,  and  the  objective  reality  involved  in  them. 
In  this  border  country  there  has  been  a  war  for  ages 
in  the  past,  and  there  is  hkely  to  be  a  war  for  ages 
in  the  future.  There  are  real  difficulties  in  the  in- 
quiry, arising  from  the  circumstance  that  conscious 
mind  and  unconscious  matter  are  so  different, — 
while  yet  they  have  an  evident  mutual  relation,  and 
also  from  the  apparent  deception  of  the  senses ;  and 
speculators  have  gathered  an  accumulation  of  imag- 
inary ones  by  their  refined  and  elaborate  specula- 
tions, so  that  now  there  are  not  only  the  original 
obstacles  in  the  way,  but  a  host  of  traditional  feuds. 
I  cling  to  the  conviction  that  there  is  a  doctrine  of 
natural  realism,  which,  if  only  we  could  seize  and 
express  it,  will  be  found  encompassed  with  fewer 
difficulties  than  any  far-fetched  or  artificial  system. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  has  given  us  a  very  elabor- 
ate classification  of  the  theories  of  sense-perception. 

(112) 


BODY.  113 

It  is  not  needful  to  follow  him  in  this  treatise.  But 
in  order  to  correct  errors  and  prepare  the  way  for  a 
fair  discussion,  it  may  serve  some  good  purposes  to 
look  at  the  account  given,  of  the  steps  involved,  by 
the  three  British  metaphysicians  who  have  given  the 
greatest  attention  to  the  subject.  To  begin  with 
Dr.  Thomas  Reid.  According  to  him,  there  is,  first, 
an  action  or  affection  of  the  organism ;  there  is,  next, 
a  sensation  in  the  mind ;  thirdly,  this  sensation,  as  a 
sign,  suggests  intuitively  an  external  object.  The 
two  points  on  which  he  dwells  chiefly  are,  first,  that 
there  is  no  idea  between  the  external  object  and  the 
mind  percei^dng;  and,  secondly,  that  we  reach  a 
belief  in  the  external  world  intuitively,  and  not  by 
any  process  of  reasoning.  "  This  conviction  is  not 
only  irresistible,  but  it  is  immediate ;  that  is,  it  is 
not  by  a  train  of  reasoning  and  argumentation  that 
we  come  to  be  convinced  of' the  existence  of  what 
we  perceive."  ( Works,  p.  259.)  I  believe  that  he 
has  estabhshed  his  two  pomts  successfully,  and  in 
doing  so  he  has  rendered  immense  service  to  philos- 
ophy. Dr.  Thomas  Bro^vn  gives  a  different  account 
of  the  operation.  There  is  first,  as  in  the  other 
theory,  —  indeed  in  all  theories,  —  an  affection  of  the 
bodily  frame  ;  secondly,  a  sensation  in  the  mind ;  and 
thirdly,  a  reference  of  that  to  an  external  object  as 
the  cause.  He  calls  in  two  general  mental  laws  to 
give  us  the  reference.  The  first  is  an  intuitive  law 
of  cause  and  effect,  which  impels  us  when  we  dis- 
cover an  effect  to  look  for  a  cause.     We  have  a  sen- 

8 


114  BODY. 

sation  of  resistance,  of  which  we  discover  no  cause 
within  the  mind,  and  therefore  we  look  for  it  beyond 
the  mind.  The  second  law,  of  which  he  makes  large 
use,  is  that  of  suggestion,  which  connects  sensations, 
so  that  one  becomes  representative  of  others. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  and  Mr.  Mill  are  forever 
criticising  these  two  doctrines,  but  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  either  has  given  a  clear  and  correct  exposi- 
tion of  theuL  Hamilton,  when  he  commenced  his 
edition  of  Eeid,  thought  that  philosopher's  views 
were  the  same  as  his  own  (we  shall  see  wherein 
they  differ  immediately) ;  as  he  advances,  he  sees 
that  this  is  not  the  case  ;  and  he  nowhere  gives  us 
a  precise  account  of  Reid's  theory,  which,  whether 
well  founded  or  not,  is  consistent  and  easily  under- 
stood. As  to  Brown,  Hamilton  is  forever  carping  at 
him,  as  if  he  had  a  cherished  determination  to  re- 
move his  system  out  of  the  way,  as  one  that  opposed 
the  reception  of  his  own.  The  circumstance  that 
neither  Eeid's  theory  nor  Brown's  theory  would 
quite  fit  into  his  compartments,  is  a  proof  that  Ham- 
ilton's classification  of  theories,  though  distinguished 
by  great  logical  power,  is  not  equal  to  the  diversities 
of  human  conception  and  speculation.  He  clearly 
does  injustice  to  Brown,  by  insisting  on  making  him 
an  idealist  —  he  makes  him  a  cosmothetic  idealist. 
Now  there  is  no  idea  in  Brown's  system,  as  there 
was  in  the  older  theories.  He  made  great  use  of 
sensation,  and  was  in  great  difficulties  when  he  at- 
tempted to  show  how,  from  this  sensation,  we  could 


BODY.  115 

infer  an  external  world ;  but  the  sensation  is  an  ex- 
isting, and  not  an  imaginary  thing  like  the  idea; 
and  the  sensation  was  held  by  him  to  be  an  effect, 
but  not  at  all  a  representative,  of  an  external  and 
extended  object.  Mr.  Mill,  in  criticising  Hamilton's 
criticism,  would  make  Eeid  an  ideahst.  (p.  177.)  This 
is  obviously  a  mistake.  Eeid  did  call  in  a  sensation 
as  a  sign,  but  it  was  not  supposed  to  be  representa- 
tive, that  is,  to  bear  any  resemblance  or  analogy  like 
the  old  idea  to  the  external  object.  All  that  is  as- 
serted of  it  is  that  we  are  conscious  of  it,  which  we 
are  not  of  the  idea,  and  that  it  suggests  a  belief  in 
an  external  object  intuitively,  and  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  Him  who  gave  us  our  constitution.  Mill 
represents  Eeid  and  Brown  as  holding  substantially 
the  same  doctrine :  "  The  difference  between  them  is 
extremely  small,  and,  I  will  add,  unimportant." 
(p.  175.)  Eeid  held  that  we  never  could  reason 
from  the  sensation  within  to  the  extended  object 
without.  Brown  labors  to  show  that  the  whole  pro- 
cess is  one  of  ordinary  inference,  proceeding  always 
on  the  intuitive  law  of  cause  and  effect,  aided  by  the 
association  of  ideas.  But  Mr.  Mill  teUs  us  that 
"  Bro^yn  also  thinks  that  we  have,  on  the  occasion  of 
certain  sensations,  an  instantaneous  conviction  of  an 
outward  object."  (p.  164.)  I  am  surprised  at  such  a 
statement  from  one  who  has  imbibed  so  much  from 
Brown,  who  so  clearly  represents  the  process  as  in- 
vohdng  inference.  We  find  everj^vhere  such  pas- 
sages as  the  following :  "  Perception,  then,  even  in 


116  BODY, 

that  class  of  feelings  by  which  we  learn  to  consider 
ourselves  as  surrounded  by  substance,  extended  and 
resisting,  is  only  another  name,  as  I  have  said,  for 
the  result  of  certain  associations  and  inferences  that 
flow  from  other  more  general  principles  of  the  mind." 
(Lectures,  xxvi.)  I  call  the  theory  of  Brown  (which 
is  taken  from  the  Sensational  School  of  France)  the 
Inferential,  as  distinguished  from  the  Ideal  theory 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Intuitive  theory  on  the 
other. 

Hamilton's  doctrine  differs  both  from  that  of  Reid 
and  Brown.  It  is,  that  there  is  first  an  action  of 
the  organism,  and,  secondly,  a  simultaneous  sensation 
and  perception.  He  labors  particularly  to  show  that 
sense-perception  being  evoked,  there  is  nothing  be- 
tween it  and  the  object,  no  sensation,  no  idea ;  but 
that  we  gaze  at  once  on  the  object,  in  fact  are  con- 
scious of  it,  conscious  at  one  and  the  same  time  of  the 
ego  and  the  7ion  ego.  Between  this  and  Brown's  doc- 
trine there  is  an  irreconcilable  difference.  Brown 
makes  the  process  one  of  inference,  implying,  no 
doubt,  an  intuition,  but  an  intuition  of  a  general  cha- 
racter bearing  on  all  other  mental  operations.  Hamil- 
ton makes  the  perception  primitive  and  original  and 
immediate.  Hamilton  also  differs  from  Eeid,  but  the 
point  is  not  so  important.  Reid  makes  the  sensation 
precede  the  perception;  whereas  Hamilton,  in  accord- 
ance, I  think,  with  the  revelations  of  consciousness, 
makes  them  contemporaneous.  Both  make  the  opera- 
tion intuitive  and  not  inferential.      This  doctrine  of 


BODY,  IIV 

Hamilton  is  not  without  its  difficulties.  It  leaves  many 
points  unexplained,  —  perhaps  they  are  ultimate  and 
cannot  be  explained,  —  possibly  they  are  so  simple 
that  they  do  not  need  explanation.  It  does  not  pro- 
fess to  show  how  the  preceding  organic  affection  is 
connected  with  the  mental  perception.  Perhaps  the 
human  faculties  cannot  clear  up  the  subject.  Pos- 
sibly the  question  itself  may  be  unmeaning,  for  there 
may  be  no  how  to  ask  about,  no  connection  except 
this,  that  the  cognitive  mind  is  so  constituted  as  to 
know  the  bodily  frame  with  which  it  is  so  intimately 
connected.  This  doctrine,  as  it  is  the  most  sunple, 
seems  to  me  to  be  upon  the  whole  the  most  truth- 
like, that  has  yet  been  propounded.  It  does  not  pro- 
fess to  clear  up  all  mysteries,  but  it  embraces  the 
acknowledged  facts,  and  it  starts  no  hypotheses.  I 
regret  the  dogmatism  which  the  author  displays  in 
asserting  it.  I  do  not  agree  with  him  in  tliuiking 
that  it  can  be  estabHshed  at  once  by  an  appeal  to 
consciousness.  But  embracing  as  it  does  only  facts, 
I  am  inclined  to  adhere  to  it,  till  some  facts  not  con- 
tained in  it  be  ascertained  by  physiology  or  ps^'chol- 
ogy,  or  the  two  combined.  I  am  certainly  not  dis- 
posed to  abandon  it  for  so  hypothetical  a  doctrine  as 
that  adopted  by  Mr.  MiU  and  elaborated  by  Professor 
Bain. 

In  the  mature  man  we  find  certain  ideas,  beUefs, 
and,  I  would  add,  judgments.  I  readily  allow  all  of 
these  to  be  subjected  to  an  analysis.  Mr.  Mill  is 
quite  justified   in  declaring  that  "we   are   not   at 


118  BODY, 

liberty  to  assume  that  every  mental  process  which 
is  now  as  unhesitating  and  rapid  as  intuition  was  in- 
tuition at  its  outset."  (p.  144.)  At  present  we  have 
to  look  at  the  ideas  and  convictions  which  we  enter- 
tain in  regard  to  the  external  world.  I  allow  at 
once  that  "  we  have  no  means  of  now  ascertaining 
by  direct  evidence,  whether  we  were  conscious  of 
outward  and  extended  objects  when  we  first  opened 
our  eyes  to  the  light."  (p.  147.)  I  am  willing,  there- 
fore, to  consider  Mr.  Mill's  theory  of  the  genesis  of 
our  apprehension  and  belief  His  theory  seems  to 
be,  that  we  can  get  them  by  means  of  sensations  and 
associations  of  sensation.  "All  we  know  of  objects 
is  the  sensations  they  give  us,  and  the  order  of  the 
occurrence  of  these  sensations."  "Of  the  outward 
world  we  know  and  can  know  absolutely  nothing, 
except  the  sensations  we  experience  from  it."  {Logic, 
B.  I.  c.  iii.  §  7.)  The  result  reached  by  him  is,  that 
"  matter  may  be  defined  a  permanent  possibility  of 
sensations."  (p.  198.)  He  does  not  commit  himself, 
but  he  is  not  averse  to  the  idea  that  "  the  no7i  ego 
altogether  may  be  but  a  mode  in  which  the  mind 
represents  to  itself  the  possible  modifications  of  the 
egor  (p.  189.) 

In  the  discussion  which  is  forced  upon  us  by  this 
doctrine,  which  at  first  sight  seems  so  strange,  there 
are  two  points  to  be  specially  attended  to :  First,  is 
Mr.  Mill's  account  of  the  ideas  and  convictions  which 
we  have  concerning  body  correct  ?  Under  this  head 
our  appeal  must  be  to  consciousness.     I  beheve  that 


BODY.  119 

it  declares  that  Mr.  Mill,  in  his  analysis,  commonly 
leaves  out  the  main  element.     A  second  question 
has  to  be  answered,  Does  Mr.  Mill's  hypothesis  ex- 
plain all  that  is  in  our  apprehension  and  belief?     In  ' 
answering  this  question  we  must  be  careful  not  to 
allow  him  to  do,  what  Mr.  Crosse  and  M.  Pouchet 
are  suspected  of  having  done  in  professing  to  estab- 
lish the  doctrine  of  spontaneous  generation  by  ex- 
periment.     Mr.  Crosse  is  alleged  to  have  had  the 
germs  of  the  acari  produced  by  him  in  his  carelessly 
cleaned  vessels;  and  M.  Pouchet  to  have  had  the 
germs  from  which  he  derived  animals  in  the  putres- 
cent matter.     Certain  it  is,  that  when  other  persons 
performed  the  same  experiments  as  Mr.  Crosse,  tak- 
ing care  to  exclude  all  organized  bodies,  no  animals 
were  produced ;  and  M.  Pasteur  maintains  that,  if 
you  allow  him  to  destroy  the  germs  in  the  putres- 
cent fluid,  no  life  will  appear.     Now,  we  must  keep 
a  strict  watch  on  Mr.  Mill,  lest  he  be  guilty  of  a  like 
oversight  in  deriving  all  our  ideas  and  convictions 
from  so  few  germs.     As  we  do  so,  we  shall  find  that 
in   order   to   prop   up   the    theory,  which   he   pro- 
fesses to  rear  on  so  narrow  a  basis,  he  is  obfiged  to 
add  buttress  after  buttress  in  the  shape  of  new  ideas 
and  implied  faculties.     In  particular,  we  shall  find 
him  guilty  of  a  very  grave  logical  mistake :  he  is 
ever  assuming,  without  perceiving  it,  the  idea  which 
he  professes  to  explain.     In  admitting  the  veracity 
of  memory,  he  himself  lays  down  a  most  important 
principle,  that  we   should  assume   the   belief  "for 


120  BODF, 

which  no  reason  can  be  given  which  does  not  pre- 
suppose the  behef,  and  assume  it  to  be  well-ground- 
ed." We  shall  find  that  in  unfolding  his  theory  of 
the  genesis  of  our  ideas  of  body  he  neglects  this 
rule,  and  without  being  aware  of  it,  assumes  the 
ideas  of  Externality,  and  Eesisting  Force,  and  Ex- 
tension, which  he  is  seeking  to  generate  and  explain 
by  a  circuitous  process.  Let  us  look  at  these  ideas 
in  the  order  now  mentioned. 

(1.)  What  is  implied  in  Externality  f  Mr.  Mill  says 
we  are  aware  of  ourselves  as  a  series.  If  I  were 
inclined  to  adopt  this  representation,  I  would  say 
that  by  externality  we  mean  a  something  without 
and  beyond  the  series.  But  I  have  objected  to  this 
account  as  inadequate.  I  have  endeavored  to  show 
that  in  all  mental  action,  even  in  sensation,  there  is 
a  perception  of  self  as  existing;  that  in  memory 
there  is  a  remembrance  of  self,  and  that  we  proclaim 
the  present  self  and  the  remembered  self  identical. 
Now,  by  an  external  object  I  mean  a  thing  existing, 
but  not  this  self,  a  thing  different  from  this  perma- 
nent and  identical  self  I  believe  that  our  first  per- 
ceptions of  externality  are  derived  from  things  ap- 
prehended as  extended,  as  having  a  direction  and 
stretching  away  in  space.  But  as  this  involves  ex- 
tension, the  consideration  of  it  falls  under  next  head. 
For  the  present  we  must  look  at  externality  simply 
as  denoting  an  existing  thing,  different  from,  and  not 
part  of,  the  ego  known  by  self-consciousness.  Mr. 
Mill  admits  that  every  man  comes  to  entertain  some 


BODY.  121 

c5uch  aj^prehension.  "I  consider  them  (the  sensa- 
tions) to  be  produced  by  something  not  only  exist- 
ing independently  of  my  will,  but  external  to  my 
bodily  organs  and  my  mind."  (Logic,  B.  i.  c.  iii.  §  7.) 
I  am  here  to  examine  his  account  of  the  generation 
and  the  nature  of  this  idea  and  conviction.  I  have 
found  great  difficulty  in  handling  the  subject,  owing 
to  the  gossamer  character  of  the  theory,  which  is 
far  too  subtle  and  ingenious  to  be  solid  or  true. 

In  conducting  this  whole  discussion,  we  must  be 
on  our  guard  against  being  misled  by  an  ambiguity 
in  the  use  of  the  phrase  "  outward  world."  It  may 
mean  the  world  out  of  the  conscious  mind,  —  this 
I  venture  to  call  the  extra-mie7ital  world ;  or  it  may 
mean  the  world  beyond  the  body,  —  this,  for  dis- 
tinction's sake,  I  call  the  extra-organic  world.  I 
am  not  sure  that  Mr.  Mill,  or  Mr.  Bain  who  helps 
him  to  develop  his  system,  have  escaped  the  perplex- 
ities thus  arising.  I  insist  that  they  are  not  at  Hb- 
erty  to  assume  the  existence  of  the  bodily  frame, 
and  then  and  thus  account  for  the  idea  of  a  world 
beyond.  Assuming  only  a  series  of  sensations 
aware  of  itself,  they  must  thence  generate  somethmg 
exterior. 

Mr.  Mill  thus  gets  the  idea  of  externality :  —  "I 
see  a  piece  of  white  paper  on  a  table.  I  go  into  an- 
other room,  and  though  I  have  ceased  to  see  it,  I 
am  persuaded  the  paper  is  still  there.  I  no  longer 
have  the  sensations  which  it  gave  me ;  but  I  believe 
that  when  I  again  place  myself  in  the  circumstances 


122  BODY. 

in  which  I  had  those  sensations,  that  is,  when  I  go 
into  the  room,  I  shall  again  have  them ;  and  further, 
that  there  has  been  no  intervening  moment  at  which 
this  would  not  have  been  the  case.  Owing  to  this 
law  of  my  mind,  my  conception  of  the  world  at  any 
given  instant  consists,  in  only  a  small  proportion,  of 
present  sensations.  The  conception  I  form  of  the 
world  existing  at  any  moment  comprises,  along  with 
the  sensations  I  am  feeling,  a  countless  variety  of 
possibilities  of  sensation."  (p.  192.)  I  wish  Mr.  Mill 
would  employ  language  consistent  with  his  theory, 
and  we  should  then  be  in  a  position  to  judge 
whether  he  is  building  it  up  fairly.  As  yet  we  know 
nothing  of  "white  paper,"  "a  room,"  "another 
room ;  "  least  of  all  can  we  be  aware  of  being  placed 
in  "  circumstances : "  all  which  certainly  imply  the 
very  externality  he  is  seeking  to  gender.  We  may 
beheve  that  Mr.  Mill  does  not  forget,  but  it  is  neces- 
sary to  warn  his  readers  against  forgetting,  that  we 
have  yet  only  one  sensation  succeeding  another. 
He  refers  to  "  a  law  of  mind."  The  law  he  postu- 
lates is,  "  that  the  human  mind  is  capable  of  Expect- 
ation. In  other  words,  that  after  having  had  actual 
sensations,  we  are  capable  of  forming  the  conception 
of  possible  sensations."  (p.  190.)  It  is  one  of  the 
many  postulates  he  is  ever  making.  His  assumptions 
are  far  from  being  the  fewest  and  the  simplest  fitted 
to  explain  the  phenomena.  If  he  had  postulated 
that  in  every  act  of  sense-perception  we  apprehend 
a  something  external,  the  facts  would  have  been  ex- 


BODY.  123 

plained  much  more  satisfactorily.  But  let  us  go  on 
with  his  explication.  He  calls  attention  to  the  cir- 
cumstance, that  "  the  sensations  are  joined  in 
groups/'  so  that  "  we  should  have,  not  some  07ie  sen- 
sation, but  a  great  and  even  an  indefinite  number 
and  variety  of  sensations,  generally  belonging  to 
different  senses,  but  so  hnked  together  that  the 
presence  of  one  announces  the  possible  presence,  at 
the  same  mstant,  of  any  joy  all  the  rest."  (p.  194.) 
But  let  it  be  observed  that  we  do  not  yet  know  that 
the  sensations  belong  to  different  senses,  or  come 
from  different  parts  of  the  body,  and  the  groups  of 
sensations  can  no  more  give  us  externality  than  the 
individual  sensations.  But  then  "  we  also  recognize  a 
fixed  order  in  our  sensations."  We  have  not  yet 
cause  and  effect,  but  we  have  "  an  order  of  succes- 
sion which,  when  ascertained  by  observation,  gives 
rise  to  the  ideas  of  cause  and  effect."  "  Whether  we 
are  asleep  or  awake,  the  fire  goes  out,  and  puts  an 
end  to  one  particular  possibility  of  warmth  and  hght. 
Whether  we  are  |)i*esent  or  absent,  the  corn  ripens 
and  brings  a  new  possibility  of  food."  I  have  again 
to  remind  Mr.  Mill's  readers  that  we  do  not  yet  know 
that  we  have  bodies  to  sleep  or  wake  ;  the  sleeping 
and  waking,  the  fire  and  the  corn,  are  all  in  us  as 
sensations.  The  "present"  and  the  "absent"  slip 
in  very  dexterously  ;  but  as  yet  we  know  no  place 
at  which  we  are  present,  or  from  which  we  may  be 
absent.  The  incipient  cause  and  effect  are  as  yet 
mere  antecedence  and  consequence  within  the  mind 


124  BODY. 

^^  When  this  point  has  been  reached,  the  Permanent 
PossibiHties  in  question  have  assumed  such  unhke- 
ness  of  aspect,  and  such  difference  of  position  rel- 
atively to  us,  from  any  sensations,  that  it  would  be 
contrary  to  all  we  know  of  the  constitution  of  human 
nature  that  they  should  not  be  conceived  as,  and 
believed  to  be,  at  least  as  different  from  sensations 
as  sensations  are  from  one  another."  (p.  196.)  Still, 
all  is  within  the  thread  of  consciousness.  But  then 
it  is  said  there  is  something  in  our  "  constitution  " 
that  makes  us  believe  the  possibilities  to  be  different 
from  sensations.  I  am  glad  of  an  appeal  to  our  con- 
stitution, in  which  there  is  more,  I  believe,  than  Mr. 
Mill  has  unfolded.  Yet  I  fear  that  the  actual  appeal 
is  in  no  way  complimentary.  Our  constitution 
makes  us  believe  this  "  possibility  "  of  sensations  to 
be  different  from  the  sensations.  But  Mr.  Mill  does 
not  say,  and  would  not  say,  that  our  constitution  is 
right  in  all  this,  or  that  there  is  any  reality  corre- 
sponding to  the  belief  I  am  not  quite  sure  to  what 
law  of  our  constitution  he  refers.  If  it  be  his  favorite 
principle  of  association  of  sensations,  it  is  clear  that 
it  cannot  help  him,  for  the  associated  sensations  are 
all  in  the  mind  ;  and  if  a  train  of  sensations  could 
give  us  (which,  I  believe,  it  cannot)  what  is  not  in 
the  ideas,  it  must  be  in  virtue  of  some  power  in  the 
train  which  is  not  unfolded.  If  he  mean  the  ten- 
dency, on  which  he  dwells  so  much  elsewhere,  to  give 
an  external  reality  to  things  within,  I  admit  that 
there  is  such  a  tendency  in  loose  thinking ;  but  then 


BODY.  125 

it  is  in  minds  that  have  already  reached  a  knowledge 
of  something  outward,  and  it  is  for  Mr.  Mill  to  show, 
which  would  be  difficult,  that  it  could  exist  in  a  mind 
that  as  yet  had  no  idea  of  externality.  I  cannot  see 
that  by  either  process  Mr.  Mill  has  got  the  concep- 
tion of  an  outward  world,  and  I  am  sure  that  neither 
process  would  justify  our  belief  in  the  reality  of 
such  a  world.  A  behef  generated  by  an  accidental 
or  fatalistic  association  might  be  error  quite  as 
readily  as  truth,  and  the  disposition  to  give  an  ex- 
ternal embodiment  to  internal  feelings  is  avowedly 
illusory.  Already  we  see  those  flaws  in  the  founda- 
tion which  render  the  whole  structure  insecure,  and 
make  it  impossible  for  man  to  be  certain  that  he  can 
reach  any  truth  beyond  the  consciousness  of  the 
present  sensation. 

Our  author  now  crosses  at  one  leap  the  widest 
gulf  of  all.  "  We  find  that  thej  (possibihties  of 
sensation)  belong  as  much  to  other  human  or  sen- 
tient beings  as  ourselves."  "  The  world  of  possible 
sensations,  succeeding  one  another  according  to 
laws,  is  as  much  in  other  beings  as  in  me  •  it  has 
therefore  an  existence  outside  me ;  it  is  an  external 
world."  But  where  in  the  jorocession  of  internal 
feelings  which  has  passed  before  us  can  other  human 
beings  come  in?  "I  conclude  that  other  human 
beings  have  feelmgs  like  me ;  because,  first,  they 
have  bodies  like  me,  which  I  know  in  my  own  case 
to  be  the  antecedent  condition  of  feelings ;  and  be- 
cause, secondly,  they  exhibit  the  acts  and  other  outy- 


126  BODY. 

ward  signs  which  in  my  own  case  I  know  by  expe- 
rience to  be  caused  by  feelings."     Doubtless,  if  we 
had  got  our  bodily  frames  as  out  of  ourselves,  the 
argument  might  have  been  conclusive.     He  tells  us 
that  we  observe  bodies  which  do  not  call  up  sensa- 
tions in  our  consciousness ;  and  since  they  do  not  do 
so   in  my  consciousness,  I  infer  that  they  do  it  out 
of  my  consciousness.     The  inference  might  be  legit- 
imate, provided  we  had  otherwise  got  an  apprehen- 
sion of  things  out  of  and  beyond  the  consciousness. 
All  reasoning  is  usually  said  to  be  from  what  we 
know ;  but  in  this  inference  we  have  in  the  conclu- 
sion what  is  not  in  the  premises.      Or,  if  we  take 
Mr.  Mill's  theory  of  reasoning,  that  it  is  from  partic- 
ulars to  particulars,  by  some  sort  of  registered  ob- 
servation, the  argument  is  seen  to  be  equally  falla- 
cious;  for  we  have  no  register  of  objects  out  of 
ourselves  to  authorize  us  to  infer  that  these  possibili- 
ties constitute  an  external  world.     I  am  not  at  all 
sure  that  Mr.  Mill  (p.  207)  has  cause  to  condemn 
Keid,  when  he  maintains  that  a  like  position  taken 
by  Hume  lands  us  in  a  system  of  solitary  egoism,  or, 
as  Mr.  Mill  expresses  it,  that  "  the  no7i  ego  altogether 
may  be  but  a  mode  in  which  the  mind  represents 
to  itself  the  possible  modifications  of  the  ego."     I 
am  convinced  that  it  is  not  by  such  a  process,  that 
babies  come  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  those  who 
nurse  them  and  are  round  about  them.     So  far  as  I 
can  see,  Mr.  Mill  has  never  logically  got  out  of  the 
shell  of  the  ego  ;  nor  can  I  see  how  any  one  can  get 


BODY,  127 

out  of  it,  except  by  means  of  an  original  impulse. 
I  suspect  that  in  Mr.  Mill's  belief  of  the  existence 
of  his  fellow-men,  for  whose  benefit  he  has  written 
so  many  able  volumes,  there  is  involved  a  spontane- 
ous step  more  convincing  than  his  reflex  logic. 

The  conclusion  reached  is  :  "  Matter  may  be  de- 
fined, a  permanent  possibihty  of  sensation."  (p.  198.) 
We  shall  not  be  in  circumstances  thorouglily  to  ex- 
amine this  definition  till  we  have  fully  unfolded,  in 
the  next  two  heads,  the  nature  of  our  perceptions 
of  Eesistance  and  Extension,  which  enter  essentially 
into  our  apprehension  of  Matter.  Considered  as  an 
account  even  of  Externality  it  is  defective.  I  beheve, 
indeed,  that  it  is  the  only  result  which  Mr.  Mill  can 
reach  from  his  induction  or  his  premises.  It  should 
be  observed  that  he  does  not,  as  some  would  expect 
him,  define  matter  the  Cause  of  sensations.  Mr. 
Mill  says  what  he  means,  and  means  what  he  says, 
when  he  describes  Matter  as  the  Possibility,  not  the 
cause  of  sensations.  Dr.  Brown,  by  help  of  in- 
genuity and  twisting,  could  reach  a  cause,  for  he 
called  in  an  intuitive  conviction,  which  impels  us 
when  we  discover  a  phenomenon  to  look  for  a  cause ; 
and  when,  as  in  the  case  of  certain  sensations,  we 
cannot  get  a  cause  within,  we  are  driven  to  seek  it 
without.  His  theory,  however,  was  after  all  defect- 
ive, for  it  makes  matter,  as  a  cause,  unknown,  whereas 
we  know  matter,  as  we  shall  see  forthwith,  as  resist- 
ing our  effort,  and  as  extended.  But  Mr.  Mill  cannot 
be  sm-e,  and  does  not  profess  to  be  sure,  that  he  has 


128  BODY. 

reached  matter  even  as  an  unknown  cause.    For  our 
sensations   have  no  discoverable  causes  within  the 
mind ;    and  as  we  have  no  sensitive  experience  of 
sensations  having  causes,  and  no  original  conviction 
constraining  us  to  seek  for  a  cause,  it  is  quite  con- 
ceivable that  they  have  no  causes.     But  do  these 
"  possibilities  "  amount  to  the  idea,  which  we  have, 
of  an  outward  world  ?     So  far  as  we  have  gone,  we 
do  not  seem  to  be  beyond  the  "  series  of  feelings," 
for  the  idea  we  have  got  is  simply  of  possibilities  of 
sensation.     Mr.  Mill  thinks  that  "  both  philosophers 
and  the  world  at  large,  when  they  think  of  matter, 
conceive  it  really  as  a  Permanent  Possibility  of  Sen- 
sation." (p.  200.)^     The  "permanence"  is  really  an 
important  element,  presupposing  the  idea  of  time, 
and  of  the  past  and  the  future ;  all  of  which  carry 
^us   into  a  region  high  above  sensation,  and  imply 
mental  faculties  with  an  extensive  capacity  and  wide 
range.     But  not  even  with  this  addition  does  the 
description  come  up  to  the  reality,  I  mean  mental 
reality.     Mr.  Mill  says  that  these  "  Permanent  Pos- 
sibilities" are  now  "conceived  as,  and  believed  to 
be,  as  different  from    sensations  as   sensations   are 


1  Mr.  Mill  (p.  200)  admits  that  the  from  our  obseiTation  that  every  ex- 
majority  of  philosophers  fancy  that  perience  has  a  cause  ;  it  is  thus  that 
matter  is  something  more,  and  that  we  are  led  to  suppose  that  things  have 
the  world  at  large,  if  asked  the  ques-  a  substantive  reality.  As  I  do  not 
tion,  would  undoubtedly  agree  with  stand  up  for  a  substance  different  from 
the  philosophers.  But  then  he  ac-  the  thing  known,  I  do  not  require  to 
counts  for  this  "  imaginary  concep-  examine  this  theory.  In  future  chap- 
tion,"  as  he  calls  it,  by  two  tendencies  ters  his  defective  view  of  the  compar- 
of  the  mind,  —  one  derived  from  our  ative  power  of  the  mind  and  of  causa- 
observation  of  differences,   the  other  tion  will  be  subjected  to  criticism. 


BODY.  129 

from  one  another."  (p.  196.)  It  should  be  observed 
that  the  sensations  thus  discovered  to  be  different, 
are  all  sensations  in  the  "  series  of  feelings "  or 
"  thread  of  consciousness."  But  our  apprehension 
of  an  outward  world  is  of  something,  not  only  differ- 
ing from  the  sensations  as  one  sensation  differs  from 
another,  but  different  from  the  self,  which,  as  we 
have  found  in  last  chapter,  we  know  as  sentient. 
We  apprehend  the  material  object  as  an  existing 
thing,  —  quite  as  much  as  the  self,  but  distinct  from 
the  seK^  It  never  has  been  shown  how  the  ego,  by 
reasoning  or  any  other  logical  process,  can  give  the 
71071  ego.  I  must  therefore  look  on  the  ego  as  having 
a  capacity  of  discovering  the  non  ego,  directly  or 
indirectly.  Mr.  Mill  has  utterly  failed  to  rear  up  the 
actual  mental  idea  and  conviction  from  the  postu- 
lated materials.     TiU  such  time  as  a  mean  can  be 

1  Professor   Bain   reaches   the  con-  so  we  contradict  ourselves."  (p.  385.) 

elusion  :  "  It  is  quite  true  that  the  ob-  Again,  "  we  are  incapable  of  discuss- 

ject  of  consciousness,  which  we  call  ing  the  existence  of  an  independent 

Externality,  is  still  a  mode  of  self  in  material  world  ;  the  very  act  is  a  con- 

the  most  comprehensive  sense,  but  not  tradiction."  (p.  379.)     At  this  point 

in  the  usual  restricted  sense  of  '  self  extreme  sensationalism  and  extreme 

and  '  mind,'  which  are  names  for  the  idealism,  Mr.  Bain  and  Mr.  Terrier, 

subject  to  the  exclusion  of  the  object."  meet  and  are  one  ;  it  would  be  a  con- 

{Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  381.)     We  are  tradiction  to  speak  of  the  one  as  inde- 

accustoraed  to  say  that    "  light  exists  pendent  of  the  other  ;  they  are  joined 

as  independent  fact,  with  or  without  in  this  philosophy  of  identity,  which 

any  eyes  to  see  it.     But  if  we  consider  transcends  that  of  Hegel  himself !  But 

the  case  fairly,  we  shall  see  that  this  joking  aside,  it  is  easy  to  represent 

assertion  errs  not  simply  in  being  be-  the  doctrine  which  affirms  the  exist- 

yond  any  evidence  that  we  can  have,  ence  of  independent  objects  out  of  the 

hvl  also  in  being  a  self-contradiction,  mind  so  as  to  make  it  contradictory ; 

We  are  affirming  that  to  have  an  ex-  but   there   is  no  contradiction  in  the 

istence  out  of  our  minds  which  we  doctrine  when   correctly  stated.      Of 

cannot   know  but   as   in  our  minds,  course,  knowledge  is  in  a  mind,  but  it 

In  words,  we  assert  independent  ex-  may  be  of  an  existence  "  out  of  our 

istence,  while  in  the  very  act  of  doing  minds." 
9 


130  BODY. 

pointed  out  by  which  we  can  reach  the  outward 
world  as  an  existence,  I  cHng  to  the  beUef  that  the 
seh"  is  endowed  with  a  capacity  of  immediately  know- 
ing not  only  the  self,  but  the  not-seE 

But  it  will  be  necessary  to  review  Mr.  Mill's  theory 
of  the  genesis  of  our  idea  of  Matter  more  carefully. 
We  shall  find  it  throughout  a  series  of  assumptions, 
no  one  of  which  admits  of  proof,  and  some  of  which 
can  be  disproven.  Often  do  I  wish,  as  I  examine  it, 
that  Sir  William  Hamilton  had  been  still  alive  to 
brush  away  by  his  sweeping  logic  the  ingenuities 
which  are  employed  to  support  it.  "  Our  concep- 
tion of  Matter,"  says  Mr.  Mill,  "  comes  ultimately  to 
consist  of  Resistance,  Extension,  and  Figure,  together 
with  miscellaneous  powers  of  exciting  other  sensa- 
tions." (p.  219.)  There  is  a  palpable  omission  here, 
for  it  omits  those  powers  (specially  mentioned  by 
Locke,  Essay,  B.  ii.  c.  ii.  §  23),  by  which  one  body 
operates  upon  another ;  "  thus  the  sun  has  a  power 
to  make  wax  white,  and  fire  to  make  lead  fluid."  It 
is  enough  for  us  here  to  examine  Mr.  Mill's  theory 
of  the  production  of  the  idea  of  Resistance  and  of 
Extension. 

(2.)  We  have  certainly  an  idea  of  Resistance  and 
a  helief  in  it.  In  the  mature  man  it  becomes  a  per- 
ception, and  a  conviction  of  an  object  out  of  the 
body,  or  in  the  body,  resisting  an  effort  to  move  a 
member  of  the  body.  In  next  chapter  I  will  give 
some  account  of  the  sense  which  reveals  the  resist- 
ing object;  for  the  present  we  are  examining  Mr. 


BODY,  131 

Mill's  theory.  (See  pp.  219-21.)   "  Resistance  is  only 
.another  name  for  a  sensation  of  our  muscular  frame, 
combined  with  one  of  touch."    It  should  be  remarked 
that  this  language  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  we 
have  a  muscle,  or  that  we  have  skin  ;  the  resistance 
and  the  touch  must  yet  be  considered  as  sensations 
in  the  mind.     "  When  we  contract  the  muscles  of 
our  arm,  either  by  an  exertion  of  will  or  by  an  in- 
voluntary discharge  of  our  spontaneous  nervous  ac- 
tivity, the  contraction  is  accompanied  by  a  state  of 
sensation,  which  is  different  according  as  the  locomo- 
tion, consequent  on  the  muscular  contraction,  con- 
tinues freely  or  meets  with  an  impediment.     In  the 
former  case  the  sensation  is  that  of  motion  through 
empty  space."     We  shall  see  that  we  seem  to  have 
no  sensation  of  motion  in  empty  space.     When  our 
muscular  effort  is  not  opposed  by  anything  without 
the  body,  what  we  have  is  a  feeling  of  tension,  or  of 
one  muscle  resisting  another.     But  let  this  pass,  as 
having  no  special  connection  with  our  present  dis- 
cussion.    He  goes  on  to  say,  that  if  we  will  to  exert 
our  muscular  force,  and  the  exertion  is  accompanied 
by  the  usual  muscular  sensation,  but  the  expected 
sensation  of  locomotion  does  not  follow,  we  have 
what  is  called  the  feeling  of  resistance,  or,  in  other 
words,  of  muscular  motion,  and  that  feehng  is  the 
fundamental  element  in  the  notion  of  matter.     He 
shows  how  "skin  sensations  of  simple  contact  in- 
variably accompany  the  muscular  sensations  of  resist- 
ance ; "  how  our  sensations  of  touch  "  become  rejp- 


132  BODY. 

resentative  of  tlie  sensations  of  resistance  with  which 
they  habitually  coexist ; "  and  "  our  idea  of  matter 
as  a  resisting  cause  of  miscellaneous  sensations  is 
now  constituted."  Every  one  knows  that  the  mus- 
cular sense  and  touch  combine,  to  give  us  the  knowl- 
edge of  matter  as  a  resisting  object.  But  does  Mr. 
Mill's  account  come  fully  up  to  the  facts  falling  un- 
der the  eye  of  consciousness  ?  Does  his  theory  ex- 
plain the  facts  ?  Both  questions  must  be  answered 
in  the  negative.  In  touch,  as  we  shall  see  in  next 
chapter,  we  localize,  I  believe  intuitively,  our  sensa- 
tions in  a  given  direction,  and  at  a  given  point  in 
the  surface  of  the  body.  Again,  in  the  exercise  of 
the  locomotive  energy,  accompanied  by  muscular 
sensation,  we  have  a  sense  of  a  member  of  our  body 
which  we  will  to  move,  of  which  member  we  must 
have  some  idea,  otherwise  we  could  not  form  a  voli- 
tion regarding  it ;  and  we  have  a  perception  of  this 
member  in  motion,  resisted  by  a  body  out  of  our 
frame.  Mr.  Mill's  theory  does  not  yield  all  of  these, — 
I  rather  think  not  even  any  one  of  these  thoroughly. 
It  takes  no  notice  of  the  volition  which  moves  the 
member,  for  this  would  introduce  an  element  above 
sensations.  It  is  not  consistent  with  that  idea  of  a 
member  of  the  body,  which  is  necessary  to  the  voli- 
tion ;  for  the  theory  to  be  consistent  must  presup- 
pose that  we  have  yet  no  knowledge  of  our  bodily 
frame.  There  can  yet  be  no  apprehension  of  motion 
in  space,  for  as  yet  we  have  no  idea  of  space.  The 
idea  is  not  even  of  resistance,  properly  speaking,  for 


BODY.  133 

we  have  no  idea  of  a  resisting  object.  So  far  as  we 
have  gone  we  have  only  sensations  differing  from 
each  other  in  feehng  or  in  intensity^  and  sensations 
coexisting,  and  sensations  succeeding  each  other,  and 
sensations  the  signs  of  other  sensations. 

(3.)  The  mature  man  has  also  an  idea  of  Extension 
and  a  belief  in  Extended  objects.  We  have  an  appre- 
hension and  a  conviction  of  our  bodies  as  extended, 
and  of  other  bodies  as  extended,  that  is,  as  occupying 
space,  as  being  contained  in  space,  as  being  of  a  cer- 
tain spatial  form,  and  as  being  movable  in  space. 
Can  the  sensation  and  association  theory  account 
for  the  generation  of  this  mental  phenomenon  ?  I 
beheve  it  breaks  down  both  psychologically  and 
physiologically. 

At  this  point  Mr.  Mill  hands  us  over  to  his  friend 
Professor  Bain,  who,  in  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect^ 
has  elaborated  into  a  minute  system  the  general 
statements  scattered  throughout  Mr.  Mill's  Logic, 
Beginning  with  Feehngs,  he  goes  on  to  Thought, 
making  its  fundamental  attributes  to  be  Conscious- 
ness of  Difference,  Consciousness  of  Agreement,  and 
Ketentiveness ;  and  he  builds  up  his  system  mainly 
out  of  Feelings  by  means  of  the  laws  of  Association 
by  Contiguity  and  Kesemblance.  I  cannot  in  a  work 
like  this,  devoted  to  a  different  individual,  review 
Mr.  Bain's  theories.  But  I  beg  to  ask  whether  we 
ever  have  Feelmg  without  some  perception  of  an 
object,  say  self,  as  feehng  ?  Feelings,  even  such  as 
joy  or  pain,  are  mere  abstracts  separated  from  our 


134  BODY. 

consciousness  of  self,  as  rejoicing  or  in  distress.  A 
proper  psychological  system  should  begin  with  the 
concrete  perception,  and  not  with  a  quality  separated 
from  it.  So  much  for  his  foundation.  And  as  to  his 
mode  of  building,  it  will  be  shown  to  be  altogether 
unsatisfactory,  in  the  strictures  we  have  to  offer  on 
such  subjects  as  Association  of  Ideas,  Comparison, 
and  Relativity  of  Knowledge,  as  treated  by  Mr.  Mill. 
Mr.  Bain  has  received  great  praise  for  combining 
physiology  with  psychology.  It  is  true  that  in  his 
introduction,  and  in  various  parts  of  his  work,  he  has 
given  an  account  of  the  anatomy  and  physiology  of 
the  brain  and  nerves  and  organs  of  movement.  But 
there  is  a  mighty  gap,  which  he  can  scarcely  be  said 
to  have  tried  to  fill  up,  between  these  unconscious 
parts  and  the  conscious  thoughts  and  feelings  of 
mind  proper.  The  most  valuable  part  of  his  work 
is  that  in  which  he  describes,  more  minutely  than 
had  ever  been  done  before,  the  feelings  excited  by 
muscular  and  nervous  action,  accounting,  I  think,  so 
far  successfully,  for  many  of  our  spontaneous  and 
supposed  instinctive  movements.  But  he  is  out  of  his 
proper  region  when  he  comes  to  deal  with  the  pecu- 
liar operations  and  the  higher  ideas  of  the  mind. 
With  a  fine  capacity  for  observing  bodily  affections, 
and  an  undoubted  vigor  and  tenacity  of  intellect  in 
dealing  with  material  facts,  he  seems  to  be  unfitted 
for  reahzing  fuUy  pure  mental  or  spiritual  phenom- 
ena, as  falling  simply  under  the  eye  of  conscious- 
ness.    He   makes   as   much  use  of  nerve-forces  as 


BODY,  135 

Hartley  did  of  vibrations,  and  seems  to  identify  con- 
scious feelings  with  them,  making  the  current  and 
the  consciousness  two  sides  of  one  thing.  Even 
when  he  is  professedly  treating  of  Emotions,  Thoughts, 
and  Yolitions,  he  has  great  difficulty  m  rising  above 
nerve  affections ;  and  when  he  does  make  the  at- 
tempt, it  is  immediately  to  fall  back  to  his  old  level 
of  sensations.  He  is  to  be  constantly  watched  when 
he  would  draw  our  higher  ideas  of  necessary  truth, 
of  beauty,  and  of  moral  good  from  sensitive  affec- 
tions variously  associated.  It  could  be  shown,  that 
in  treating  of  our  intellectual  and  moral  and  volun- 
tary operations,  while  apparently  proceeding  in  so 
matter  of  fact  a  manner,  he  is  contmually  passing, 
without  seeing  it,  from  unconscious  to  conscious  ac- 
tion, from  bodily  sensations  to  mental  ideas,  and  ad- 
vancing hypotheses  as  to  the  influence  of  nervous 
and  muscular  action,  which  could  be  shown  to  be 
true  only  by  their  explaining  all  the  mental  facts 
revealed  by  consciousness ;  and  this  he  cannot  be 
said  to  have  attempted,  as  consciousness  is  seldom 
consulted,  even  formally  or  professedly.  There  is 
proof  of  all  this  in  his  theory  of  what  constitutes 
our  idea  of  extension  and  its  mode  of  growth. 

In  the  earlier  editions  of  his  Logic  (B.  i  c.  iii.  §  7), 
Mr.  MiU  had  described  Brown  as  showing  clearly 
that  the  notions  of  extension  and  figure  are  derived 
"  from  sensations  of  touch,  combined  with  sensations 
of  a  class  previously  too  little  adverted  to  by  metar 
physicians,  —  those  which   have   their   seat  in   the 


136  BODY, 

muscular  frame."  He  adds,  characteristically;  ^^  Who- 
ever wishes  to  be  more  particularly  acquainted  with 
this  admirable  specimen  of  metaphysical  analysis, 
may  consult  the  first  volume  of  Brown's  Lectures  or 
Mill's  Analysis  of  the  Mindr  The  thought  has 
germinated,  and  in  his  later  editions  he  is  able  to  re- 
fer to  Mr.  Alexander  Bain  and  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 
as  following  out  the  investigation.  Mr.  Bain  has 
certainly  taken  up  the  idea,  and  ridden  it  to  exhaus- 
tion, I  should  say  to  death. 

"  We  may  accede,"  says  Professor  Bain,  as  quoted 
by  Mr.  Mill  (p.  226),  "to  the  assertion  sometimes 
made,  that  the  properties  of  space  might  be  con- 
ceived or  felt  in  the  absence  of  an  external  world,  or 
any  other  matter  than  that  composing  the  body  of 
the  percipient  being ;  for  the  body's  own  movements 
in  empty  space  would  suffice  to  make  the  very  same 
impressions  on  the  mind  as  the  movements  excited 
by  outward  objects.  A  perception  of  length,  or 
height,  or  speed,  is  the  mental  impression  or  state  of 
consciousness  accompanying  some  mode  of  muscular 
movement,  and  this  movement  may  be  generated 
fi:om  within  as  well  as  from  without."  In  criticising 
this  theory,  so  cloudy  in  its  outline,  we  are  placed  in 
difficulties,  in  consequence  of  its  not  being  clear 
whether  Mr.  Mill  and  Mr.  Bain  assume  the  existence 
of  the  bodily  frame  as  a  material  object,  in  the  com- 
mon acceptation,  as  implying  objective  existence  and 
extension,  or,  even  in  their  own  sense,  as  "  the  mere 
possibility  of  sensations."     Are  they  accounting  for 


BODY.  137 

the  extra-mental  world;  including  tlie  bodily  frame  ? 
or  simply  for  the  extra-organic  world  ?  In  most 
places  ^Ir.  Bain  seems  to  posit  the  body  as  a  reahty. 
In  the  passage  quoted,  he  speaks  of  the  matter  com- 
posing '•  the  body  of  the  percipient  bemg/'  as  if  he 
needed  it  to  explain  our  idea  of  "  the  properties  of 
sj)ace."  He  talks  of  a  movement  bemg  "  generated 
from  within/'  which  cannot  mean  within  the  mind, 
which  is  a  mere  series  of  feelings ;  it  must  mean 
within  the  body,  which  is  quietly  assumed.  The 
whole  plausibility,  I  had  almost  said  intelligibility, 
certainly  the  expressibihty,  of  the  theory  Hes  in  its 
being  supposed  that  there  is  a  body,  and  even  an 
extended  body.  He  derives  all  from  nerve-currents 
which  imply  space,  and  motion  in  space,  and  he  con- 
structs the  idea  of  extension  by  a  siceejj  of  the  hand, 
or  a  siceep  of  the  eye,  or  a  volume  of  feeling,  which, 
if  taken  metaphorically,  explain  nothing,  and  if 
taken  literally,  that  is,  as  actualities,  imply  space  and 
motion  in  space.  But  if  the  bod}^  is  assumed  as 
known  immediately,  then  there  is  admitted  a  vast 
body  of  intuition,  of  which  he  should  have  measured 
the  amount,  and  acknowledged  the  significance.  Or 
if  it  be  said  that  the  bodily  frame  is  assumed  as  an 
h}^othesis,  the  answer  is  obvious.  If  it  explains,  as 
he  thinks  (I  do  not),  the  whole  facts,  then  the  hypoth- 
esis is  rendered  probable,  and  he  must  adhere  to 
it ;  for  the  author  of  an  hypothesis  cannot  be  allowed 
to  employ  it  to  reach  a  conclusion  and  then  abandon 
it;    on  the  contrary,  he  must  keep  by  it  and  all 


138  BODY. 

its  logical  consequences.  On  whatever  ground  as- 
siuned,  it  is  clear  that  when  assumed  there  is  Httle 
left  to  call  for  explanation.  After  we  have  got  our 
own  bodies,  with  '^  matter  "  composing  them,  capable 
of  taking  a  "  sweep/'  and  of  having  "  a  movement 
generated  within/'  it  can  be  no  difficult  matter  to 
conceive  of  other  bodies  being  extended,  and  in  mo- 
tion, and  resisting  our  movement. 

But  in  this  discussion  I  must  in  all  fairness  sup- 
pose that  he  does  not  assume  the  existence  of  the 
bodily  frame.-^  His  business  is  to  show,  on  his  theory, 
how  our  conception  in  regard  to  body  is  generated. 
As  he  attempts  to  do  so,  I  am  entitled,  after  this 
statement,  to  take  care  that  he  does  not  assume  sur- 
reptitiously what  he  professes  to  produce  by  a  pro- 
cess. He  has  as  yet  got  nothing  but  a  series  of  feel- 
ings, with  a  possibility  of  sensations  coming  no  one 

1  Since  writing  the  above,  I  find  Mr.  visional     assumption     is     eventually 

Herbert  Spencer  saying  of  Mr.  Mill :  proved    true   by   its   agreement  with 

"  If,   knowing    more    than    his    own  facts  ;  for  in  these  cases  the  facts  with 

states  of   consciousness,    he  declines  which  it  is   found  to  agree  are  facts 

to  acknowledge  anything  beyond  con-  known    in     some    other    way    than 

Bciousness  until  it  is  proved,  he  may  through  the  hypothesis :  a  calculated 

go  on   i-easoning  forever  without  get-  eclipse  of  the  moon  serves  as  a  verifi- 

ting  any  further ;  since  the  perpetual  cation  of  the  hypothesis  of  gravitation, 

elaboration  of  states  of  consciousness  because  its  occurrence  is   observable 

out   of   states    of   consciousness   can  without  taking  for  granted  the  hypoth- 

never    produce   anything    more  than  esis  of  gravitation.      But  when  the 

states  of  consciousness.     If,  contrari-  external  world  is  postulated,  and  it  is 

wise,  he  postulates  external  existence,  supposed  that  the  validity  of  the  pos- 

and  considers  it  as  merely  postulated,  tulate  may  be  shown  by  the  explana- 

then  the  whole  fal)ric  of  his  argument,  tion   of  mental  phenomena  which   it 

standing  upon  this  postulate,  has  no  furnishes,  the  vice  is  that  the  process 

greater    vaHdity   than    the    postulate  of  verification  is   itself  possible  only 

gives  it,  minus  the  possible  invalidity  by  assuming  the  thing  to  be  proved." 

of    the    argument   itself.      The   case  —Art.,   Mill   v.  Hamilton,    in     The 

must  not  be  confounded   with  those  Fortnightly  Review,  No.V. 
cases  in  which  an  hypothesis  or  pro- 


BODY.  139 

can  tell  from  what  quarter.  I  cannot  allow  him,  in 
order  that  he  may  mgeniously  get  more,  to  employ  a 
supposed  body  with  a  "  sweep  "  and  "  contractions." 
"  When  a  muscle/'  says  Mr.  Bain,  as  quoted  by 
Mr.  Mill  (see  pp.  222-24),  "begins  to  contract,  or  a 
limb  to  bend,  we  have  a  distinct  sense  how  far  the 
contraction  and  the  bending  are  carried;  there  is 
something  in  the  special  sensibility  that  makes  one 
mode  of  feeling  for  half  contraction,  another  for 
three-fourths,  and  another  for  total  contraction." 
"  If  the  sense  of  degrees  of  range  be  thus  admitted 
as  a  genuine  muscular  determination,  its  functions  in 
outward  perception  are  very  important.  The  at- 
tributes of  extension  and  space  fall  under  its  scope. 
In  the  first  place,  it  gives  the  feeling  of  linear  ex- 
tension, inasmuch  as  this  is  measured  by  the  sweep 
of  a  limb  or  other  organ  moved  by  the  muscles. 
The  difference  between  six  inches  and  eighteen 
inches  is  expressed  to  us  by  the  different  degrees  of 
contraction  of  some  one  group  of  muscles ;  those, 
for  example,  that  flex  the  arm,  or,  in  walking,  those 
that  flex  or  extend  the  lower  limb.  The  inward 
impression  corresponding  to  the  outward  fact  of  six 
inches  in  length,  is  an  impression  arising  from  the 
continued  shortening  of  a  muscle,  —  a  true  muscular 
sensibility.  It  is  the  impression  of  a  muscular  efibrt 
having  a  certain  continuance ;  a  greater  length  pro- 
duces a  greater  continuance  (or  a  more  rapid  move- 
ment), and  in  consequence,  an  increased  feeling  of 
expended  power.     The  discrimination  of  length  in 


140  BODY. 

any  one  direction  includes  extension  in  any  direc- 
tion." This  reads  very  like  assuming  an  extended 
bodily  arm  taking  a  sweep,  and  thus  giving  us  the 
idea  of  extension.  Of  course  we  understand,  on  re- 
flection, that  the  sweep  is  only  a  sensation  in  the 
"  series  of  feelings,"  but  when  we  understand  this, 
we  see  how  far  we  are  from  having  the  idea  of  ex- 
tension produced. 

In  explanation  of  the  theory,  Mr.  Mill  says,  ^^  Mr. 
Bain  recognizes  two  principal  kinds  or  modes  of 
discriminative  sensibility  in  the  muscular  sense  :  the 
one  corresponding  to  the  degree  of  intensity  of  the 
muscular  effort,  —  the  amount  of  energy  put  forth ; 
the  other  corresponding  to  the  duration,  —  the 
longer  or  shorter  continuance  of  the  same  effort. 
The  first  makes  us  acquainted  with  degrees  of  resist- 
ance, which  we  estimate  by  the  intensity  of  the  mus- 
cular energy  required  to  overcome  it.  To  the  second 
we  owe,  in  Mr.  Bain's  opinion,  our  idea  of  extension." 
I  have  already  commented  on  the  defects  in  Mr. 
Mill's  account  of  our  apprehension  of  resistance. 
We  have  here  to  consider  the  theory  of  the  genesis 
of  the  idea  of  extension.  It  is  referred  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  a  sensation. 

And  here  it  is  proper  to  state,  that  some  deny  the 
existence  of  such  a  sensation  as  arising  when  the 
arm  sweeps  through  empty  space.  E.  H.  "Weber  had 
come,  in  1852,  to  the  conclusion:  —  "Of  the  volun- 
tary motion  of  our  limbs  we  know  originally  nothing. 
We  do  not  perceive  the  motion  of  our  muscles  by 


BODY,  141 

their  own  sensations,  but  attain  a  knowledge  of  them 
only  when  perceived  by  another  sense.  The  muscles 
most  under  our  control  are  those  of  the  eye  and  the 
voice,  which  perform  motions  microscopically  small, 
yet  we  have  no  consciousness  of  the  motion.  We 
move  the  diajDhragm  voluntarily  against  the  heavy 
pressure  of  the  Hver,  etc.,  yet  with  as  little  conscious- 
ness of  the  motion.  It  follows  that  the  motions  of 
our  limbs  must  be  observed  by  sight  or  touch  in 
order  to  learn  that  they  move,  and  in  what  direc- 
tion." Mr.  Abbot  quotes  this  passage  in  his  Sight  and 
Touch  (p.  71),  and  he  adds,  "The  more  recent  re- 
searches of  Aubert  and  Kammler  not  only  confirm 
this  result,  but  tend  further  to  prove  that  there  is 
not  in  the  muscles  any  sense  whatever  of  their  con- 
traction." "  Accordingly,  they  remark  that  the  fric- 
tion of  our  clothing  is  a  considerable  aid  in  judging 
of  our  motions,  especially  if  it  is  close  fitting. 
When  wearing  boots,  etc.,  with  which  Ave  are  not 
familiar,  we  are  less  certain  of  our  judgments, 
and  this  is  the  more  noticeable  in  riding,  as  the  eye 
does  not  then  control  our  judgment."  The  question 
is  for  physiologists  to  settle.  I  am  not  satisfied  that 
the  Germans  referred  to  can  have  established  their 
point.  But  until  there  is  a  more  thorough  deter- 
mination of  the  exact  function  of  the  nerves  attached 
to  the  muscles,  it  is  preposterous  to  found  a  huge 
metaphysical  theory  on  our  muscular  sensations 
when  the  arm  moves  in  empty  space. 

My  opinion  on  such  a  subject  is  of  no  value,  but 


142  BODY. 

I  am  disposed  to  tliink  that  we  have  a  sense  of  the 
contraction  of  at  least  some  of  our  muscles,  and  of 
its  continuance.-^  On  the  supposition  that  we  have 
a  sense  of  resistance,  which  seems  established,  the 
muscles  of  our  arm,  being  always  in  a  state  of  more 
or  less  tension,  must  feel  the  resistance  offered  by 
one  muscle  to  another.  Dr.  Kirkes  says  that  the 
muscles  "  possess  sensibility  by  means  of  the  sensi- 
tive nerve-fibres  distributed  in  them.  The  amount 
of  common  sensibility  in  muscles  is  not  great." 
"  But  they  have  a  peculiar  sensibility,  or  at  least  a 
peculiar  modification  of  common  sensibility,  which 
is  shown  in  that  their  nerves  can  communicate  to 
the  mind  an  accurate  knowledge  of  their  states  and 
position  when  in  action."  {Fhys.,  p.  530,  5th  ed.)  We 
may,  therefore,  know  the  contractions.  But  let  us 
take  along  with  us  the  full  facts.  The  sense  of  touch- 
proper,  as  we  shall  see  in  next  chapter,  always  refers 
the  sensations  to  the  points  in  the  skin  at  which 
the  nerves  terminate ;  and  the  muscular  sense  merely 
intimates  that  one  organ  is  resisting  another.  In  that 
"  sweep  of  the  arm,"  of  which  Mr.  Bain  makes 
so  much,  there  is  implied,  first,  a  direction  of 
the  points  of  sensation  in  the  skin ;  secondly,  a  mus- 
cular resistance ;  and,  I  rather  think,  thirdly,  an  ex- 
perience to  enable  us  to  combine  the  two.     There  is, 

1  Mr.   H.Lewes  thinks  he  has  dem-  tributedto  the  muscular  sense."  {Brit. 

onstrated  the  existence   of  the  Mus-  Assoc,  1859.)      We   require   a  more 

cular  Sense.    He  skinned  a  frog,  and  thorough  investigation  of  the  relations, 

thus   made  it   insensible  to   external  and  differences,  of  the   precise  func- 

impressions,  and  found  it  "  to  mani-  tions   of  the   nerves  of  touch-proper 

fest  all  those  phenomena  usually  at-  and  the  muscular  sense 


BODY.  143 

I  suspect;  a  further  element.  In  whatever  way  it 
may  begin,  the  continuance  of  the  experimental 
bending  of  the  arm,  which  Mr.  Bain  employs,  must 
be  clone  by  the  will.  But  a  vague  directionless  effort 
will  not  move  a  limb,  still  less  continue  to  move  it 
in  a  certain  way.  The  volition  to  continue  the  sweep 
of  the  arm  impUes  a  contemplated  end,  or  some  idea 
of  the  arm,  and  a  behef  in  its  existence,  and,  I  should 
think,  in  its  extension.  It  thus  appears  that  it  is  to 
reverse  the  proper  order  of  things,  to  make  the  con- 
tinuance of  "  the  sweep  of  the  arm "  constitute  or 
give  us  the  idea  of  extension.  In  the  very  move- 
ment we  have  an  idea  of  an  extended  arm  by  touch- 
proper  or  feeling  ;  as  we  move  the  arm,  we  become 
acquainted  with  the  resistance  of  one  felt  member 
by  another ;  and  in  order  to  the  continuance  of  the 
voluntary  sweep,  there  must  be  some  apprehension, 
more  or  less  vague,  of  the  limb  which  we  continue 
to  move. 

There  are  many  serious  physiological  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  accepting  this  muscular  theory.  The 
extent  of  a  sweep  of  the  arm  does  not  depend  mere- 
ly on  the  amount  of  force  put  forth ;  nor  does  it  de- 
pend solely  on  the  continuance  of  the  effort :  it  dc^ 
pends  also  on  the  proportionate  length  of  the  two 
arms  of  the  lever  on  which  the  muscle  operates. 
For  instance,  the  biceps  muscle  of  the  arm  is  inserted 
an  inch  below  the  elbow-joint,  whilst  the  distance 
from  the  point  of  insertion  to  the  end  of  the  Hmb 
may  be  sixteen  inches.     When  the  muscle  contracts 


144  BODY. 

to  a  certain  extent,  the  rapidity  of  the  movement  at 
the  extremity  will  be  sixteen  times  as  great  as  it 
would  have  been  if  the  insertion  had  been  at  the 
extremity;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  force  em- 
ployed by  the  muscle  has  been  sixteen  times  as  great 
as  would  have  been  reqmred  if  the  insertion  had 
been  at  the  extremity.  A  large  amount  of  force  is 
thus  expended  in  order  to  secure  the  great  advantage 
of  rapidity  of  movement.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that 
neither  the  intensity  nor  the  extent  of  contraction 
can  give  us  the  amount  of  motion  in  the  part  on 
which  the  muscle  operates ;  and,  that  while  the  mus- 
cular sense  may  inform  us  of  the  intensity,  and  ex- 
tent of  the  intensity,  and  extent  of  the  contraction 
of  the  fibres  of  a  muscle,  it  can  give  us  no  information 
of  the  extent  of  the  movement  of  our  limbs,  till 
after  long  experience  applied  to  each  limb.  "  It  is 
doubtful,"  says  Dr.  Kirkes  [Pliys.,  p.  646),  "how  far 
the  extent  of  muscular  movement  is  obtained  from 
sensations  in  the  muscles  themselves.  The  sensation 
of  movement  attending  the  motions  of  the  hand  is 
very  shght ;  and  persons  who  do  not  know  that  the 
action  of  particular  muscles  is  necessary  for  the  pro- 
duction of  given  movements,  do  not  suspect  that  the 
movement  of  the  fingers,  for  example,  depends  on 
action  in  the  forearm."  Mr.  Abbot  has  pressed  some 
of  the  difficulties  (Sight  and  Touch,  p.  70) :  "Let  us 
suppose  a  blind  man  trying  to  get  the  notion  of  dis- 
tance from  the  motion  of  his  hand.  He  finds  a  cer- 
tain sweep  of  the  hand  brings  it  into  contact  with  a 


BODY.  145 

desk ;  the  distance  of  which,  therefore,  is  represented 
by  that  effort.  But  it  requires  a  greater  effort  to 
reach  the  eyes  or  the  nose ;  and  distance  being 
=  locomotive  effort,  it  is  demonstrated  that  the  nose 
extends  beyond  the  desk.  The  top  of  the  head  must 
be  conceived  as  more  remote,  and  the  back  farthest 
of  all»  In  general,  when  we  refer  distances  to  the 
eye,  as  we  habitually  do,  objects  four  inches  from  the 
eye  must  appear  farther  from  us  than  those  at 
twelve.  This  is  another  novelty.  But  again,  since 
the  hand  moves  in  curves,  and  cannot  without  con- 
siderable effort  be  made  to  move  m  a  straight  line, 
it  is  also  demonstrated  that  an  epicycloid  is  shorter 
than  a  right  line  between  the  same  points." 

But,  after  all,  the  question  is  to  be  decided  by 
psychological  rather  than  physiological  considera- 
tions. The  phenomenon  to  be  explained  is  our  idea 
of  extension,  and  consciousness  will  require  to  be 
consulted.  The  theory  was  started  by  Brown,  and 
Hamilton  had  thus  examined  it  (Append.,  Eeid's 
Works,  p.  869) :  "  The  notion  of  Time  or  succession 
being  supposed,  that  of  longitudinal  extension  is 
given  in  the  succession  of  feelings  which  accompanies 
the  gradual  contraction  of  a  muscle ;  the  notion  of 
this  succession  constitutes  i2)so  facto  the  notion  of  a 
certain  length ;  and  the  notion  of  this  length " 
(he  quietly  takes  for  granted)  "  is  the  notion  of 
longitudinal  extension  sought.  The  paralogism 
here  is  transparent.  Length  is  an  ambiguous 
term;  and  it  is  length  in  space,  extensive  length, 

10 


146  BODY. 

and  not  length  in  time  protensive,  whose  notion  it  is 
the  problem  to  solve."  Mr.  Mill  (p.  227)  quotes  this 
language,  and  tries  to  avoid  the  argument  by  urging 
that  the  "  assertion  of  Brown,  and  of  all  who  hold 
the  Psychological  theory,  is  that  the  notion  of  length 
in  space,  not  being  in  our  consciousness  originally,  is 
constructed  by  the  mind's  laws  out  of  the  notion  of 
length  in  time.  The  argument  is  not,  as  Sir  William 
Hamilton  fancied,  a  fallacious  confusion  between  two 
different  meanings  of  the  word  length,  but  an  iden- 
tification of  them  as  one."  This  statement  is  cer- 
tainly sufficiently  clear,  but  it  crowns  the  absurdity. 
"  When  we  say  that  there  is  a  space  between  A  and 
B,  we  mean  that  some  amount  of  these  muscular 
sensations  must  intervene;  and  when  we  say  the 
space  is  greater  or  less,  we  mean  that  the  series  of 
sensation  (amount  of  muscular  effort  being  given)  is 
longer  or  shorter."  "Now  this,  which  is  unques- 
tionably the  mode  in  which  we  become  aware  of  sen- 
sation, is  considered  by  the  psychologists  in  question 
to  he  extension."  I  need  not  repeat  that  what  is  here 
represented  as  unquestionable,  has  been  questioned 
physiologically.  But  we  are  now  discussing  the 
psychological  question. 

We  have  here  three  different  phenomena,  —  con- 
sciousness being  the  witness.  We  have  —  (1.)  Series 
of  Muscular  Sensations;  (2.)  Length  of  Time;  (3.) 
Length  of  Space.  These  three  may  have  relations 
one  to  another,  but  they  are  surely  diverse  from  one 
another.     Mr.  Mill  explains  that  he  does  not  draw 


BODY.  147 

the  one  from  the  other,  which  would  be  preposterous 
enough,  but  he  declares  them  identical,  which  is  ab- 
surd in  the  extreme.  It  matches  the  doctrme  of 
Hegel,  justly  regarded  as  the  reductio  ad  ahsurdum 
of  his  whole  philosophy,  that  all  things  are  one. 
Hegel  lessened  the  absurdity  of  this  statement  by 
another,  that  aU  things  are  different ;  but  Mr.  Mill  has 
no  such  explanation  to  offer,  for  he  declares  musular 
sensations,  time,  and  space  to  be  identical,  without 
a  difference.  Mr.  Mill  gives  a  scanty  enough  account 
of  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  but  he  acknowledges 
that  we  possess  a  power  of  discerning  differences. 
If  we  can  trust  our  capacities  at  all,  they  declare 
that  the  three  things  under  consideration  are  as 
different  as  any  one  thing  can  be  from  any  other. 

A  series  of  miiscidar  sensations  and  length  of  time 
are  surely  different.  They  are  different  in  them- 
selves, and  we  can  conceive  an  animated  being,  say  a 
lobster,  to  have  a  succession  of  sensations,  and  yet 
no  idea  of  tune.  Again,  series  of  muscidar  sensations 
and  extensio7i  are  not  the  same.  The  series  of  feel- 
ings excited  as  I  pass  my  hand  over  a  table  is  not 
the  same  as  the  yard  square  which  is  the  size  of  the 
table.  Curious  consequences  would  seem  to  foUow 
from  this  doctrine  of  identity.  If,  in  the  next  atr 
tempt  with  the  same  series  of  sensations,  my  hand 
passed  over  a  table  two  yards  long,  the  theory  would 
identify  the  time  with  two  yards,  as  before  it  did 
with  one  :  and  as  Mr.  Mill  admits  the  law  of  identity 
(see  cu.),  or,  that  things  which  are  identical  with  the 


us  .  BODY. 

same  tiling  are  identical  with  one  another,  it  would 
make  one  yard,  which  is  the  same  with  a  series  of 
sensations,  identical  with  two  yards,  which  is  iden- 
tical with  the  same  series  of  sensations.    To  represent 
this  otherwise.     The  length  of  time  taken  by  us  to 
travel  between  London  and  Paris  does  not  merely 
help  us  (as  every  one  admits)  to  estimate  the  length 
of  way  when  we  have  an  idea  of  the  rate  at  which 
we  are  travelling  (as  the  thermometer  measures  heat 
for  us),  but  is  the  very  same  with  the  length  of  the 
way ;  and  as  we  travel  it  in  a  longer  or  shorter  time, 
or  with  more  or  fewer  sensations,  so  is  the  length  of 
way  actually  longer  or  shorter   at  different  times. 
If  we  draw  back  from  such  consequences  by  appeal- 
ing to  a  different  measure,  would  not  this  show  that 
we  had  unfortunately  taken  the  wrong  rule  ?     But, 
after  all,  I  will  not  positively  affirm  that  such  con- 
sequences follow,  for  the  doctrine  is  one  that  baffles 
all  reasoning  because  it  sets  aside  the  first  premises 
of  reasoning.      Mr.  Abbot  says  very  properly,  "  In- 
deed the  obvious  differences  between  the  two  ideas 
are  so  great,  that  a  philosopher  who  has  neglected 
them  can  scarcely  be  convinced  by  more  abstruse 
considerations.     Thus,  muscular  effort  has  degrees, — 
its  parts  are  not  equal  •  extension  does  not  admit  of 
degrees,  —  its  parts  are  equal.     Extension  has  three 
dimensions,  muscular  effort  only  one.     The  parts  of 
extension  are  co-existent ;  those  of  muscular  effort 
are  successive."     Finally,  length  of  time  and  length 
of  space  are  not  the  same.     As  weU  might  we  iden- 


BODY.  149 

tify  colors  with  smellS;  sounds  with  shapes,  sweet 
with  sour,  light  with  darkness,  love  with  hatred, 
virtue  with  vice,  Mr.  Mill  with  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
as  identify  extension  with  duration. 

Mr.  Mill's  attempt  to  get  support  to  his  hypothesis 
from  the  sense  of  sight  is,  if  possible,  still  more  un- 
successful. He  is  obliged  to  suppose  that  in  vision 
we  have  originally  only  a  sensation  of  color,  and 
that  the  idea  of  an  extended  surface  is  given  by,  or 
rather  is  identical  with,  the  time  occupied  by  the 
muscular  sensafions  as  we  move  the  eye.  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton,  in  reviewing  Berkeley,  had  noticed 
the  doctrine  that  the  eye  gives  us  only  color,  and  his 
criticism  has  commonly  been  regarded  as  amounting 
almost  to  a  demonstration:  "All  parties  are,  of 
course,  at  one  in  regard  to  the  fact  that  we  see  color. 
Those  who  hold  that  we  see  extension,  admit  that 
we  see  it  only  as  colored  -,  and  those  who  deny  us 
any  vision  of  extension  make  color  the  exclusive  ob- 
ject of  sight.  In  regard  to  this  first  position  all  are 
therefore  agreed.  Nor  are  they  less  harmonious  in 
reference  to  the  second ;  that  the  power  of  perceiv- 
ing color  involves  the  power  of  perceiving  the  differ- 
ences of  colors.  By  sight  we,  therefore,  perceive 
color,  and  discriminate  one  color,  that  is,  one  colored 
body,  —  one  sensation  of  color,  from  another.  This 
is  admitted.  A  third  position  will  also  be  denied  by 
none,  that  the  colors  discriminated  in  vision  are,  or 
may  be,  placed  side  by  side  in  immediate  juxtaposi- 
tion ;  or  one  may  limit  another  by  being  superin- 


150  BODY, 

duced  partially  over  it.  A  fourth  position  is  equally 
indisputable  ;  that  the  contrasted  colors,  thus  bound- 
ing each  other,  will  form  by  their  meeting  a  visible 
line,  and  that,  if  the  superinduced  color  be  sur- 
rounded by  the  other,  this  line  will  return  upon  it- 
self, and  thus  constitute  the  outhne  of  a  visible 
figure.  These  four  positions  command  a  peremptory 
assent ;  they  are  all  self-evident.  But  their  admis- 
sion at  once  explodes  the  paradox  under  discussion  " 
(that  extension  cannot  be  cognized  by  sight  alone). 
"  And  thus :  A  line  is  extension  in  one  dimension,  — 
length ;  a  figure  is  extension  in  two,  —  length  and 
breadth.  Therefore  the  vision  of  a  line  is  a  vision 
of  extension  in  length ;  the  vision  of  a  figu.re,  the 
vision  of  extension  in  length  and  breadth."  {3fetaph. 
vol.  ii.  p.  167.) 

Mr.  Mill  acknowledges,  "  I  cannot  make  the  answer 
to  this  argument  as  thorough  and  conclusive  as  T 
could  wish."  (p.  239.)  His  attempts  to  lessen  its 
force  are  exceedingly  weak  and  palpably  insufficient. 
He  calls  attention  to  the  circumstance  that  the  eye 
"  does  not  cognize  visible  figure  by  means  of  color 
alone,  but  by  all  those  motions  and  modifications  of 
the  muscles  connected  with  the  eye,  which  have  so 
great  a  share  in  giving  us  our  acquired  perceptions 
of  sight."  Be  it  so,  the  demonstration  remains  un- 
touched, that  we  take  in  figure  when  we  take  ih 
color.  He  says,  that  an  eye  immovably  fixed  "  gives 
a  full  and  clear  vision  of  but  a  small  portion  of 
space."     The  admission  is  sufficient  for  our  purpose. 


BODY.  151 

He  throws  us  once  more  on  Mr.  Bain,  wlio  tells  us, 
"  Wlien  we  look  at  a  circle,  say  one-tenth  of  an  inch 
in  diameter,  the  eye  can  take  in  the  whole  of  it  with- 
out movement."  The  tenth  of  an  inch  is  as  good 
as  a  whole  inch,  or  a  foot,  or  a  yard.  In  the  tenth 
of  an  inch  is  extension  with  a  boundary,  and  may 
be  a  measure  to  aid  us  in  ascertaming  the  extent  we 
can  take  in  by  the  sweep  of  the  eyes.  Mr.  Mill  ad- 
mits "  a  rudimentary  conception  must  be  allowed ; 
for  it  is  evident  that  even  without  moving  the  eye 
we  are  capable  of  having  two  sensations  of  color  at 
once,  and  that  the  boundary  which  separates  the 
colors  must  give  some  specific  affection  of  sight." 
He  would  lessen  the  significance  of  this  admission  in 
a  very  unworthy  manner :  "  But  to  confer  on  these 
discriminative  impressions  the  name  which  denotes 
our  matured  and  perfected  cognition  of  extension, 
or  even  to  assume  that  they  have  anything  in  com- 
mon with  it,  seems  to  be  going  beyond  evidence." 
No  one  maintains  that  our  primary  vision  of  a  sur- 
face by  the  eye  comes  up  to  our  perfected  cognition 
of  extension ;  still  it  is  a  surface,  and  it  has  a  bound- 
ary, and  therefore  it  has  something  in  common  with 
it.  Mr.  Bain  tells  us,  "  We  may  still,  however,  see 
very  strong  grounds  for  maintaming  the  presence  of 
a  muscular  element,  even  in  this  instance."  Be  it 
so ;  the  demonstration  of  Hamilton  holds  good,  that 
in  the  two  colors  in  this  space,  whether  with  or  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  muscles,  we  have  Hues  and  spaces. 
But  he  adds,  "  In  the  second  place,  the  essential  im- 


152  BODY. 

port  of  visible  form  is  something  not  attainable 
without  the  experience  of  moving  the  eye.  If  we 
looked  at  a  little  round  spot,  we  should  know  an 
optical  difference  between  it  and  a  triangular  spot ; 
and  we  should  recognize  it  as  identical  with  another 
round  spot."  And  then,  subjecting  the  fact  to  his 
theory,  instead  of  forming  his  theory  from  the  facts, 
he  tells  us,  "  We  mean  by  a  round  form  something 
which  would  take  a  given  sweep  of  the  eye  to  com- 
prehend it."  I  suppose  this  is  what  he  means  by  the 
import  of  form,  that  it  is  the  time  spent  in  muscular 
action  (!),  which  I  rather  think  might  be  the  same 
for  a  square,  or  a  triangle,  or  an  oval,  of  a  certain 
size,  as  for  a  circle.  I  really  cannot  understand  how 
we  should  optically  know  the  difference  of  the  figures, 
unless  we  perceived  them  as  figures.  In  spite  of  aU 
these  perverted  attempts  at  the  resolution  of  them 
into  something  else,  there  still  remains  the  surface 
and  the  boundary  perceived  by  the  eye. 

Faihng  utterly  in  the  psychological  analysis,  Mr. 
Bain  and  Mr.  Mill  (p.  232)  fall  back  on  a  statement 
of  Platner,  which  Sir  William  Hamilton  had  copied 
into  his  Lectures  without  knowing  what  to  make  of 
it.  "In  regard  to  the  visionless  representation  of 
space  or  extension,  the  attentive  observation  of  a 
person  born  blind,  which  I  formerly  instituted  in  the 
year  1785,  and  again  in  relation  to  the  point  in  ques- 
tion, have  continued  for  three  whole  weeks,  —  this 
observation,  I  say,  has  convinced  me  that  the  sense 
of  touch  by  itself  is  altogether  incompetent  to  afford 


BODY.  153 

US  the  representation  of  extension  and  space,  and  is 
not  even  cognizant  of  local  exteriority ;  in  a  word, 
that  a  man  deprived  of  sight  has  absolutely  no  per- 
ception of  an  outer  world  beyond  the  existence  of 
something  effective,  different  from  his  own  feeling  of 
passivity,  and  in  general  only  of  the  numerical  diver- 
sity, —  shall  I  say  of  impressions  or  of  things  ?  In 
fact,  to  those  born  blind,  time  serves  instead  of  space. 
Vicinity  and  distance  means  in  their  mouths  nothing 
more  than  the  shorter  or  longer  time,  the  smaller  or 
greater  number  of  feelings  which  they  find  necessary 
to  attain  from  some  one  feehng  to  another.  That  a 
person  blind  from  birth  employs  the  language  of 
vision,  —  that  may  occasion  considerable  error ;  and 
did,  indeed,  at  the  commencement  of  my  observa- 
tions, lead  me  wrong  •  but,  in  point  of  fact,  he  knows 
nothing  of  things  as  existing  out  of  each  other ;  and 
(this  in  particular  I  have  very  clearly  remarked)  if 
objects,  and  the  parts  of  his  body  touched  by  them, 
did  not  make  different  kinds  of  impressions  on  his 
nerves  of  sensation,  he  would  take  everything  ex- 
ternal for  one  and  the  same.  In  his  own  body  he 
absolutely  did  not  discriminate  head  and  foot  at  all 
by  their  distance,  but  merely  by  the  difference  of 
the  feehngs  (and  his  perception  of  such  differences 
was  incredibly  fine)  which  he  experienced  from  the 
one  and  from  the  other,  and,  moreover,  through  time. 
In  like  manner,  in  external  bodies,  he  distinguished 
their  figure  merely  by  the  varieties  of  impressed 
feelings  j  inasmuch,  for  example,  as  the  cube  by  its 


154  BODY. 

angles    affected    his   feelings   differently   from    the 
sphere." 

Let  it  be  observed  of  this  account,  that  it  is  largely 
theoretical,  by  one  who  believed  with  Kant,  that 
there  were  a  priori  forms  of  space  and  time  in  the 
mind,  and  that  these  were  brought  forth  empirically 
only  by  the  sense  of  sight.  Platner  does  not  give 
us  the  facts  to  enable  us  to  judge  for  ourselves ;  he 
favors  us  only  with  his  conclusions.  His  observations 
carry  us  as  far  back  as  1785,  when  the  distinction 
between  touch-proper  and  the  muscular  sense  was 
not  established.  Later  physiological  research  has 
shown  that,  in  the  case  of  the  blind,  as  in  all  others, 
touch-proper  makes  us  localize  the  affections  of  our 
bodily  frame,  and  that  the  muscular  sense  gives  us 
^^  something  effective,  different  from  our  feeling  of 
passivity:"  we  may  add,  different  from  our  felt 
bodily  frame.  It  has  been  proven,  by  later  and  fully 
detailed  researches,  that  those  born  blind  know  their 
own  body  as  extended  by  the  common  sensations  of 
feeling,  and  know  extra-organic  objects  by  the  resist- 
ance offered  to  their  muscular  efforts.  Even  Mr. 
Mill  is  obliged  to  modify  and  explain  Platner's  state- 
ment (p.  233):  —  "But  Platner,  though  unintention- 
ally, puts  a  false  color  on  the  matter  when  he  says 
that  his  patient  had  no  perception  of  extension ;  he 
had  conceptions  of  extension  after  his  own  manner ; " 
in  fact,  "  all  that  is  meant  by  persons  who  see." 
Without  this  explanation  the  statement  of  Platner 
would  be  fatal  to  the  theory  of  Mill,  who  makes  us 


BODY,  155 

get  our  knowledge  of  extension  from  the  rauscular 
feelings,  and  not  as  Platner,  whose  avowed  aim  is  to 
get  it  from  sight.  "With  this  explanation  it  can  help 
neither  side,  for  it  puts  those  who  see  in  the  same 
position  as  the  blind,  and  those  who  see  will  be  ad- 
mitted by  all  to  have  "a  perception  of  an  outer 
world  "  by  the  sense  of  touch.  I  believe  that  Plat- 
ner  may  be  right  when  he  says  that  "  local  exterior- 
ity/' that  is,  objects  out  of  the  body,  may  not  be 
given  b}^  touch-jDroper  or  feeling ;  but  this  is  certainly 
given  by  the  muscular  sense  in  the  case  of  the  bhnd, 
as  in  that  of  the  seeing.  When  he  speaks  of  time 
serving  instead  of  space  to  those  born  blind,  and 
that  vicinity  and  distance  means  only  shorter  or 
longer  time,  or  the  smaller  or  greater  number  of 
feelings  which  they  find  necessary  to  attain  from 
some  one  feeling  to  another,  I  beheve  he  was  led 
astray  by  not  distinguishing  between  our  apprehen- 
sion of  space  and  the  measure  of  space.  The  idea 
of  members  of  the  body  localized  is  given  most 
probably  by  all  the  senses.  But  the  actual  measure- 
ment of  space  is  always  a  subsequent  process,  im- 
plying comparison  and  a  standard.  I  beheve  that 
in  all  of  us  the  succession  of  our  feelings,  of  our 
muscular  feelings,  but  also  of  our  mental  ideas  and 
feelings  as  well,  is  one  means  of  helping  us  to 
measure  (not  only  time,  but)  space ;  we  measure  it 
in  a  loose  way,  by  the  feehngs  we  have  experienced 
in  passing  over  it  in  travelling,  or  by  a  member  of 
our  body.     Those  born  bhnd  must  be  specially  de-  ^ 


156  BODY. 

pendent  on  sucli  a  measure.  Those  who  see  have  a 
natural  measure  provided  in  the  surface  which  falls 
under  the  perception  of  the  eye.  Those  born  blind 
have  such  a  measure  in  the  surface  of  the  body  given 
by  touchy  and  in  the  effort  of  the  locomotive  energy 
reported  by  the  muscular  sense.  We  shall  see  in 
next  chapter  that  a  very  different  account  from  that 
of  Platner  is  given  by  later  German  physiologists.^ 

As  the  result  of  these  discussions,  it  appears  that 
we  have  ideas  and  convictions  of  externality,  of 
resistance  to  the  energy  of  self,  and  of  extension, 
that  cannot  be  resolved  into  any  elements  which  do 
not  imply  them.  But  do  these  subjective  apprehen- 
sions and  beliefs  imply  corresponding  objective  real- 
ities ?  This  is  the  old  question  of  metaphysics.  To 
treat  it  historically,  logically,  and   critically  would 


1  In  order  to  be  able  to  form  an  in-  of  each.  When  their  head,  and  their 
telligent  opinion  on  these  subjects,  I  legs,  and  their  arms  were  pricked  ex- 
put  myself  in  communication  with  the  actly  alike,  they  at  once  showed  us  the 
Eev.  J.  Kinghan,  who  for  twenty  seat  of  sensation,  and  knew  the  points 
years  has  been  connected  with  the  In-  to  be  out  of  each  other.  I  moved 
stitution  for  the  Blind  in  Belfast,  first  their  hand  first  over  a  book  seven 
as  assistant,  and  now  as  Principal,  inches  long,  and  then  over  a  desk  four- 
He  declares  that  he  has  never  found  teen  inches  long,  occupying  the  same 
anything,  in  all  his  teaching  of  the  time  with  each  process,  and  they  at 
blind,  or  intercourse  with  them,  to  con-  once  declared  that  the  latter  was  much 
firm  Platner's  statement.  Those  longer  than  the  former.  We  allowed 
bom  blind  cannot  have  the  visual  idea  a  boy  to  feel  round  a  room  with  which 
of  space,  but  they  have,  he  says,  a  he  was  unacquainted,  and  he  at  once 
very  clear  notion  of  figure  and  dis-  declared  its  shape.  One  of  these 
tance  got  directly  from  the  sense  of  children  was  a  girl  of  the  age  of  eight, 
touch.  With  his  aid  I  have  experi-  just  entered  the  Institution,  so  igno- 
mented  with  very  young  children  born  rant  that  she  did  not  know  the  meaning 
blind.  I  put  two  small  pieces  of  wood,  of  angle  or  corner  or  point,  calling  the 
one  triangular  and  the  other  square,  corners  of  the  figures  "  little  heads." 
under  the  palm  of  the  hand,  and  with-  She  said  the  square  had  two  little 
out  being  allowed  to  move  the  hand  heads  and  two  little  heads,  but  was 
over  it,  they  at  once  told  us  the  shape  not  sure  that  two  and  two  make  four. 


BODY.  15T 

require  a  separate  volume.  Fortuuately  it  is  not 
necessary  here  to  enter  upon  the  wide  question. 
Mr.  Mill  grants  that  there  is  an  assurance  which  is 
'^  a  test  to  which  we  may  bring  all  our  convictions  " 
(see  X.),  and  that  "  we  may  be  sure  of  what  w^e  see 
as  well  as  what  we  feel "  (see  fi).  Following  these 
admitted  principles,  I  do  not  see  that  Mr.  Mill  can 
object  to  the  reaUty  of  an  extended  world,  provided 
always  that  it  be  shown  that  our  ideas  as  to  exter- 
nahty  and  extension  cannot  be  resolved  into  simpler 
elements.  The  conviction  we  entertain  as  to  an  ex- 
ternal world  is  of  the  nature  of  a  primitive  percep- 
tion, and  not  a  derivative  idea.  We  -perceive  objects 
out  of  ourselves  resisting  us  and  extended.  This 
perception,  like  that  of  consciousness,  is  self-evident : 
we  seem  to  look  at  once  on  the  object.  It  is  also 
necessary :  no  doubt  we  can  imagine  it  to  be  other- 
wise, but  we  cannot  be  made  to  judge  or  beheve 
that  our  hand  is  not  an  extended  object.  It  is  uni- 
versal :  all  men  entertain  it  and  act  upon  it.  Inge- 
nious objections  may  be  urged  against  all  this,  but 
they  are  such  as  are  advanced  not  only  against  all 
truth,  but  against  all  inquiry,  and  proceed  upon  a 
universal  scepticism,  which  Mr.  MiU,  who  professes  to 
be  a  lover  of  truth,  does  not  avow. 

These  same  considerations  justify  us  in  looking 
upon  body  as  a  substance.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  I  do  not  stand  up  for  an  unknown  substratum 
beneath  the  known  thing.  Whatever  is  known  as 
existing,  as  acting,  and  having  permanence,  I  regard 


158  BODY. 

as  a  substance.  Mind  is  a  substance^  as  it  can  be  so 
characterized.  But  we  have  seen  that  we  know 
body  as  an  existence,  in  operation,  and  with,  as  Mr. 
Mill  allows,  a  permanence ;  it  is  therefore  a  sub- 
stance. It  is  vastly  more  than  a  "  possibility ; "  it 
is  an  actuahty.  It  is  more  than  a  possibility  of 
^^  sensations ; "  it  has  an  existence  even  as  the  sensa- 
tions have  ;  and  a  body  is  known  not  only  as  giving 
sensations,  but  as  capable  of  acting  on  other  bodies 
in  a  variety  of  ways,  which  it  is  the  office  of  physical 
science  to  classify  and  to  reduce  to  laws.  By  adher- 
ing to  these  simple  principles  we  are  made  to  feel 
that  we  are  out -of  the  region  of  phantoms  and  in 
the  land  of  reahties. 


CHAPTER   YII. 

THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES. 

THERE  is  an  impression  among  many  that  Mr. 
Mill's  theory  has  the  support  of  physiology,  and 
this  is  strengthened  by  the  anatomical  and  physio- 
logical details  which  constitute  so  large  a  portion  of 
Mr.  Bain's  work.  But  I  cannot  discover  that  either 
has  found  a  basis,  or  even  a  starting-point,  for  their 
general  theory  of  the  mind,  or  for  their  particular 
theory  of  the  manner  in  which  we  reach  the  idea 
of  an  extended  world,  in  any  ascertained  phenomena 
of  our  bodily  frame.  Their  speculations  receive 
no  aid  from  physiology,  and  must  stand  or  fall  by 
their  psychological  merits  or  demerits.  The  phys- 
iology of  the  senses  is  still  in  a  very  uncertain  con- 
dition, and,  whatever  it  may  do  in  ages  to  come,  can 
as  yet  throw  little  light  on  strictly  mental  action, 
except,  indeed,  in  the  way  of  correcting  premature 
hypotheses.  It  may  be  profitable  to  look  at  some 
of  the  later  researches  into  the  senses  conducted  by 
eminent  physiologists,  especially  in  Germany.  We 
shall  find  that  they  give  no  sanction  to  the  hypoth- 
esis of  Mr.  Mill  and  Mr.  Bain,  and  seem  to  favor  a  the- 
ory of  a  very  different  character.     In  the  sketch  that 

(159) 


160        THE   PHYSIOLOGY    OF    THE    SEIS'SES. 

follows,  I  have  made  free  use  of  the  great  works  on 
physiology  which  have  been  published  in  our  coun- 
try, and  still  more  particularly  of  the  admirable  his- 
torical, critical,  and  expository  summary  by  Wundt, 
in  his  Beitrdge  zur  Theorie  der  Smneswahrnehmung 

Touch. 

The  scientific  investigation  of  this  sense  may  be 
said  to  have  commenced  with  the  researches  of  J. 
Miiller  and  E.  H.  Weber.  The  general  result  reached 
by  Miiller  is,  that  "  every  point  in  which  a  nerve- 
fibre  ends  is  represented  in  the  sensorium  as  a  space- 
particle."  ( Wundt,  Theor.  Sinneswahr.)  There  are 
disputes  as  to  how  the  general  law  should  be  stated, 
but  we  have  a  fact  here  which  has  not  been  and 
cannot  be  set  aside.  The  nerves  of  touch  proper, 
setting  out  from  the  base  of  the  brain,  tend  towards 
the  periphery  of  the  body.  They  reach  the  skin 
each  at  a  determined  point :  there  is  a  special  aggre- 
gation of  these  points  in  the  mid-finger  and  the  tip 
of  the  tongue.  Now,  wherever  the  nerve  terminates, 
there  the  sensation  is  felt :  thus,  if  we  prick  a  nerve 
which  reaches  the  mid-finger,  the  pain  is  localized  at 
the  point  where  the  nerve  terminates.  If  we  stretch 
or  pinch  the  ulnar  nerve,  by  pushing  it  from  side  to 
side,  or  compressing  it  with  the  fingers,  the  shock  is 
felt  in  the  parts  to  which  its  ultimate  branchlets  are 
distributed,  namely,  in  the  palm  and  back  of  the 
hand,  and  in  the  fourth  and  fifth  fingers.     "  Accord- 


THJS   PHTSIOLOGT    OF   THE    SEJSFHES.        161 

ing  as  the  pressure  is  varied,  the  pricking  sensation 
is  felt  by  turns  in  the  fourth  finger,  in  the  fifth,  in 
the  palm  of  the  hand,  or  in  the  back  of  the  hand ; 
and  both  on  the  palm  and  on  the  back  of  the  hand 
the  situation  of  the  pricking  sensation  is  different, 
according  as  the  pressure  on  the  nerve  is  varied; 
that  is  to  say,  according  as  different  fibres  or  fasciculi 
of  fibres  are  more  pressed  upon  than  others.  The 
same  will  be  found  to  be  the  case  m  irritating  the 
nerve  in  the  upper  arm."  (MUller's  Physiology,  by 
Baly,  p.  740.)  So  strong  is  this  tendency  to  localize 
the  sensation  at  the  extremities  of  the  nerves,  that 
when  an  arm  or  leg  is  amputated  the  person  has  still 
the  feeling  of  the  lost  Hmb.  Mliller  has  collected  a 
number  of  such  cases.  (76.,  pp.  746,  747.)  "A  stu- 
dent, named  Schmidts,  from  Aix,  had  his  arm  am- 
putated above  the  elbow  thirteen  years  ago ;  he  has 
never  ceased  to  have  sensations  as  if  in  the  fingers. 
I  applied  pressure  to  the  nerves  in  the  stump ;  and 
M.  Schmidts  immediately  felt  the  whole  arm,  even 
the  fingers,  as  if  asleep."  "  A  toll-keeper  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Halle,  whose  right  arm  had  been 
shattered  by  a  cannon-ball  in  battle,  above  the  elbow, 
twenty  years  ago,  and  afterwards  amputated,  has 
still,  in  1833,  at  the  time  of  changes  of  the  weather, 
distinct  rheumatic  pains,  which  seem  to  him  to  exist 
in  the  whole  arm ;  and  though  removed  long  ago, 
the  lost  part  is  at  those  times  felt  as  if  sensible  to 
draughts  of  air.    This  man  also  completely  confirmed 

our  statement,  that  the  sense  of  the  integrity  of  the 
11 


162        TBE   PHYSIOLOGY   OJf    THE   SENSES, 

limb  was  never  lost."  When  there  is  a  change  made 
artificially  in  the  peripheral  extremities  of  nerves, 
the  sensations  are  still  felt  as  if  in  the  original  spots. 
"  When,  in  the  restoration  of  a  nose,  a  flap  of  skin  is 
turned  down  from  the  forehead  and  made  to  unite 
with  the  stump  of  the  nose,  the  new  nose  thus  formed 
has,  as  long  as  the  isthmus  of  skin  by  which  it  main- 
tains its  original  connections  remains  undivided,  the 
same  sensations  as  if  it  were  still  on  the  forehead ; 
in  other  words,  when  the  nose  is  touched,  the  patient 
feels  the  impression  in  the  forehead.  This  is  a  fact 
well  known  to  surgeons,  and  was  first  observed  by 
Lisfranc."  {Ih.,  p.  748.) 

No  doubt  it  is  possible  to  ascribe  all  this  to  ex- 
perience and  the  association  of  ideas.  We  first,  it  is 
said,  find  by  observation  that  a  certain  sensation 
originates  in  a  particular  part  of  the  body,  and  the 
same  sensation  ever  after  suggests  the  part.  But  the 
facts,  as  a  whole,  will  not  submit  to  this  explanation. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  phenomena  quoted  can 
be  thus  accounted  for.  For  surely  an  experience  of 
thirteen  or  twenty  years  might  have  been  sufiicient 
to  change  the  associations  acquired  at  an  earlier  date, 
and  to  place  the  persons  under  the  influence  of  new 
ones,  provided  always  that  the  original  ones  had  not 
been  instinctive  or  native.  In  the  case  of  the  trans- 
ference of  the  flap  of  skin,  Mliller  says,  "  When  the 
communication  of  the  nervous  fibres  of  the  new  nose 
with  those  of  the  forehead  is  cut  off  by  division  of 
the  isthmus  of  skin,  the  sensations  are  of  course  no 


THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES.       163 

longer  referred  to  the  forehead;  the  sensibihty  of 
the  nose  is  at  first  absent,  but  is  gradually  developed." 
This  language  implies  that  the  old  reference  to  the 
forehead  ceased  in  spite  of  the  old  association  when 
the  isthmus  was  cut  •  and  that  the  new  reference 
to  the  nose  Avas  occasioned  by  the  sensibility  of  the 
nervCj  according  to  the  physiological  law,  which 
makes  us  ascribe  the  sensation  to  the  extremity  of 
the  nerve.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  experience 
could  give  us  the  ready  localization  of  the  sensation, 
more  particularly  when  the  feeling  is  within  the 
body,  and  in  a  part  w^hich  has  never  fallen  under  the 
senses  of  touch  or  sight.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that 
the  instantaneous  voluntary  drawhig  back  of  a  limb 
when  wounded,  and  the  shrinking  of  the  frame  when 
boiling  liquid  is  poured  down  the  throat,  can  proceed 
from  an  application  of  an  observed  law  as  to  the  seat 
of  sensations.  From  a  very  early  age,  and  long  be- 
fore they  give  any  evidence  of  knowing  distance 
beyond  their  bodies,  or  having  any  other  acquKed 
perceptions,  children  will  indicate  that  they  know  at 
least  vaguely  the  seat  of  the  pain  felt  by  them ;  if 
a  child  is  wounded  in  the  arm,  it  will  not  hold  out 
its  foot.  But  the  question  seems  to  be  set  at  rest  by 
a  physiological  fact,  thus  stated  by  Dr.  Baly:  — 
"  Professor  Valentin  [Bepertor.  fur  Anat  und  Phy- 
siol., 1836,  p.  330)  has  observed,  that  individuals  w^ho 
are  the  subjects  of  congenital  imperfection,  or  ab' 
sence  of  the  extremities,  have,  nevertheless,  the  in- 
ternal sensations  of  such  limbs  in  their  perfect  state. 


164        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF    THE   SEJ^SES. 

A  girl  aged  nineteen  years,  in  whom  the  metacarpal 
bones  of  the  left  hand  were  very  short,  and  all  the 
bones  of  the  phalanges  absent,  —  a  row  of  imper- 
fectly organized  wart-like  projections  representing 
the  fingers,  —  assm^ed  M.  Valentin  that  she  had  con- 
stantly the  internal  sensation  of  a  palm  of  the  hand, 
and  ^Ye  fingers  on  the  left  side  as  perfect  as  on  the 
right.  When  a  ligature  was  placed  round  the  stump, 
she  had  the  sensation  of  ^  formication '  in  the  hand 
and  fingers ;  and  pressure  on  the  ulnar  nerve  gave 
rise  to  the  ordinary  feeling  of  the  third,  fourth,  and 
fifth  fingers  being  asleep,  although  these  fingers  did 
not  exist.  The  examination  of  three  other  indi- 
viduals gave  the  same  results."  (/&.,  p.  747).^ 

Miiller  maintains,  that  in  this  way  we  get  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  greater  number  of  the  parts  of  our  body, 
and  in  all  the  dimensions  of  space ;  and  that  when 
our  body  comes  into  collision  with  another  body,  if 
the  shock  be  sufficiently  strong,  the  sensation  of  our 
body  to  a  certain  depth  is  awakened,  and  there 
arises  a  sensation  of  the  contusion  in  the  whole 
dimensions  of  the  cube.  He  thus  makes  the  knowl- 
edge not  only  of  the  third  dimension  of  space,  but 
of  our  own  body,  to  depend  on  an  original  disposi- 
tion [Anlage).  He  carries  this  doctrine  so  far  as  to 
hold  that  as  the  nerves  of  all  the  senses  are  extended 
over  the  frame,  so  there  is  a  representation  of  space 

1  Mr.  Mill  refers  (p,  246)  to  a  case  was    unable   to    localize   the  feeling. 

given  him  by  Hamilton  from  Maine  de  The  case  is  valueless,  as  evidently  the 

Biran,  of  a  person  who  had  lost  the  functions   of   the   nervous   apparatus 

power  of  the  motor  nerves,  but  who,  were  deranged, 
though  still  alive  to  the  sense  of  pain. 


THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF    THE   SEls^SES.        165 

given  not  only  by  touch  and  sight,  but  also  by  taste 
and  smell,  —  the  sense  of  hearing  alone  not  giving 
us  a  perception  of  space,  because  it  does  not  perceive 
its  special  extension.  "The  first  idea  of  a  body 
having  extension,  and  occupymg  space,  arises  in  our 
mmd  from  the  sensation  of  our  own  corporeal  ex- 
tension. This  consciousness  of  our  owtq  corporeal 
existence  is  the  standard  by  which  we  estimate  in 
our  sense  of  touch  the  extension  of  all  resisting 
bodies."  {Physiology,  p.  1081.)  Wundt  says  (p.  2), 
"  These  \dews,  if  they  are  not  alwaj-s  carried  out 
with  such  consistency,  are  in  their  essential  funda- 
mental positions  still  acknowledged  at  this  day  by 
most  physiologists." 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  a  like  doctrine  was 
held  on  independent  grounds  by  two  of  the  greatest 
psychologists  of  this  century,  — by  M.  Saisset  m 
France,  and  Sir  William  Hamilton  in  this  country. 
The  former  dwells  on  the  locahzation  of  our  sensa- 
tions in  their  various  organic  seats.  (See  Art.  "  Sens" 
in  Diet  cles  Sciences  Philos.)  The  latter  says  that 
"  an  extension  is  apprehended  in  the  apprehension 
of  the  reciprocal  externality  of  all  sensations,"  and 
that  "in  the  consciousness  of  sensations  relativelv 
locahzed  and  reciprocally  external,  we  have  a  veri- 
table apprehension,  and  consequently  an  immediate 
perception  of  the  affected  organism,  as  extended,  di- 
vided, figured,"  etc.  (App.  Reid's  Works,  pp.  884,  885.)^ 

1  It  is  interesting  to  find  D.  Stewart  companied  with  a  perception  of  the 
saying,  "  It  is  characteristical  of  all  local  situation  of  their  exciting  causes.'' 
sensations  of  touch,  that  they  are  ac-    {Elem.,  vol.  iii.  p.  310.) 


166        THE    PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES. 

I  confess  that  I  have  a  great  partiality  for  this  doc- 
trine. Even  the  sense  of  hearing,  if  it  does  not 
yield  the  extension  of  our  frame,  may  give  a  direc- 
tion to  the  somid  heard  in  the  ear.  The  conclusion 
is  the  result  of  accurate  physiological  research,  and 
it  seems  to  me  to  clear  up  most  of  the  psychological 
difficulties  connected  with  the  senses,  and  to  favor  a 
metaphysical  realism  which  enables  us  to  stand  up 
for  the  veracity  of  our  original  sense-perceptions, 
which  are  mainly  of  the  body  as  affected.  It  sup- 
poses that  when  the  soul  is  roused  into  consciousness 
by  an  affection  of  the  nerves,  it  gives  a  direction  and 
a  localization  to  its  sensations,  and  as  it  feels  simul- 
taneously a  number  of  sensations  from  different 
members  of  the  body,  it  feels  them  to  be  out  of  each 
other,  and  related  in  respect  of  direction ;  and  as 
sensations  accumulate  and  succeed  each  other,  it 
gives  a  sensation,  or  rather  perception,  of  our  ca- 
pacity of  being  affected  at  very  different  points  of 
the  periphery,  and  consequently  of  a  volume.  When 
in  a  tepid  bath  we  have  not  only  a  pleasant  sensa- 
tion (which  is  all  that  Mr.  Bain  allows),  we  have  a 
feeling  of  the  frame  as  affected  over  the  whole  sur- 
face. But  let  not  this  statement  be  misunderstood. 
No  one  means  to  affirm  that  we  have  as  yet  a  repre- 
sentation or  image  in  the  mind  of  the  external  con- 
figuration of  the  body,  and  of  its  several  parts,  such 
as  we  reach  Avhen  we  come  to  feel  them  with  the 
hand  or  see  them  in  a  mirror.  This  is  a  subsequent 
attainment  made  by  a  gathered  experience  through 


THE   PHYSIOLOGY    OF    THE   SEJS^SES.        167 

the  combination  of  various  senses ;  and  we  are  often 
in  perplexity  from  the  difficulty  of  uniting  the  in- 
tuitive with  the  acquired  knowledge,  as  when  we 
know  that  the  pain  in  toothache  is  in  a  certain  direc- 
tion, and  yet  are  in  doubts  as  to  w^hat  tooth  corre- 
sponds externally  to  the  internal  localization.  But 
as  the  ground  of  the  whole,  we  have  a  localized  per- 
ception of  points,  and  of  different  points  and  direc- 
tions, in  our  bodily  frame,  which,  I  may  add,  is  felt 
to  be  ours  by  the  command  which  our  efforts  have 
over  it,  and  the  sensations  of  which  it  is  felt  to  be 
the  seat.  Some  parts  of  this  general  view  seem  to 
me  to  be  established  by  physiological  arguments,  and 
the  theory  as  a  whole  is  vastly  better  fitted  to  meet 
and  account  for  our  idea  of  extension  than  the  base- 
less hypothesis  sanctioned  by  Mr.  Mill. 

The  curious  experimental  researches  of  Weber 
seem  to  confirm  the  general  doctrine  that  Touch 
Proper  or  Feeling  is  very  specially,  as  the  Germans 
represent  it,  a  space-giving  organ.  His  experiments 
were  conducted  by  means  of  a  pair  of  compasses 
sheathed  with  cork,  with  which  he  touched  the  skin 
while  the  eyes  were  closed,  in  order  to  determine 
how  close  the  points  of  the  compasses  might  be 
brought  to  each  and  still  be  felt  as  two  bodies.  The 
distance  between  the  points  necessary  to  indicate 
different  sensations  was  found  to  vary  in  different 
parts  of  the  body,  from  one-half  Parisian  hne  on  the 
tip  of  the  tongue  to  thirty  Parisian  lines  on  the  back 
of  the  body,  thus  showing  the  sensitiveness  of  the 


168        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SEI^SES. 

one  part  to  be  sixty  times  finer  tlian  that  of  the 
other  part.  The  capabihty  of  discerning  the  differ- 
ence of  sensation  is  somewhat  different  in  different 
individuals,  but  it  is  said  that  their  relative  propor- 
tion in  different  parts  of  the  body  remains  tolerably 
constant  in  the  same  individual.  The  researches 
seem  to  imply  that  the  sense  of  touch  indicates  to 
us,  in  a  way  w^hicli  cannot  be  the  result  of  a  gathered 
experience,  both  points  of  space  and  intervals  of 
space,  always  within  and  not  beyond  the  bodily 
frame.  The  points  must  be  perceived  immediately, 
and  an  interval  or  line  between  is  either  ]3erceived 
immediately,  or  is  necessitated  in  mathematical 
thought  by  the  comparison  of  the  different  points. 

Weber  regards  the  skin  as  a  sort  of  mosaic  of 
circles  or  compartments,  which  in  different  positions 
have  different  magnitudes  and  shapes,  and  that  each 
has  its  own  capacity  of  sensation.  The  theory  sug- 
gested by  Fick  is  thus  stated  by  Dr.  Carpenter : 
"Each  nerve-fibril  breaks  up  into  a  pencil  of  fine 
filaments  at  the  periphery,  which  are  distributed 
over  a  certain  space,  perhaps  on  the  average  about 
1.25  of  an  inch  in  diameter.  An  impression  made 
upon  any  one  of  these  filaments  conveys  the  same 
sensation  to  the  sensorium,  providing  no  other  nerve 
be  distributed  to  the  same  space  j  but  this  hardly 
ever  occurs,  and  hence  compound  sensations  arise  by 
which  our  perception  of  the  precise  spot  of  the  skin 
touched  by  a  point  is  accurately  determined.  It  is 
obvious  that  the  closer  these  '  sensory  circles '  are, 


TBE   PHYSIOLOGY    OF    THE    SENSES.        169 

and  the  more  intimately  the  branches  of  different 
nerves  are  intercalated  with  one  another,  the  greater 
will  be  the  sense  of  locality  of  that  part ;  or,  in  other 
words,  the  greater  will  be  the  facility  with  w^hich 
minute  differences  in  the  precise  spot  touched  will 
be  appreciated."  [Hum.  Pliys.,  p.  611.)  The  subject 
has  been  keenly  discussed  in  Germany.  According 
to  George,  movement  is  the  source  of  all  objective 
consciousness.  If  by  objective  consciousness  is  meant 
not  that  of  our  bodily  frame,  but  of  somethmg  be- 
yond, I  believe  the  doctrine  is  correct.  We  discover 
extra-organic  objects  by  the  resistance  offered  to  our 
movement.  Fortlage  ascribes  our  intuition  of  body 
to  the  restraint  laid  on  our  impulse  ( Triebhemmiing). 
It  is  thus,  no  doubt,  we  know  the  existence  of  ob- 
jects beyond  our  bodies,  but  already  in  touch  we 
have  an  apprehension  of  our  frames  as  extended. 
Lotze  has  observed  much,  and  speculated  more  on 
this  whole  subject.  He  says  that  when  two  object- 
points  come  into  perception  through  two  excitations 
of  the  nerves,  the  consciousness  of  their  spatial  near- 
ness to  one  another  is  not  given ;  and  he  starts  the 
hypothesis  that  this  is  furnished  by  a  third  nerve- 
process,  which  he  calls  "  place  mdicators."  Meissner 
has  sought  to  bring  Lotze's  hypothesis  into  unison 
wdth  physiological  and  anatomical  researches.  He 
thinks  he  has  discovered  ^^touch-corpuscles,"  which 
he  represents  as  the  actual  touch-organs.  These  are 
found  specially  in  the  hand  and  the  foot,  and  they  at 
once  give  us  bodies  without  us  as  objects,  apart  from 


170        THE  PHYSIOLOGY    OF   THE   SENSES. 

the  sensation  of  pressure.  These  researches  and  dis- 
cussions all  proceed  on  the  idea  that  our  knowledge 
of  an  extended  world  is  obtained  not  exclusively  by 
a  sweep  of  the  hand,  but  by  some  special  provision 
in  the  sense  of  touch  proper  or  feeling. 

The  admitted  conclusions  are  thus  stated  by 
Wundt  (pp.  64,  65):  "With  every  single  sensation 
[Empfindang)  is  connected  involuntarily  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  place  at  which  it  occurs.  As  soon 
as  there  are  two  contemporaneous  sensations  in  the 
perception  (  Wahrnelimung),  there  is  thence  given  a 
dim  representation  of  the  extent  of  the  skin  which 
the  impressions  embrace,  whereby  the  impressions 
are  immediately  conceived  as  spatially  separated. 
But  about  the  magnitude  of  their  separation  in  space 
nothing  determinate  can  yet  be  declared,  as  that  rep- 
resentation is  for  this  purpose  altogether  indistinct. 
It  is  usually  only  when  one  is  first  led  through  an 
internal  or  external  impulse  to  resolve  upon  an  esti- 
mation by  measure,  that  there  is  raised  a  clear  image 
of  the  entire  parts  of  the  body  and  of  the  points 
touched,  and  thereby  is  first  given  the  determinate 
representation  of  the  interspace  which  lies  between 
the  impressions."  He  then  explains,  that,  in  regard 
to  the  distance  which  is  to  be  found  between  two 
impressions,  the  soul,  in  that  it  perceives  two  different 
sensations  of  place  ( Ortsempfindungen),  is  compelled 
to  put  an  interspace  between  them,  and  to  represent 
this  out  of  the  like  experience  through  sight  or  the 
muscular  sense. 


TBE   PHYSIOLOGY    OF    THE    SENSES,        171 

Muscular  Sense. 

Sir  Charles  Bell  established  the  great  truth,  that 
the  nerves  of  sensation  dififer  from  those  of  motion. 
From  his  physiological  researches,  and  the  ingenious 
psychological  sj)eculations  of  his  contemporary,  Dr. 
Thomas  Brown,  has  proceeded  the  very  general  ac- 
knowledgment in  this  country  of  the  existence  cf  a 
Muscular  Sense  to  be  distinguished  from  Touch 
Proper.  Physiologically  the  Muscular  Sense  consists 
of  a  Motor  nerve,  under  the  control  of  the  will,  going 
out  from  the  brain  and  moving  the  muscle  attached 
to  it,  and  of  a  Sensor  nerve  going  back  to  the  brain 
and  giving  intimation  of  the  motion.  Psychologi- 
cally this  sense  serves  as  imjoortant  purposes  as  either 
touch  proper  or  sight.  It  may  be  doubted  whether, 
apart  from  this  endowment,  we  should  have  a  sense 
or  knowledge  of  any  object  beyond  our  bodily  frame. 
Feehng,  or  the  skin-sense  as  it  has  been  called,  seems 
to  give  us  merely  the  periphery  of  our  bodies  ;  and 
when  we  become  cognizant  of  an  extra-organic  ob- 
ject, as  when  on  pressing  the  palm  of  the  hand  on 
a  table  we  feel  a  surface,  I  believe  there  is  a  combi- 
nation of  the  two  senses  of  touch  j)roper  giving  us  a 
sense  of  the  surface  of  the  hand,  and  of  the  muscular 
sense  giving  a  knowledge  of  an  outward  object  re- 
sisting this  surface.  "If  we  lay  our  hand  upon  a 
table,  we  become  conscious,  on  a  little  reflection, 
that  we  do  not  feel  the  table,  but  merely  that  part 
of    our   skin   which   the   table   touches."      (Mliller, 


172         THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES. 

p.  1081.)  Even  as  to  the  colored  surface  falling  under 
the  eje,  it  is  doubtful  whether  we  should  place  it 
certainly  out  and  beyond  our  organism  without  the 
concurrence  of  the  muscular  sense  and  a  gathered 
experience.  The  boy  born  blind^  whose  eye  was 
couched  by  CheseldeUj  said  that  objects  at  first 
seemed  "  to  touch  his  eyes  as  what  he  felt  did  his 
skin."  In  a  like  case  operated  upon,  and  recorded 
}fy  Home,  objects  seemed  at  first  to  touch  the  eye. 
The  expressions  are  somewhat  vague,  but  it  is  clear 
that  the  objects  were  felt  as  having  a  close  relation- 
ship to  the  eye,  and  were  not  known  as  being  at  a 
distance.  It  is  certain  that  it  is  mainly  and  most 
effectually  (if  not  exclusively)  by  the  muscular  sense 
that  we  obtain  an  apprehension,  or  rather  knowledge, 
of  an  object  beyond  our  bodily  frame,  and  indepen- 
dent of  it.  Dr.  Carpenter,  with  his  usual  sound  judg- 
ment, declares  that  it  is  probably  on  the  sensations 
communicated  through  this  sense  that  "  the  idea  of 
the  material  world,  as  something  external  to  our- 
selves, chiefly  rests ;  but  that  this  idea  is  by  no 
means  a  logical  deduction  from  our  experience  of 
these  sensations,  being  rather  an  instinctive  or  intui- 
tive perception  directly  excited  by  them."  (Hum. 
Fhys.,  p.  612.) 

I  cannot  do  better  than  quote  once  more  from 
Wundt,  who  gives  us  the  result  of  German  research 
(p.  427.)  "The  first  acts  of  sense-perception  are 
grounded  on  the  operation  of  the  Muscular  Sense 
[that  is,  so  far  as  objects  beyond  the  body  are  con- 


THE    PHYSIOLOGY    OF    THE    SEJS'SES.        1T3 

cerned].  "When  we  move  our  members  we  come 
iipon  external  resistances.  We  observe  that  these 
resistances  sometimes  give  way  before  our  pressure ; 
but  we  find  at  the  same  time  that  this  takes  place 
with  very  different  degrees  of  facility,  and  that  in 
order  to  put  different  bodies  in  motion  we  must  ap- 
ply very  different  degrees  of  muscular  force  ;  but  to 
every  single  degree  of  the  contraction-force  there 
corresponds  a  determinate  degree  in  intensity  of  the 
muscular  sensations.  With  these  muscular  sensa- 
tions, the  sensations  of  the  skin  which  cover  our 
members  of  touch  so  continually  mingle,  that  the 
intensity  of  these  touch-sensations  goes  parallel  to 
the  intensity  of  the  accompan3dng  muscular  sensa- 
tions. We  succeed  in  this  way  in  connecting  the 
degree  of  intensity  of  the  muscular  sensations  in  a 
necessary  manner  with  the  nature  of  the  resistances 
which  set  themselves  against  our  movement." 

Vision. 

The  eye  is  a  more  complicated  structure  than  any 
of  the  other  organs  of  sense,  and  there  are  more  dis- 
putes as  to  the  functions  and  operations  of  its  parts 
than  in  regard  to  those  of  an}^  of  the  other  senses. 
On  some  points,  however,  there  is  a  pretty  general 
agreement  among  the  scientific  physiologists  in 
Germany,  who  have  devoted  so  much  attention  to 
the  subject ;  and  these  are  sufficient  for  our  pm'pose, 
being  opposed  to  the  hypothesis  supported  by  Mr. 
Mill  and  Mr.  Baua. 


174         THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF    THE    SEI^SES. 

It  seems  to  be  admitted  on  all  hands,  that  by  the 
eye  we  have  immediately  a  perception  of  space  in 
two  dimensions,  or  of  a  surface.  In  stating  the 
views  of  Miiller,  Wmidt  says  (p.  95),  "  We  can  per- 
ceive spatial  extension  and  the  relation  in  position 
of  outward  objects  only  so  far  as  we  have  a  spatial 
sensation  of  our  own  retina  and  the  relative  position 
of  its  single  points.  As  the  retina  spreads  itself  in 
a  surface,  the  images  of  objects  obtain  upon  it  only 
two  dimensions.  But  this  disadvantage,  under  which 
sight  labors  as  comparec^  with  feeling,  is  compensated 
by  the  body's  own  movements,  by  means  of  which 
we  can  view  successively  the  one  object  from  different 
stand-points.  As  regards  the  sense  of  sight,  the  per- 
ception [Anschaiiung]  of  the  third  dimension  is 
through  a  judgment,  and  so  Miiller  calls  it  a  repre- 
sentation ( Vorstellung),  while  he  designates  the  in- 
tuition of  surface  as  a  sensation."  "The  grand 
principle  of  the  theory  of  Miiller,  that  the  percep- 
tion of  a  surface  is  a  sensation,  and  that  the  percep- 
tion of  depth  on  the  other  hand  is  a  representation 
formed  through  judgment,  is  to  this  day  the  univer- 
sally received  one,  and  the  researches  remain  settled, 
although  this  department  since  that  time  has  been 
enriched  by  a  great  many  new  facts,  and  although 
this  principle,  so  far  as  certain  matters  of  fact  are 
concerned,  does  not  seem  to  be  sufficient."  The  in- 
sufficiency does  not  relate  to  the  original  discern- 
ment of  a  surface  by  the  eye,  which  seems  to  be  ac- 
knowledged on  all  hands,  but  to  the  provision  in  the 


THE    PHYSIOLOGY   OF    THE    SEXSES.        1T5 

eye  itself  for  discovering  the  three  dimensions  of 
space.  "  The  perception  of  superficial  space,  which 
goes  before  all  representations  of  space,  and  makes 
the  same  possible,  is  bound  up  in  the  sense  of  sight 
so  intimately  with  the  pure  sensation,  that  there  is 
nowhere  in  the  consciousness  any  act  lying  m  the 
middle  between  the  sensation  and  its  perception  in 
the  form  of  space."  (p.  145.)  It  should  be  added 
that  Waitz  and  Lotze  are  oj)posed  as  to  whether  the 
chief  hnportance  should  be  attached  to  the  sensible 
or  motor  factors :  Waitz  ascribing  the  greater  value 
to  the  sensation ;  and  Lotze,  to  the  motor  element. 
Wundt  (p.  104)  says  that  all  observation  shows  that 
both  exercise  an  influence  at  the  same  time. 

So  much  for  our  j^erception  of  a  superficies  by  the 
eye.  But  there  is  a  provision  in  the  organ  of  sight 
for  gi\^g  us  space  in  three  dimensions,  and  for  dis- 
covering the  distance  of  objects.  This  can  be  done 
even  by  the  single  eye,  not  immediately  with  every 
perception,  as  may  be  done  by  the  two  eyes,  but  by 
a  succession  of  perceptions.  This  is  accomplished  in 
the  case  of  a  smgle  eye  by  its  power  of  accommo- 
dating itself  to  different  distances.  Much  attention 
has  been  given  of  late  years  to  the  nature  of  the 
accommodation-mechanism  by  Helmholtz  and  others. 
The  accommodation  seems  originally  to  be  involun- 
tary and  unconscious,  but  is  brought  under  our  notice 
by  the  attached  muscular  feeling.  So  far  as  this 
means  is  concerned,  the  determination  of  distance 
by  one   eye  is  confined  within  very  narrow  hmits ; 


176        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES. 

but  there  is  a  great  help  to  it  in  the  movement  of 
the  ball  of  the  eye,  of  which  intimation  is  given  by 
the  attached  muscles.  But  by  far  the  most  important 
provision  in  the  visual  organ  for  discovering  the 
third  dimension  of  space  is  to  be  found  in  binocular 
vision,  that  is,  in  the  convergence  of  the  axis,  accord- 
ing as  the  objects  are  near,  and  in  the  different  as- 
pect of  the  object  falling  under  each  eye.  Wundt 
again  supplies  us  with  an  excellent  summary :  "  The 
measurements  which  we  are  able  to  bring  out  by 
means  of  our  senses  which  give  us  the  intuition  of 
space  show  this  remarkable  difference  between  the 
two,  that  the  eye  as  the  sense  operating  in  the  dis- 
tance measures  space  according  to  all  the  four  dimen- 
sions ;  whereas  sensations  by  the  skin,  which  are 
effected  only  by  the  immediate  contact  of  the 
outward  object  with  the  surface  of  the  skin, 
are  all  disposed  only  over  one  surface.  The  per- 
ception of  the  third  dimension  of  space  through 
the  sense  of  sight  is,  however,  so  far  as  can  be  proven 
by  experience,  a  mediate  one  derived  from  the  move- 
ments of  the  muscles  of  the  eye  (partly  of  the  ex- 
ternal, which  move  the  apple  of  the  eye  ;  partly  of 
the  internal,  which  regulate  the  accommodation- 
mechanism).  These  measurements  of  distance  de- 
pend on  nothing  but  the  estimation  of  the  muscular 
sensations  accompanying  the  movements,  and  there- 
fore the  perception  is  accomplished  only  by  means 
of  a  lengthened  experience  and  practice,  and  hence 
arise  the  great  uncertainty  and  incompleteness  of 


TEE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES.        177 

all  measurements  of  that  kind.  Originally  all  spatial 
sense-intuitions  are  of  surfaces;  depth  for  the  eye 
comes  forth  gradually  out  of  the  surface  ;  the  sense 
ever  penetrates  deeper  and  deeper  into  boundless 
spacC;  its  circle  of  vision  widening  as  the  visual  circle 
of  its  experience  extends."  (p.  29.) 

That  the  eye  is  immediately  cognizant  of  direction 
and  superficial  figure  is  proven  by  the  reported 
cases  of  persons  born  blmd,  but  who  acquired  eye- 
sight by  means  of  a  surgical  operation.  The  best 
reported  case  is  that  of  Dr.  Franz  of  Leipzig  [Phil. 
Trans,  of  Roy.  Soc.  1841),  and  I  shall  quote  from  it 
at  considerable  length.  The  youth  had  been  born 
blind,  and  was  seventeen  years  of  age  when  the  ex- 
periment was  wrought  which  gave  him  the  use  of 
one  eye.  When  the  eye  was  sufiiciently  restored  to 
bear  the  hght,  "  a  sheet  of  paper  on  which  two  strong 
black  lines  had  been  drawn,  the  one  horizontal,  the 
other  vertical,  was  placed  before  him  at  the  distance 
of  about  three  feet.  He  was  now  allowed  to  open 
the  eye,  and  after  attentive  examination  he  called 
the  Hues  by  their  right  denominations."  "  The  out- 
line in  black  of  a  square,  six  inches  in  diameter, 
within  which  a  circle  had  been  drawn,  and  within 
the  latter  a  triangle,  was,  after  careful  examination, 
recognized  and  correctly  described  by  him."  "  At 
the  distance  of  three  feet,  and  on  a  level  with  the 
eye,  a  solid  cube  and  a  S2')here,  each  of  four  inches 
diameter,  were  placed  before  him."  "After  atten- 
tively examining  these  bodies,  he  said  he  saw  a  quad- 

12 


178        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES. 

rangular  and  a  circular  figure,  and  after  some  con- 
sideration lie  pronounced  the  one  a  square  and  the 
other  a  disc.  His  eye  being  then  closed,  the  cube 
was  taken  away  and  a  disc  of  equal  size  substituted 
and  placed  next  to  the  sphere.  On  again  opening 
his  eye  he  observed  no  difference  in  these  objects, 
but  regarded  them  both  as  discs.  The  solid  cube 
was  now  placed  in  a  somewhat  oblique  position  be- 
fore the  eye,  and  close  beside  it  a  figure  cut  out  of 
pasteboard,  representing  a  plane  outline  prospect  of 
the  cube  when  in  this  position.  Both  objects  he 
took  to  be  something  like  flat  quadrates.  A  pyramid 
placed  before  him  with  one  of  its  sides  towards  his 
eye  he  saw  as  a  plain  triangle.  This  object  was  now 
turned  a  little  so  as  to  present  two  of  its  sides  to 
view,  but  rather  more  of  one  side  than  of  the  other : 
after  considering  and  examining  it  for  a  long  time, 
he  said  that  this  was  a  very  extraordinary  figure ; 
it  was  neither  a  triangle,  nor  a  quadrangle,  nor  a 
circle ;  he  had  no  idea  of  it,  and  could  not  describe 
it  J  '  in  fact,'  said  he,  ^  I  must  give  it  up.'  On  the  con- 
clusion of  these  experiments,  I  asked  him  to  describe 
the  sensations  the  objects  had  produced  \  whereupon 
he  said,  that  immediately  on  opening  his  eye  he  had 
discovered  a  difference  in  the  two  objects,  the  cube 
and  the  sphere,  placed  before  him,  and  perceived 
that  they  were  not  drawings  ;  but  that  he  had  not 
been  able  to  form  from  them  the  idea  of  a  square 
and  a  disc  until  he  perceived  a  sensation  of  what  he 
saw  in  the  points  of  his  fingers,  as  if  he  really  touched 


TBE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF    THE   SENSES.        179 

the  objects.  When  I  gave  the  three  bodies  (the 
sphere,  cube,  and  pyramid)  into  his  hand,  he  was 
much  surprised  he  had  not  recognized  them  as  such 
by  sight,  as  he  was  well  acquainted  with  mathemat- 
ical figures  by  his  touch."  These  observations  show 
that  the  eye  takes  in  surface  and  superficial  figure 
at  once,  but  cannot  immediately  discern  solidity.  If 
the  persons  have  the  use  of  both  eyes,  they  would 
observe  the  difference  between  a  disc  and  a  solid, 
but  they  would  not  be  able  to  say,  till  they  feel  it, 
that  the  latter  is  a  soHd.  It  requires  to  be  added, 
that  persons  who  have  their  sight  thus  given  them 
require  observation  and  thought  to  reconcile  the  in- 
formation they  had  got  from  touch  with  that  which 
they  are  now  receiving  from  sight,  — just  as  persons 
who  have  learned  two  languages,  say  German  and 
French,  require  practice  to  enable  them  readily  to 
translate  the  one  into  the  other.  In  the  case  reported 
by  Cheselden,  the  boy,  "  upon  being  told  what  things 
were  whose  form  he  before  knew  from  feeling,  said 
he  would  carefully  observe  that  he  might  know  them 
again."  Dr.  Carpenter  tells  us  of  a  boy  of  four  years 
old,  upon  whom  the  operation  for  congenital  cataract 
had  been  very  successfully  performed,  that  "  he  con- 
tinued to  find  his  way  about  his  father's  house  rather 
by  feehng  with  his  hands,  as  he  had  been  formerly 
accustomed  to  do,  than  by  his  newly  acquired  sense 
of  sight,  being  evidently  perplexed  rather  than  as- 
sisted by  the  sensations  which  he  had  derived  through 
it.     But  when  learning  a  new  locahty,  he  employed 


180        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES. 

hjs  sight,  and  evidently  perceived  the  increase  of 
facility  which  he  derived  from  it."  {3Ian.  of  Phys. 
p.  593.) 

All  the  recorded  cases  show  that  there  is  also  a 
process  of  reasoning  and  experience  in  the  discovery 
of  distance.  Mr.  Abbot  (p.  150)  gives  the  following 
account  of  the  observations  of  Trinchinetti :  —  "  He 
operated  at  the  same  time  on  two  j)atients  (brother 
and  sister),  eleven  and  ten  years  old  respectively. 
The  same  day,  having  caused  the  boy  to  examine  an 
orange,  he  placed  it  about  one  metre  from  him,  and 
bade  him  try  to  take  it.  The  boy  brought  his  hand 
close  to  his  eye  [quasi  a  contatto  del  suo  occJiio),  and 
closing  his  fist,  found  it  empty,  to  his  great  surprise. 
He  then  tried  again  a  few  inches  from  his  eye,  and 
at  last,  in  this  tentative  way,  succeeded  in  taking  the 
orange.  When  the  same  experiment  was  tried  with 
the  girl,  she  also  at  first  attempted  to  grasp  the 
orange  with  her  hand  very  near  the  eye  {coUa  mano 
assai  vicina  alV  occhio),  then,  perceiving  her  error, 
stretched  out  her  forefinger  and  pushed  it  in  a 
straight  line  slowly  until  she  reached  the  object." 
Other  patients  have  been  observed  (by  Janin  and 
Duval)  to  move  their  hands  in  search  of  objects  in 
straight  lines  from  the  eye.  Trinchinetti  "  regards 
these  observations  as  indicating  a  belief  that  visible 
objects  were  in  actual  contact  with  the  eye."  It  is 
clear  that  the  eye  gives  direction  to  the  object,  but 
does  not  apprehend  distance  immediately.  Franz 
says  of  his  patient,  that  "  if  he  wished  to  form  an 


TEE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF    THE   SENSES.        181 

estimate  of  ^^  the  distance  of  objects  from  his  own 
person,  or  of  two  objects  from  each  other,  without 
moving  from  his  place,  he  examined  the  objects  fr-om 
different  points  of  view  by  tm^ning  his  head  to  the 
right  and  to  the  left." 

The  German  physiologists  have  paid  great  atten- 
tion to  the  case  of  persons  born  bhnd,  and  the  con- 
clusions reached  do  not  correspond  with  those  of 
Platner.  "As  respects  persons  born  blind,"  says 
Wundt  (p.  60),  "  who  are  not  supported  by  the  accom- 
panying and  preceding  experience  of  the  sense  of 
sight,  the  perception  of  the  sensation  of  place  takes 
place  after  a  much  more  tedious  and  laborious  man- 
ner. The  blind  man  receives  the  representation  of 
his  body  wholly  through  his  own  touch.  While  he 
touches  with  the  finger  or  hand  different  parts  of 
his  body,  there  arise  m  the  muscles  of  the  arm  just 
as  many  different  muscular  feelings.  These  become 
to  him  a  measure  of  different  distances.  Thus  he 
receives  from  the  mutual  spatial  position  of  single 
points  a  representation  of  his  skin-surface,  and  while 
at  the  same  time,  at  every  point,  the  Quale  of  the 
sensation  corresponding  to  the  same  imprints  itself, 
he  is  placed  in  a  position  also  to  declare  the  place 
where  are  to  be  found  the  impressions  which  work 
fi'om  without." 

This  is  more  fully  explained  (p.  31) :  "  The  repre- 
sentation of  the  third  dimension  can  also  be  awakened 
in  the  person  born  bhnd,  but  this  only  through  a 
long  series  of  conclusions,  in  which  the   changing 


182        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES, 

impressions  of  the  sense  of  feeling,  and  the  muscular 
sensations  of  the  entire  self-moving  body,  work  to- 
gether. As  the  person  seeing  remains  in  his  place, 
and  lets  the  objects  in  a  manner  come  towards  him, 
while  he,  at  his  will,  opens  his  eyes  to  the  far  or  the 
near ;  so  must  the  blind  person,  when  he  would  dis- 
cover the  outer  world,  go  and  seek  out  the  objects 
which  remain  to  him  in  unchangeable  rest."  "  The 
person  seeing  accommodates  only  his  eye,  the  blind 
man  his  whole  body,  to  the  objects." 

It  does  not  concern  us  in  this  discussion  to  inquire 
what  truth  there  is  in  the  Berkeley  an  theory  of 
vision.  If  the  above  conclusions  be  trustworthy,  as 
I  believe  they  are,  they  show  it  can  be  accepted  only 
with  important  modifications.  Berkeley  was  posi- 
tively mistaken  in  arguing  that  the  eye  is  percipient 
only  of  color,  and  not  of  extension.  He  was  further 
guilty  of  an  oversight  in  not  attending  to  the  very 
special  provision  in  the  organs  of  vision  for  enabling 
us,  always  by  experience^  to  discover  the  third  dimen- 
sion of  space,  and  distance.  It  is  firmly  established 
that  a  surface  is  ever  presented  to  the  eye,  and  is 
perceived  immediately;  and  this  surface  supplies  a 
measure  to  us  in  all  our  other  visual  perceptions.  It 
is  now  proven  that  there  is  a  beautiful  teleological 
apparatus  in  each  eye,  and  stiU  more  in  the  rela- 
tive position  of  the  two  eyes,  whereby  we  can  dis- 
cover the  solidity  and  estimate  the  distances  of 
bodies.'^ 

1  Thus  far  there  is  truth  in  Abbot's  Sight  and  Touch. 


THE   PHTSIOLOGY   OF    THE   SEJSSES.        183 

As  the  result  of  this  criticism,  conducted  on  the 
Psychological  Method,  we  find  ourselves  entitled  to 
adhere  to  a  certain  body  of  intuitive  truth  respecting 
both  mind  and  matter.  Instead  of  looking  on  mind 
as  a  mere  "  series  of  feelings/'  we  apprehend  it  as 
an  abidmg  existence,  with  various  properties  which 
evolve  themselves  from  day  to  day  in  our  experience. 
Instead  of  regarding  matter  as  a  "  possibihty,"  we 
contemplate  it  as  having  a  permanent  being,  with 
diverse  forms  of  activity,  which  are  ever  manifesting 
themselves  to  our  senses.  On  this  intuitive  truth 
we  build  others  by  a  gathered  observation,  and  as 
we  do  so  we  feel  that  they  are  laid  on  a  foundation 
which  cannot  be  shaken. 

Some  object  to  this  realistic  doctrine,  whether  as 
held  by  the  world  at  large  or  by  professed  metaphy- 
sicians, that  it  is  contradicted  by  the  estabhshed 
truths  of  modern  physical  science,  which  shows  that 
light  and  heat  are  not  substances,  but  vibrations  in 
an  ether,  and  that  all  the  other  physical  forces  are 
correlated  with  them.  But  these  discoveries  of  recent 
science  are  all  consistent  with  a  doctrine  of  natural 
reahsm,  when  the  same  is  j^roperly  expounded.  Our 
senses  afford  us  primarily  a  knowledge  of  the  affec- 
tions of  our  bodily  frame,  these  affections  being  al- 
ways localized.  Such  information  is  given  us  by 
touch,  by  sight,  and  probably  also  by  smell,  taste, 
and  hearing.  Then,  by  the  muscular  sense,  we  come 
to  know  objects  resisting  the  movement  of  our  local- 
ized organs,  and  external  to  these  organs.     In  these 


184        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SEJS'SJi.S. 

operations^  and  especially  in  muscular  resistance,  we 
know  motion  and  force,  that  .is,  we  are  sensible  of  a 
limb  moving  in  consequence  of  an  effort,  and  being 
stayed  by  an  extended  object  with  a  resisting  force. 
This  is  all  we  know  primarily  of  matter  by  the  senses, 
and  it  has  not  been  set  aside  by  any  doctrine  of 
modern  physical  science. 

I  have  no  partiality  for  the  distinction  between  the 
Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities  of  bodies.  In  fact, 
as  has  often  been  acknowledged,  the  secondary  qual- 
ities, such  as  heat  and  smell,  are  not  so  much  proper- 
ties of  matter  as  felt  affections  of  our  organism,  which 
may  indeed  imply  an  external  cause,  but  with  which 
they  are  not  to  be  identified.  We  can,  however, 
specify  the  qualities  of  body  which  are  primarily  or 
intuitively  known.  These  seem  to  be  Externality, 
Eesisting  Force,  and  Extension,  together,  I  think, 
with  Motion  in  Space.  All  besides,  such  as  temper- 
ature, odors,  tastes,  and  sounds,  are  mere  affections 
of  our  organism,  giving  notice  of  changes  in  our 
bodily  frame.  Lotze  says  that  our  sense  of  pressure 
and  of  temperature  is  not  an  object,  but  a  condition 
which  the  incitement  in  the  parts  of  the  skin  brings 
forth.  Meissner,  following  out  the  same  doctrines, 
says  that  they  are  not  sensations  {Empfindunge7i), 
but  feelings,  in  so  far  as  they  do  not  stand  in  relation 
directly  and  immediately  to  an  object,  but  are  a 
condition  of  the  subject,  our  own  selves.  Even  color 
itself,  though  more  objective,  is  felt  merely,  as  in  the 
seen  surface,  standing  in  relation  to  our  eye,  and  we 


THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES,       185 

can  say  nothing  more  of  it  than  that  it  affects  us  in 
a  particular  manner. 

Taking  this  view  of  matter,  we  see  that  we  have 
first  an  original  or  intuitive  knowledge.  To  this  we 
are  ever  adding  by  observation,  by  generalization, 
and  by  deduction.  But  then,  in  the  rapidity  of 
thought  and  the  hurry  of  life,  our  observations  are 
often  loose,  our  generahzations  too  wide,  and  our 
reasonings  hasty.  Hence  the  errors  into  which  we 
are  led,  which,  however,  are  not  to  be  charged  on 
our  senses,  but  upon  the  judgments  we  have  super- 
induced upon  the  information  which  they  furnish. 
It  cannot  be  shown  that  our  intuitive  perceptions, 
being  those  that  have  the  sanction  of  Him  who  made 
us,  ever  do  deceive  us,  or  that  they  are  contradicted 
by  any  established  truth  of  science.-^ 

Ado  J)  ting  these  views  of  our  original  perceptions, 
we  see  how  we  have  a  confirmation  of  their  trust- 
worthiness in  the  circumstance  that  the  different 
senses  yield  the  same  testimony.  I  am  persuaded, 
indeed,  that  our  conviction  rests  primarily,  and  all 
along  most  firmly,  on  the  assurance  we  have  as  to 
the  veracity  of  each  sense  (see  a).  Still  it  is  possible 
to  get  verifications  even  of  our  intuitions  and  dem- 
onstrations,—  thus  land-measuring  and  astronomy 
corroborate  our  geometrical  deductions.     It  is  cer- 

1 1  have   endeavored   to   show  that  (2.)    That    between    Sensation    and 

the  difficulties  connected  with  the  ap-  Perception  ;    (3. J)    That   between   the 

parent  deception  of  the  senses  can  be  Objects   intuitively  Perceived  ;  all  of 

removed    by   attending  to   three   dis-  them  being  extra-mental,  but  some  of 

tinctions  : — (1.)    That    between    our  them  2i\so  extra-organic. —  {IntuiU'ons, 

Original  and  Acquired  Perceptions;  Pt.  ii.  B.  ii.  c.  i.  §  3-) 


186        THE   PHYSIOLOGY   OF   THE   SENSES, 

tainly  satisfactory  to  find  that,  in  their  original 
depositions,  the  senses,  which  are  so  far  independent 
witnesses,  thoroughly  concur.  Thus  both  touch  and 
sight  give  us  surfaces,  which  a  little  experience 
enables  us  to  discover  to  be  identical.  It  is  probable 
that  all  the  senses  give  us  direction  outward.  It  is 
certain  that  they  all  give  us  information  directly  or 
indirectly  of  external  objects ;  and  thus  each  in  its 
own  way  prepares  us  for  looking  out  upon  and  esti- 
mating a  world  which,  beginning  at  self  as  a  centre, 
extends  as  far  into  space  as  the  eye,  aided  by  the 
telescope,  can  penetrate. 


CHAPTER   YIII. 

MEMOEY,   ASSOCIATION    OF    IDEAS,   BELIEF,   AND    UNCONSCIOUS 
MENTAL   OPERATIONS. 

THE  faculty  of  Memory  has  not  received  any  very 
special  consideration  in  the  wiitings  of  Mr.  Mill. 
When  we  turn  to  the  account  given  by  his  prede- 
cessors in  the  school,  we  find  it  defective,  in  fact,  as 
is  usual  with  them,  overlookmg  the  main  element. 
Our  recollections  are  represented  as  "  revived  sensa- 
tions." The  statement  might  be  allowed  to  pass  in 
common  conversation,  or  in  loose  literature,  but  can- 
not be  accepted  from  a  metaphysician.  There  may 
be  a  revival  not  merely  of  our  sensations,  but  of 
our  mental  operations  generally,  of  our  thoughts, 
our  emotions,  —  of  our  very  recollections.  And  in 
every  exercise  of  memory  there  is  more  than  a  re- 
vival of  our  experience.  As  the  new  and  the  essen- 
tial element,  there  is  a  helief  that  loe  have  had  the 
experience,  and  that  the  event  has  been  before  us, 
in  time  past.  All  this  being  matter  of  constant  con- 
sciousness, we  seldom  notice  it,  just  as  we  pay  no  at- 
tention to  the  bodies  which  we  ever  see  falling  to 
the  ground.  But  as  it  was  the  falling  apple,  which 
ordinary  men  thought  beneath  their  regard,  which 

(187) 


188  MEMOBY,   ASSOCIATION   OF 

seemed  to  Newton  (if  the  common  story  is  to  be 
credited)  the  phenomenon  to  be  weighed,  and  which 
actually  furnished  the  key  to  the  explanation  of  the 
path  of  the  moon  and  planets  in  their  orbits ;  so  it 
is  in  the  familiar  facts  of  our  consciousness  that  the 
psychologist  finds  the  means  of  clearing  up  the 
more  complex  laws  of  our  mental  nature.  In  par- 
ticular, every  one  who  would  dive  into  the  deeper 
mysteries  of  mind  must  specially  estimate  what  is 
involved  in  memory,  which  is  quite  as  important 
a  faculty  as  even  sensation  in  our  mental  consti- 
tution. 

In  memory,  let  it  be  observed,  we  are  beyond  the 
territory  of  immediate  knowledge,  with  the  object 
before  us :  we  are  now  in  the  region  of  Faith.  We 
beheve  in  the  existence  of  an  object  not  now  present ; 
in  that,  say,  of  a  departed  friend  never  again  to  be 
met  with  in  this  world.  We  believe  that  this  friend 
lived,  and  that  we  had  frequent  intercourse  with  him, 
in  time  past.  I  call  this  the  Kecognitive  Power  of 
Memory,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  mere  reproductive, 
the  recalling  and  imagining  power.  What  we  thus 
experience,  what  we  are  conscious  of,  cannot  be 
called  "  a  revived  sensation  "  without  giving  the  re- 
vival  much  that  was  not  in  the  sensation.  We  have 
now  not  only  Faith  in  its  rudiments,  we  have  Time 
in  all  its  significance.  No  doubt  it  appears  first  in 
the  concrete  mixed  up  with  other  things  ;  but  so  do 
all  our  ideas,  so  do  our  very  sensations.  It  comes  in 
the  form  of  an  event  believed  to  have  happened  in 


IDEAS,    BELIEF,   ETC.  189 

time  past.  But  it  is  there  in  the  mind,  consciousness 
being  witness;  and  we  have  only  to  abstract  the 
time  from  the  event  to  have  the  abstract  idea  of 
time, — just  as  we  have  the  idea  of  sensation  by 
separating  in  thought  the  sentient  from  the  self  sen- 
tient. Time  thus  reached  has  quite  as  real  an 
existence  as  the  very  sensation  which  may  have 
been  conjoined  with  our  original  perception  of  the 
event. 

Mr.  Mill,  in  language  already  quoted  [i^iqyra,  pp. 
68,  94),  admits  the  existence  of  the  belief  involved 
in  memory,  and  asserts  its  veracity  and  ultimate 
veracity.  Our  memories  and  expectations  are  present 
feelings,  but  each  of  them  involves  a  behef  in  more 
than  its  own  existence.  A  remembrance  involves 
'^  the  belief  that  a  sensation,  of  which  it  is  a  copy  or 
representation,  actually  existed  in  the  past ; "  and  an 
expectation  involves  the  belief,  "  that  a  sensation  or 
other  feeling  to  which  it  directly  refers  will  exist  in 
the  future  ;  "  and  the  belief  the  two  include  is,  "  that 
I  myself  formerly  had,  or  that  I  myself  and  no  other 
shall  hereafter  have,  the  sensations  remembered  or 
expected."  He  is  fond,  as  we  shall  immediately  see, 
of  ascribing  most  of  our  convictions,  beliefs,  and 
judgments  to  association  of  ideas.  Mr.  James  Mill 
had  declared  broadly,  "  that  wherever  the  name 
Belief  is  applied,  there  is  a  case  of  the  indissoluble 
association  of  ideas ; "  and  that  "  no  instance  can  be 
adduced  in  which  anything  besides  an  indissoluble 
association  can  be  shown  in  belief"  {Analysis,  p.  281.) 


I 
190  MEMOBY,   ASSOCIATIOJSr  OF 

But  his  son  has  been  obhged  to  modify  this  doctrine, 
and  to  allow  that  there  is  an  "  ultimate  "  belief  prior 
to  association,  and  independent  of  it.  I  am  sure  that 
he  is  right  in  calling  in  such  a  belief  But  I  am  also 
sure  that  he  should  have  called  in  other  beliefs 
equally  independent  of  association;  and  we  shall 
have  to  supply  his  deficiencies  as  we  advance  by 
showing  how  wide  is  the  domain  of  faith.  Mean- 
while let  us  observe  how  much  is  involved  in  the 
faith  of  memory  and  expectation.  We  have  seen  in 
last  chapter  that  the  senses  directly  or  indirectly 
open  to  us  the  distant  and  the  remote,  till  our  minds 
are  lost  in  the  immensity  of  space.  Now  we  see 
time  stretching  away  into  the  past  and  the  future, 
till  it  goes  out  into  eternity.  And  it  is  interesting 
to  notice,  that  while  these  ultimate  beliefs,  like  the 
senses,  carry  with  them  their  own  evidence,  they  are 
ever  meeting  with  corroborations.  We  remember  a 
field,  a  dell,  a  cottage  which  we  once  visited;  we 
have  not  seen  it  for  many  years,  but  as  we  now  go 
back  to  it,  we  find  it  as  we  have  been  picturing  it  in 
our  minds.  These  confirmations  of  our  lower  faiths 
lielp  us  to  put  a  more  implicit  trust  in  our  higher 
natural  beliefs,  which  may  not  admit  of  any  confirm- 
ation by  sense.  Already,  in  this  belief  of  memory 
and  expectation,  we  have  the  beginnings  and  the 
rudiments  of  that  faith  in  the  unseen,  which  in 
its  higher  flights  carries  us  so  far  beyond  ourselves, 
and  lifts  us  as  on  wings  high  above  this  world. 

The  subject  of  Association  of  Ideas,  which  is  inti- 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,   ETC.  191 

mately  connected  with  Memory,  has  long  engaged 
the  attention  of  British  metaphysicians.  It  is  re- 
ferred to  by  Hobbes,  who  was  evidently  aware  of 
what  Aristotle  had  written.  It  was  employed  by 
Locke  to  explain  certain  anomalies  and  eccentricities 
of  mind  and  character.  Its  importance  in  account- 
ing for  ordinary  mental  action  was  first  brought  out 
fully  by  Francis  Hutcheson,  who  showed  in  particular 
how  it  helped  to  create  secondary  affections.  Some 
of  its  properties  had  a  prominence  given  them  by 
Hume,  who  used  it  to  help  his  sceptical  purposes  by 
explaining  by  it  many  of  the  beliefs  usually  ascribed 
to  reason.  A  fuller  and  a  juster  account  of  it  than 
any  previously  pubHshed  was  given  by  Turnbull  (the 
preceptor  of  Eeid)  in  his  Moral  PliilosoiJhy.  Hart- 
ley speculated  upon  it  in  an  empirical  and  peculiarly 
Anglican  manner,  identifying  association  with  vibra- 
tions in  the  nerves.  All  the  Scottish  metaphysicians, 
including  Eeid,  Beattie,  and  Stewart,  discoursed  upon 
it  with  greater  or  less  fulness.  But  as  universal  at- 
tention was  called  to  it,  its  power  and  significance 
came  to  be  greatly  exaggerated.  This  was  certainly 
done  by  Alison  when,  passing  far  beyond  the  more 
sober  views  entertained  on  the  same  subject  by  Hutch- 
eson  and  Beattie,  he  sought  to  account  by  this  one 
principle  for  all  the  pheiiomena  of  beauty.  Brown 
drew  back  from  so  extreme  a  position,  and  maintained 
that  there  was  excited  by  beautiful  objects  a  class  of 
feelings  which  could  not  be  resolved  into  association 
of  ideas  nor  anything  else.     But  in  his  mental  phys- 


192  MEMOBY,   ASSOCIATION   OF 


iology  suggestion  plays  a  very  important,  I  would 
say  the  principal,  part.  He  treats  of  our  intellectual 
operations  under  the  heads  of  Simple  and  Eelative 
Suggestion,  and  indulges  in  an  excess  of  ingenuity 
in  making  these  two  faculties  manufacture  so  many 
of  our  ideas.  Mr.  James  Mill  followed,  and  carrying 
out  a  hint  thrown  out  by  Brown,  that  all  our  asso- 
ciate feelings  could  be  reduced  to  '^  a  fine  species  of 
proximity"  (Lecture  xxxv.),  resolved  all  suggestion 
into  the  one  law  of  contiguity;  and  abandoning 
Brown,  who  stood  up  for  intuitive  beliefs,  and  adher- 
mg  to  Hume,  accounted  for  our  very  beliefs  and 
judgments  by  association.  The  time  for  a  reaction 
had  now  come.  Artists  never  favored  Alison's  reduc- 
tion of  beauty  to  association.  New  and  profound 
ideas  were  introduced  into  English  metaphysics  by 
Coleridge,  and  through  the  taste  stimulated  by  him 
and  others  for  German  speculation.  But  the  recoil 
was  actually  called  forth  by  Sir  James  Mackintosh's 
Dissertation  on  Ethical  Science,  which  at  once  created 
the  opposition  of  our  higher  moralists  to  the  attempt 
made  by  him  to  manufacture  our  idea  of  moral  good 
by  means  of  association.  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  who 
belongs  to  this  period,  devoted  his  penetrating  intel- 
lect to  the  more  thorough  expression  of  the  laws  of 
the  reproduction  of  our  ideas,  and  has  thrown  not  a 
little  light  on  the  subject,  at  the  same  time  keeping 
the  principle  in  its  own  place.  Some  of  us  had 
hoped  that  this  tendency  to  exaggerate  the  power 
and  importance  of  association  had  enjoyed  its  day, 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,   ETC.  193 

and  was  now  past  forever.  But  the  wheel  of  specu- 
lative opinion  seems  to  have  come  round  to  the  posi- 
tion it  had  an  age  ago ;  and  we  find  association  of 
ideas  occupying  in  the  writings  of  the  younger  Mill 
and  Mr.  Bain  as  high  a  place  as  it  ever  had  in  the 
works  of  AHson  and  Brown,  of  Mackintosh  and  the 
older  Mill^  —  or,  we  may  add,  as  it  had  two  ages 
earher  still  in  the  philosophy  of  Hume  and  of  Hart- 
ley. There  is  evidently  clear  room  for  a  new  dis- 
cussion of  the  whole  subject.  Of  late  it  has  been 
taken  up  by  the  German  metaphysicians  generally ; 
and  the  School  of  Herbart,  in  particular,  has  been 
seeking  to  give  a  mathematical  expression  to  the 
laws  of  the  succession  of  our  ideas.  I  should  like 
to  see  the  results  of  the  investigations  of  the  British 
School,  —  especially  of  Hamilton,  and  of  the  later 
German  metaphysicians,  wrought  out  into  a  consistr 
ent  system. 

Mr.  Mill  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  added  much 
to  our  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  association.  He 
specially  dwells  on  two  points,  and  he  exaggerates 
and  distorts  both.  The  first  is  what  he  calls  the  Law 
of  Inseparable  Association.  "  Associations  produced 
by  contiguity  become  more  certain  and  rapid  by  rep- 
etition. When  two  phenomena  have  been  very 
often  experienced  in  conjunction,  and  have  not  in 
any  single  instance  occurred  separately,  either  in  ex- 
perience or  in  thought,  there  is  produced  between 
them  what  has  been  called  Inseparable  Association ; 
by  which  is  not  meant  that  the  association  must  in- 

13 


194  MEMOBY,  ASSOaiATlOir   OF 

evitably  last  to  the  end  of  life,  tliat  no  subsequent 
experience  or  process  of  thought  can  possibly  avail 
to  dissolve  it,  but  only  that,  as  long  as  no  such  ex- 
perience or  process  of  thought  has  taken  place,  the 
association  is  irresistible,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
think  the  one  thing  disjoined  from  the  other." 
(p.  191.)  We  have  here  an  important  truth,  which 
was  much  dwelt  upon  by  our  author's  father.  It 
can  scarcely  be  raised  to  the  dignity  of  a  law;  it 
results  from  higher  laws.  According  to  the  fre- 
quency with  which  two  ideas  have  been  together,  so 
will  be  the  tendency  of  the  one  to  recall  the  other. 
When  they  have  often  been  associated,  the  one  will 
bring  up  the  other,  not  only  without  an  act  of  wiU 
on  our  part,  but  it  may  be  in  opposition  to  our  ut- 
most efforts.  Thus  there  are  painful  recollections 
which  we  would  fain  be  rid  of,  but  they  cleave  to  us 
with  horrid  pertinacity,  because  conjoined  with  ob- 
jects which  are  forever  pressing  themselves  on  our 
notice.  The  only  way  of  dissolving  such  a  combina- 
tion is  by  forming  a  new  one,  —  as  in  chemistry  we 
dissolve  a  compound  by  bringing  to  bear  upon  it 
another  substance,  which  having  a  strong  affinity  to 
one  of  the  elements,  draws  it  away  from  that  with 
which  it  is  now  united.  It  is  thus  we  break  up  an 
old  set  of  associations  by  forming  new  ones,  say  by  a 
change  of  scene  or  society. 

So  far  we  have  a  well-known  operation,  according 
to  a  well-known  law.  But  let  us  understand  precisely 
what  is  involved.     We  shall  find  that  Mr.  Mill  has 


IDEAS,    BELIEF,   ETC,  195 

BO  stretched  the  law  as  to  make  it  embrace  an  en- 
tirely different  phenomenon.  It  is  implied  that  two 
ideas  having  been  together,  the  one  will  never  cast 
up  without  the  other  tending  to  follow.  But  this 
does  not  require  that  we  judge  or  decide  that  there 
is,  and  still  less  that  there  must  be,  some  relation 
between  them  in  the  nature  of  things,  or  discerned 
by  the  mind.  On  the  contrary,  we  may  see  them  to 
be  utterly  discrepant,  and  wish  that  we  could  only 
break  the  links  that  join  them  in  the  chain  of  asso- 
ciation. Thus  there  is  a  lovely  spot  where  we  once 
saw  a  foul  act  committed,  and  ever  since,  as  we  pass 
it,  the  whole  scene  rushes  into  our  mind ;  but  we 
never  think  or  conclude  that  there  is  any  necessary 
or  even  natural  connection  between  the  place  and 
the  deed.  Mr.  Mill  has  slipjDcd  in  a  word  very  dex- 
terously, when  he  says,  "  It  is  impossible  for  us  ever 
to  think  the  one  disjoined  from  the  other."  This  is 
true  only  when  by  "  think  "  we  understand  "  having 
the  idea  of"  It  is  a  fact  that  the  one  idea  recalls  the 
other,  but  we  do  not  therefore  think  the  one  to  be 
jomed  to  the  other,  either  in  the  nature  of  things, 
or  according  to  the  laws  of  thought. 

We  have  here  come  to  one  of  the  gravest  errors 
into  which  Mr.  Mill  has  fallen  in  his  theory  of  the 
operations  of  the  mind.  It  is  that  of  making  the 
association  of  ideas  usurp  the  province  of  judgment, 
which  declares  that  two  ideas  or  objects  have  a  rela- 
tion. I  admit  that  the  two,  suggestion  and  judg- 
ment or  comparison,  often  coincide  and  co-operate, 


196  MEMOBY,  ASSOCIATION   OF 

and  accomplisli  most  important  ends  as  they  do  so. 
Things  that  have  a  natm^al  connection  are  often  pre- 
sented to  us  together  •  they  are  thus  brought  under 
the  law  of  association,  and  they  are  henceforth  often 
recalled  at  the  same  time.  In  this  way  the  associa- 
tion of  ideas  may  lead  to  a  hasty  belief,  not  founded 
on  a  careful  comparison  of  facts.  I  believe  that 
much  of  what  is  usually  reckoned  understanding  or 
judgment  contains  little  else  than  an  association  of 
ideas.  The  so-called  "thought"  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals, of  children,  and  even  of  men  of  mature 
years,  consists  mainly  in  ideas  succeeding  each  other 
in  a  train  determined  by  outward  circumstances  or 
by  habit.  It  has  to  be  added,  that  association  of 
ideas  often  essentially  aids  us  in  forming  a  mature 
judgment,  by  bringing  things  that  have  a  positive 
relation  into  juxtaposition,  whereby  we  are  enabled 
to  discover  the  connection.  As  the  association  helps 
the  judgment,  so  the  judgment,  when  it  once  con- 
nects the  two  things,  creates  an  association  of  ideas, 
whereby  the  one  tends  to  bring  up  the  other,  and 
thereby  we  may  be  led  to  discover  further  relations, 
real  or  imaginary.  But  the  actual  comparison  of 
two  ideas  or  objects,  and  the  predication  of  their 
agreement  or  disagreement,  is  always  an  operation 
different  from,  and  should  be  regarded  as  higher 
than,  the  mere  alliance  of  them  by  an  accidental  asso- 
ciation in  our  minds.  The  psychologist,  instead  of 
confounding,  should  be  careful  to  distinguish  them. 
Philosophy  should  aim  at  delivering  us  as  much  as 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,  ETC.  197 

possible  from  the  power  of  accidental  conjunctions, 
and  bringing  us  under  the  habitual  influence  of  a 
judicial  temper  of  mind,  which  looks  to  the  nature 
of  things.  Mr.  Mill  has  done  as  much  as  within  him 
lies  to  degrade  human  intelligence,  by  grounding 
beliefs  on  association,  when  he  should  have  led  us  to 
seek  for  a  deeper  foundation  in  the  mind's  capacity 
of  discerning  realities  and  their  relations.  This  is  a 
subject  which  will  come  more  fully  before  us  when 
we  consider  Comparison. 

Mr.  Mill  makes  great  use  of  another  peculiarity  of 
association,  which  had  been  much  dwelt  on  by 
Brown.  "  When  impressions  have  been  so  often  ex- 
perienced in  conjunction,  that  each  of  them  calls  up 
readily  and  instantaneously  the  ideas  of  the  whole 
group,  these  ideas  sometimes  melt  and  coalesce  into 
one  another,  and  aj)pear  not  several  ideas  but  one." 
{Logic,  B.  VI.  c.  iv.  §  3.)  Thus  far  we  have  a  correct 
statement.  When  ideas  have  often  been  in  com- 
pany, they  flow  together  so  spontaneously,  and  in 
the  end  so  rapidly,  that  we  cannot  stay  or  even 
watch  them  in  theh^  course.  As  thus  having  no  at- 
tention bestowed  on  them,  some,  or  perhaps  the 
whole,  pass  away  into  oblivion,  according  to  a  law 
to  be  immediately  unfolded.  Possibly  we  do  not 
declare  them  to  be  one,  —  I  rather  think  we  make 
no  declaration  about  them  at  all ;  but  we  do  not,  we 
cannot,  distinguish  them  one  from  another.  And 
when  high  feeling  mingles  with  them,  there  may  be 
produced   upon  our  nervous   organism  a  combined 


198  ME3£0BY,   ASSOCIATION  OF 

result  of  a  peculiar,  perhaps  of  an  intense,  kind, 
which  may  abide  when  the  mental  ideas  and  emo- 
tions are  gone. 

But  Mr.  Mill  goes  much  further  than  this.  ^^  When 
many  impressions  or  ideas  are  operating  in  the  mind 
together,  there  sometimes  takes  place  a  process  of  a 
similar  kind  to  chemical  combmation."  (Logic,  B.  vi. 
c.  iv.  §  3.)  This  he  explains, "  The  effect  of  concurring 
causes  is  not  always  precisely  the  sum  of  the  effects 
of  those  causes  when  separate,  nor  even  always  an 
effect  of  the  same  kind  with  them ; "  thus  water,  the 
product,  differs  in  its  qualities  from  its  two  elements, 
oxygen  and  hydrogen.  We  must  be  very  careful 
here  to  ascertain  the  precise  facts,  to  guard  against 
exaggerating  them,  or  allowing  them  to  be  turned 
to  illegitimate  purposes.  Let  it  be  observed,  that  in 
chemical  action  we  have  always  two  substances, 
each  with  many  properties  known  and  unknown : 
we  bring  them  into  a  certain  relation  to  each  other ; 
an  action  takes  place  very  much  of  an  unknown  char- 
acter, but  implying  the  operation  of  electricity,  or  of 
one  of  the  correlated  forces  of  the  universe;  the 
result  is  the  formation  of  water,  which  possesses 
properties  different  from  the  oxygen,  and  the  hydro- 
gen, and  the  energy  exerted  in  producing  the 
changes,  but  which  is  always  capable  of  being  re- 
solved into  the  same  old  elements  with  the  same 
measure  of  energy.  Now  the  question  is,  is  there  an 
analogous  operation  produced  by  the  association  of 
ideas  ?     I  have  admitted  that,  as  the  result  of  long 


IDEAS,    BELIEF,    ETC.  199 


and  repeated  conjunction,  ideas,  each,  it  may  be, 
with  its  own  peculiar  feehng,  succeed  each  other 
mth  incalculable  rapidity,  so  that  we  cannot  distin- 
guish between  them ;  and  that  they  may  coalesce  in 
a  result.  Show  the  mother  a  plaything  which  be- 
lono-ed  to  a  deceased  child,  and  what  a  rush  of  re- 
membrances  and  attached  emotions  will  spring  up, 
which  she  is  not  only  not  inclined,  but  not  able,  to 
analyze.  But  is  there  anything  in  all  this  like 
chemical  action  ?  There  is  a  mighty  torrent,  but  it 
a]3pears  to  me  that  in  the  confluence  there  is  noth- 
ing after  all  but  the  individual  ideas  with  their  cor- 
responding feelings.  There  may  be  new  associa- 
tions, but  there  does  not  seem  to  be  a  new  idea. 
Some  of  the  ideas  may  pass  away  on  the  instant 
never  to  be  recalled,  whereas  others  may  bulk 
largely  before  the  mind,  and  leave  their  observed  or 
abiding  consequences.  But  in  the  agglomeration 
there  seems  to  be  nothmg  but  the  ideas,  the  feel- 
ings, and  their  appropriate  impressions,  coalescing; 
there  is  no  new  generation,  no  generation  of  an  idea 
not  in  the  separate  parts  of  the  collection. 

In  particular,  it  is  altogether  unwarrantable  out 
of  mere  associated  sensations  to  draw  those  lofty  ideas 
which  the  mind  can  form  as  to  substance  and  quality, 
cause  and  effect,  moral  good  and  moral  obligation. 
Let  us  observe  with  care  what  is  imphed  in  the  pro- 
duction of  a  new  body  by  chemical  composition. 
There  is  one  element  with  its  properties,  and 
another   element  with  its  properties,  a  mutual  ac- 


200  ME3I0BY,   ASSOCIATION  OF 

tion  in  which  there  is  potential  energy  expended^ 
and  a  new  product  with  its  properties.  And  this 
mutual  action  we  reckon  a  wonderful  action  of 
bodies ;  we  distinguish  it  from  mechanical  action ; 
we  call  it  by  the  name  of  chemical  affinity,  and  we 
seek  to  determine  its  laws.  But  let  us  suppose  that 
instead  of  two  elementary  bodies  we  have  two  sen- 
sations, say  of  two  colors,  or  two  smells,  or  two 
sounds,  and  that  these  have  been  often  together,  so 
that  the  one  always  comes  up  immediately  after  the 
other  •  I  ask,  whether  we  have  any  ground  to  believe 
that  these  would  of  themselves  generate  a  third  thing 
different  from  the  two  ?  If  they  do,  it  must  be  by 
some  causal  power  in  the  sensations,  or  out  of  the 
sensations,  in  the  mind  or  out  of  the  mind ;  and  it  is 
the  business  of  the  psychologist  not  to  overlook  this 
power,  not  to  confound  it  with  the  mere  association 
of  old  ideas,  but  to  separate  it  from  them  carefully, 
diligently  to  observe  it,  and  endeavor  to  discover  its 
laws,  —  as  the  chemist  seeks  to  find  the  law  of 
elementary  affinity.  I  can  discover  no  evidence  that 
two  sensations  succeeding  each  other  will  ever  be 
anything  else  than  two  sensations,  or  that  two  re- 
membered sensations  will  ever  be  anything  else  than 
two  remembered  sensations.  "When  a  further  pro- 
duct appears,  such  as  the  idea  of  power,  or  the  idea 
of  the  good,  it  cannot  be  the  effect  of  a  mere  sensa- 
tion, except  in  the  sense  above  explained  (p.  85),  of 
an  occasion,  implying  a  co-operative  capacity  in  the 
mind,  such  as  a  judgment  or  a  power  oi'  discerning 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,   ETC.  201 

moral  goodj  —  which  capacity  should  be  noted  as 
carefully  as  the  sensations.  In  short,  the  laws  of  as- 
sociation are  the  mere  laws  of  the  succession  of  our 
ideas  and  attached  feelings,  and  can  generate  no 
new  idea,  without  a  special  inlet  from  without  or 
capacity  within.  Association  cannot  give  a  man  born 
bhnd  the  least  idea  of  color,  and  as  little  can  it  pro- 
duce any  other  idea.  By  mixing  the  colors  of  yel- 
low and  blue,  the  hand  could  produce  green ;  but 
give  a  person  the  idea  of  yellow  and  the  idea  of 
blue,  and  from  the  two  he  could  not  manufacture 
the  idea  of  green ;  still  less  could  he  from  these  sen- 
sations, or  any  others,  form  such  ideas  as  those  of 
time  or  potency. 

There  are  two  points  in  regard  to  the  association 
of  ideas  which  require  to  be  cleared  up.  The  first 
is  the  precise  and  ultimate  expression  of  the  law, 
that  things  which  are  related,  in  particular,  that 
things  which  are  like  suggest  each  other.  This 
law,  under  one  form  or  other,  has  appeared  in  nearly 
every  classification  of  the  laws  of  the  succession  of 
our  mental  states  from  the  time  of  Aristotle  down- 
wards. Mr.  Mill  puts  the  law  in  the  form,  "  Similar 
phenomena  tend  to  be  thought  of  together."  (p.  190.) 
I  believe  that  other  related  things  do  also  suggest 
each  other ;  but  let  this  pass.  The  unsettled  ques- 
tion is,  must  the  relation  be  seen  by  the  mind  before 
the  law  operates  ?  I  see  a  portrait,  and  it  at  once 
suggests  the  original.  I  have  never  seen  the  two 
together;  I  see  the  portrait  for  the  first  time,  the 


202  MEMOBY,   ASSOCIATION   OF 

original  is  not  present,  and  yet  it  is  immediately 
called  up.  It  can  scarcely  be  alleged  in  such  a  case 
that  I  first  discover  the  resemblance,  and  then  have 
the  idea  of  the  original,  for  until  the  idea  of  the 
original  springs  up  I  cannot  discover  the  resem- 
blance. Is  the  law  then  to  take  this  form,  that  like 
suggests  hke  before  the  likeness  is  observed  ?  This 
is  a  topic  on  which  Hamilton  often  pondered,  and  he 
has  advanced  some  subtle  considerations  which  are 
perhaps  not  sufficiently  reduced  to  a  consistent 
system.  Mr.  Mill  severely  criticises  Hamilton,  but 
has  not  himself  sounded  the  depths  of  the  subject, 
which  requires  to  be  further  cleared  up  before  we 
have  an  ultimate  expression  of  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion. In  endeavoring  to  explicate  it,  we  must  ever 
keep  a  firm  hold  of  the  distinction  between  the 
observation  of  relations,  which  is  an  act  of  compari- 
son, and  the  mere  suggestion  of  one  thing  by 
another.  We  shall  see  that  the  school  of  Mr.  MiU 
has  perseveringly  confounded  them. 

The  other  point  requiring  further  elucidation  re- 
lates to  the  Secondary  Laws  of  Suggestion,  as  they 
have  been  called  by  Brown,  or  the  Law  of  Prefer- 
ence, as  it  has  been  called  by  Hamilton.  To  explain 
what  this  means  :  suppose  that  the  idea  now  before 
the  mind  has  been  associated  with  a  great  number 
of  others,  according  to  the  laws  of  contiguity  and 
correlation;  the  question  arises,  why  among  these 
ideas  does  it  go  after  one  rather  than  another  ?  I 
met  with  a  dozen  people  at  a  dinner ;  what  makes 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,   ETC,  203 

me  think  of  some  one  of  them  rather  than  the 
others  ?  Many  references  had  been  previously 
made  to  the  facts  bearing  on  this  subject,  but  the 
first  enumeration  of  Secondary  Laws,  as  different 
from  the  Primary,  was  made  by  Brown,  whose  ar- 
rangement though  clear  was  defective  in  logical 
reduction.  I  am  sure  there  are  two  Laws  of  Prefer- 
ence which  have  a  powerful  influence.  One  of  these 
is  the  law  of  native  taste  and  talent.  We  go  after 
the  ideas  which  have  the  deepest  interest  to  our 
natural  faculties.  Some,  for  instance,  have  a  great 
tendency  to  observe  resemblances,  and  among  possi- 
ble associations  they  will  find  hkenesses,  analogies, 
and  affinities  coming  up  most  strongly  and  frequently 
Some  have  constitutionally  certain  strong  appeten- 
cies or  passions,  and  their  thoughts  will  tend  towards 
the  corresponding  objects.  The  mother  with  a 
strong  love  of  offspring  will  find  every  topic  started 
and  event  occurring,  suggesting  possible  perils  or  en- 
joyments to  her  children.  I  need  not  dwell  on  this, 
as  it  has  no  special  reference  to  our  present  discus- 
sion, which  certainly  the  other  has. 

I  call  it  the  Law  of  Mental  Energy.  Those  ideas 
are  brought  up  most  readily  and  frequently  on 
which  we  have  bestowed  the  greatest  amount  of 
mental  force.  Every  mind  seems  to  be  endowed 
with  a  certain  amount  of  power,  and,  according  to 
the  power  expended  on  an  idea,  so  is  it  remembered 
for  a  greater  length  of  time,  and  so  is  it  suggested 
more  easily  and  firequently.     It  may  be  an  energy 


204  MEMOBY,   ASSOCIATION   OF 

of  sensation,  as  when  the  idea  has  been  very  pleas- 
urable or  very  painful.  It  may  be  an  energy  of  in- 
telligence, as  when  we  have  devoted  one  or  several 
of  our  faculties,  eagerly  or  for  a  length  of  time,  to 
a  given  object.  It  may  be  an  energy  of  emotion,  as 
when  a  liVely  hope  or  an  anxious  fear  has  collected 
round  a  particular  event.  Or  it  may  be  an  energy  of 
will,  as  when  we  have  given  earnest  attention  to  a  sub- 
ject. Of  course,  the  ideas,  when  they  appear,  always 
come  up  according  to  such  Primary  Laws  as  those 
of  contiguity  and  correlation ;  but  the  Law  of  Energy 
shows  why,  among  a  variety  of  objects  which  it 
might  follow,  the  mind  takes  one  rather  than 
another.  It  is  thus  we  explain  that  Law  of  Insep- 
arable Association  on  which  Mr.  Mill  dwells  so  much: 
the  ideas  have  been  together,  and  much  energy 
having  been  expended  on  them  in  their  frequent 
combination,  they  come  up  together,  and  they  come 
up  often.  Much  the  same  effects  as  are  produced  by 
frequent  occurrence  follow  from  a  very  strong  energy 
being  exerted  only  for  a  brief  period,  only,  may  be, 
for  a  few  minutes  or  moments.  A  strong  sensation, 
as  that  of  an  avalanche,  heard,  it  may  be,  only  once 
in  our  lives,  may  leave  a  life-long  impression  of  itself 
We  can  never  forget  the  moment  when,  after  long 
search  and  toil  in  some  branch  of  research,  a  glorious 
thought  burst  on  our  view  like  the  sun,  and  threw  a 
flood  of  light  on  all  surrounding  objects.  A  terrible 
convulsion  of  fear  will  imprint  itself  on  our  souls  for 
life,  and  be   renewed  by  every  correlated  circum- 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,   ETC.  205 

stance.  An  acute  sorrow  will  burn  itself  into  the 
soul^  and  leave  a  wound  which  a  thousand  circum- 
stances will  tend  to  open,  —  thus  the  widow  can 
never  pass  the  spot  where  her  husband  Avas  thrown 
out  of  a  carriage  and  killed  in  her  presence,  without 
having  the  whole  scene  with  its  nervous  agitations 
revived. 

This  train  of  thought  and  observation  opens  to  us 
what  I  regard  as  a  very  deep  and  fundamental  law 
of  memory  in  its  recalling  power.  I  believe  we  are 
momentarily  conscious  of  every  sensation,  idea, 
thought,  or  emotion  of  the  mind.  But  it  is  merci- 
fully provided  that  many  of  our  mental  states  are 
never  reproduced  :  they  are  happily  allowed  to  pass 
away  into  forgetfulness,  at  least  they  cannot  be 
brought  up  in  ordinary  circumstances,  —  though 
there  are  curious  recorded  instances  of  their  reap- 
pearing in  extraordinary  positions.  We  should  cer- 
tainly be  in  a  pitiable  condition  if  every  tick  of  the 
clock  in  the  room  in  which  we  sit,  if  every  act  of 
will  put  forth  in  moving  our  limbs,  if  every  passing 
thought  in  our  day  dreams  or  our  night  dreams, 
came  up  as  readily  as  our  more  important  cogitations, 
which  have  engaged  and  engrossed  much  thought 
and  attention.  While  we  are  conscious  (so  it  ap- 
pears to  me)  of  every  mental  operation,  it  seems  to 
be  necessary  that  a  certain  amount  of  mental  force 
should  be  expended  in  order  to  our  having  the  capac- 
ity to  recall  it.  Very  possibly  this  mental  law  may 
be  connected  with  a  physiological  one,  with  what  has 


206  MEMOBY,   ASSOCIATION   OF 


been  called  by  Dr.  Carpenter  "  unconscious  cerebra- 
tion." I  am  inclined  to  tliink  that  our  conscious 
mental  affections  tend  to  produce  an  unconscious 
brain  affection,  and  that  the  concurrence  of  the 
brain  thus  affected  is  necessary  in  order  to  memory, 
or  the  reproduction  of  an  idea.  Now,  a  certain 
amount  of  mental  force  may  be  necessary  to  produce 
the  cerebration,  without  which  there  can  be  no  rec- 
ollection. Whether  from  purely  mental  or  cerebral 
causes,  or  as  I  think  from  the  two  combined,  it  looks 
as  if  the  recalling  of  ideas  requires  that  they  should 
first  have  been  in  the  consciousness  with  a  certain 
amount  of  force  or  vividness.  Many  ideas  which 
have  been  in  the  mind  never  reappear,  and  those 
which  do,  come  forth,  according  to  the  power  or  prero- 
gative we  have  imparted  to  them,  —  like  the  stars, 
which  do  not  all  show  themselves,  —  for  otherwise 
the  sky  would  be  one  blazing  concave,  but  which, 
when  they  do  appear,  come  out  according  to  their 
nearness  to  us  and  their  magnitude. 

It  is  by  this  broader  and  deeper  principle  that  I 
account  for  what  Mr.  Mill  chooses  to  call  the  Law  of 
Obliviscence.  I  agree  with  Sir  William  Hamilton  in 
thinking  that  there  may  be  more  than  one  object 
before  the  mind  at  one  time.  Suppose  that  there 
are  five  objects  before  the  eye,  I  believe  that  we 
could  notice  all  of  them.  But  our  apprehension  of 
all  and  each  is  so  spread  and  dissipated,  is  so  faint 
and  vague,  that  the  chance  is,  that  no  one  of  them 
ever  presents  itself  to  the  mind  at  any  future  time. 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,    ETC.  207 

But  let  one  of  them  be  of  a  very  brilliant  color,  or 
let  it  have  a  large  amount  of  attention  centred  upon 
it  for  a  special  end,  or  suppose  that  it  had  created 
an  interest  in  itself  in  time  past  so  that  it  now 
awakens  lively  feeling,  that  object  will  be  found  to 
have  so  imprinted  itself  on  the  mind,  that  it  will  re- ' 
main  when  others  pass  uito  obliviscence.  "After 
reading,"  says  Mr.  Mill  (p.  260),  "a  chapter  of  a 
book,  when  we  lay  down  the  volume  do  we  remem- 
ber to  have  been  individually  conscious  of  the  prbated 
letters  and  syllables  which  have  passed  before  us  ? 
Could  we  recall,  by  any  effort  of  mind,  the  visible 
aspect  presented  by  them,  unless  some  unusual  cir- 
cumstance has  fixed  our  attention  upon  it  during  the 
perusal?  Yet  each  of  these  letters  and  syllables 
must  have  been  present  to  us  as  a  sensation  for  at 
least  a  passing  moment,  or  the  sense  could  not  have 
been  conveyed  to  us.  But  the  sense  being  the  only 
thing  in  which  we  were  interested,  —  or,  in  excep- 
tional cases,  the  sense  and  a  few  of  the  words  or 
sentences,  —  we  retain  no  impression  of  the  separate 
letters  and  syllables."  By  the  same  principle,  we 
account  for  the  facts  which  of  late  years  have  been 
commonly  ascribed  to  Unconscious  Mental  Action. 

Mr.  Mill  has  done  essential  service  to  philosophy 
by  opposing  the  tide  which,  both  in  Germany  and  in 
Britain,  has  been  flowing  too  strongly  in  favor  of  this 
theory.  And  yet  I  am  not  sure  that  he  has  appre- 
hended all  that  is  in  the  facts  supposed  to  favor  the 
doctrine. 


208  MEMOBY,   ASSOCIATION   OF  ^     ■ 

(1.)  I  hold  tliat  the  soul,  from  the  very  first,  is  en- 
dowed with  certain  powers  or  tendencies.  Even 
matter  has  capacities  which  lead  to  action,  and  to 
changes  of  state  when  the  needful  conditions  are 
fulfilled ;  and  much  more  must  the  soul  have  original 
properties,  which  come  forth  in  operation  according 
to  the  law  imposed  on  them.  But  in  these  primary 
endowments  there  is  no  action,  conscious  or  uncon- 
scious ;  there  is  simply  a  capacity  of  action.  Some 
of  the  German  philosophers  who  support  the  theory 
confound  these  a  priori  powers  or  regulative  prin- 
ciples of  the  mind,  of  which  we  are  certainly  not 
conscious,  with  the  actions  that  proceed  from  them, 
and  of  which  we  are  conscious. 

(2.)  The  mind  by  action  is  ever  acquiring  and  lay- 
ing up  power,  capacity,  tendency.  We  have  some- 
thing analogous  in  physical  nature.  In  the  geolog- 
ical ages,  the  plants  by  drinking  in  the  sunbeams 
acquired  a  stock  of  power,  which  went  down  with 
them  into  the  earth  as  they  sank  into  it,  which  abides 
in  the  coal  which  they  helped  to  form,  and  is  now 
ready  to  burst  out  in  heat  and  flame  in  our  fires,  and 
supply  mechanical  power  to  our  steam-engines. 
There  seems  to  be  a  like  laying  up  of  power  in  the 
mind ;  of  intellectual,  and,  I  may  add,  of  moral  or 
immoral  power,  —  the  result  of  continued  mental 
action.  When  we  have  done  an  act,  we  have  a 
g^reater  capacity,  along  with  a  tendency  to  do  it 
again.  Thus  it  is  that  we  are,  all  our  lives  long,  and 
on  every  day  of  them,  acquiring  powers,  tendencies, 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,   ETC.  209 

dispositions,  habits,  inclinations,  which  are  to  abide 
with  us  for  years,  —  perhaps  forever.  This  is  one 
of  the  regulating  principles  in  the  rejDroduction  of 
our  mental  states  generally,  and  particularly  in  the 
association  of  ideas.  What  is  done,  and  especially 
what  is  done  repeatedly,  leaves  its  trace  on  the  soul, 
and  may  appear  in  deeds  long,  long  after.  Ideas  which 
have  been  together  simultaneously  or  in  immediate 
succession,  have  the  property  and  the  tendency 
to  come  up  together,  and  this  in  proportion  to 
the  mental  energy  which  has  been  expended  m  pro- 
ducing them,  and  under  this  to  the  frequency  with 
which  they  have  been  together.  This  is  one  of  the 
elements  which  gives  its  beneficent  and  its  awful 
power  to  habit.  But  let  it  be  carefully  observed, 
that  in  all  this  we  have  not  come  in  sight  of  uncon- 
scious mental  action.  We  were  conscious  of  every 
step  of  the  actual  operations  of  the  mind,  and  we 
were  responsible  for  them  throughout.  Those  who 
support  the  theory  mistake  the  unconscious  acquired 
power  for  unconscious  acts. 

(3.)  The  mind  by  action  may  affect  the  structure 
of  the  brain,  or  the  forces,  —  mechanical,  chemical, 
vital,  —  operating  in  it,  and  in  the  nervous  system. 
Materiahstic  physiologists  represent  high  mental 
capacity  as  resulting  from  a  large  or  finely  con- 
structed brain.  The  more  probable  theory  is,  that  a 
nicely  adapted  and  a  finely  strung  cerebral  structure 
results  from  high  mental  capacity  and  activity.  It 
is  not  the  casket  which  forms  the  jewel,  but  it  is  the 

14 


210  3fE3WBY,    ASSOCIATION   OF 

jewel  that  determines  tlie  size  and  shape  of  the 
casket ;  or,  to  use  a  better  illustration  in  such  a  con- 
nection, it  is  the  kernel  that  determines  the  form  of 
the  husk.  The  finely  organized  brain  thus  produced 
may,  in  man  and  the  lower  animals,  tend  to  go 
down  by  the  ordinary  laws  of  transmission  from 
parent  to  offspring.  It  is  thus,  that  in  certain  of  the 
West  India  Islands,  by  examining,  the  heads  of  the 
negroes  on  a  plantation,  a  hatter  can  tell  at  what 
age  their  forefathers  were  transplanted  from  Africa, 
—  the  brain  being  larger  in  those  families  whose  an- 
cestors have  been  longest  in  contact  with  civilized 
men.  It  is  thus,  that  in  our  own  country,  the  aver- 
age size  of  the  heads  of  the  educated  classes  is  larger 
than  that  of  the  uneducated.  But  in  this,  the  actual 
action  of  the  mind  is  conscious  throughout.  It  is  only 
the  organic  product  of  which  we  are  unconscious. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  work  out  these  principles 
to  their  results.  They  imply  important  and  far- 
ranging  consequences, — mental  and  organic.  But 
these  are  not  the  doctrines  defended  by  those  whose 
opinions  I  am  here  reviewing.  Not  satisfied  with 
native  endowments,  and  acquired  powers,  and  bodily 
effects,  which  are  unconscious,  they  insist  on  the  ex- 
istence of  actual  operations  which  are  unaccompanied 
with  consciousness.  They  are  not  agreed  among 
themselves  as  to  what  is  the  nature  of  this  action. 
The  theory  was  introduced  into  modern  speculation 
by  Leibnitz,  who  connected  it  with  the  essential  ac- 
tivity of  his  monads.     It  was  eagerly  seized  by  cer- 


IDEAS,    BELIEF,   ETC.  211 

tain  of  the  pantheistic  speculators  of  Germany,  who 
maintamed  that  the  Di^dne  Idea  awakes  to  conscious- 
ness according  to  certam  laws.  As  held  in  the 
present  day,  it  takes  two  different,  I  should  say  in- 
consistent, forms.  According  to  a  numerous  school 
in  Germany,  which  may  be  held  as  represented  by 
the  younger  Fichte,  the  unconscious  mental  action 
is  thought,  and  thought  of  the  highest  kind  :  the 
thought  which  in  the  bee  constructs  the  cells  on 
mathematical  principles;  which  bursts  out  in  the 
highest  products  of  genius,  artistic,  Hterary,  and 
philosophic,  and  gives  bu^th  even  to  inspiration.  The 
theory  under  this  form  seems  to  me  to  be  fanciful  in 
the  highest  degree.  As  to  animal  instincts,  they  are 
clearly  to  be  traced  to  original  or  inherited  proper- 
ties, obeying  laws  not  yet  determined.  And  as  to 
genius,  it  is  to  be  explained  by  far  different  principles. 
We  account  for  it  by  high  mental  endowment,  often 
stimulated  into  intense  action  by  a  peculiar  nervous 
temperament.  We  have  no  evidence,  that,  prior  to 
Bacon  composing  the  Novum  Organum,  or  Shak- 
speare  writing  Hamlet,  there  was  any  mental  opera- 
tion below  consciousness.  There  were  lofty  gifts  in 
both,  and  also  a  training  and  exj)erience  which  left 
their  permanent  effects ;  but  when  these  came  forth 
into  action,  I  apprehend  that  the  illustrious  authors 
were  quite  conscious  of  them,  though  they  might 
not  have  been  able  or  disposed  to  furnish  a  metaphys- 
ical analysis  of  them. 

The  theory  of  Hamilton  is  of  a  more  sober  char- 


212  MEMOBT,    ASSOCIATION   OF 

acter,  but  seems  to  be  equally  devoid  of  evidence  to 
support  it.  The  class  of  facts  on  which  he  rests  his 
opinion  are  misapprehended.  "  When  we  hear  the 
distant  murmur  of  the  sea^  what  are  the  constituents 
of  the  total  perception  of  which  we  are  conscious  ? " 
{Metaph.,  vol.  i.  p.  351.)  He  answers  that  the  mur- 
mur is  a  sum  made  up  of  parts,  and  that  if  the  noise 
of  each  wave  made  no  impression  in  our  sense,  the 
noise  of  the  sea,  as  the  result  of  these  impressions, 
could  not  be  realized.  "  But  the  noise  of  each  sev- 
eral wave  at  the  distance,  we  suppose,  is  inaudible ; 
we  must,  however,  admit  that  they  produce  a  cer- 
tain modification  beyond  consciousness  on  the  per- 
cipient object."  He  speaks  of  our  perception  of  a 
forest  as  made  up  of  impressions  left  by  each  leaf, 
which  impressions  are  below  consciousness.  There 
is  an  entire  misapprehension  of  the  facts  in  these 
statements,  and  this,  according  to  Hamilton's  own 
theory  of  the  object  intuitively  perceived.  The  mind 
is  not  immediately  cognizant  of  the  sound  of  the 
sea,  or  of  its  several  waves,  — •  nor  of  the  trees  of 
the  forest  and  their  several  leaves.  All  that  it  knows 
intuitively  is  an  affection  of  the  organism.  The  im- 
pression made  by  the  distant  object  is  on  the  organ- 
ism ;  and  when  the  action  is  sufficiently  strong,  the 
mind  is  called  into  exercise,  and,  from  the  perceived 
affections,  argues  or  infers  the  peculiar  nature  of  the 
distant  cause.  In  this  class  of  phenomena  there  is 
no  proof  of  a  mental  operation  of  which  we  are  un- 
conscious. 


IDEAS,   BELIEF,  ETC.  213 

Hamilton  explains,  by  supposed  unconscious  acts, 
a  class  of  mental  phenomena  with  which  we  are  all 
familiar.  We  walk  in  a  "brown  study"  from  a 
friend's  house  to  our  home  :  there  must  have  been 
many  mental  acts  performed  on  the  way,  but  they 
cannot  be  recalled.  The  question  is,  were  they  ever 
before  the  consciousness  ?  Dugald  Stewart  maintains 
that  they  were  for  the  time,  but  that  we  cannot  rec- 
ollect them.  Notwithstandmg  the  acute  remarks 
of  Hamilton,  I  adhere  to  the  explanation  of  Stewart. 
I  do  so  on  the  general  principle,  that  in  propounding 
an  hypothesis  to  explain  a  phenomenon,  we  should 
never  call  in  a  class  of  facts,  of  whose  existence  we 
have  no  other  j)roof,  when  we  can  account  for  the 
whole  by  facts  known  on  independent  evidence. 
Hamilton  tells  us,  "  When  suddenly  awakened  during 
sleep  (and  to  ascertain  the  fact,  I  have  caused  my- 
self to  be  roused  at  different  seasons  of  the  night),  I 
have  always  been  able  to  observe  that  I  was  in  the 
middle  of  a  dream  ; "  but,  he  adds,  that  he  was  often 
scarcely  certain  of  more  than  the  fact  that  he  was 
not  awakened  from  an  unconscious  state,  and  that 
we  are  often  not  able  to  recollect  our  dreams.  He 
represents  it  as  a  peculiarity  of  somnambuhsm,  that 
we  have  no  recollection  when  we  awake  of  what  has 
occurred  during  its  continuance.  (Vol.  i.  pp.  320-322.) 
Every  one  will  admit  that  we  are  often  conscious  of 
states  at  the  time,  which  we  either  do  not  remember 
at  all,  or  more  probably  cannot  remember,  except 
for  a  very  brief  period  after  we  have  experienced 


214         MEMORY,  ASSOCIATION   OF   IDEAS. 

them.  We  have  thus  an  established  order  of  facts 
sufficient  to  explain  the  whole  phenomena,  and  do 
not  require  to  resort  to  alleged  facts  of  which  we 
have  and  can  have  no  direct  evidence.  We  walk 
home  of  an  evening  from  a  place  at  a  distance  con- 
versing as  we  go  along  with  a  friend.  In  order  to 
our  reaching  our  dwelling,  there  must  have  been  a 
number  of  mental  acts  to  enable  us  to  thread  our 
way,  along  possibly  a  very  perplexed  road.  Next 
morning  we  remember  the  topics  gone  over  in  the 
conversation,  but  have  entirely  and  forever  forgot 
the  acts  of  will  implied  in  guiding  our  steps.  But  I 
venture  to  affirm  that  at  the  time  we  were  conscious 
of  both,  that  we  were  conscious  even  of  the  volitions 
that  brought  us  safely  to  our  home,  and  that  we 
should  have  seen  this  and  acknowledged  it,  and  re- 
membered it,  had  there  been  anything  to  call  our 
attention  to  it  at  the  time.  The  reason  why  the  one 
is  remembered  while  the  other  is  forgotten,  is  to  be 
found  in  the  circumstance,  that  the  conversation  ex- 
cited our  interest,  whereas  the  walk,  as  being  the 
result  of  long  acquired  habit,  called  forth  no  feehng, 
and  so  passed  into  oblivion. 


CHAPTER    IX. 


JUDGMENT   OR   COMPARISON. 


IN  this  chapter  I  have  to  point  out  firsts  a  grave 
defect,  and  then  a  still  graver  error. 
There  is  no  part  of  the  psychology  of  the  school 
to  which  Mr.  Mill  belongs  in  which  their  defects  are 
so  evident  as  in  their  account  of  the  Judging,  Com- 
parative, or  Correlative  capacity.  They  may  have 
been  misled  m  part  by  Brown,  who  joined  in  one 
suggestion  and  relation,  under  a  faculty  which  he 
called  Relative  Suggestion,  whose  function  it  is  at 
once  to  discover  relations  and  suggest  objects  accord- 
ing to  relations.  Brown  was  wrong,  I  think,  in  allow- 
ing two  such  diverse  functions  to  one  power ;  but  it 
is  justice  to  him  to  say  that  he  has  given  a  compre- 
hensive view  of  the  relations  which  the  mind  of  man 
can  discover.  He  has  a  generic  and  a  specific  divis- 
ion. He  has  first  a  grand  twofold  division  into  Co- 
existence and  Succession.  Under  the  first  he  em- 
braces Position,  Resemblance  or  Difference,  Propor- 
tion, Degree,  Comprehension ;  and  under  the  second, 
Causal  and  Casual  Priority.  The  later  members  of 
the  school,  such  as  Mr.  James  Mill,  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill  and 

(215) 


216  JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISON, 

Mr.  Bain,  have  been  lessening  the  number,  and  low- 
ering the  importance  of  the  relations  which  can  be 
discovered  by  our  faculties,  and  thus  narrowing  our 
mental  powers,  so  as  to  enable  them  the  more  readily 
to  account  for  the  phenomena  of  the  mind  by  sensa- 
tions and  association.  Mr.  James  Mill  does  speak  of 
Kelative  Terms,  but  contrives  to  get  them  without 
calling  in  a  special  faculty  of  Comparison.  Mr.  J.  S. 
Mill,  after  specifying  1st,  Feelings,  2d,  Minds,  and  3d, 
Bodies,  as  included  among  namable  things,  men- 
tions, "  4th  and  last,  the  Successions  and  Co-exist- 
ences, the  Likenesses  and  Unlikenesses  between  feel- 
ings or  states  of  consciousness."  In  explanation,  he 
tells  us,  "  Those  relations,  when  considered  as  subsist- 
ing between  other  things,  exist  in  reality  only  be- 
tween the  states  of  consciousness  which  those  things, 
if  bodies,  excite,  if  minds,  either  excite  or  experience." 
{Logic,  B.  I.  c.  iii.  §  15.)  This  statement  is  quite  in 
accordance  with  his  general  theory  as  he  has  now 
developed  it.  As  we  know  originally  only  feelings 
or  states  of  consciousness,  so  the  relations  we  dis- 
cover can  only  be  between  feelings  and  possibihties 
of  feehng.  No  doubt  most  people  imagine  that  in 
comparing  Juhus  Caesar,  Charlemagne,  and  Napoleon 
Bonaparte ;  and  in  comparing  or  contrasting  Louis 
Napoleon  with  Augustus,  Comte  with  Hobbes,  and 
Mill  with  Hume,  we  are  comparing  things  out  of  our 
states  of  consciousness :  but  the  new  philosophy  cor- 
rects this  vulgar  error,  and  in  doing  so  is  consistent 
with  itself;  —  whether  it  be  consistent  with  our  in- 


JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISON  217 

tuitive  assurances  or  no.  To  complete  the  simplicity 
of  the  reduction,  Mr.  Bain  tells  us,  in  reviewing 
Grote's  Flato  {Macmillcm' s  Magazine,  J^%?  1865), 
"  These  two  facts.  Cognizance  of  Difference  and  Cog- 
nizance of  Agreement,  can  be  shown  to  exhaust  the 
essence  of  knowledge,  and  both  are  requisites.  All 
that  we  can  know  of  a  gold  ring  is  summed  up  in  its 
agreement  with  certain  things,  round  things,  small 
things,  gold  things,  etc.,  and  its  differences  from 
others,  squares,  oblong,  silver,  iron,"  etc. 

I  maintain  that  this  account  of  man's  power  of 
correlation  is  far  too  narrow,  —  consciousness  being 
the  witness  and  arbiter.  Profound  thinkers  have 
given  a  much  wider  sweep  to  the  intellect.  I  have 
quoted  the  enumeration  by  Brown,  and  I  have  pre- 
sented below  the  classifications  of  such  thinkers  as 
Locke,  Hume,  and  Kant.^  I  ask  the  reader  to  look 
at  them,  and  to  decide  for  himself  whether  they  can 
all  be  reduced  to  agreement  and  disagreement.  Mr. 
Mill  gives  a  place  to  co-existences  and  successions. 
In  this  he  is  surely  right :  for  when  I  say  that  Shak- 
speare  and  Cervantes  died  the  same  year,  and  that 
the  ancient  epic  poets.  Homer  and  Yirgil,  lived  be- 
fore the  modern  ones,  Dante  and  Milton,  I  indicate 

1  Locke  specifies  Cause  and  Effect,  II.  Quality,  containing  Reality,  Nega- 
Time,  Place,  Identity  and  Diversity,  tion.  Limitation.  III.  Relation,  con- 
Proportion  and  Moral  Relations  {Es-  taining  Inherence  and  Subsistence, 
say,  B.  II.  c.  xxxvii),  Hume  men-  Causality  and  Dependence,  Commu- 
tions  Resemblance,  Identity,  Space  nity  of  Agent  and  Patient.  IV.  Mo- 
and  Time,  Quantity,  Degree,  Con-  dality,  containing  Possibility  and  Im- 
trariety.  Cause  and  Effect.  Kant's  possibility,  Existence  and  Non-Exist- 
categories  are,  —  I.  Quantity,  con-  tence,  Necessity  and  Contingence. 
taining    Unity,    Plurality,    Totality. 


218  JUDGMENT   OB   COMPABISOm 

more  than  an  agreement  in  the  former  case  and  a 
disagreement  in  the  latter,  —  I  intimate  the  point 
of  relation,  which  is  that  of  Time,  —  a  relation,  I 
may  add,  the  significance  of  which  has  not  been 
esthnated  by  Mr.  Mill.     When  I  say  that  one  figure 
before  my  eyes  is  a  disc,  and  another  a  solid,  I  declare 
more  than  a  difference  or  co-existence, —  I  declare  that 
the  two  difier  in  respect  of  their  occupation  of  space. 
Again,  when  I  affirm  that  oxygen  is  one  of  the  ele- 
ments of  water,  I  predicate  a  relation  of  part  and 
whole,  and  imply  one  of  composition,  which  is  surely 
more  than  agreement,  or  co-existence,  or  succession. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  other  relations,  such  as 
that  of  quantity,  when  I  maintain  that  Chimborazo 
is  higher  than  Mont  Blanc ;  and  of  active  property, 
when  I  declare  that  the  sun  attracts  the  earth,  and 
that  oxygen  combines  with  hydrogen  to  form  water.-^ 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  discover  and  expose 
what  is  perhaps  the  most  fatal  error  in  the  whole 
theory :  it  consists   in   ascribing  to  association  the 
functions  of  judgment.     Mr.  James  Mill  thus  sums 
up  a  statement :  "  We  have  now  then  explored  those 
states  of  Consciousness  which  we  call  Belief  in  ex- 
istences :  Belief  in  present  existences ;  Belief  in  past 
existences ;    and    Belief  in  future   existences.      We 
have  seen  that,  in  the  most  simple  cases,  Belief  con- 
sists in  sensation  alone,  or  ideas  alone ;  in  the  more 


1  I  have  arranged  the  Relations  as  tity,  Resemhlance,  Active  Property, 
those  of  Identity  and  Difference,  and  Cause  and  Effect.  —  Intuitions,  P. 
Whole  and  Parts,  Space,  Time,  Quan-    II.  B.  in.  c.  i. 


JUDGMENT   OB   COMPABISON.  219 

complicated  cases,  in  sensation,  ideas,  and  association, 
combined ;  and  in  no  case  of  belief  has  any  other 
ingredient  been  found."  As  to  Propositions,  he  says 
they  are  either  of  general  names  or  particular  names. 
Of  the  former  he  says,  "  They  are  all  merely  verbal ; 
and  the  Behef  is  nothing  more  than  recognition  of 
the  coincidence,  entire  or  partial,  of  two  general 
names."  As  to  th-e  latter,  he  says,  "  Propositions  re- 
lating to  individuals  may  be  expressions  either  of 
past  or  future  events.  Belief  in  past  events,  upon 
our  own  experience,  is  memory ;  upon  other  men's 
experience,  is  Belief  in  testimony  -,  both  of  them  re- 
solved into  association.  Belief  in  future  events  is 
the  inseparable  association  of  Hke  consequents  with 
like  antecedents."  {Analysis,  pp.  290,  307,  308.)  I 
am  not  sure  whether  the  son  would  adopt  the  whole 
of  this  statement :  he  has  been  obliged  to  admit  that 
memory  yields  an  ultimate  belief,  which  is  not  the 
result  of  association.  But  his  theory  in  the  main 
coincides  with  that  of  the  father.  It  is  admitted 
that  there  is  an  original  consciousness  of  sensations, 
and  that  there  is  a  memory  of  sensations,  which  can- 
not be  resolved  into  anything  simpler.  It  is  further 
postulated  that  there  is  an  association  of  sensations 
according  to  contiguity  and  agreement,  and  that  there 
is  an  expectation  of  sensations.  Out  of  these,  as  I 
understand,  spring  our  judgments  (if  indeed  we  have 
the  power  of  judging)  and  our  beliefs,  w^hich  imply, 
and  can  imply  nothing  more  than  contiguity  or 
agreement  in  the  sensations.     I  charge  this  doctrine 


220  JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISOJSF, 

with  stripping  man  of  the  capacity  of  judging  of  the 
actual  relations  of  things  ;  and  making  all  our  beliefs, 
except  those  involved  in  sensations,  and  the  memory 
of  them,  to  be  the  creation  of  circumstances,  and 
capable  of  being  changed  only  by  circumstances  with 
their  conjunctions  and  correspondencies,  which,  for 
anything  we  can  ever  know,  may  be  altogether  for- 
tuitous or  fatalistic. 

The  defects  of  the  theory  commence  in  the  account 
given  of  the  matter  with  which  the  mind  starts  :  this 
is  supposed  to  be  merely  sensations.  But  the  fatal 
consequences  do  not  become  evident  till  we  see  what 
must  be  the  explanation  rendered  of  the  mind's 
capacity  of  Judgment.  I  have  endeavored  in  this 
treatise  to  meet  and  stop  the  error  at  its  inlet,  that 
so  we  may  be  preserved  from  the  issues.  I  have 
shown  that  the  mind  starts  with  an  original  stock 
of  knowledge  and  belief  In  sense-perception  it 
knows  objects,  with  an  existence,  external  to  self, 
extended,  and  capable  of  resistance  and  of  motion. 
In  self-consciousness  it  knows  self  as  an  existing 
thing,  sentient,  or  knowing,  or  remembering,  or 
believing,  or  judging,  or  resolving,  or  entertaining 
moral  or  other  sentiments.  In  memory  we  remem- 
ber ourselves  and  the  event  in  the  past,  and  thus 
have  a  continuous  and  identical  self,  with  the  impor- 
tant element  of  time.  And  now  we  can  compare  all 
these,  and  discover  relations  among  them.  By  this 
further  faculty  the  domain  of  our  knowledge  is  indef- 
initely extended :  in  fact  our  acquaintance  with  an 


JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISON.  221 

object  is  very  vague  and  very  limited  till  we  have 
detected  its  connections  with  other  things.  But 
what  I  wish  specially  noticed  is,  that  the  comparison 
is  not  between  mere  "  feelings  or  states  of  conscious- 
ness," but  between  things,  without  us  as  well  as 
within  us.  I  compare  self  in  one  state,  say  under 
sensation,  with  self  in  another  state,  say  recollecting 
or  resolving.  I  compare  one  extended  object 
with  another,  and  declare  the  one  to  be  larger  than 
the  other.  I  compare  events  remembered,  and  de- 
clare that  they  happened  at  different  times.  I  com- 
pare my  very  comparisons,  and  discover  further,  it 
may  be  more  recondite,  proportions  and  harmonies, 
till  we  link  all  nature  within  and  without  us  in  a 
series  of  uniformities.  And  let  it  be  observed,  that 
our  judgments  throughout  are  judgments  as  to  real- 
ities. As  being  cognizant  of  extended  objects  in 
perception  by  the  senses,  on  noticing  two  extended 
objects,  say  St.  Paul's  and  its  door,  we  declare  the 
one  to  be  greater  than  the  other ;  and  our  judgment 
is  about  things,  and  not  about  sensations,  or  the 
mere  possibilities  of  sensation.  On  seeing  two  per- 
sons on  our  right  hand  and  two  persons  on  our  left 
hand,  we  declare  them  to  be  four,  as  soon  as  we  un- 
derstand what  "  two  "  and  what  "  four  "  mean.  We 
remember  our  school  days  and  our  college  days,  and 
we  declare  the  one  to  be  prior  to  the  other.  Our 
comparisons  in  such  cases  are  of  things,  and  our 
judgments  upon  things,  and  not  on  mere  feelings,  or 
mere  possibilities  of  feehng.      Circumstances  have 


222  JUDGMENT  OB    COIIPABISON, 

not  produced  the  judgments,  nor  can  circumstances 
change  or  modify  them.  In  all  circumstances  I  dev 
cide  that  the  house  is  larger  than  its  door  ;  that  two 
and  two  make  four ;  and  that  an  event  which  oc- 
curred when  we  were  ten  years  old  must  be  prior  to 
one  which  happened  when  we  were  twenty. 

I  admit  that  association  tends  to  produce  action, 
independent  of  judgment  upon  a  comparison  of  the 
things.  When  things  have  often  been  together  in 
the  mind,  we  go  spontaneously  from  the  one  to  the 
other ;  and  if  action  be  needed  to  secure  the  second, 
we  will  be  disposed  to  exert  it.  As  Mr.  Bain,  in  un- 
folding the  nature  of  our  Beliefs,  expresses  it  {Emot 
and  Will,  p.  579),^  "  An  animal  sees  the  water  that 
it  drinks,  and  thereby  couples  in  its  mind  the  prop- 
erty of  quenching  thirst  with  the  visible  aspect. 
After  this  association  has  acquired  a  certain  degree 
of  tenacity,  the  sight  of  water  at  a  distance  suggests 
the  other  fact,  so  that,  from  the  prospect,  the  animal 
realizes  to  some  degree  the  satisfying  of  that  craving. 
The  sight  of  water  to  the  thirsty  animal,  then,  in- 
spires the  movements  preparatory  to  actual  drinking ; 
the  voluntary  organs  of  locomotion  are  urged  by 
the  same  energetic  spur  on  the  mere  distant  sight, 
as  the  organs  of  lapping  and  swallowing  under  the 
feeling  of  relief  already  commenced.  This  is  the 
state  of  mature  conviction  as  to  the  union  of  the 
two  natural  properties  of  water."     I  reckon  this  as 

1  Mr.  Bain  admits  Intuitive  Beliefs,    born  energy  of  the  brain  gives  faith, 
but  then  they  deceive  us.     "  The  in-    and  experience  scepticism/'  p.  582. 


JUDGMENT    OR    COMPARISON.  223 

a  case  mainly  of  association,  and  not  of  judgment. 
I  do  allow  that  association  tends  to  make  us  form 
judgments.  When  two  objects  have  been  often 
brought  together,  we  are  led  to  discover  a  resem- 
blance, real  or  imaginary,  between  them.  But  ad- 
mitting all  this  freely,  I  maintain  that  the  mind  has 
a  power  of  judgment,  upon  the  bare  contemplation 
of  objects,  and  apart  altogether  from  the  association 
of  instances.  On  the  simple  consideration  of  two 
straight  lines,  I  am  sure  they  cannot  enclose  a  space. 
I  have  only  to  hear  of  a  case  of  ingratitude  for  favors 
to  declare  it  to  be  bad  and  blameworthy. 

While  the  two,  association  and  comparison,  often 
help  each  other,  yet  they  are  never  the  same.  The 
one  may  exist  without  the  other ;  and  the  one  does 

not  increase  nor  decrease  with  the  other.     In  manv 

t/ 

cases  there  is  a  strong  and  inseparable  association 
without  the  judgment  j^erceiving  any  relation,  nay, 
where  it  would  declare  that  there  is  no  connection 
in  the  nature  of  things.  Thus  the  letter  A  natur- 
ally suggests  the  letter  B,  because  they  have  come 
so  often  together  in  our  repetition  of  the  alphabet ; 
yet  no  one  thinks  that  the  two  have  in  them- 
selves any  bonds  of  union.  It  so  happens  that,  when 
the  name  St.  Patrick  is  brought  up,  I  always  associate 
with  it  the  legend  I  heard  in  my  youth  about 
the  saint  swimming  from  Donaghadee  to  Portpatrick, 
with  his  head  in  his  teeth;  yet  the  frequency  of 
the  conjunction  has  not  been  able  to  convince  me  of 
the  possibihty  of  the  act.     Often  have  the  numbers 


224  JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISON. 

17  and  20  been  together  in  my  mind,  from  the  ac- 
cident of  their  having  been  printed  together  on  a 
card  on  which  I  had  frequent  occasion  to  look ;  but 
it  has  never  occurred  to  me  that  the  two  must  have 
a  necessary  connection.  It  thus  appears  that  fre- 
quency of  association  cannot  of  itself  generate  a 
judgment  with  its  attached  belief  On  the  other 
hand,  a  judgment  declaring  that  there  is  a  connec- 
tion does  not  imply  that  there  has  been  a  frequent 
association.  Comparatively  seldom  have  17  -f-  ^^ 
been  conjoined  in  my  mind  with  37,  —  certainly  not 
so  frequently  as  17  has  been  associated  with  20, — 
and  yet,  on  the  bare  contemplation  of  17  -|-  20, 1  de- 
clare them  to  be  equal  to  37,  and  cannot  be  made 
to  decide  otherwise.  If  I  hear  that  Peter  Jones 
robbed  his  master  John  Smith,  who  trusted  him,  I 
declare  that  Peter  Jones  deserves  punishment,  and 
this  though  I  never  heard  of  Peter  Jones  before. 

Mr.  Mill  is  prepared  to  carry  out  his  principles 
to  consequences,  which  seem  to  me  a  reductio  ad 
ahsurdum  of  the  principles.  He  tells  us  (p.  69)  that 
"  the  reverse  of  the  most  familiar  principles  of  geom- 
etry might  have  been  made  conceivable,  even  to  our 
present  faculties,  if  these  faculties  had  co-existed 
with  a  totally  different  constitution  of  external  na- 
ture," and  quotes  at  length,  in  proof  of  this,  from 
Essays  by  a  Barrister,  in  which  it  is  said,  —  "  There 
is  a  world  in  which,  whenever  two  pairs  of  things 
are  either  placed  in  proximity  or  are  contemplated 
together,  a  fifth  thing  is  immediately  created  and 


JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISON,  225 

brought  within  the  contemplation  of  the  mind  en- 
gaged in  puttmg  two  and  two  together.  This  is 
surely  neither  inconceivable,  for  we  can  readily  con- 
ceive the  result  by  thinking  of  common  puzzle  tricks, 
nor  can  it  be  said  to  be  beyond  the  power  of  Omnip- 
otence. Yet  in  such  a  world  surely  two  and  two 
w^ould  make  five."  This  certainly  would  be  the 
result  on  Mr.  Mill's  theory.  But  such  consequences 
can  be  admitted  only  by  those  who  deny  the  mind 
all  power  of  kno^\dng  the  nature  of  things.  Those 
of  us  who  stand  up  for  a  power  of  independent  judg- 
ment, that  is,  a  judgment  founded  on  the  perception 
of  things,  cannot  allow  such  conclusions.  Were  we 
placed  in  a  world  in  which  two  pairs  of  things  were 
always  followed  by  a  fifth  thing,  we  inight  be  dis- 
posed to  believe  that  the  pairs  caused  the  fifth  thing, 
or  that  there  w^as  some  prearranged  disposition  of 
things  producing  them  together ;  but  we  could  not 
be  made  to  judge  that  2  -|-  2  ^^  5,  or  that  the  fifth 
thing  is  not  a  different  thing  from  the  two  and  the 
two.  On  the  other  supposition  put,  of  the  two  pairs 
always  suggesting  a  fifth,  we  should  explain  their 
recurrence  by  some  law  of  association,  but  we  would 
not  confound  the  5  with  the  2  -|-  2,  or  think  that  the 
two  pairs  could  make  ^\e. 

The  same  ingenious  gentleman  supports  the  theory 
by  another  illustration,  and  receives  the  sanction  of 
Mr.  Mill.  "  It  would  also  be  possible  to  put  a  case 
of  a  world  in  which  two  lines  w^ould  be  universally 
supposed  to  include  a  space.     Imagine  a  man  who 

15 


226  JUDGMENT   OB    COMFABISON. 

had  never  had  any  experience  of  straight  lines 
through  the  medium  of  any  sense  whatever,  suddenly 
placed  upon  a  railway  stretching  out  on  a  perfectly 
straight  line  to  an  indefinite  distance  in  each  direc- 
tion. He  would  see  the  rails,  which  would  be  the 
first  straight  lines  he  had  ever  seen,  apparently  meei^ 
ing,  or  at  least  tending  to  meet,  at  each  horizon ;  and 
he  would  thus  infer,  in  the  absence  of  all  other  ex- 
perience, that  they  actually  did  enclose  a  space  when 
produced  far  enough."  Now  I  allow  that  this  person, 
as  he  looked  one  way,  would  see  a  figure  presented 
to  the  eye  of  two  straight  lines  approaching  nearer 
each  other ;  and  that  as  he  looked  the  other  way 
he  would  see  a  like  figure.  But  I  deny  that  in  com- 
bining the  two  views  he  would  ever  decide  that 
the  four  lines  seen,  the  two  seen  first  and  the 
two  seen  second,  make  only  two  straight  lines. 
Tn  uniting  the  two  perceptions  in  thought,  he 
would  certainly  place  a  bend  or  a  turn  some- 
where, possibly  at  the  spot  from  which  he  took 
the  two  views.  He  would  continue  to  do  so  till  he 
realized  that  the  lines  seen  on  either  side  did  not  in 
fact  approach  nearer  each  other.  Or  to  state  the 
whole  phenomenon  with  more  scientific  accuracy : 
Intuitively,  and  to  a  person  who  had  not  acquired 
the  knowledge  of  distance  by  experience,  the  two 
views  would  appear  to  be  each  of  two  lines  approach- 
ing nearer  another  ;  but  without  his  being  at  all  cog- 
nizant of  the  relation  of  the  two  views,  or  of  one 
part  of  the  lines  being  farther  removed  from  him 


JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISON.  227 

than  another.  (See  supra,  pp.  160-168.)  As  expe- 
rience told  him  that  the  lines  receded  from  him  on 
each  side,  he  would  contrive  some  means  of  com- 
bining his  observations,  probably  in  the  way  above 
indicated ;  but  he  never  could  make  two  straight 
hnes  enclose  a  space. 

The  same  remarks  apply,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  a 
third  case  advanced  by  the  Barrister.  Thomas  Reid, 
who  was  a  man  of  humor  and  addicted  to  mathe- 
matics, amused  himself  and  relieved  a  dry  discussion 
by  drawing  out  a  "  Geometry  of  Yisibles  "  (  Works,  p. 
147),  in  which  he  exhibits  the  conclusions  which 
could  be  deduced  from  the  supposed  perceptions  of 
sight.  He  proceeds  upon  the  Berkeley  an  doctrine 
of  vision,  and  supposes  that  by  sight  we  could  have 
"  no  conception  of  a  third  dimension  "  of  space ;  and 
that  a  person  with  sight,  but  without  touch,  would 
see  length  and  breadth,  but  could  have  no  idea  of 
thickness,  or  of  the  distinction  of  figures  into  planes 
and  curves.  Such  a  one,  he  thinks,  might  be  driven 
by  geometry  to  the  conclusion  that  "  every  right  line 
being  produced  will  at  last  return  into  itself ; "  that 
"  any  two  right  hnes  being  produced  will  meet  in 
two  points;"  and  that  "two  or  more  bodies  may 
exist  in  the  same  place."  But  these  inferences  can 
be  deduced  only  by  denjdng  to  vision  functions 
which  belong  to  it,  and  ascribing  to  it  others  which 
are  not  intuitive  or  original.  We  have  seen  that 
the  eye  takes  in  intuitively  a  colored  surface,  and  if 
there  be  two   colors  on  the   surface,  divided  by  a 


228  JUDGMENT   OB    COMPABISON, 

curve  line,  we  at  once  have  the  perception  of  a 
curve.  Again,  by  binocular  vision  we  have,  if  not 
intuitively,  at  least  by  an  easy  process  of  experience 
and  inference,  space  in  the  third  dimension.  It  is 
further  to  be  borne  in  mind,  that  in  our  acquired  per- 
ceptions we  lay  down  rules  which  may  help  us  in 
common  cases,  but  which,  not  being  absolutely  cor- 
rect, may  lead  into  error  when  improperly  applied 
to  other  cases  -,  as  when  we  argue  from  the  crooked 
image  presented  to  the  eye  that  there  is  a  crooked 
stick  corresponding  to  it  in  the  water.  Proceeding 
on  such  assumptions  as  these,  it  is  possible  to  show 
that  we  are  landed  in  the  consequences  so  graphi- 
cally pointed  out  by  Eeid.  But  the  consequences 
are  not  legitimate,  because  they  are  drawn  from  a 
misapprehension  of  the  precise  nature  of  our  intui- 
tive perceptions  in  vision.  There  is  and  can  be  no 
evidence  that  a  person  with  the  sense  of  sight,  but 
without  the  sense  of  touch,  would  draw  them.  I 
hold  that  the  very  vision  of  two  straight  lines  would 
prevent  us  from  being  led  to  declare  that  they  could 
meet  at  two  points.  Upon  the  bare  contemplation 
of  the  lines,  whether  made  known  by  sight  or  touch, 
we  at  once  reject  all  such  conclusions,  however  in- 
geniously constructed  from  premises  which  have  not 
the  sanction  of  our  constitution. 

When  such  consequences  are  allowed  and  defend- 
ed, we  see  how  ominous  is  this  conjunction  in  the 
philosophic  firmament  of  the  School  of  Comte  with 
that  of   Hume.      The   philosophy   thus    generated 


JUDGMENT   OB    COMPAEISOJST.  229 

places  truth,  that  is,  a  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
thmgs,  beyond  the  reach  of  human  faculties ;  which 
commence  with  they  know  not  what,  and  close, 
after  a  laborious  process,  with  results  which  may 
have  as  little  reality  as  a  succession  of  dissolving 
views.  Stripping  us  of  a  poAver  of  independent 
judgment,  it  leaves  us  the  servants,  I  should  rather 
say  the  slaves,  of  circumstances,  with  their  conjunc- 
tions and  correspondences,  which  may  all  be  the 
issue  of  bhnd  chance  or  dead  mechanism,  —  cer- 
tainly without  our  being  able  to  say  that  they  are 
not.  Along  with  independence,  I  fear  there  is  also 
taken  away  all  responsibility,  of  judgment  and 
belief,  —  except,  indeed,  such  accountabihty  as  we 
may  require  of  a  horse  or  a  dog  when  we  associate 
its  vices  with  a  lash,  simply  to  prevent  the  animal 
from  doing  the  deed  again.  I  am  persuaded  that 
such  a  creed  must  exercise,  whether  the  persons  are 
or  are  not  aware  of  it,  whether  they  do  or  do  not 
confess  it,  a  deadening  influence  on  those  who 
actually  believe  it  and  come  under  its  sway ;  and  if 
ever  it  should  be  accepted  in  its  results  (I  say  re- 
sults, for  its  processes  are  too  subtle  to  be  grasped 
by  the  rough  hands  of  the  common  people),  and  its 
appropriate  sentiments  diffused,  in  a  community,  the 
consequences  would  be  as  fatal  as  those  which  flowed 
in  the  end  of  last  century  in  France,  from  the  prev- 
alence of  the  Sensational  Philosophy,  when  it  gave 
a  wrong  direction  to  the  great  political  upheaval, 
and  helped  to  degrade  the  national  character. 


230  JUDGMENT    OB    COMPABISON, 

We  can  avoid  these  issues  only  by  maintaining 
that  man  is  so  constituted  as  to  know  originally 
something  of  the  reality  of  things,  and  to  be  capable 
of  rising  to  an  acquaintance  with  their  relations. 
Association  may  help  us  to  form  a  reasonable  judg- 
ment —  and  it  is  a  happy  circumstance  when  it  does 
so ;  but  whether  we  are  or  are  not  so  aided,  we 
should  be  taught  that  it  is  our  duty  to  found  our 
behefs  on  a  previous  judgment,  in  which  we  look  to 
the  nature  of  things  as  the  same  can  be  discovered 
by  us.  One  end,  no  doubt,  of  a  good  training  is  to 
encompass  us  with  profitable  associations  in  the 
family,  in  the  social  circle,  and  in  the  community ; 
with  associations  originating  in  the  highest  senti- 
ments, and  sanctioned  by  the  common  conscience 
and  the  universal  reason  of  the  men  of  former  ages. 
But  it  is  a  still  higher  end  of  the  highest  education 
to  raise  us  above  all  hereditary  and  casual  associa- 
tion of  times  or  circumstances,  and  to  constrain  us 
to  base  our  beliefs  on  an  inspection  of  realities  and 
actualities.  Every  youth  should  be  taught  that  he 
is  endowed  with  an  inherent  power  of  discernment, 
which  he  is  not  at  liberty  to  lay  aside  in  any  circum- 
stances, and  for  the  proper  use  of  which  he  is  respon- 
sible. 


CHAPTER   X. 


RELATIVITY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 


WHEN  Professor  Ferrier  projDOunded  the  theory 
that  one's  self  mixes  as  an  integral  and  essen- 
tial part  with  our  knowledge  of  every  object,  and  Sir 
William  Hamilton  unfolded  his  doctrine  of  the  rela- 
tivity of  knowledge,  I  felt  constrained  to  declare 
that  there  were  views  prevalent  in  metaphysical 
sjDeculation  which  were  working  as  much  mischief 
as  the  ideal  theory  had  done  in  the  days  of  Berkeley ; 
and  I  ventured  to  affirm  that  if  Professor  Ferrier's 
speculations  were  not  regarded  as  a  reductio  ad 
ahsiirdum  of  the  whole  style  of  thinking,  "  the  next 
phenomenon  appearing  in  the  philosophic  firmament 
must  be  a  Hume  or  a  Fichte."  {MetJi.  of  JDiv.  Gov- 
ern., 4th  Edit.  App.  pp.  536-539.)  In  now  holding 
that  this  fear  has  been  realized,  it  is  not  needful  to 
maintain  that  Mr.  Mill  is  in  every  respect  like  either 
the  great  Scottish  sceptic  or  the  great  German 
idealist,  any  more  than  to  assert  that  these  two  are 
like  each  other.  Mr.  JVIill  is  not  so  original  a  thinker 
as  Hume,  nor  does  he  like  him  profess  scepticism. 
He  does  not  possess  the  speculative  genius  of  Fichte, 

(231) 


232  BELATIVITY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

and  lie  defends  his  system  in  a  mucli  more  sober 
manner.  But  it  can  be  shown  that  his  philosophy 
comes  very  nearly  to  the  positions  taken  up  by  Hume, 
when  Hume  is  properly  understood ;  and  in  main- 
taining that  mind  is  a  series  of  feelings  aware  of 
itselfj  and  that  matter  is  a  possibility  of  sensations, 
he  has  reached  conclusions  quite  as  visionary  as 
those  of  Fichte.  As  Hume  brought  out  fully  the 
results  lying  in  the  Philosophy  of  Berkeley  —  as 
one  of  the  offshoots  of  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  and 
as  Fichte  carried  to  their  logical  consequences  cer- 
tain of  the  fundamental  principles  of  Kant,  so  Mr. 
Mill,  and  we  may  add  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  are  pur- 
suing to  their  proper  issues  the  doctrine  floating  in 
nearly  all  our  later  metaphysics,  that  we  can  know 
nothing  of  the  nature  of  things. 

Mr.  Bain  speaks  complacently  of  ^^  the  great  doc- 
trine called  the  Eelativity  of  Knowledge,  which  has 
risen  by  slow  degrees  to  its  present  high  position  in 
philosophy."  But  unfortunately  —  I  should  rather 
say  fortunately  —  no  two  defenders  of  the  doctrine 
have  agreed  as  to  the  sense  in  which  they  hold  it ; 
in  fact  I  can  see  no  point  in  which  they  meet  except 
the  Comtian  position,  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
actual  nature  of  things  is  beyond  the  reach  of  man. 
Mr.  Mill  remarks  very  properly  (p.  5),  that  the 
phrase  "  relativity  of  knowledge  "  admits  of  a  great 
variety  of  meanings,  and  that  when  a  philosopher 
lays  great  stress  upon  the  doctrine,  "  it  is  necessary 
to  cross-examine  his  writings,  and  compel  them  to 


BELATIVITY   OF  KXOWLEJDGE.  233 

disclose  in  which  of  its  many  degrees  of  meaning  he 
understands  the  phrase." 

There  is  a  doctrine  sometimes  passing  by  this 
name,  which  will  recommend  itself  to  all  sober 
thinkers:  who  will  admit  —  (1.)  that  we  can  know 
objects  only  so  far  as  we  have  faculties  of  knowl- 
edge ;  (2.)  that  we  can  know  objects  only  under  the 
aspects  presented  to  the  faculties ;  and  (3.)  that  our 
faculties  are  limited  m  number  and  m  range,  so  that 
not  only  do  we  not  know  all  objects,  we  do  not  know 
all  about  any  one  object.  These  positions  have 
been  disputed  by  none  except  some  of  the  Alexan- 
drian Neo-Platonists  in  ancient  times,  and  a  few 
German  defenders  of  the  Absolute  Philoso23hy  in 
modern  times.  A  doctrine  embracing  these  posi- 
tions has  been  known  and  acknowledged  under  such 
designations  as  that  of  "  the  limited  knowledge  of 
man,"  and  should  not  be  expressed  by  so  ambiguous 
a  phrase  as  "  the  relativity  of  knowledge,"  which  is 
applied  to  a  very  different  theory.  That  theory  has 
of  late  years  assumed  four  different  forms. 

I.  There  is  the  fonn  given  to  it  by  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton. He  thus  unfolds  it  {Metaijh.  i.  148):  "Oiu: 
knowledge  is  relative,  —  1st,  because  existence  is 
not  cognizable  absolutely  and  in  itself,  but  only  in 
special  modes;  2d,  because  these  modes  can  be 
kno^\m  only  if  they  stand  in  a  certain  relation  to 
our  faculties."  Mr.  Mill  thus  comments :  "  Whoever 
can  find  anything  more  in  these  statements  than 
that  we  do  not  know  all  about  a  thing,  but  only  so 


234  BELATIVITT   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

much  as  we  are  capable  of  knowing,  is  more  ingen- 
ious or  more  fortunate  than  myself"  But  surely  it 
is  desirable  to  have  even  this  much  allowed  and 
clearly  enunciated ;  only  I  think  it  unfortunate  that 
two  such  inexplicable  phrases  as  "absolutely"  and 
"in  itself "  should  have  been  introduced.  Sir  Wil- 
liam gives  a  third  reason,  and  here  the  error  appears. 
"  ScZ,  Because  the  modes,  thus  relative  to  our  facul- 
ties, are  presented  to  and  known  by  the  mind  only 
under  modifications  determined  by  these  faculties 
themselves."  This  doctrine  is  thoroughly  Kantian 
in  itself  and  in  its  logical  consequences.  It  makes 
the  mind  look  at  things,  but  through  a  glass  so  cut 
and  colored  that  it  gives  a  special  shape  and  hue  to 
every  object.  "Suppose  that  the  total  object  of 
consciousness  in  perception  is  =  12 ;  and  suppose 
that  the  external  reality  contributes  6,  the  material 
sense  3,  and  the  mind  3,  —  this  may  enable  you 
to  form  some  rude  conjecture  of  the  nature  of  the 
object  of  perception."-^  [Metaioh.  ii.  p.  129.)  This 
doctrine  very  much  neutralizes  that  of  natural 
reahsm,  which  Hamilton  seems,  after  the  manner  of 
Keid,  to  be  so  strenuously  defending.  To  suppose 
that  in  perception  or  cognition  proper  we  mix 
elements  derived  from  our  subjective  stores,  is  to 
unsettle  our  whole  convictions  as  to  the  reality  of 


1  Sir  William   Hamilton  has  used  that  he  had  some   means  of  satisfying 

very    unguarded   language  as  to  hu-  himsGlf  that  he  held  by  the  reality  of 

man  nescience ;  but  I  have  reason  to  things.      There    is   a    point  here  on 

believe  that  he  thought  himself  misun-  which  it  is  hoped  some  of  his  pupils 

derstood,  and  I  am   inclined  to  think  may  be  able  to  thi-ow  light. 


BELATIVITT   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  235 

things;  for  if  the  mind  adds  three  things,  why 
not  thirty  things,  why  not  three  hundred,  till  we  are 
landed  in  absolute  idealism,  or  in  the  dreary  flat 
into  which  those  who  would  float  in  that  empty 
.space  are  sure  in 'the  end  to  fall,  that  is,  absolute 
scepticism.  By  assuming  this  middle  place  between 
Reid  and  Kant,  this  last  of  the  great  Scottish  metr 
aphysicians  has  been  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
opposing  camps  of  idealism  and  realism,  and  it 
will  be  impossible  for  the  school  to  continue  to 
hold  the  position  of  their  master. 

It  required  no  great  shrewdness  to  foresee  the 
logical  consequences  that  would  be  dra\\Ti,  and  so  I 
take  no  credit  for  resolutely  opposing  the  doctrine 
from  the  time  of  its  publication.  It  should  be  al- 
lowed that  sensations,  feelings,  impressions,  associate 
themselves  with  our  knowledge,  but  every  man  of 
sound  sense  easily  separates  them ;  and  it  should  not 
be  difficult  for  the  philosopher  to  distinguish  between 
them,  to  distmguish  between  our  intuition  of  a  tooth 
and  the  pain  of  toothache,  between  the  perception 
of  a  landscape  and  the  aesthetic  emotions  which  it 
calls  up.  Following  the  spontaneous  convictions  of 
assurance  and  certitude  in  the  mind  (see  x.),  which 
all  but  the  sceptic  allow  speculatively,  and  which 
even  the  sceptic  must  actually  proceed  upon  in  de- 
fending his  scepticism,  we  should  hold,  —  (1.)  that 
we  know  the  very  thing  as  appearing,  and  not  a 
mere  appearance  without  a  thing  to  appear ;  and 
(2.)  that  our  knowledge  is  correct  so  far  as  it  goes, 


236  BELATIVITY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

and  is  not  modified  by  the  subjective  forms  of  the 
mind.  I  have  been  striving  in  these  chapters  to 
show  that  we  unmediately  know  a  self  and  extended 
objects  beyond.  But  we  have  the  same  grounds  for 
affirming  that  our  knowledge  is  correct  as  for  asseri> 
ing  that  we  have  knowledge.  In  the  event  of  man's 
intuitive  knowledge  being  mistaken  or  fallacious  in 
any  point,  it  is  certain  he  could  never  discover  it  to 
be  so  with  his  present  faculties.  Our  perceptions  of 
sense,  consciousness,  and  intuitive  reason  all  combine 
in  a  consistent  result,  and  we  must  receive  the  whole 
or  reject  the  whole.  Hamilton  declares  that  "no  ai>- 
tempt  to  show  that  the  data  of  consciousness  are 
(either  in  themselves  or  in  their  necessary  conse- 
quences) mutually  contradictory,  has  yet  succeeded." 
"An  original,  universal,  dogmatic  subversion  of 
knowledge  has  hitherto  been  found  impossible."  ( App. 
to  Keid's  Works,  p.  746.)  That  there  should  be  such 
consistency  in  intuitive  truth  that  the  acutest  human 
intellects  have  not  been  able  to  detect  a  contradic- 
tion, is  not  the  primary  proof,  but  is  a  confirmation 
of  its  truth.  That  there  should  be  such  consistency 
in  total  error,  or  in  a  mixture  of  truth  and  error,  is 
scarcely  believable  :  we  could  account  for  it  only  on 
the  supposition  that  it  was  produced  by  a  mischievous 
deity,  who  wished  so  to  deceive  us  that  we  could 
never  discover  the  deception,  —  a  supposition  con- 
tradicted by  the  circumstance  that  the  whole  con- 
stitution of  our  minds  and  of  things  is  fitted  to  im- 
press us  with  the  importance  of  veracity,  showing 


BELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  237 

that  the  Creator  and  Euler  of  our  world  is  a  God  of 
Truth. 

II.  Mr.  Mill  has  enunciated  the  doctrine  in  a  second 
form,  and  accepts  it  as  expressing  "  a  real  and  im- 
portant law  of  our  mental  nature.  This  is,  that  we 
only  know  anything  by  knowing  it  as  distinguished 
from  something  else ;  that  all  consciousness  is  of  dif- 
ference ;  that  two  objects  are  the  smallest  number 
required  to  constitute  consciousness ;  that  a  thing  is 
only  seen  to  be  what  it  is  by  contrast  with  what  it 
is  not."  (p.  6.)  He  tells  that  the  employment  of  the 
phrase  to  express  this  meaning  is  sanctioned  by  high 
authorities,  and  he  mentions  Mr.  Bain,  "  who  habit- 
ually uses  the  phrase  '  relativity  of  knowledge '  in 
this  sense."  It  is  quite  true  that  the  doctrine,  that 
all  knowledge  consists  in  comparison,  has  ajDpeared 
again  and  again  in  speculative  philosophy ;  but  as 
destroying  the  simplicity  of  our  mental  operations, 
and  reversing  the  order  of  nature,  it  has  wrought 
only  mischief 

The  mind,  as  I  apprehend,  begins  its  intelligent 
acts  with  knowledge,  and,  we  may  add,  with  beliefs, 
and  then  it  can  go  on  to  compare  the  things  known 
and  believed  in,  and  thereby  widens  the  domain  both 
of  knowledge  and  belief  It  commences,  we  may 
suppose,  with  a  perception,  —  which  is  knowledge,  — 
of  an  external  object,  and  a  consciousness,  —  which 
is  knowledge,  —  of  self  as  perceiving  the  object. 
Then  it  remembers,  and  in  doing  so  has  a  belief  in 
+he  object  which  has  been  perceived.     In  all  this 


238  BELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

there  is  no  comparison,  but  having  this,  the  mind 
can  forthwith  institute  a  comparison  and  pronounce 
a  judgment.  Thus,  having  a  knowledge  of  body  in 
the  concrete,  the  mind  can  then,  when  a  purpose  is 
to  be  served  by  it,  declare  that  body  exists,  and  that 
it  is  extended ;  and  having  a  knowledge  of  self,  it 
can  assert  that  it  exists,  and  that  it  is  under  grief  or 
joy,  —  as  our  experience  may  be  at  the  time.  Ke- 
membering  an  event  as  happening  in  time  past,  it 
can  declare  that  the  event  is  real,  and  the  time  real. 
But  while  such  judgments  are  involved  in  our  pri- 
mary cognitions,  I  rather  think  that  they  come  in 
later  life :  the  child,  I  rather  think,  as  knowing  its 
own  existence  and  never  doubting  it,  is  not  at  the 
trouble  of  asserting  it.  But  the  child,  on  perceiving 
two  objects  successively,  or  it  may  be  simultaneously, 
delights  to  discover  a  relation  between  them.  Such 
judgments  follow  so  immediately  on  the  cognitions, 
that  it  is  not  necessary  to  distinguish  them  from  one 
another  except  in  scientific  psychology.  But  if  meta- 
physicians lay  down  an  opposite  doctrine,  and  draw 
consequences  from  it,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
correct  the  statement. 

I  suppose  Mr.  Mill  would  represent  the  mind  as 
beginning  with  sensations.  We  have  then  a  sensa- 
tion. Is  there  comparison  in  this  ?  I  cannot  discover 
that  there  is.  No  doubt,  upon  another  sensation 
rising  up,  we  may  compare  the  one  with  the  other 
and  discover  an  agreement  or  difference.  But  in 
order   to  this   comparison   there   is   memory;    and 


BELATIVITY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  239 

memory,  in  recalling  the  sensation,  must  bring  it  np 
prior  to  the  comparison.     But  Mr.  Mill  may  say  that 
we  have  two  sensations  simultaneously,  —  say  a  sen- 
sation of  resistance  by  one  sense,  and  a  sensation  of 
color  by  another,  and  we  declare  them  at  once  to 
agree  or  to  differ.     But  could  we  not  have  the  sen- 
sation of  resistance  or  the  sensation  of  color  though 
each  came   alone  ?     Even  when  they  come  simulta- 
neously, we  are  able  to  compare  them,  because  we 
know  so  much  of  each.     We  ever  proceed  on  a  sup- 
posed knowledge  of  the  objects  when  we  compare 
and  decide.     When  I  say  that  2  +  2  =  4,  it  is  be- 
cause I  know  what  is  meant  by  the  terms.     If  I  say 
Ben  Nevis  is  a  few  feet  higher  than  Ben  Macdhui,  it 
is  because  I  know  somewhat  of  the  height  of  each 
mountain.     If  I  say  that  Aristotle's  Induction  was 
not   the   same    as   Bacon's;   that  Comte's   Positive 
Method  differs    essentially  from   Bacon's   Inductive 
Method ;  that  Locke  was  not  a  follower  of  Hobbes ; 
that  Condillac  had   no  right  to  proclaim  himself  a 
disciple  of  Locke ;  that  Eeid  met  Hmne  in  a  more 
sagacious  manner  than  Kant  did ;  that  Bro^^m  vainly 
endeavored  to  combine   the  Sensational  School  of 
France  with  the  British  Association  School  and  the 
School  of  Reid ;  and  that  a  good  Inductive  Logic 
must   combine  certain   principles  of  Wliewell  with 
those  of  Mill,  —  I  do  so   because  I  think  I  know 
something   of   the  philosophic  systems  of  which  I 
speak,  and  am  thus  able  to  compare  or  to  contrast 
them. 


240  BELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

But  Mr.  Mill  may  refer  me  to  the  philosophy  of 
Hamilton,  which  declares  that  in  the  very  first  act 
of  consciousness  we  discover  the  relation  of  the  ego 
and  the  no7i  ego.  My  readers,  however,  will  have 
seen  by  this  time  that  I  am  not  bound  to  follow 
Hamilton,  who,  in  fact,  though  without  meaning  it, 
prepared  the  way  for  a  farther  doctrine  from  which 
he  would  have  turned  away  with  the  strongest  aver- 
sion. I  believe  that  in  our  conscious  sense-percep-, 
tions  we  know  both  the  self  and  the  notrself  in  one 
concrete  act ;  and  of  course  we  have  in  all  this  the 
materials  for  a  judgment  j  but  I  doubt  much  whether 
the  infant  actually  pronounces  the  judgment.  But 
then  it  is  said  that  our  knowledge  of  the  object  is 
an  apprehension  of  the  relation  of  the  object  or  sen- 
sation to  the  perceiving  mind.  Now,  I  believe  that 
a  relation  is  formed  in  the  very  act  of  knowledge. 
But  my  knowledge  does  not  consist  in  the  percep- 
tion of  the  relation ;  on  the  contrary,  the  relation 
may  arise  simply  from  the  knowledge.  I  apprehend 
the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America ;  as  I 
do  so,  I  have  constituted  a  relation  between  myself 
and  him ;  but  there  may  have  been  no  j)revious  re- 
lation ;  and  if  I  declare  the  relation,  it  is  by  a  con- 
sequent and  subsequent  act.  I  strive  to  rise  to  a 
contemplation  of  the  Divine  Being;  there  is  no 
doubt  a  relation  of  my  mind  to  the  object  viewed ; 
but  the  relation  consists  in  my  contemplation.  When 
the  Divine  Being  looks  down  on  His  works  and  pities 
those  who  suffer,  it  is  not  because  the  Creator  in  all 


BELATIVITk    OF  KNOWLEDGE.  241 

this  is  dependent  on  His  creatures ;  the  viewing  of 
them  by  Him  with  regard  and  commiseration  consti- 
tutes the  particular  and  interesting  relation.  It  is 
high  time  to  lay  an  arrest  on  that  style  of  represent- 
ation, so  frequent  in  the  present  age,  which  would 
make  us  perceive  a  relation  before  perceiving  the 
things  related,  and  make  the  very  Divine  knowledge, 
so  far  as  we  can  comprehend  it,  depend  on  creature 
relations. 

I  take  exception,  on  like  grounds,  to  another  part 
of  the  same  doctrine :  "  That  a  thing  is  only  seen  to 
be  what  it  is  by  contrast  with  what  it  is  not."  I  ad- 
mit that  where  w^e  can  discover  contrasts,  our  notions 
are  rendered  more  distmct  and  vivid.  But  I  cannot 
allow  that  we  should  not  have  known  a  sensation, 
say  the  feeling  of  a  lacerated  Hmb,  to  be  painful,  un- 
less we  had  contrasted  it  with  a  pleasurable  one ;  on 
the  contrary,  I  maintain  that  in  order  to  contrast  the 
two,  we  must  have  experienced  them  in  succession. 
I  cannot  beheve  that  we  should  never  have  known 
body  as  extended,  unless  we  had  pre\aously  kno^Mi 
something  as  unextended ;  or  that  no  one  could 
know  and  appreciate  moral  good  unless  he  had  been 
acquainted  with  moral  evil. 

The  doctrine  I  am  expounding  in  this  volume 
makes  the  relations  to  be  in  the  things  compared, 
and  not  the  creation  of  the  mind  as  it  compares 
them.  The  opposite  doctrine  reverses  the  order  of 
the  mmd's  procedure,  and,  logically  followed  out,  un- 
settles the  foundation  of  knowledge.     It  makes  us 

16 


242  BELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE, 

discover  relations  between  things  in  themselves  un- 
known, and  it  leaves  us  standing  on  a  bridge  of 
which  we  do  not  know  that  it  has  a  support  at  either 
end.  If  w^e  know  a  thing  only  in  relation  to  another 
thing,  and  this  only  in  relation  to  some  other  thing, 
as  we  thus  ever  chase  the  thing  without  catching  it, 
we  are  made  to  feel  as  if  we  had  only  a  series  of 
strings  put  into  our  hands,  at  which  we  have  to  pull 
forever  without  their  bringing  anything  but  other 
strings. 

Mr.  Mill's  theory  obliges  him  to  accept  the  special 
doctrine  I  am  now  examining  in  its  very  lowest 
form.  The  school  of  Kant,  both  in  its  German  and 
British  modifications,  supposes  that  the  mind  has  a 
rich  furniture  of  forms  and  categories,  out  of  which 
can  be  fashioned  an  ideal  world  of  a  very  lofty 
character.  But  the  school  of  Mill,  admitting  no  a 
priori  elements,  and  limiting  the  comparative  capaci- 
ties of  the  mind,  can  furnish  no  such  glorious  crea- 
tion. Mr.  Mill  gives  us  the  power  of  discovering 
only  the  relations  of  co-existence  and  succession, 
and  of  resemblance  and  difference.  He  says  that 
"  equality  is  but  another  word  for  the  exact  resem- 
blance, commonly  called  identity,  considered  as 
subsisting  between  things  in  respect  of  their  qiiatv- 
tity"  And  then,  in  explaining  what  is  implied  in 
quantity,  "When  we  say  of  two  things  that  they 
differ  in  quantity,  just  as  when  we  say  they  differ  in 
quality,  the  assertion  is  always  grounded  upon  a 
difference   in   the    sensations   which    they   excite" 


BELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE,  243 

{Logic,  B.  I.  c.  iii.  §  11,  12) :  thus  making  us  know 
nothing  of  either  quahty  or  quantity  or  number, 
except  as  denoting  agreements  in  the  sensations 
forming  the  series  which  we  call  mind.  Mr.  Bain 
goes  doAvn  to  a  still  lower  level,  when  he  tells  us,  in 
a  passage  already  quoted  (p.  217),  that  cognizance 
of  difference  and  cognizance  of  agreement  exhaust 
the  essence  of  knowledge ;  that  all  we  can  know  of 
a  ring  is  its  agreement  with  certain  things,  and  its 
differences  from  other  things ;  which  other  things,  of 
course,  can  be  known  only  as  they  agree  with,  or 
differ  from,  yet  other  things.  Knowledge  can  have 
no  resting-place  when  driven  from  one  thing  to 
another  in  this  shuttlecock  process.  It  falls  through, 
by  being  placed  between  such  instabilities.  The 
way  to  meet  all  this,  and  put  knowledge  on  its 
proper  basis,  is  by  showing  that  we  have  an  original 
knowledge  of  self,  and  of  objects,  such  as  a  ring,  be- 
yond self;  and  that,  proceeding  on  this,  we  are  able 
to  discover  not  only  resemblances  and  differences, 
but  various  other  important  relations,  which  enable 
us  to  combine  every  one  thing  known  with  others  as 
also  known  in  a  compact  structure,  m  which  every 
one  part  binds  all  the  others,  and  helps  to  support 
the  whole. 

III.  Mr.  Mill  would  especially  apply  the  phrase, 
"  relativity  of  knowledge,"  to  a  third  doctrine,  being, 
in  fact,  his  own  theory  of  the  mind.  "  Our  knowl- 
edge of  objects,  and  even  our  fancies  about  objects, 
consist  of  nothing  but  the  sensations  they  excite,  or 


244  BELATIYITY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

which  we  imagine  them  exciting  in  ourselves." 
"This  knowledge  is  merely  phenomenal."  "The 
object  is  known  to  us  only  in  one  special  relation, 
namely,  as  that  which  produces,  or  is  capable  of 
producing,  certain  impressions  on  our  senses;  and 
all  that  we  really  know  is  these  impressions."  "  This 
is  the  Doctrine  of  the  Eelativity  of  Knowledge  to 
the  knowing  mind,  in  the  simplest,  purest,  and,  as  I 
think,  the  most  proper  acceptation  of  the  words." 
(pp.  7-14.)  I  confess  I  can  see  no  propriety  in 
applying  to  such  a  theory  a  phrase  which  had  been 
appropriated  by  Sir  William  Hamilton,  or  by  some 
of  us  who  had  criticised  him,  to  a  different  doctrine. 
I  do  not  see  that  it  has  any  right  to  claim  the  title 
of  "  knowledge,"  or  that  it  can  get  "  relations,"  when 
it  has  no  things  to  bring  into  relation.  The  theory 
is  simply  that  we  know  sensations,  and  possibilities 
of  sensations,  while  we  cannot  be  said  to  know  what 
sensations  are.  But  I  have  no  interest  in  giving 
the  phrase  any  one  special  application  rather  than 
another ;  I  believe  it  to  be  vague  and  ambiguous 
—  in  fact,  not  used  by  any  two  philosophers,  I  rather 
think  by  no  one  philosopher,  at  different  places,  in 
one  and  the  same  sense ;  and  I  think  it  should  be 
altogether  banished  from  speculation.  And  as  to 
the  doctrine  to  which  Mr.  Mill  would  specially 
apply  it,  I  need  not  enter  upon  the  consideration  of 
it  here,  as  I  have  been  examining  it  all  through- 
out this  volume.  But  there  is  a  fourth  form 
of  the  general  theory,   defended    by  an  illustrious 


BELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  245 

member   of   the    same    school,   which   demands    a 
notice. 

lY.  Mr.  Grote,  in  his  exposition  of  Plato's  philoso- 
phy (Art.  Thecetetus),  has  developed  a  theory  of  rela- 
tivity, which  he  ascribes  to  the  Sophists,  at  least 
to  Protagoras,  and  which  he  himself  is  prepared  to 
accept.  It  is  the  doctrine  of  Homo  3Iensiira,  which, 
construed  in  its  true  meaning,  is  said  to  be,  "  Object 
is  implicated  with,  limited  or  measured  by.  Subject ; 
a  doctrine  proclaiming  the  relativeness  of  all  objects 
perceived,  conceived,  known  or  felt  —  and  the 
omnipresent  involution  of  the  perceiving,  conceiv- 
ing, knowing,  or  feelmg,  Subject :  the  Object  vary- 
ing with  the  Subject.  ^As  things  appear  to  me, 
so  they  are  to  me  ]  as  they  appear  to  you,  so  they 
are  to  you.'  This  theory  is  just  and  important  if 
rightly  understood  and  explained."  (Vol.  ii.  p.  335.) 
"  So  far  as  the  doctrine  asserts  essential  fusion  and 
implication  between  Subject  and  Object,  with  actual 
multiphcitity  of  distinct  subjects  —  denying  the 
reality  either  of  absolute  and  separate  Subject,  or  of 
absolute  and  separate  Object  —  I  think  it  true  and 
instructive."  (p.  340.)  Proceeding  on  this  general 
doctrine,  he  reaches  another :  "  What  is  Truth  to 
one  man,  is  not  truth,  and  is  often  Falsehood,  to 
another ;  that  which  governs  the  mind  as  infalhble 
authority  in  one  part  of  the  globe,  is  treated  with 
indifference  or  contempt  elsewhere.  Each  man's 
behef,  though  in  part  determined  by  the  same  causes 
as  the  belief  of  others,  is  in  part  also  determined  by 


246  RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE, 

causes  peculiar  to  himself.  When  a  man  speaks  of 
Truth  he  means  what  he  himself  (along  with  others, 
or  singly,  as  the  case  may  be)  believes  to  be  Truth ; 
unless  he  expressly  superadds  the  indication  of  some 
other  persons  believing  in  it."  (p.  360.) 

I  have  looked  from  time  to  time  into  the  Platonic 
and  Aristotelian  discussions  on  the  subject,  but  I 
confess  I  have  never  been  able  to  discover  what  was 
the  precise  philosophy  of  the  Sophists,  or  whether 
indeed  they  had  a  philosophy,  or  whether  they  were 
anything  more  than  instructors  of  youth,  professing 
to  teach  wisdom  —  without  knowing  what  wisdom 
is.  So  far  as  any  of  them,  such  as  Protagoras,  had 
a  philosophic  system,  I  think  it  probable  that  they 
meant  it  to  be  that  which  has  been  elaborated  by 
the  British  Section  of  the  school  of  Comte.  But  I 
have  here  to  do  not  with  the  Greek  Sophists,  but 
with  Mr.  Grote.  I  am  surprised  to  find  him  repeat- 
ing the  juggle,  which  has  so  often  been  exposed, 
arising  from  the  ambiguity  of  the  phrase  ^^  Subject 
and  Object."  No  doubt,  if  you  use  the  terms  as  cor- 
relative, meaning  by  "subject"  the  mind  contemplat- 
ing an  object,  and  by"  object"  a  thing  contemplated, 
then  the  subject  implies  the  object,  and  the  object 
the  subject,  as  the  husband  implies  the  wife,  and 
the  wife  the  husband.  But  as  we  cannot  argue 
from  the  husband  implying  the  wife  that  every 
man  has  a  wife,  or  from  the  wife  implying  a  hus- 
band that  every  woman  has  a  husband,  so  we  cannot 
argue  from  the  mere  existence  of  a  mind  that  there 


RELATIVITY   OF   KNOWLEDGE.  247 

must  be  an  external  thing  to  think  about,  nor  from 
the  bare  existence  of  an  object  or  thing  that  there 
must  be  a  mind  to  think  about  it.  As  to  the  allega- 
tion  that  the  subjective  mind  necessarily  mixes  its 
own  shapes  and  colors  with  the  things  known,  I 
have  abeady  examined  it  when  discussing  the  first 
form  of  the  theory  of  relativeness.  There  is,  there 
can  be  no  proof  advanced  in  its  behalf — that  is  to 
show  that  the  mirror  does  not  correctly  reflect  the 
object  presented  to  it.  We  have  the  same  grounds 
for  beheving  in  the  accuracy  of  our  primitive  knowl- 
edge as  we  have  for  believing  in  the  existence  either 
of  the  subject  or  the  object. 

But  the  fatal  part  of  the  doctrine  lies  in  the  asser- 
tion, that  truth  varies  with  the  individual,  and  with 
the  ch-cumstances  in  which  he  may  be  placed :  a 
tenet  which,  if  held  by  the  Sophists,  deserves  all  the 
reprobation  heaped  upon  it  by  Socrates,  Plato,  and 
Aristotle,  —  and,  I  may  add,  that  the  defence  of  it, 
in  the  further  light  we  now  enjoy,  is  worse  than  the 
original  offence.  By  truth,  I  mean  what  philosophers 
in  general  have  understood  by  it,  —  the  conformity 
of  our  ideas  to  things.  There  is  no  truth  where 
there  is  no  correspondence  of  our  notions  to  realities. 
I  admit  that  human  knowledge  never  comes  up  to 
the  extent  of  things.  I  allow  that  human  knowledge 
is  often  partial,  that  is,  is  only  partly  correct,  and 
may  have  error  mixed  up  with  it.  But  truth,  so  far 
as  it  is  truth,  is  the  ao-reement  of  thouo:hts  mth 
things.     To   illustrate  this,  I  will   not   trouble  the 


248  BELATIYITY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

school  with  transcendental  or  religious  truth.  I  ap- 
peal to  judgments  pronounced  on  more  common 
and  familiar  afiairs.  Were  any  one  to  affirm  that 
there  never  had  been  such  a  country  as  ancient 
Greece,  such  a  man  as  Socrates,  or  such  a  sect  as  the 
Sophists ;  that  Queen  Victoria  is  incapable  of  cher- 
ishing the  memory  of  departed  friends,  that  Louis 
Napoleon  is  a  man  of  guileless  transparency  and 
openness  of  character,  or  that  President  Lincoln  was 
a  man  given  to  crooked  and  dishonest  policy ;  that 
Mr.  Grote  was  utterly  illiterate,  had  never  written, 
and  could  not  write  a  history  of  Greece,  and  had 
never  been  favorable  to  vote  by  ballot,  —  I  would 
say  of  this  person,  not  that  he  had  got  what  is  truth 
to  himself,  but  that  he  had  not  reached  truth  at  all. 
Were  I  to  allow  myself  to  think  that  a  certain  Lon- 
don banking-house  of  high  repute  is  on  the  point  of 
bankruptcy,  and  that  those  who  manage  it  are  a 
band  of  rogues  and  robbers,  I  should  in  the  very 
act  be  guilty  not  only  of  error  but  of  sin ;  and  I  am 
sure  that  were  I  to  give  expression  to  such  a  thought, 
I  should  be  justly  exposed  to  punishment. 

Mr.  Grote  represents  his  doctrine  as  forming  the 
basis  of  the  principle  of  toleration,  and  the  opposite 
doctrine  as  fostering  intolerance,  (p.  362.)  I  reverse 
this  account,  and  declare  that  the  person  who  avows 
that  he  cannot  distinguish  between  truth  and  error, 
is  not  in  circumstances  to  exercise  the  virtue  of  tol- 
erance ;  for  he  has  not  discovered  an  error  which  he 
is  bound  to  tolerate  -,  and  Mr.  Grote's  principle  would 


BELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE,  249 

lead  him  to  refuse  toleration,  if  ever  he  did  reach 
positive  truth.  The  principle  of  toleration,  as  I  un- 
derstand it,  is,  that  I  am  bound  to  tolerate  what  I 
believe,  what  I  may  know,  to  be  error-  that  the 
power  of  punishing  error  as  error  has  not  been  put 
into  my  hands,  has  in  fact  been  mercifully  withheld 
from  me  by  One  who  claims  to  be  Himself  the 
Judge.  I  am  quite  sure  that  there  is  a  God  who 
rules  this  world  in  justice  and  love,  and  yet  I  feel 
that  I  must  bear  even  with  the  "  fool  who  says  in 
his  heart.  There  is  no  God."  This  is  my  idea  of 
toleration,  which  I  reckon  a  much  deeper  and  juster 
one  than  that  held  by  those  who  say  that  truth 
varies  with  the  individual,  the  age,  and  the  circum- 
stances. 

But  then  Mr.  Grote  tells  us  "  no  infallible  objective 
mark,  no  common  measure,  no  canon  of  evidence,  re- 
cognized by  all,  has  yet  been  found."  (p.  360.)  I 
admit  freely  that  we  cannot  obtain  what  a  certain 
school  calls  an  absolute  criterion  of  truth ;  for  I  admit 
that  the  w^ord  '^  absolute  "  is  about  the  most  unintel- 
ligible in  the  language,  whether  as  used  by  those 
who  favor  or  oppose  the  doctrine  it  is  employed  to 
designate.  I  allow,  further,  that  it  is  in  vain  to 
search  for  any  one  criterion  which  will  settle  for  us 
what  is  truth  in  all  matters.  But  we  have  tests 
quite  sufficient  to  determine  for  us  what  is  truth  and 
what  is  error  in  many  matters,  both  speculative  and 
practical ;  these  I  shall  endeavor  to  unfold  in  a  future 
chapter.  (See  xix.)     I  have  intuitive  evidence  of  my 


250  BELATIVITT  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

own  existence ;  and  evidence  from  testimony  of  the 
existence  of  India,  which  I  never  saw  ;  and  evidence 
from  induction  and  deduction  of  the  existence  of 
the  law  of  gravitation,  —  and  I  declare  of  any  one 
who  denies  any  of  these  that  he  is  in  error,  and  this 
however  strong  his  beliefs  may  be.  To  believe  with- 
out evidence,  and  not  to  believe  when  we  have 
evidence,  may  both  be  sinful  when  our  belief  or  un- 
belief involve  duties  which  we  owe  to  ourselves,  to 
our  fellow-men,  and  to  God. 


CHAPTER    XL 

man's  power  op  conception  as  a  test  of  truth. 

THE  word  "  conceive/'  with  its  derivatives  "  con- 
ceivable" and  "inconceivable/'  is  one  of  the 
most  ambiguous  in  the  philosophic  nomenclature  of 
this  country.  When  I  say  I  cannot  conceive  the  dis- 
tance of  a  star  which  requires  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  years  to  transmit  its  light  to  our  earth,  I  use  the 
term  in  the  sense  of  "  image  "  or  "  represent."  When 
I  af&rm  that  I  have  a  conception  of  the  animal  king- 
dom, I  mean  that  I  have  a  general  notion  of  beings 
possessing  animation.  When  I  declare  that  I  cannot 
conceive  that  God  should  be  unjust,  I  signify  that  I 
cannot  so  believe  or  decide.  These  three  senses  are 
at  once  seen  not  to  be  the  same  when  the  difference 
is  pointed  out.  We  cannot  easily  imagine  the  dis- 
tance of  a  fixed  star,  but  we  decide  on  the  evidence 
produced,  or  believe  on  the  authority  of  astronomers, 
that  it  is  at  the  distance  it  is  said  to  be.  We  cannot 
image  the  class  "  animal  kingdom/'  for  it  includes 
innumerable  objects,  yet  we  can  intellectually  think 
about  it,  that  is,  about  objects  possessing  the  com- 
mon attribute  of  anhnal  life.     We  cannot  be  made 

(251) 


252  MAIPS   POWER    OF   GONCEFTION 

to  decide  or  believe  that  Cleopatra's  Needle  should 
be  in  Paris  and  Egypt  at  the  same  time^  yet  with 
some  difficulty  we  can  simultaneously  image  it  in 
both  places. 

It  could  easily  be  shown  that  the  phrase  is  used 
in  all  these  senses  in  philosophy^  as  well  as  in  our 
current  literature.  '^  By  conception/'  says  Stewart 
{Mem.  c.  iii.),  "  I  mean  that  power  of  the  mind  which 
enables  us  to  form  a  notion  of  an  absent  object  of 
perception."  Sir  William  Hamilton  professes  to  use 
the  word  in  the  same  sense  as  the  German  Begriff, 
that  is,  for  the  general  notion  formed  by  an  indefinite 
number  of  objects  being  joined  by  the  possession  of 
a  common  attribute.  With  or  without  avowing  it^ 
philosophers  have  also  employed  it  in  the  third  sense. 
Hamilton  often  explains  conceive  by  "construe  in 
thought/'  which  must  denote  an  act  of  judgment ; 
he  must  employ  it  in  this  sense  when  he  says  it  is 
inconceivable  that  space  should  have  limits.  Dr. 
Whewell's  arguments  in  favor  of  necessary  truth  are 
valid  only  when  he  uses  it  in  the  signification  of 
judging,  as  when  he  says,  "we  cannot  conceive 
reasoning  to  be  merely  a  series  of  sensations."  {Phil 
Ind.  Sciences,  i.  44.) 

The  question  arises,  and  must  now  be  settled,  in 
which  of  these  senses,  or  in  what  other,  is  the  word 
employed  when  man's  power  or  impotency  of  con- 
ception is  supposed  to  be  a  test  of  truth.  It  is  clear 
that  it  cannot  be  employed  in  the  first-mentioned 
sense      Man's  capabihty  of  imaging  an  object  is  no 


AS   A    TEST   OF    TBUTH.  253 

proof  of  its  existence :  I  can  picture  a  hobgoblin 
mtliout  supposing  it  to  be  a  reality.  Man's  inca- 
pacity to  image  or  represent  an  object  is  no  proof  of 
its  non-existence ;  a  blind  man  cannot  have  an  idea 
of  color,  but  this  does  not  prove  even  to  him  that 
color  has  no  existence.  Nor  can  it  be  used  in  the 
second  signification  above  intimated.  I  can  form  a 
notion  of  a  class  of  mermaids  without  being  con- 
vinced that  mermaids  were  ever  seen  by  any  human 
being.  In  these  senses  of  the  words  there  is  much 
conceivable  by  man  which  has  no  existence,  much 
inconceivable  by  man  which  has  an  existence.  Con- 
ceivabihty  and  inconceivabihty  can  be  employed  as 
a  test  of  truth  only  in  the  third  meaning  of  the 
term,  as  signifying  "  construe  in  thought  "  (whatever 
that  may  mean),  judge  or  decide. 

Both  the  defenders  and  opposers  of  intuitive  truth 
have  been  in  the  way  of  going  from  the  one  of 
these  meanings  to  the  other.  Hamilton  uses  the 
phrase  both  in  the  first  and  third  of  these  significa- 
tions without  perceiving  that  they  are  not  the  same ; 
and  it  is  verj^  much  because  of  this  ambiguity  that 
he  is  able  to  make  it  appear  that  there  is  a  contra- 
diction in  human  thought.  He  says,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  we  cannot  conceive  space  or  time  as 
without  bounds ;  which  must  mean,  when  properly 
interpreted,  that  we  must  always  give  a  boundary 
in  the  image  we  form  of  it.  But  then  he  tells  us,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  we  are  altogether  unable  to 
conceive  space  or  time  as  bounded;  that  is,  when 


254  MAN'S   POWEB    OF  CONCEPTION 

rightly  understood,  we  cannot  be  made  to  judge  or 
decide  that  it  has  bounds.  He  has  constructed  a  set 
of  opposed  j)i'opositions  as  to  space,  time,  and 
infinity,  the  seeming  contradiction  arising  very 
much  from  the  double  signification  of  the  word 
"conceive."  (See  Art.  on  "Unconditioned"  in  Dis- 
missions.)  But  the  philosopher  who  has  made  the 
most  frequent  use  of  the  impossibility  of  conceiving 
the  opposite  as  a  test  of  truth  is  Dr.  Whewell.  He 
tells  us  that  necessary  truths  are  those  "in  which 
we  cannot,  even  by  an  effort  of  imagination,  or  in  a 
supposition,  conceive  the  reverse  of  that  which  is  as- 
serted." Necessary  truths  are  those  of  which  we  can- 
not distinctly  conceive  the  contrary."  {Phil  Ind.  8c., 
i.  55,  59.)  The  phrase  "imagination"  and  the 
phrase  "  distinctly "  might  lead  us  to  think  that  by 
"  conceive  "  we  are  to  understand  "  image,"  yet  we 
must  attach  a  different  meaning  to  it  when  he  tells 
us  more  accurately  of  necessary  truths  that  we 
"see"  them  —  which  must  mean  "judge"  them  — 
"  to  be  true  by  thinking  about  them,  and  see  that 
they  could  not  be  otherwise."  {lb.,  p.  20.)  But  so 
loosely  does  he  use  this  test,  that  he  declares  that 
laws  acknowledged  to  be  discovered  by  experiment, 
such  as  the  laws  of  motion  and  of  chemical  affinity, 
are  such  that  it  is  inconceivable  that  they  should 
not  be  true.  "For  how,  in  fact,  can  we  conceive 
combinations  otherwise  than  as  definite  in  kind  and 
quantity  ?  "  "  We  cannot  conceive  a  world  in  which 
this  should  not  be  the  case."  {Ih.,  i    400.)     When 


AS   A    TEST   OF   TRUTH.  255 

the  defenders  of  fundamental  truth  fall  into  such 
ambiguity  of  phraseology,  and  apply  their  test  so 
unsatisfactorily,  there  is  some  excuse  for  those  who 
criticise  and  oppose  them  when  they  take  advantage 
of  their  mistakes. 

I  say  "•  some  excuse,"  for  I  cannot  allow  that  this 
is  an  entire  justification  of  Mr.  JVIill  when  he  uses 
the  word,  as  I  shall  show  he  does,  in  so  many  dijBfer- 
ent  senses;  and  when,  in  criticising  Hamilton  and 
Whewell,  he  employs  it  in  a  way  they  would  not 
have  allowed.  Mr.  Mill  is  aware  that,  when  Sir 
William  Hamilton  is  wishing  to  bring  out  his  full 
meaning,  he  uses  such  phrases  as  "think,"  and 
"construe  in  thought:"  and  Dr.  Whewell,  while  he 
also  uses  the  word  "  think,"  is  careful  to  represent 
Conceptions  as  modifications  of  Fundamental  Ideas, 
which  he  enumerates  and  classifies.  Mr.  ]*tlill  always 
employs  the  phrase  in  a  vague  manner,  and  often  in 
more  than  one  signification.  He  must  use  it  in  the 
sense  of  "  image  "  or  "  picture  "  when  he  says,  "  We 
cannot  conceive  a  line  without  breadth ;  we  can 
form  no  mental  picture  of  such  a  line."  {Logic,  B.  n. 
c.  V.  §  1.)  This  is  all  true,  but  it  is  also  true  that 
we  can  form  an  abstract  notion  of  such  a  fine. 
He  states  that  Dr.  Whewell's  idea  of  necessary  truth 
is  "a  proposition,  the  negation  of  which  is  not 
only  false,  but  inconceivable."  But  then,  in  criticis- 
ing this  test,  he  uses  the  word  ni  quite  a  difierent 
sense :  "  When  we  have  often  seen  and  thought  two 
things   together,   and  have   never   in  one  instance 


256  MAIPS   POWER    OF   CONCEPTION 

either  seen  or  thought  of  them  separate,  there  is,  by 
the  primary  law  of  association,  an  increasing  diffi- 
culty, which  in  the  end  becomes  insuperable,  of  con- 
ceiving the  two  things  apart."  {lb.,  §  6.)  It  is  clear 
that  while  Dr.  Whewell  uses  the  phrases  as  applica- 
ble to  a  proposition  declared  to  be  true,  Mr.  Mill 
employs  it  in  the  sense  of  mental  pictures  joined  by 
association.  This  is  one  other  instance  of  an  am- 
phiboly, which  we  have  noticed  before,  and  which 
will  require  to  be  noticed  again  in  examining  Mr. 
Mill's  attempt  to  explain  necessity  of  thought  by 
association  of  ideas. 

He  tells  us,  "  The  history  of  science  teems  with 
inconceivabilities  which  have  been  conquered,  and 
supposed  necessary  truths,  which  have  first  ceased 
to  be  thought  necessary,  then  to  be  thought 
true,  and  have  finally  come  to  be  deemed  im- 
possible." (p.  150.)  And  then  he  gives  us  once 
more  his  famous  case  of  persons  not  being  able 
to  conceive  of  antipodes,  being  "merely  the  effect 
of  a  strong  association."  But  let  us  understand 
precisely  in  what  sense  our  forefathers  had  a  diffi- 
culty in  conceiving  the  existence  of  antipodes.  It  is 
evident  that  they  could  have  little  difficulty  in 
imagining  to  themselves  a  round  globe  with  persons 
with  their  feet  adhering  to  it  all  around.  Their 
difficulty  lay  in  deciding  it  to  be  true ;  and  the 
difficulty  was  increased  by  the  very  vividness  of  the 
picture  of  men,  as  they  would  have  said,  with  their 
feet  upward  and  their  head  downward.     It  is  clear 


AS   A    TEST   OF    TEUTK  257 

that  Mr.  Mill,  when  he  applies  it  to   such  a   case, 
must  be  using  the  word  in  the  sense  of  "judge  "  and 
"  believe."     But  let  us  understand  on  what  ground 
our  ancestors  felt  a  difficulty  in  yielding  their  judg- 
ment   and   behef     Not  because  of  any   supposed 
intuition  or  necessary  truth,  —  I  am  not  aware  that 
they  ever  appealed  to  such ;  not  even  because  of  a 
strong   association:   but   because    the    alleged   fact 
seemed  contrary  to  a  law  of  nature  estabhshed  by 
observation.      A   gathered    experience    seemed    to 
show  that  there  was  an  absolute  up  and  down,  and 
that  heavy  bodies  tended  downwards,  and  thus,  and 
not  on  any  a  priori  grounds,  did  they  argue  that 
there  could  not  be  antipodes,  as  persons  so  situated 
would  fall  away  into  a  lower  space.     As  a  narrow 
experience   had  created  the   difficulty,  so   it   could 
remove  it  by  giving   us  a  view  of  the  earth  as   a 
mass  of  matter,   causing   human  beings  to  adhere 
to   it    over    its  whole    surface.     And   such   a    case 
does   not   m   the  least  tend   to  prove,   that   truths 
which  are  seen  to  be  truths  at  once,  and  without 
a  gathered  experience,  could  ever  be  set  aside  by  a 
farther    experience:    that    a    conscious   inteUigent 
being  could  be  made  to  regard  himself  as  non-exist- 
ing ;  that  he  could  beUeve  himself  as  havmg  been 
in  existence  before  he  existed ;  or  that  he  could  be 
led  to  allow  that  two  straight  lines  might  enclose 
a  space  in  the  constellation  Orion. 

It  is  in  the  highest  degree  expedient,  at  the  stage 
to  which  mental  science  has  come,  that  the  word 

17 


258  MAN'S   FOWEB    OF  CONGEFTION. 

^  conceive/  and  its  derivatives,  should  be  abandoned 
altogether  in  such  a  connection ;  as  being  fitted  to 
confuse  our  ideas  and  mislead  our  judgments.  The 
greatest  and  wisest  philosophers  have  not  appealed 
to  the  possibility  or  impossibility  of  conception  as 
tests  of  truth  or  falsehood,  but  have  pointed  to  other 
and  clearer  and  more  decisive  criteria} 


1  The  printing  of  this  work  had  pro-  lief"  (i.  303.)     But  he  himself  con- 

ceeded  thus  far,  when  I  observed  that  tinues  to  take  advantage  of  the  am- 

Mr.  M.,  in  6th  edition  of  Logic,  just  biguity,  which  is  greater  than  he  yet 

published,  has  been  obliged,  in  defend-  sees.     I  have  been  laboring  for  years 

ing  himself  against  Mr.  Spencer,  to  to  make  metaphysicians  perceive  the 

notice  that  "  conceive  "  might  signify  ambiguity, 
*'  to  have  an  idea  "  or  "  to  have  a  be- 


CHAPTER   XII. 

SELF-EYIDENCE   AND   NECESSITY  THE  TESTS   OF  INTUITION. 

ME.  jMILL  freely  admits  the  existence  and  the 
veracity  of  intuitive  perceptions.  But  he  has 
not  mquired  into  their  nature,  their  mode  of  opera- 
tion, their  laws,  their  tests,  or  their  lunits.  What  he 
has  failed  to  do  must  be  undertaken  by  others ;  and 
in  the  process  it  will  be  seen  that  intuition  has  quite 
as  important  a  place  in  the  mind  as  sensation,  asso- 
ciation, or  any  of  Mr.  Mill's  favorite  principles,  and 
that  it  must  be  embraced  and  have  a  distmct  place 
allotted  to  it  m  a  sufficient  theory  of  our  mental 
operations. 

Our  intuitions  are  all  of  the  nature  of  perceptions, 
in  which  we  look  on  objects  known  or  apprehended : 
on  separate  objects,  or  on  objects  compared  with  one 
another.  Sometimes  the  objects  are  present,  and  we 
look  on  them  directly,  by  the  senses  and  self-con- 
sciousness. In  other  cases  they  are  not  present,  but 
still  we  have  an  apprehension  of  them,  and  our  con- 
victions, whether  beliefs  or  judgments,  proceed  upon 
this  apprehension.  A  very  different  account  has 
often  been  given  of  them.     According  to  T^ocke,  the 

(259) 


260  SELF-EVIDENCE   AND  NECESSITY 

mind  in  intuition  looks  at  ideas,  and  not  at  things. 
According  to  the  theory  elaborated  by  Kant,  and  so 
far  adopted  by  Hamilton,  it  is  possessed  of  a  priori 
forms,  which  it  imposes  on  objects.  Such  views  are 
altogether  indefensible,  and  have  in  fact  hindered  the 
ready  reception  of  the  true  doctrine.  Making  our 
intuitions  mere  ideas  or  forms  in  the  mind,  they  have 
very  much  separated  them  from  realities.  The  in- 
tuitions I  stand  up  for  are  all  intuitions  of  things. 
In  opposition  to  M.  Comte  and  his  school  in  all  its 
branches,  I  hold  that  man  is  so  constituted  as  to 
know  somewhat  of  things,  and  the  relations  of  things. 
What  we  know  of  things,  with  their  relations,  on  the 
bare  inspection  or  contemplation  of  them,  constitutes 
the  body  of  intuitive  truth,  and  the  capacity  to  dis- 
cover it  is  called  intuition.  Taken  in  this  sense,  the 
exercise  of  intuition  is  not  opposed  to  experience, 
but  is  in  fact  an  experience :  only  it  is  not  a  gathered 
experience ;  it  is  a  singular  experience  at  the  basis 
of  all  collected  experiences. 

Our  intuitive  perceptions  are  all,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, individual  or  singular.  Thus,  by  the  external 
senses,  we  observe  an  extended  and  colored  surface 
before  us,  or  by  the  internal  consciousness  we  ex- 
perience ourselves  in  a  certain  state  of  thought  and 
feeling.  Our  very  intuitive  judgments  or  com- 
parisons are  singular.  On  finding  that  a  particular 
rod,  A,  is  of  the  same  length  as  another  rod,  B,  and 
that  B  is  of  the  same  length  as  a  third  rod,  C,  we  at 
once  declare  that  A  is  equal  to  C.     But  we  can  gen- 


THE    TESTS   OF  IXTTJITION.  261 

eralize  these  intuitive  judgments,  and  then  they  be- 
come maxims  or  axioms.  "We  see  that  what  is  true 
of  the  rods  A,  B;  C,  would  also  be  of  the  rods  D,  E, 
r,  or  of  any  other  objects  found  equal  to  one  an- 
other, and  we  feel  ourselves  entitled  to  declare  that 
"  things  which  are  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal 
to  one  another."  As  the  generalization  is  the  result, 
not  of  an  intuitive,  but  a  discursive  process,  it  is 
possible  that  error  may  creep  into  it,  that  the  gener- 
alized expression  of  our  original  perceptions  may  be 
mutilated  or  exaggerated.  But  on  the  supposition 
that  the  generalization  has  been  properly  conducted, 
the  maxim  is  as  certain  as  the  individual  perception 
is  allowed  to  be. 

By  standing  up  for  this  distinction  between  what  we 
may  call  our  spontaneous  and  our  generalized  intui- 
tions, we  can  answer  an  objection  urged  against  the 
existence  of  necessary  truth  by  Mr.  JNIill.  "  The  very 
fact  that  the  question  is  disputed,  disproves  the 
alleged  impossibility.  Those  against  whom  it  is 
needful  to  defend  the  belief  which  is  affirmed  to  be 
necessary,  are  unmistakable  examples  that  it  is  not 
necessary."  (p.  150.)  But  what  is  the  dispute  ?  It 
is  commonly  not  as  to  the  behef,  but  simply  as  to 
whether  it  is  intuitive,  which,  as  Mr.  ]\Iill  knows  and 
asserts,  is  not  to  be  settled  by  intuition.  Take  only 
one  example :  the  sums  of  equals  are  equals ;  there 
is  no  dispute  as  to  the  truth  of  this.  What  JMr. 
]\Iill's  school  objects  to  is,  that  it  should  be  represent- 
ed as  intuitive.     But  again,  what  the  upholders  of 


262  SELF-EVIDENCE  AND   NECESSITY 

necessary  truth  maintain  is,  not  that  every  man  must 
hold  speculatively  by  intuitive  truth,  that  is,  hold  by 
it  in  the  generalized  form  given  it  by  philosophers ; 
but  that  all  believe  in,  and  spontaneously  act  upon, 
their  individual  primitive  perceptions.  It  is  quite 
possible  for  Mr.  Mill  to  maintain  that  the  law  of 
cause  and  effect  is  not  necessary  or  universal,  and 
that  there  may  be  a  phenomenon  without  a  cause  in 
the  Dog-star ;  but  meanwhile  it  will  be  found  that 
on  any  given  occurrence  presenting  itself,  he  will 
look  for  something  as  producing  it. 

If  we  look  carefully  into  the  nature  of  the  intui- 
tive perceptions  of  the  mind,  they  will  be  found  to 
be  of  three  kinds.  Some  of  them  are  of  the  nature 
of  Primitive  Cognitions :  the  object  is  now  present, 
and  we  look  upon  it.  It  is  thus  we  are  conscious  of 
self  as  existing  in  a  particular  state.  This  bemg 
self-evident,  we  cannot  be  made  to  regard  ourselves 
as  non-existent,  and  not  in  that  particular  state.  In 
other  exercises  our  intuitions  are  of  the  nature  of 
Primitive  Beliefs ;  the  object  is  not  present,  but  we 
contemplate  it,  and  discover  that  it  is  of  such  a  na- 
ture. It  is  thus  that  we  believe  of  space,  that  it 
does  not  cease  when  our  eye  is  no  longer  able  to 
follow  it :  this  appears  from  the  very  nature  of  space ; 
and  having  such  a  conviction,  we  cannot  be  made  to 
believe  that  space,  at  the  point  at  which  it  ceases  to 
be  invisible,  should  come  to  a  termination.  Again, 
some  of  our  intuitions  are  of  the  nature  of  Primitive 
Judgments,  in  which  by  bare  inspection  we  discover 


THE    TESTS    OF   INTUITION.  263 

relations  between  things  apprehended.  Thus  we  are 
told  first  of  one  man  that  he  died  at  the  age  of  fifty, 
and  then  of  another  man  that  he  died  at  the  age  of 
fifty,  and  we  at  once  declare  that  the  two  men  died 
at  the  same  age ;  and  this  being  evident  from  the 
contemplation  of  the  things,  we  cannot  be  made  to 
decide  otherwise. 

The  truth  reached  by  intuition  in  these  its  three 
forms  is  of  course  limited,  —  is  confined,  indeed, 
within  very  stringent  boundaries.  It  is  narrowed, 
first  of  all  by  the  original  inlets,  which  are  the  out- 
ward and  inward  senses  ;  and  secondly,  by  the  limit- 
ed capacity  of  man  to  discover  what  is  involved  in 
this  primitive  stock.  ^Yhat  intuition  may  do  of  itself 
is  best  seen  in  mathematical  demonstration,  in 
which  every  step  taken  is  seen  to  be  true  at  once, 
on  the  bare  contemplation  of  the  figures  or  num- 
bers, and  by  which  we  reach  a  body  of  truth  of  im- 
mense scientific  value.  But  the  main  service  of  in- 
tuition consists  in  its  furnishing  a  point  from  which 
experience  may  start,  and  a  foundation  on  which  to 
build.  Our  original  perceptions  lie  at  the  basis  of  all 
our  acquired  ones.  I  allow  that  our  acquired  ones, 
obtained  by  a  gathered  experience,  carry  us  far  be- 
yond our  primitive  perceptions.  But  in  fact  intui- 
tions, for  example  those  of  sense  and  consciousness, 
mingle  with  all  our  mental  operations,  and  upon 
them  we  must  fall  back  in  the  last  resort,  when 
reqmred  to  specify  the  ground  on  which  experience 
rests. 


264  SELF-EVIDENCE  AND   NECESSITY 

Keeping  these  explanations  and  distinctions  in 
view,  it  should  not  be  difficult  to  find  tests  of  intui- 
tion. The  primary  mark  I  hold  to  be  Self-Evidence. 
The  evidence  is  in  the  objects,  and  is  discerned  by 
the  mind  on  the  bare  contemplation  of  them.  From 
the  mere  inspection  of  consciousness  we  perceive 
self  in  some  action  or  under  some  affection.  From 
the  simple  apprehension  of  2  -|-  2  we  see  that  it 
makes  4.  And  wherever  there  is  Self-Evidence  there 
will  also  be  Necessity.  But  let  us  observe  carefully 
what  this  necessity  consists  in.  It  is  not  a  fatalistic 
necessity  imposed  upon  us  from  without,  and  for  any- 
thing we  know  in  an  arbitrary  manner.  It  is  neces- 
sity arising  solely  from  the  nature  of  things  as  the 
same  is  perceived  by  the  mind.^  This  conviction  of 
necessity  may  assume  two  forms,  a  positive  and  a 
negative.  On  the  bare  contemplation  of  2  -|-  2  I  see 
that  it  must  make  4 :  this  is  the  positive  form.  I 
am  further  constrained  to  decide  that  it  cannot  be 
otherwise,  that  2  -j-  2  cannot  be  3,  or  5,  or  any  other 
number :  this  is  the  negative  form.  These  two  forms 
depend  on  each  other,  or  rather  they  both  depend 
on  the  Self-Evidence ;  and  we  may  in  argument  of 


1  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  following  in  meanings,  he  is  completely  fettered  by 

this   respect   Sir  William   Hamilton,  them.      Their  indestructibility  is  the 

stands  up  for  Necessity  as  a  test  of  proof  to  him  that  his  consciousness  is 

ultimate    truth,   but    overlooks    Self-  imprisoned  within  them,"  {Fortn.Bev. 

Evidence,  the  evidence  in  the  thing  No.  v.)    I  have  given  a  more  pleasant 

looked  at.     "  No  matter  what  he  calls  account  of  them.     The  necessity  is 

these  indestructible  relations  [of  Con-  not  a  fetter  or  a  prison,  but  a  convic- 

sciousness,   using   consciousness  in  a  tion  arising  from  an  immediate  per- 

very  vague  and  perverted  sense],  no  ception  of  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
matter  what  he  supposes  to  be  their 


THE    TESTS    OF  INTUITION  265 

any  kind  employ  the  one  or  other  as  may  suit  our 
purpose.  And  as  is  the  nature  of  the  original  per- 
ception, so  is  the  precise  nature  of  the  conviction  of 
necessity.  We  have  seen  that  our  intuitions  may  be 
of  the  nature  of  cognitions,  of  beliefs,  or  of  judg- 
ments ;  and  whatever  the  intuition  be,  we  must  ad- 
here to  it,  and  cannot  be  made  to  give  our  assent  to 
the  opposite.  Thus,  if  our  intuition  be  a  cognition 
of  an  object  as  existing,  we  cannot  be  made  to  ac- 
knowledge it  as  non-existing :  if  I  know  self  as  think- 
ing, I  cannot  be  made  to  allow  that  it  is  not  thinking. 
Again,  if  our  intuition  be  a  behef,  such  as  that  I  saw 
a  particular  person  yesterday,  I  cannot  be  made  to 
believe  that  I  did  not  see  him.  The  same  is  true  of 
our  judgments  :  deciding  that  two  straight  lines  can- 
not enclose  a  space,  I  cannot  be  made  to  allow  that 
they  can  form  a  closed  figure.  Thus  understood, 
the  necessity  of  conviction  (and  not  the  mere  inca- 
pacity of  conceiving)  becomes  a  criterion  of  funda- 
mental truth,  clear  and  certairf,  and  not  difficult  of 
application. 

To  these  some  have  added  Universality.  But  the 
phrase  has  been  used  in  two  different  significations. 
As  employed  by  some,  it  means  the  imiversality  of 
the  truth.  In  this  sense  the  universality  is  involved 
in  the  necessity ;  we  cannot  be  made  to  believe  that 
two  straight  lines  should  enclose  a  space  at  any  time 
or  in  any  world.  Thus  understood,  the  test  of  uni- 
versahty  is  not  different  from  that  of  necessity ;  but 
as  presenting  the  conviction  imder  a  very  important 


266  SELF-EVIDENCE   AND   NECESSITY 

aspect,  it  may  often  be  usefully  employed  in  deter- 
mining whether  a  truth  is  intuitive.  But  Univer- 
sality may  also  mean  being  entertained  by  all  men. 
This  property  of  intuitive  truth  may  be  more  appro- 
priately designated  by  Catholicity  or  Common  Con- 
sent. This  quality  does  belong  to  all  primary  truth, 
and  where  it  is  found  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  pre- 
sumption that  the  truth  is  intuitive.  But  it  is  not 
a  proof;  for  it  may  spring  not  so  much  from  any  in- 
born principle  as  from  the  uniformity  to  be  found 
in  the  experience  of  all  men.  All  men  expect  that 
the  sun  will  rise  to-morrow,  not  from  any  intuitive 
principle,  but  from  the  gathered  observations  of  the 
past  carried  forward  to  the  future. 

These  two  then,  Self-Evidence,  and  Necessity  with 
implied  Universality,  are  the  decisive  tests  of  intui- 
tive truth.  All  intuitive  truths  possess  these  charac- 
teristics ;  no  others  do.  The  question  now  to  be 
discussed  is.  Can  these  marks  be  produced  by  Asso- 
ciation of  Ideas,  or  by  Experience,  the  two  princi- 
ples from  which  Mr.  Mill  gets  all  our  general  con- 
victions ? 

(1.)  "As  for  the  feehng  of  necessity,  or  what  is 
termed  a  "  necessity  of  thought,  it  is  of  all  mental 
phenomena  positively  the  one  which  an  inseparable 
association  is  the  most  evidently  competent  to  gen- 
erate." (p.  299).  In  answer  to  this  it  can  be  shown, 
in  the  first  place,  that  in  many  cases  of  immediate 
and  necessary  conviction  we  have  not  two  ideas  to 
be  associated.     This  holds  of  our  primitive  cognitions 


THE    TESTS    OF   INTUITION.  267 

and  primitive  beliefs.  Take  the  consciousness  which 
the  infant  has  of  a  sensation,  or  rather  of  self  as 
sentient.  Here  we  cannot  point  to  two  objects  which 
have  been  often  together :  we  have  only  one  object, 
the  sentient  self  as  existing,  and  we  cannot  be  made 
to  know  it  as  not  existmg  or  not  sentient.  Again,  I 
remember  that  I  was  under  a  peculiar  sensation  of 
pain  two  days  ago  :  I  never  had  the  same  feelmg  be- 
fore ;  the  object  is  one,  and  there  has  been  no  repe- 
tition, and  therefore  no  association  can  have  been 
formed  •  and  yet  I  have  the  most  perfect  assurance 
that  I  existed  two  days  ago  under  that  sensation, 
and  I  cannot  be  made  to  believe  otherwise.  These 
are  cases  of  intuition  allowed  by  Mr.  Mill  (see  e,  q), 
but  in  which  association  cannot  generate  the  con- 
viction. 

In  other  cases,  I  admit  that  there  is  a  combination 
of  two  ideas  or  two  objects,  that  is,  those  in  which 
we  institute  a  comparison  or  pronounce  a  judgment. 
But  even  in  such  the  judgment  is  ^^ronounced  not 
in  consequence  of  the  mere  association,  but  on  a 
comparison  of  the  things  brought  together.  What 
Mr.  Mill  means  by  the  feeling  of  necessity,  which 
can  be  generated  by  his  examples,  is  evident  from 
his  examples.  "  Many  persons  who  have  been  fright- 
ened in  childhood  can  never  be  alone  in  the  dark 
without  irrepressible  terrors.  Many  a  person  is  un- 
able to  revisit  a  particular  place,  or  think  of  a  partic- 
ular event,  without  recalling  acute  feehngs  of  grief 
or  reminiscences  of  suffering."  (p.  265.)     This  is  a 


268  SBLF-EVIDENCE   AND  NECESSITY 

very  glaring  example  of  mistaking  the  point  to  be 
proven.  Mr.  Mill  is  aware  what  those  who  hold 
necessary  truth  mean  by  it.  "  Necessary,"  says  Mr. 
Mill,  "  according  to  Kanf  s  definition,  is,  that  of  which 
the  negation  is  impossible."  But  the  necessity  which 
he  looks  at  and  accounts  for  is  of  a  very  different 
character ;  it  is  not  a  necessity  of  conviction,  of 
belief,  or  judgment,  but  is  a  mere  association  of  two 
ideas  or  thoughts,  so  that  the  one  never  comes  up 
without  the  other.  He  explains  his  meaning : 
"  When  an  association  has  acquired  the  character  of 
inseparability,  —  when  the  bond  between  the  two 
has  been  thus  firmly  riveted,  not  only  does  the  idea 
called  up  by  the  association  become,  in  our  con- 
sciousness, inseparable  from  the  idea  which  suggested 
it,  but  the  facts  or  phenomena  answering  to  those 
ideas  come  at  last  to  seem  inseparable  in  existence : 
things  which  we  are  unable  to  conceive  apart,  appear 
incapable  of  existing  apart."  (p.  191.)  The  word 
"  conceive  "  has  here  come  in  with  all  its  ambiguity, 
and  the  two  things  denoted  by  it,  having  an  idea, 
and  judging  or  deciding,  are  here  represented  as 
being  one.  But  the  two  are  very  different.  The 
fright  in  childhood  may  long  continue  to  raise  up 
terror,  but  cannot  of  itself  create  conviction ;  as 
may  be  seen  in  the  case  of  multitudes  who  expe- 
rience the  fear  but  have  never  believed  in  ghosts. 
When  Pascal  was  crossing  a  bridge  in  a  carriage, 
the  two  leaders  took  fright  and  plunged  into  the 
Seine ;  the  shock  broke  the  traces,  and  the  carriage 


THE    TESTS   OF  INTUITIOJS',  269 

remained  on  the  brink  of  the  precipice ;  ever  after 
he  felt  as  if  there  was  an  abyss  on  his  left  hand,  and 
had  a  chair  placed  there  to  tranquillize  his  mind. 
But  this  association,  while  it  raised  the  painful  idea, 
did  not  convince  his  judgment  that  there  was  act- 
ually a  river  ever  running  at  his  left  hand.  I  never 
pass  a  particular  spot  without  being  reminded  of  a 
youthful  companion  whom  I  met  there  for  the  last 
time  before  his  removal  from  this  world;  but  this 
association  of  my  friend  and  the  spot  has  not  con- 
vinced me  that  the  two  have  any  real  connection. 
The  mother  never  thmks  of  a  particular  church-yard 
without  remembering  that  her  boy  sleeps  there ; 
but  she  does  not  therefore  think  that  her  child  will 
be  there  forever ;  on  the  contrary,  she  may  firmly 
believe  that  he  will  rise  again. 

(2.)  Just  as  httle  can  experience,  I  mean  a 
gathered  experience,  create  the  self-evidence  and 
its  consequent  necessity.  A  truth  reached  by  an 
accumulation  of  instances  cannot  be  self-evident,  for 
the  evidence  is  collected  from  the  uniformity  of 
many,  perhaps  of  innumerable  cases.  Neither  is  it 
accompanied  with  any  conviction  of  necessity.  Yf  e 
do  not  affirm  of  a  general  law  thus  discovered  that 
the  opposite  of  it  is  impossible,  and  we  allow  that 
there  may  be  exceptions.  Some  persons  are  so 
situated  that  they  see  crows  daily,  and  they  have 
never  seen  them  with  any  other  color  than  black ; 
they  have  sufficient  evidence  of  the  general  law 
that  crows  are  of  this  color,  and  when  the  idea  of  a 


270  SELF-EVIDENCE  AND   NECESSITY 

crow  comes  up  before  them,  it  will  always  be  in  a 
sable  hue :  but  it  is  not  self-evident  that  crows 
are  black ;  and  they  do  not  decide  that  they  must 
be  of  this  color,  or  that  there  cannot  possibly  be 
white  crows  in  any  other  world  which  God  has 
made. 

We  have  seen,  in  a  former  chapter,  that  the  mind 
is  endowed  with  a  capacity  of  observing  relations. 
Some  of  these  are  discovered  by  a  process  of  length- 
ened observation.  It  is  thus  we  know  that  all  mat- 
ter attracts  other  matter,  and  that  the  elements  of 
bodies  have  certain  chemical  affinities  which  can  be 
expressed  in  numerical  proportions.  But  there  are 
other  relations  which  can  be  discerned  immediately. 
In  saying  so,  I  do  not  affirm  that  they  are  noticed 
independently  of  things  compared;  I  mean  that 
they  are  discovered  on  the  contemplation,  the  bare 
contemplation,  of  the  objects,  and  without  a  gathered 
experience  or  an  induction  of  instances.  Thus,  on 
comparing  my  conscious  self  of  the  present  moment 
with  the  remembered  self  of  yesterday,  I  at  once, 
and  without  any  mediate  proof,  declai*e  an  identity 
of  person.  A  triangle  being  a  figure  with  three 
angles,  I  need  no  experiments  to  convince  me  that 
one  of  the  angles  being  a  part  is  less  than  the  whole, 
and  that  the  three  angles  make  up  the  whole.  I 
may  never  have  tried  whether  I  could  enclose  a 
space  by  two  straight  lines :  I  do  not  require  to  try 
it,  for  I  see  it  at  once ;  and  I  would  declare  of  any 
apparent  or  professed  attempt  to  make  them  form  a 


THE    TESTS    OF  US^'TUITIOJ^.  271 

closed  figure,  that  it  must  involve  some  deception, 
and  that  the  two  Knes  cannot  be  straight. 

Mr.  Mill  derives  what  are  usually  reckoned  intui- 
tive truths  by  "simple  enumeration  without  a 
known  exception ; "  a  method  which  Bacon  declares 
to  be  "puerile"  and  useless,  as  the  next  instance 
may  prove  an  exception.  "  The  principles  of  num- 
ber and  geometry  are  duly  and  satisfactorily  proved 
by  that  method  alone,  nor  are  they  susceptible  of 
any  other  proof"  {Logic,  B.  iii.  c.  xxi.  §  2.)  This 
makes  the  evidence  for  mathematical  axioms  the 
same  m  kmd  as  that  which  the  Hindu  has  for  water 
being  always  Hquid;  as  that  which  we  have  for 
crows  being  black  all  over  the  universe ;  and  for  the 
alternation  of  day  and  night  continuing  forever. 
We  see  now  how  he  should  be  obliged  in  logical 
consistency  to  maintain  that  two  and  two  may  make 
five  m  other  worlds.  I  meet  this  by  showing  that 
there  is  an  essential  diiFerence  between  the  two 
classes  of  cases.  In  the  one  we  see  nothing  in  the 
nature  of  things  to  necessitate  the  law ;  we  adhere 
to  it  simply  on  the  ground  of  the  number  of  instan- 
ces, and  Ave  can  readily  be  made  to  believe  that 
the  law  is  limited  in  range,  and  that  there  are  ex- 
ceptions. But  in  the  other  class  the  relation  is  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  things;  we  discover  it  at 
once  by  looking  at  the  things ;  we  believe  it  to  hold 
wherever  the  things  exist,  and  w^e  cannot  be  made 
to  decide  otherwise.  In  order  to  account  for  the 
conviction    of    necessity    and     universality   which 


272  SELF-EVIDENCE  AND   NECESSITY 

attaches  to  mathematical  truth,  Mr.  Mill  refers  to 
the  circumstance  that  geometrical  curves  admit  of 
being  distinctly  painted  in  the  imagination,  so  that 
we  have  "mental  pictures  of  all  possible  combina- 
tions of  lines  and  angles."  {Logic,  B.  ii.  c.  v.  §  5.) 
But  what,  I  ask,  makes  he  of  algebraic  demonstra- 
tions, where  there  can  be  no  such  painting  of  the 
imagination,  w^hile  yet  there  is  the  same  necessity  ? 
And  I  call  attention  to  the  circumstance  that  men- 
tal pictures  do  not  constitute  an  accumulation  of  in- 
stances, or  tend  in  the  least  to  bring  the  case  imder 
the  law  of  simplex  enumeratio.  They  do,  however, 
serve  a  purpose.  They  enable  us  to  perceive  more 
clearly  the  nature  of  the  objects,  and  to  conceive  the 
"possible  combinations  of  angles  and  figures,"  so. 
that  we  see  the  certainty  and  necessity  of  the  truth. 
Supposing,  he  says  that  two  straight  lines  after 
diverging  could  again  converge,  "we  can  transport 
ourselves  thither  in  imagination,  and  can  frame  a 
mental  image  of  the  appearance  which  one  or  both 
the  lines  must  present  at  that  point,  which  we  may 
rely  upon  as  being  precisely  similar  to  the  reality." 
The  clearness  of  the  image  does  help  us,  but  it  is 
simply  in  the  w^ay  of  giving  us  an  apprehension  of 
the  "reality,"  and  thus  enabling  us  to  pronounce  a 
judgment  on  which  we  may  "  rely." 

By  means  of  these  tests  we  can  without  much 
difficulty  distinguish  between  truths  which  are  intui- 
tive, and  truths  which  are  reached  by  a  gathered 
experience.     We  have  seen  that  Mr.  Mill  proceeds 


THE    TESTS    OF    INTUITION.  273 

on  these  criteria.  (See  i^,  ^,  i.)  And  if  any  one  will 
take  the  trouble  to  look  back  upon  the  chapter  in 
which  I  have  collected  his  "  Admissions/'  he  will  see 
that  Self-Evidence,  and  Necessity  with  UniversaUty, 
cover,  sanction,  and  justify  all  the  intuitive  princi- 
ples he  has  avowed.  But  as  not  folloT\ing  out  these 
criteria  consequentially,  he  rejects  as  intuitive,  and 
labors  to  establish  otherwise,  truths  which  can  stand 
these  tests  quite  as  clearly  and  decisively  as  those 
acknowledged  by  him.  Hence  the  heterogeneous 
character  of  his  theory,  which  looks  as  if  it  stood 
altogether  on  sensation,  and  was  reared  by  associa- 
tion, but  requires  to  be  buttressed  on  all  sides  by  in- 
tuition to  keep  it  from  falling.  It  is  only  by  logi- 
cally carrying  out  these  tests  that  we  can  construct 
a  consistent  system  of  philosophy,  in  which  we  give 
to  intuition  what  belongs  to  intuition,  and  to  expe- 
rience what  belongs  to  experience.  Let  us  now  in- 
quire whether  our  conviction  as  to  causation  can 
stand  the  tests  of  intuition. 

18 


CHAPTER    XIII. 


CAUSATION. 


ON  this  subject  a  much  sounder  doctrine  than 
that  entertained  by  most  metaphysicians  has 
been  laid  down  by  Professor  Bain^  who,  however, 
has  neglected  to  unfold  all  that  is  in  the  mental 
phenomenon  which  he  has  noticed.  "As  regards 
muscular  exertion,  there  is  a  notable  specialty,  a 
radical  difference  in  kind,  signified  by  such  phrases 
as  ^  the  sense  of  power,'  '  the  feeling  of  energy  put 
forth,'  '  the  experience  of  force  or  resistance.'  This 
is  an  ultimate  phase  of  the  human  consciousness,  and 
the  most  general  and  fundamental  of  all  our  con- 
scious states.  By  this  experience  [observe,  not  a 
gathered  experience]  we  body  forth  to  ourselves  a 
notion  of  force  or  power."  He  believes  that  "  the 
combined  movements  of  locomotion  are  original  or 
instinctive."  {Senses  and  Intell,  pp.  98,  267.)  Here, 
then,  we  have  a  perception,  original  and  intuitive,  of 
things  exercising  power.  We  are  immediately  con- 
scious of  power  exerted,  and  we  find  it  producing  an 
effect.  Again,  things  become  known  to  us  as  exer- 
cising power  upon  us,  and  we   know  the  effect  as 

(274) 


CAUSATION.  275 

proceeding  from  a  cause.  This  perception  of  power 
exercised  by  us,  and  upon  us,  is  the  primary  cogni- 
tion of  things  on  which  all  our  judgments  as  to 
causation  are  founded.  Our  knowledge  both  of  self 
and  of  external  objects  is  of  things  effecting  and 
being  effected. 

Mr.  Mill  tells  us,  in  his  Logic,  that  he  has  no  in- 
tention of  entering  into  the  merits  of  the  question 
of  causation  "  as  a  problem  of  transcendental  meta- 
physics." And  yet  in  his  logical  treatment  of  the 
subject  he  is  ever  introducing,  I  think  unfortunately, 
metaphysical  speculations.  In  the  discussion  he  has 
confounded  (in  this  respect  Hke  some  of  the  Scottish 
metaphysicians)  the  principle  of  causation  with  that 
of  the  uniformity  of  nature.  When  we  say  that  na- 
ture is  uniform,  we  mean  that  nature  constitutes  a 
course  or  system ;  that  there  is  in  it  a  determinate 
number  of  agents,  or  rather  a  fixed  amount  of  ener- 
gy, actual  or  potential,  operating  according  to  laws, 
and  in  an  arranged  constitution.  That  there  is  an 
invariable  uniformity  in  nature,  is  discovered  by  a 
long  experience.  It  is  certainly  not  an  obvious  truth 
forced  upon  us  by  an  early  and  easy  observation. 
Judging  by  first  appearances,  it  looks  as  if  nature 
often  acted  unsystematically,  or  was  swayed  by  in- 
fluences out  of  its  sphere.  The  mother  finds  her 
child  in  health  to-day,  sick  to-morrow,  better  the 
third  day,  and  dead  the  next ;  so  far  from  showing 
a  uniformity,  it  seems  rather  to  indicate  a  change  of 
agency,  springing  either  from  an  unknown  fatality 


276  CAUSATION. 

or  the  will  of  a  supernatural  being.  It  is  only  as 
the  result  of  long  and  patient  research,  conducted 
independently  in  the  various  departments  of  nature 
and  of  history,  that  we  reach  the  reasonable  convic- 
tion that  there  is  a  fixed  system  constituted  amidst 
these  seeming  irregularities. 

Now  it  is,  in  fact,  of  this  uniformity  of  nature  that 
Mr.  Mill  is  treating  in  his  chapter  on  the  "  Evidence 
of  Universal  Causation."  He  is  right  in  saying  of  it, 
"  There  must  have  been  a  time  when  the  universal 
prevalence  of  that  law  throughout  nature  could  not 
have  been  affirmed  in  the  same  confident  and  un- 
qualified manner  as  at  present."  He  is  further  right, 
so  far  as  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  concerned,  when 
he  says  that  the  reasons  for  our  reliance  on  it  "  do 
not  hold  in  circumstances  unknown  to  us,  and  beyond 
the  possible  range  of  our  experience.  In  distant 
parts  of  the  steUar  regions,  where  the  phenomena 
may  be  entirely  unlike  those  with  which  we  are  ac- 
quainted, it  would  be  folly  to  affirm  confidently  that 
this  general  law  prevails,  any  more  than  those  spec- 
ial ones  which  we  have  found  to  hold  universally  on 
our  own  planet.  The  uniformity  in  the  succession 
of  events,  otherwise  called  the  law  of  causation,  must 
be  received  not  as  a  law  of  the  universe,  but  of  that 
portion  of  it  only  which  is  within  the  range  of  our 
means  of  sure  observation,  with  a  reasonable  degree 
of  extension  to  adjacent  cases."  In  this  passage  he 
identifies  "  the  uniformity  in  the  succession  of  events" 
with  "  the  law  of  causation."     But  these  are  not  the 


GAUSATIOir.  277 

same.  It  is  quite*  conceivable  that  there  may  be 
worlds  in  which  there  is  a  universal  causation,  and 
yet  no  self-contained  system  of  natural  causes.  Some, 
or  many,  or  in  fact  all  of  the  phenomena  might  be 
produced  by  agents  acting  from  above  or  beyond  the 
phenomena  themselves,  —  say  by  the  Divine  Being, 
or  angels,  or  demons.  In  such  a  world  spring  might 
follow  winter  one  year,  and  be  prevented  from  fol- 
lowing it  the  next  by  the  action  of  a  supra-mundane 
influence ;  and  no  one  would  be  able  from  the  past 
to  anticipate  the  future.  In  this  state  of  things  there 
would  be  no  imiformity  of  physical  agencies,  and  yet 
there  would  be  an  invariable  causation.  Now  the 
grand  metaphysical  question  is  not  about  the  uni- 
formity of  nature,  but  about  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect.  There  is  a  momentary  discovery  of  the 
difference  of  the  two,  and  yet  a  studious  identifica- 
tion of  them  in  the  following  passage  :  "  There  was  a 
time  when  many  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  must 
have  aj)peared  altogether  capricious  and  irregular, 
not  governed  by  any  laws,  nor  steadily  consequent 
upon  any  causes.  Such  phenomena,  indeed,  were 
commonly  in  that  early  stage  of  human  knowledge 
ascribed  to  the  direct  intervention  of  the  wiU  of 
some  supernatural  being,  and  therefore  stiU  to  a 
cause." 

It  is  admitted  that  the  great  body  of  mankind, 
whether  they  are  or  are  not  persuaded  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  uniform  system  of  nature,  beheve  as  to 
every  effect,  as  to  every  new  thing   produced,  or 


278  VAUSATIOJS. 

change  upon  an  old  thing,  that  ft  must  have  had  a 
cause,  whether  natural  or  supernatural.  The  ques- 
tion is,  Is  this  behef  intuitive  ? 

This  conviction  can  stand  the  tests  of  intuition. 
On  the  bare  contemplation  of  a  new  phenomenon, 
that  is,  of  a  new  thing  appearing,  of  a  thing  which 
did  not  exist  before,  we  declare  that  it  has  had  a 
producing  cause.  It  certainly  appears  in  very  early 
life,  before  there  can  be  a  lengthened  or  wide  obser- 
vation or  enumeration  of  instances.  It  is  strong  in 
very  prunitive  states  of  society,  long  before  mankind 
had  observed  an  invariable  uniformity  in  the  occur- 
rence of  natural  phenomena.  It  can  be  shown  that 
it  is  necessary  and  universal.  Mr.  Mill  indeed  tells 
us,  "  I  am  convinced  that  any  one  accustomed  to  ab- 
straction and  analysis,  who  will  fairly  exert  his  facul- 
ties for  the  purpose,  will,  when  his  imagination  has 
once  learned  to  entertain  the  notion,  find  no  difficul- 
ty in  conceiving  that  in  some  one  for  instance  of  the 
many  firmaments  into  which  sidereal  astronomy  now 
divides  the  universe,  events  may  succeed  one  another 
at  random,  without  any  fixed  law ;  nor  can  anything 
in  our  experience  or  in  our  mental  nature  constitute 
a  sufficient,  or  indeed  any,  reason  for  believing  that 
this  is  nowhere  the  case."  The  phrase,  "  fixed  law," 
here  employed,  is  ambiguous ;  it  may  mean  a  mere 
natural  or  physical  law,  such  as  that  of  attraction. 
And  I  acknowledge  at  once  that  it  is  quite  possible 
to  apprehend  and  to  believe  that  there  may  be  worlds 
in  which  new  phenomena,  or  changes  on  old  phenom- 


CAUSATION.  279 

ena,  may  be  produced,  without  the  operation  of  that 
law  of  gravitation  which  seems  to  act  everywhere  in 
our  mundane  system.  But  the  real  question  is,  would 
not  the  mind  insist,  and  this  according  to  "  a  fixed 
law"  of  our  "mental  nature,"  that  the  event  must 
have  a  cause  in  an  agent  physical  or  sjomtual  ?  We 
may  observe  that  the  old  misleading  phrase,  "  con- 
ceive," is  once  more  casting  up.  I  admit  we  can 
have  the  idea  of,  that  is,  image  to  ourselves,  a  new 
phenomenon  without  any  necessary  precedent.  But 
I  hold  that  we  cannot  be  made  to  judge,  decide,  or 
beheve,  that  in  any  firmament  there  could  be  a  new 
event,  —  say  a  world  springmg  into  being  with  no 
cause  to  produce  it. 

The  mental  phenomenon,  the  conviction  and  its 
attached  necessity,  Mr.  Mill  would  explain  by  the  as- 
sociation of  ideas.  But  then,  in  order  to  save  himself 
from  obvious  and  pressing  difficulties,  he  is  obhged  to 
lay  do^^Ti  very  stringent  precautions  as  to  when  asso- 
ciation can  generate  a  feehng  of  necessity.  In  order 
to  produce  the  inseparable  association,  the  phenom- 
enon must  be  "  so  closely  linked  in  our  experience, 
that  we  never  perceive  the  one  without  at  the  same 
time,  or  the  immediately  succeeding  moment,  per- 
ceiving the  other."  Again,  "  No  frequency  of  con- 
junction between  two  phenomena  will  create  an  in- 
separable association  if  counter  associations  are  being 
created  all  the  while."  (p.  266.)  By  help  of  these 
two  principles  he  tries  to  avoid  the  objection  which 
might  be  urged  to  liis  mode  of  accounting  for  the 


280  CAUSATION. 

conviction  of  necessity.  But  he  is  seen  to  be  involved 
in  hopeless  perplexities  when  these  laws  are  ap- 
plied to  causation.  For  neither  of  them  would  allow 
the  necessary  conviction  to  be  formed  as  to  cause 
and  effect  from  mere  experience.  For  it  is  not  the 
case  that  we  never  perceive  a  cause  without  perceiv- 
ing an  effect,  or  that  we  never  observe  an  effect  with- 
out also  observing  a  cause.  On  the  contrary,  the 
effects  of  causes  operating,  and  the  causes  of  effects 
falling  under  our  notice,  are  very  often  concealed 
from  us.  Of  how  few  of  the  occurrences  happening 
in  the  circle  of  our  experience,  or  in  the  times  in 
which  we  hve,  are  we  able  to  estimate  the  conse- 
quences ?  In  a  large  propc^rtion  of  the  physical  ef- 
fects which  come  under  our  notice,  the  cause  is  not 
discovered  at  the  time,  and  is  only  found  out  in  the 
end  by  a  process  of  elaborate  experiment,  fitted  to 
distract  instead  of  aiding  association ;  and  in  the  case 
of  a  large  number  of  the  occurrences  of  our  personal 
experience,  or  recorded  in  history,  we  never  do  rise 
to  the  discovery  of  the  causes.  Again,  as  to  the  oth- 
er precautionary  rule,  we  find  that  in  the  case  of 
cause  and  effect  there  is  a  constant  formation  of 
"  counter  associations  "  by  reason  of  the  complexity 
of  the  conditions  which  meet  in  the  cause,  and  of  inci- 
dents which  attach  themselves  to  the  effect,  and  of 
the  combination  of  each  of  these  with  a  host  of  con- 
comitant circumstances  to  disturb  the  formation  of  an 
inseparable  association.  A  fif-iend  dies :  no  doubt  there 
has  been  a  physical  cause  of  the  occurrence,  but  how 


CAUSATIOJS'.  281 

many  things  prevent  us  from  discovering  or  even  in- 
quiring about  it;  and  finding  little  satisfaction  in  the 
contemplation,  we  dwell  rather  on  the  regard  we  had 
for  the  departed,  on  his  excellent  qualities,  on  the  loss 
we  have  suffered;  or,  if  we  think  of  what  led  to  it,  we 
prefer  referring  the  whole  to  the  appointment  of  God. 
That  amidst  all  these  comphcations,  and  in  spite  of 
appearances  to  the  contrary,  mankind  should  ever 
have  clung  to  the  beHef  that  there  is  a  cause,  natural 
or  supernatural,  to  every  event,  is  a  proof  that  the 
conviction  is  deeply  seated  in  our  nature. 

When  Mr.  Mill  confines  his  attention  to  the  physi- 
cal and  logical  nature  of  causation,  he  throws  Hght 
upon  the  subject.  "  The  statement  of  the  cause  is 
hicomplete  unless  in  some  shape  or  other  we  intro- 
duce all  the  conditions."  "  In  practice,  that  particu- 
lar condition  is  usually  styled  the  cause,  whose  share 
in  the  matter  is  superficially  the  most  conspicuous, 
or  whose  requisiteness  to  the  production  of  the  efiect 
we  happen  to  be  insisting  upon  at  the  moment." 
"  The  real  cause  of  the  phenomenon  is  the  assem- 
blage of  all  the  conditions."  There  is  new  and  im- 
portant truth  in  this  statement.  But  I  am  not  sure 
that  Mr.  Mill  has  got  a  full  view  of  the  facts.  In 
material  nature  there  is  always  need  of  the  action 
of  two  or  more  agents  in  order  to  an  effect.  If  a 
ball  moves  in  consequence  of  another  striking  it, 
there  is  need  of  the  one  baU  as  well  as  the  other, 
and  the  cause,  properly  speaking,  consists  of  the  two 
in  a  relation  to  each  other.     But  not  only  is  there  a 


282  CAUSATION, 

duality  or  plurality  in  the  cause,  there  is  the  same 
(Mr.  Mill  has  not  noticed  it)  in  the  effect.  The  effect 
consists  not  merely  of  the  one  ball,  the  ball  struck 
and  set  in  motion,  but  also  of  the  other  ball  which 
struck  it,  and  which  has  now  lost  part  of  its  momen- 
tum. By  carrying  out  this  doctrine,  we  can  deter- 
mine what  is  meant  by  "  condition  "  and  "  occasion  " 
when  the  phrases  are  applied  to  the  operation  of 
causation.  "When  we  speak  of  an  agent  requiring  a 
'^condition,"  an  "occasion,"  or  "circumstances,"  in 
order  to  its  action,  we  refer  to  the  other  agent  or 
agents  required,  that  it  may  produce  a  particular 
effect.  Thus  that  fire  may  burn,  it  is  necessary  to 
have  fuel,  or  a  combustible  material.  In  order  that 
my  will  may  move  my  arm,  it  is  needful  to  have 
the  concurrence  of  a  healthy  motor  nerve.  So 
much  for  the  dual  or  plural  agency  in  the  cause. 
But  there  is  a  similar  complexity  in  the  effect,  and 
we  need  a  like  phrase  to  designate  the  part  of  it 
which  we  do  not  require  to  consider  at  the  time. 
Thus  the  steam  which  has  raised  a  certain  weight 
has  expended  meanwhile  a  certain  amount  of  force ; 
but  persons  striving  merely  to  have  the  weight 
raised  care  nothing  for  the  other,  and  may  call  it 
"  incidental ;  "  which  incidental  part,  however,  may 
be  the  essential  element  in  the  view  of  the  engineer 
who  requires  to  generate  the  steam.  In  the  proper 
enunciation  of  the  cause  and  the  effect  —  the  invari- 
able and  unconditional  cause  and  effect  —  there 
should  be  a  statement  of  all  the  concurring  antece- 


CAUSATION.  283 

dents,  and  all  the  involved  consequents,  including 
the  conditions  in  the  cause,  and  the  incidents  in  the 
effect. 

By  carrying  out  this  doctrine  consistently,  we  are 
able  to  give  (which  Mr.  Mill  has  not  done)  its 
proper  place  to  the  "  Agent "  and  "  Patient ; "  the 
distinction  between  which  has  been  noticed  in  some 
form  or  other  by  most  philosophers  from  the  time  of 
Aristotle.  The  agent  and  patient  are  certainly  not 
to  be  identified  with  the  cause  and  effect ;  but  they 
are  to  be  found  in  the  cause,  that  is,  in  the  assem- 
blage of  circumstances  necessary  in  order  to  the 
production  of  the  effect.  These  circumstances  or 
agencies  must  concur,  in  short,  must  operate  on 
each  other,  in  order  to  action  and  change.  Thus,  in 
order  to  the  production  of  water,  there  must  be  both 
oxygen  and  hydrogen;  the  two  act  on  each  other 
according  to  their  nature  and  laws ;  and  both  are 
changed  and  appear  in  the  product.  That  which 
we  consider  as  acting  may  be  called  the  Agent;  that 
which  we  regard  as  acted  on  may  be  considered  as 
the  Patient.  It  should  be  observed  and  remembered, 
that  the  agent  under  one  aspect  is  always  a  patient 
under  another,  and  the  patient  may  also  be  viewed 
as  an  agent ;  for  that  which  acts  is  always  acted  on, 
and  that  which  is  acted  on  always  acts ;  and  action 
is  always  equal  to  reaction.  The  account  now  given 
enables  us  to  settle  a  question  which  has  often  been 
started,  but  never  determined  satisfactorily.  The 
question  is,  Is  the  effect  always  posterior  in  time  to 


284  CAUSATION. 

the  cause,  or  may  it  not  be  contemporaneous  ?  The 
answer  is,  that  the  complex  effect  always  follows  the 
complex  cause ;  but  that  the  concurrent  agents  which 
constitute  the  cause  may  be  regarded  as  acting  on 
each  other  simultaneously.  The  oxygen  and  the 
hydrogen  influence  each  other  contemporaneously, 
and  are  followed  by  the  production  of  water  as  the 
effect. 

The  reader  may  compare  the  statement  now 
offered  with  that  given  by  Mr.  Mill  in  his  chapter 
''  Of  the  Law  of  Universal  Causation."  Mr.  Mill  has 
not  seen  that  as  the  cause  consists  in  an  assemblage 
of  conditions,  so  the  effect  consists  in  an  assemblage 
of  consequences.  In  the  agents  concurring  in  the 
cause  there  is  a  real  distinction  between  agent  and 
patient,  whereas  he  says  the  distinction  vanishes  on 
examination,  or  rather  is  found  to  be  merely  verbal. 
He  has  discussed,  but  avowedly  does  not  know  how 
to  settle,  the  question  as  to  whether  the  cause  pre- 
cedes the  effect.  He  has  also  noticed  the  circum- 
stance, that  in  some  cases  when  the  cause  ceases,  the 
effect  also  seems  to  cease,  whereas  in  others  the 
effect  appears  to  remain ;  but  he  has  not  been  able 
to  give  a  full  explanation  of  the  phenomenon.  The 
effect  remains  when  the  assemblage  of  circumstan- 
ces which  constitute  the  cause  abides.  It  is  thus  a 
book  remains  on  the  table  as  long  as  the  table  is  in 
a  position  to  uphold  it.  It  is  thus  oxygen  and  hy- 
drogen abide  in  water  till  an  element  with  a 
stronger  affinity  with  one  of  them  succeeds  in  draw- 


CAUSATIOy.  2S5 

ing  it  off.  In  other  cases  the  concurrence  of  agencies 
acting  as  the  cause  is  ever  Uable  to  be  broken  up, 
and  the  effect  ceases  when  the  complex  cause  has 
disappeared.  It  is  thus  that  the  book  is  upheld  in 
my  hand  only  so  long  as  I  stretch  out  my  arm: 
thus  that  the  room  is  illuminated  by  day  only  so 
lono'  as  the  smi  shines,  and  bv  nio'ht  onlv  so  lono;  as 
the  lamp  continues  to  burn.  In  all  cases  a  change 
imphes  a  new  agent,  or  a  new  concurrence  of 
agencies. 

But  we  are  now  in  the  heart  of  our  author's  logi- 
cal discussions.  ]\L\  MiU's  Logic  has  never  been  sub- 
jected to  a  careful  review  on  the  part  either  of  his 
supporters  or  opponents.  It  deserves  such  an  exam- 
ination because  of  its  excellences,  and  it  requires  it 
because  of  its  errors,  which  manv  students  are  ac- 
cepting  along  with  the  truths.  I  undertake  this 
review  in  the  immediately  succeeding  chapters. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 


THE  LOGICAL  NOTION. 


FOEMAL  Logic  is  usually  represented  as  dealing 
with  the  Notion,  Judgment,  and  Keasoning. 
Mr.  Mill  has  no  separate  exposition  of  the  Notion. 
He  treats  instead,  of  Names :  as  if  Names  did  not 
stand  for  Thoughts,  the  nature  of  which  should  have 
been  previously  investigated.  This  is  surely  a  defect 
in  an  elaborate  Logical  Treatise.  In  his  controver- 
sial work  he  has  given  us  his  theory  of  the  Notion 
or  Conception.     It  will  be  necessary  to  examine  it. 

The  Notions,  that  is,  apprehensions  of  things, 
which  the  mind  can  entertain,  are  of  three  sorts :  — 
First,  There  is  the  Singular  Concrete  Notion,  such  as 
Homer,  Yirgil,  Dante,  Milton,  this  man,  this  dog,  that 
daisy,  that  book.  This  notion  is  singular,  as  it  em- 
braces a  single  object.  It  is  concrete,  as  it  contem- 
plates the  object  as  possessing  an  aggregate  of  quali- 
ties. The  consideration  of  the  nature  of  this  notion 
does  not,  properly  speaking,  come  under  Formal 
Logic,  which  has  to  do  only  with  Discursive  Thought ; 
that  is,  thought  in  which  there  is  a  process  from  some- 
thing given  or  allowed  to  something  founded  upon  it. 

(286) 


THE  LOGICAL   NOTION.  287 

It  is  furnished  to  us  by  intuition,  primarily  by  the 
senses  and  consciousnesSj  and  does  not  imply  any  logi- 
cal operation.  But  then  it  comes  into  Logic  when  it 
is  combined  with  the  abstract  and  general  notion  in 
the  proposition  and  argument.  Thus,  when  we  say, 
"  Locke  was  an  independent  thinker,"  the  subject  is 
a  singular  concrete  notion  compared  with  a  general 
notion  in  the  predicate.  Logic,  therefore,  cannot 
overlook  this  notion,  but  it  may  hand  over  the 
special  discussion  of  its  origin  and  validity  to  psychol- 
ogy or  metaphysics.  Mr.  Mill  gives  us  a  correct 
enough  account  of  it,  though  he  does  not  specially 
investigate  its  nature  :  "  A  concrete  name  is  a  name 
which  stands  for  a  tiling."     (B.  i.  c.  ii.  4.) 

Second,  There  is  the  Abstract  Notion.  It  is  the 
apprehension  of  a  part  of  an  object  as  a  part,  say  of 
the  head  of  a  horse  as  the  head  of  a  horse.  More 
technically  it  is  the  apprehension  of  an  attribute. 
"  An  abstract  name  is  a  name  which  stands  for  an 
attribute  of  a  thing."  {lb.)  In  this  latter  sense  the 
part  cannot  exist  separate  from  the  whole  :  thus 
transparency  cannot  exist  apart  from  a  transparent 
object,  such  as  glass  or  ice.  But  though  an  abstract 
quahty  cannot  exist  apart  from  an  object,  it  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  a  nonentity  or  a  fiction  of  the  mind. 
Kationality  cannot  exist  apart  from  a  rational  being, 
but  it  has  a  real  existence  in  a  rational  being,  such 
as  man. 

On  account  of  the  defective  view  which  he  takes 
of  the  intellectual  faculties  of  man,  Mr.  MiU  has  not 


288  TEE   LOGICAL   NOTION, 

been  able  to  furnish  an  adequate  account  of  the 
Abstract  Notion.  Speaking  of  the  notion  of  length 
without  breadth,  ^^  According  to  what  appears  to  me 
the  sounder  opinion,  the  mind  cannot  form  any  such 
notion  3  it  cannot  conceive  length  without  breadth." 
(B.  I.  c.  viii.  7.)  And  in  his  recent  work,  '^  The  ex- 
istence of  Abstract  Ideas  —  the  conception  of  the 
class  qualities  by  themselves,  and  not  as  embodied 
in  an  individual  —  is  effectually  precluded  by  the 
law  of  Inseparable  Association."  (p.  314.)  The 
ambiguous  word  "  conceive  "  has  once  more  cast  up 
without  his  teUing  us  in  what  sense  he  employs  it. 
I  should  say  that  in  these  passages  he  uses  it  in  the 
sense  of  "image,"  in  which  signification  the  state- 
ment is  true.  I  believe  that  length  cannot  exist 
except  in  an  extended  object  which  has  also  breadth, 
and  I  am  sure  that  I  can  image  length  only  in  an 
extended  object.  He  adds,  that  the  mind  "  can  only, 
in  contemplating  objects,  attend  to  their  length,  ex- 
clusively of  their  other  sensible  qualities,  and  so 
determine  what  properties  may  be  predicated  of 
them  in  virtue  of  their  length  alone."  This  is  not  a 
sufficiently  comprehensive  account  of  the  Abstract 
Notion;  but  it  implies  that  there  is  more  than  a 
mere  image.  If  we  inquire  carefully  into  its  nature, 
we  shall  find  that  as  a  thought  it  implies  not  only 
attention  but  a  comparative  act.  We  apprehend  the 
attribute  to  be  an  attribute  of  the  concrete  object, 
thus  comparing  the  part  and  whole.  This  apprehen- 
sion is  the  Abstract  Notion,  and  we  can  compare  the 


THE  LOGICAL   NOTION.  289 

attribute  apprehended  with  other  attributes,  or  with 
concrete  objects  of  various  kinds,  and  make  affirma- 
tions or  denials.  Thus,  on  perceiving  a  cone  of 
sugar  as  a  concrete  object,  we  can  in  abstract 
thought  fix  on  the  figure,  and  from  the  contempla- 
tion of  it  we  might  by  a  further  abstraction  fix  on 
the  conic  sections,  and  by  a  process  of  reasoning 
evolve  their  properties.  In  all  this  we  should  be 
dealing,  not  with  mere  hypotheses,  but  abstracted 
reahties  ;  and  the  conclusions  we  reach  will  be  found 
true  of  all  cones,  and  of  all  sections  of  the  cone, 
including  the  ellijDtic  figures  in  which  the  planets 
move.^ 

Third,  There  is  the  general  Notion,  such  as  man, 
poet,  animal.  We  are  so  constantly  forming  notions 
of  this  sort,  that  it  should  not  be  difficult  to  evolve 
the  processes  involved  in  it.  The  two  first  steps 
are,  —  (1.)  that  we  observe  a  resemblance  among 
objects  3  (2.)  that  we  ^^  on  the  points  of  resem- 
blance. The  first  is  accomplished  by  the  mind's 
power  of  perceiving  agreements,  and  the  second 
by  an  operation  of  abstraction.  No  absolute  rule 
can  be  laid  down  as  to  which  of  these  processes 
is  the   prior.     I  believe  that  in  most  cases  there 

1  Regarding  Logic  as  the  Science  of  nished —  I.  The  Abstract  Quality  im- 

the  Laws  of  Discursive  Thought,  as  plies  a  Concrete  Object.      II.  When 

above  defined,  the  Abstract  Notion  is  the  Concrete  Object  is  real  the  Ab- 

clearly  embraced  in  it,  as   in   it  we  stract  Quality  taken   from  it  is   also 

draw  an  attribute  out  of  the  concrete  real.      III.   When  the  Abstract  is   a 

object  given,  and  we  must  endeavor  Quality,  it  is  not  to  be   regarded  as 

to  unfold   the   Laws  of  Thought  in-  having  an  independent  existence ;  Its 

volved  in  it.    The  following  may  serve  existence  is  in  a  Concrete  Object, 
provisonally  till  a  better  list  be  fur- 
Id 


290  THE   LOGICAL   NOTION. 

is  first  a  perception  more  or  less  vague  of  a  like- 
ness, and  then  the  separate  consideration  of  the 
points  of  likeness.  But  in  other  cases  we  seem 
rather  to  fix  primarily  on  an  attribute,  and  conjoin 
by  it  all  the  objects  which  we  discover  to  possess 
it.  Thus,  in  zoology  the  naturalist  fixes  on  the 
possession  of  a  backbone,  and  makes  it  the  bond 
of  a  class  of  animals.  But  there  is  more  in  gen- 
eralization than  either  or  than  both  of  these  steps. 
(3.)  The  consummating  step  is,  that  we  constitute 
a  class  which  embraces  all  the  objects  possessing 
the  common  attribute  or  attributes.  Till  this  step 
is  taken  there  is  no  generalization.  When  this 
step  is  taken  the  general  notion  is  formed.  Let 
it  be  observed  that  there  is  here  an  operation  be- 
yond the  other  two.  In  the  first  step  we  must 
have  observed  or  contemplated  more  or  fewer  ob- 
jects, and  perceived  them  to  resemble  each  other; 
still  the  number  was  limited.  In  the  second  step 
we  fixed  on  a  quality  or  qualities  common  to  the 
objects  noticed.  But  in  the  final  step  the  number 
of  objects  is  indefinite,  and  must  include  not 
merely  those  we  have  observed  and  compared,  but 
all  others  possessing  the  mark  or  marks  fixed  on. 
On  seeing  only  half  a  dozen  red  deer  I  may  have 
been  forcibly  struck  with  their  resemblance,  and 
may  have  been  able  to  ^^  on  their  points  of  like- 
ness,—  such  as  their  shape  and  their  noble  antlers. 
But  when  I  take  the  decisive  step  and  form  the 
class   red   deer,   that  class  must  include  not  only 


THE   LOGICAL  NOTION.  291 

those  I  have  seen,  but  all  others  with  that  form 
of  body  and  horns;   not  only  these  six  deer,  but 
all  other  deer  now  Uving,  and  all  deer  that   ever 
lived  or  shall  live;   not  only  so,  but  all  imagma- 
Ue  deer,  the  deer  sung  of  by  all  the  poets,  and  the 
d^er  that  may  be  created  by  the  ever  active  imagi- 
nation.    A  notion  is  not  general  unless  it  embraces 
all  the  objects  possessing  the  mark  or  marks  fixed 
on.    Now  this  consummating  step  has  not  been  no- 
ticedj  or  at  least  has  not  had  its  appropriate  place 
allotted  to  it,  by  most  psychologists  and  logicians. 
Dr.  Brcwn  dwells  very  fondly  on  the  feeling  of  re- 
semblance, as  he  calls  it  (he  should  have  said  the 
observati(ai   of   the   relation   of  resemblance),   but 
takes  no  notice  of  the  all-important  act  by  which  the 
species  is  aade  to  embrace  all  the  objects  havmg 
the  resemblmce.      This   specially  intellectual   step 
was  from  time  to  time  before  the  mind  of  Hamilton, 
as  when  he  sa}s,  that  "  concepts  have  only  a  poten- 
tial, not  an  actial,  universality;   that  is,  they  are 
only  universal,  ii^smuch  as  they  may  be  apphed  to 
any  of  a  certain  ^ass  of  objects."     But  with  an  oc- 
casional glimpse  o\  the  truth,  he  loses  sight  of  it 
immediately  after,  Wd   he   talks   of  a   mysterious 
"  synthesis  in  conscioisness,"  wherein  "  the  qualities, 
which   by  comparisoi\  are  judged  similar,  and  by 
attention  are  constitutW  into  an  exclusive  object  of 
thought,  —  these  are  alieady,  by  this  process,  identi- 
fied in  consciousness ;  fo.  they  are  only  judged  sim- 
ilar, inasmuch  as  they  poduce  in  us  indiscernible 


292  THE   LOGICAL   NOTION. 

effects."  [Logic,  Lect.  viii.)     His  whole  exposition  is 
confused  and  unsatisfactory,  and  it  issues  in  his  find- 
ing a  contradiction  in  the  general  notion.     He  loses 
his   consistency   and    clearness   in    endeavoring    to 
find  some  sort  of  reconciliation  between  nominalism 
and  conceptualism.     Mr.  Mill  has  unfolded  no  ele- 
ments in  the  general  notion  except  the  attribute 
and  the  name.     "  We  create  an  artificial  association 
between  those  attributes  (to  which  we  wish  tc  de- 
vote our  exclusive  attention)  and  a  certain  conbina- 
tion  of  articulate   sounds,  which  guarantees  to  us 
when  we  hear  the  sound,  or  see  the  written  charac- 
ters corresponding  to  it,  there  will  be  raised  in  the 
mind  an  idea  of  some  object  possessing  tlose  attri- 
butes, in  which  idea  those  attributes  alrne  will  be 
suggested  vividly  to  the  minds,  our  consciousness  of 
the  remainder  of  the   concrete    idea  oeing   faint." 
"  The  association  of  that  particular  se:  of  attributes 
with  a  given  word  is  what  keeps  th-^m  together  in 
the  mind  by  a  stronger  tie  than  iiat  with  which 
they  are  associated  with  the  remander  of  the  con- 
crete image."  (p.  322.)     There  is  a  great  oversight 
here.     There  is  no  reference  to  iie  discovery  of  re- 
semblances among  objects  as  cmstituting  the  com- 
mencement of  the  whole  process.     He  ascribes  to 
the  name  what  is  done  by  tie  possession  of  com- 
mon qualities.     "  For  a  clasf  is  absolutely  nothing 
but  an  indefinite  number  of  individuals  denoted  by 
a  general  name.     The  nane  given  to  them  in  com- 
mon  is   what    makes    then   a   class."      But  what 


THE    LOGICAL    NOTIOIN'.  293 

makes  the  name  applicable  to  the  indefinite  number 
of  objects  ?  What  enables  us,  when  we  discover  a 
new  object,  to  say  whether  it  is  or  is  not  entitled  to 
the  name?  The  answer  to  these  questions  will  force 
us  to  look  beyond  the  name  to  the  like  attributes  in 
the  objects,  as  making  the  objects  pass  under  the 
same  name,  as  enabling  us  to  miderstand  what  is 
denoted  by  the  name,  as  being  the  meaning  of  the 
name,  and,  in  fact,  constituting  the  bond  which  joins 
the  objects  in  a  class.  There  is  a  passage  in  which 
he  has  a  glimpse  of  the  consummating  step,  and 
indeed  of  the  whole  process. .  "  The  only  mode  in 
which  any  general  name  has  a  definite  meaning, 
is  by  being  a  name  of  an  indefinite  variety  of  things, 
namely,  all  things  kno^vn  or  unknown,  past,  present, 
or  futm-e,  which  possess  certain  attributes."  [Logic,  i. 
V.  3.)  This  language  does  point  to  something  else 
than  the  name  as  bringing  together  "  the  indefinite 
number  of  individuals  in  the  class : "  it  points  to  the 
possession  of  "  certain  attributes  "  in  the  "  indefinite 
variety  of  things ; "  and  it  implies,  though  it  does 
not  just  state,  that  the  class  must  include  all  the 
objects  possessing  these  attributes.  This  account, 
consequentially  followed  out,  makes  the  common 
notion  embrace  three  elements:  objects  resembling 
each  other ;  points  of  resemblance ;  and  the  inclu- 
sion of  all  objects  having  these  points.  But  Mr. 
Mill  habitually  loses  sight  of  some  of  these  essential 
characteristics,  and  ever  falls  back  upon  the  attribute 
and  the  name.     This  omission  in  the  theory  of  the 


294  THE  LOGICAL   NOTION. 

notion  comes  out  in  positive  error  in  the  account  of 
the  judgmen-*,  and  reasoning. 

According  to  the  exposition  now  given,  the  Class- 
Notion  always  includes  both  objects  and  attributes, 
objects  having  a  resemblance,  and  common  attri- 
butes possessed  by  them.  So  far  as  it  embraces 
objects,  it  is  said  to  have  Extension.  So  far  as  it 
contains  attributes,  it  is  said  to  have  Comprehension 
or  Intension.  This  distinction  was  indicated  in  the 
Port-Royal  Logic,  and  was  enunciated  in  several 
logical  works  published  in  the  end  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury^. It  has  been  elaborated  with  great  care,  at 
times  with  an  excess  of  refinement,  by  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton.  That  every  general  notion  should 
have  both  these  aspects,  follows  from  the  ac- 
count I  have  given  of  its  formation  and  constitu- 
tion. In  every  General  Notion  there  must  be 
objects  compared;  this  constitutes  the  Extension. 
There  must  also  be  marks  to  bring  the  objects 
together  under  one  head;  this  is  Comprehension. 
The  former  is  got  by  observation  and  comparison, 
the  latter  by  abstraction.  We  see  that  as  the  one 
rises  the  other  falls,  and  that  as  the  one  falls  the 
other  rises.  As  we  multiply  the  marks  or  attributes, 
there  must  be  fewer  objects  possessing  them.     As 

1  In  particular,  I  have  found  it  in  a  an   Introduction   to   Logic  {2d   edit., 

Compend    of    Logic,    prepared    and  1722)  by  Gershom  Carmichaelof  Glas- 

printed  (there  is    no  evidence  of  its  gow  University ;  and  again  in  a  Com- 

having  been  published)  for  use  of  the  pend  of  Logic  by  Francis  Hutcheson, 

Scottish  Universities,    by  order  of  a  which  was  used  in  Glasgow  College 

Parliamentary  Commission,  1795  ;  in  till  towards  the  close  of  last  century. 


THE   LOGICAL   NOTION.  295 

we  multiplj  the  objects,  they  must  have  fewer  com- 
mon marks.  Hence  the  rule,  that  the  greater  the 
Extension,  the  less  the  Comprehension;  and  the 
greater  the  Comprehension,  the  less  the  Extension. 

Upon  this  distinction  the  remark  is,  "  that  the  Ex- 
tension is  not  anything  intrinsic  to  the  concept ;  it 
is  the  sum  of  all  the  objects,  in  our  concrete  images 
of  which  the  concept  is  included  :  but  the  compre- 
hension is  the  very  concept  itself;  for  the  concept 
means  nothing  but  our  mental  representation  of  the 
sum  of  the  attributes  composing  it."  (p.  333.)     It  is 
clear   that   of   the    three    constituents    of   common 
notions  he  gives  the  chief,  or  rather  exclusive,  place 
to  the  attributes.     "  All  men,  and  the  class  man,  are 
expressions  which  point  to  nothing  but  attributes ; 
they  cannot  be  interpreted   except  in  comprehen- 
sion." (p.  363.)     In   opposition   to  this,  I  maintain 
that  the  Extension  of  the  notion  is  quite  as  impor- 
tant an  aspect  of  it  as   the    Comprehension;   that 
every  common  notion  may  be  interpreted  in  Exten- 
sion as  well  as  Intension;  that  in  the    class    there 
must  be  objects  to  combine  as  well  as  attributes  to 
combine  them;    and    that  a  mental   representation 
must  be  inadequate  which  does   not   embrace   the 
objects  as  well  as  the  sum  of  the  attributes  possessed 
by  them.    The  Universal  Notion  is  of  objects  possess- 
ing common  attributes,  the  notion  including  all  the 
objects  possessing  the  attributes.    We  see  here,  in  Mr. 
Mill's  logical  doctrine,  a  taint  at  the  fountam,  which 
will  be  found  running  through  the  whole  stream. 


296  TEE  LOGICAL   NOTION, 

"  General  concepts,  therefore,  we  have,  properly 
speaking,  none."  "I  consider  it  nothing  less  than 
a  misfortune  that  the  words  Concept,  General  No- 
tion, or  any  other  phrase  to  express  the  supposed 
mental  modification  corresponding  to  a  class  name, 
should  ever  have  been  invented.  Above  all,  I  hold 
that  nothing  but  confusion  ever  results  from  intro- 
ducing the  term  Concept  into  Logic;  and  that 
instead  of  the  Concept  of  a  class,  we  should  always 
speak  of  the  signification  of  a  class  name."  (pp.  321, 
331.)  But  surely  it  is  desirable  to  have  a  word  to 
express  the  "mental  modification"  when  we  con- 
template a  "class,"  and  Conception  or  General  No- 
tion seems  appropriate  enough.  I  also  think  it 
desirable  to  have  a  phrase  to  denote,  not  the  "  signi- 
fication of  a  class  name,"  but  the  thing  signified  by 
the  class  name  ;  and  the  fittest  I  can  think  of  is 
Concept.  Mr.  Mill  would  replace  Abstract  and 
General  Idea  by  "  the  connotation  of  the  class  name." 
I  reckon  the  epithet  "  connotation  "  a  very  good  one 
for  some  purposes.  It  was  used  by  the  schoolmen ; 
it  was  a  favorite  one  with  Mr.  James  Mill ;  and  has 
had  a  clear  meaning  attached  to  it.  "  A  connotative 
term  is  one  which  denotes  a  subject  and  implies  an 
attribute."  Thus,  "  white  "  is  connotative ;  "  it  de- 
notes all  things  white,  as  snow,  paper,  the  foam  of 
the  sea,  etc. ;  and  implies,  or,  as  it  was  termed  by 
the  schoolmen,  connotes  the  attribute  whiteness." 
But  while  "  connotative "  is  an  expressive  enovigh 
epithet,  applied   to  certain   predicates,  it  does   not 


THE   LOGICAL   NOTION.  297 

bring  out  what  is  contained  in  the  class-notion. 
^^  Horse/'  for  example,  is  a  general  notion,  embrac- 
ing an  indefinite  number  of  objects ;  but  all  this  is 
not  expressed  by  applying  the  phrase  "  connotative." 
"It  denotes  a  subject;"  but  what  is  the  subject? 
This  question  is  left  unanswered.  It  can  be  answered 
only  by  saying  that  it  consists  of  all  the  objects 
possessing  the  attributes  -,  and  as  to  the  phrase  "  sig- 
nification of  the  class  name,"  it  leaves  it  unsettled 
what  the  thing  signified  is.  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  the  words  Conception  and  Concept  serve  a 
good  purpose  ;  they  express  the  signification  of  the 
class  name.^ 

The  General  Notion  being  formed  in  the  way  ex- 
plained, we  fix  it  and  preserve  it,  and  think  of  it  by 
means  of  a  Sign.  The  Sign  may  be  one  or  other  of 
two  sorts.  Lauding  the  founder  of  his  School,  Mr. 
Mill  says,  "  It  is  a  doctrine  of  one  of  the  most  fertile 
thinkers  of  modern  times,  Auguste  Comte,  that, 
besides  the  logic  of  signs,  there  is  a  logic  of  images, 
and  a  logic  of  feelings.  In  many  of  the  familiar 
processes  of  thought,  and  especially  m  uncultured 
minds,  a  visual  image  serves  instead  of  a  word."  (p. 
329.)  Omitting  the  consideration  of  the  logic  of 
feelings  as  not  coming  specially  before  us,  the  doc- 
trine attributed  to  Comte  as  so  "  fertile  "  a  thinker 


1  The    following  are  some   of  the  Eeal.     III.     The  Eeality  in  the  Uni- 

Laws  of  Thought  involved  in  the  Gen-  versal   consists    in  the  possession  of 

eral  Notion :  —  I.  The   Universal  im-  common  attributes  by  all  the  objects 

plies  Singulars.     II.  When  the   Sin-  embraced  in  it. 
gulars  are  Real  the  Universal  is  also 


298  THE  LOGICAL   NOTION. 

was  long  ago  proclaimed  by  Aristotle^  and  has  floated 
ever  since,  in  a  more  or  less  correct  form,  in  logic 
and  speculative  philosophy.  According  to  Aristotle, 
a  notion  is  not  the  same  as  a  phantasm,  but  it  is 
never  found  without  a  phantasm.^  The  expression 
of  Mr.  Mill  is  much  more  loose.  He  talks  of  a 
"  logic  of  images ; "  whereas  it  is  not  a  logic,  but  a 
notion  entertained  by  means  of  an  image.  He 
speaks  of  the  image  being  a  "  visual  sensation  "  and 
"  visual  appearance  ; "  whereas  it  may  be  a  phantasm 
by  any  of  the  senses,  —  it  may  be  of  a  smell,  or  a 
taste,  or  a  touch,  or  a  sound. 

I  believe  that  the  General  Notion  is  kept  before 
the  mind  primarily  by  the  phantasm.  In  every 
such  notion  the  objects  are  indefinite  —  are  innu- 
merable ]  and  so  the  human  mind  (whatever  angelic 
minds  may  do)  cannot  image  them  all;  but  it  images 
one  as  a  sign  of  the  others.  The  attribute,  or  aggre- 
gate of  attributes,  cannot  be  imaged  apart  from 
objects,  but  we  labor  to  fashion  an  object  which 
may  give  prominence  to  the  one  attribute,  if  there 
be  only  one,  or  combine  them  if  there  be  many. 
This,  I  am  persuaded,  is  the  original  and  spontaneous 
agency  by  which  we  carry  with  us  and  compare  our 
concepts.  Mr.  Mill  has  a  glimpse  of  this,  and  noth- 
ing more,  when  he  says  that  "  in  uncultured  minds  a 
visual   image  serves  instead  of  words."     The   more 

1  Distinguishing  between  Notions,  dmaei  tov  firi  (baviaafiara  elvai,  ri  ovdi 
voTffiara,  and  <l>avTaaiiaTa,  Aristotle  ravra  (pavracjf^aTa,  dW  ovk  avev  <j>av. 
says  (see  Anim.  iii.  7),  NoT/fiaTa  tivI    raciiaTidv. 


THE   LOGICAL  NOTION.  299 

correct  expression  would  be,  that  in  cultured  minds 
the  word  often  comes  to  serve  the  purpose  of  the 
image  and  to  supersede  it.  I  believe  we  naturally 
resort  to  the  image ;  but  the  image  is  always  felt  to 
be  inadequate.  Hence  the  common  remark,  that 
we  cannot  have  an  adequate  idea,  that  is,  in  the 
sense  of  image,  of  a  class.  Suppose  the  notion  to  be 
"quadruped :"  when  we  think  about  the  class,  we 
may,  and  do  commonly,  image  some  sort  of  beast  with 
four  Hmbs  ;  but  if  the  limbs  be  those  of  a  horse,  they 
cannot  be  those  of  a  dog,  and  if  they  be  those  of  a 
dog,  they  cannot  be  those  of  the  horse  ;  and  if  they 
be  different  from  either,  they  cannot  be  those  either 
of  the  horse  or  the  dog.  All  this  does  not  prove 
that  we  cannot  in  thought  form  a  general  notion,  or 
that  we  cannot  legitimately  employ  it  in  judgment 
and  reasoning ;  it  merely  shows  that  the  image,  as 
being  single,  is  not  equal  to  the  indefinite  number 
of  objects,  and,  as  being  concrete,  cannot  be  identi- 
cal with  the  attribute,  which  is  abstract.  The  fact 
is,  the  image,  or,  as  I  prefer  calling  it  with  Aristotle, 
the  phantasm,  is  a  mere  sign,  —  one  for  the  many, 
that  one  being  as  far  as  possible  a  type  of  the  many. 
The  mind  spontaneously  forms  such  representations, 
and  delights  to  do  so ;  and  when  it  can  have  them, 
the  thinking  is  rendered  much  more  vivid  and 
pleasant,  and  is  more  readily  accompanied  with  ex- 
citement and  emotion. 

But  when  the  generahzations  are  very  high,  when 
the  abstractions  are  very  refined,  and  the  common 


300  THE  LOGICAL   NOTION. 

attributes  are  very  numerous^  or  not  very  definitely 
fixed,  it  becomes  all  but  impossible  to  construct  a 
phantasm  which  will  represent  the  class.  We  can 
form  a  pretty  fair  representative  image  of  quadru- 
ped, but  what  phantasm  could  stand  for  such  com- 
plex notions  as  civilization,  liberty,  politics,  art,  and 
science  ?  In  striving  to  compass  such  notions^  we 
naturally  resort  to  artificial  symbols,  particularly 
language.  If  there  be  a  word  suitable  to  express 
the  thought,  it  wiU  employ  it;  if  there  be  not,  it 
will  labor  to  invent  one.  But  so  far  from  images 
serving  instead  of  words,  the  words  serve  our  pur- 
pose as  being  images.  It  has  been  remarked  by 
metaphysicians  that  most  names  were  originally  of 
individual  objects.  An  individual  object,  or  the 
image  of  it,  was  first  taken  to  represent  the  class ; 
and  then  the  name  of  the  individual,  as  a  sound  or 
a  written  character  addressed  to  the  eye,  was  used 
as  a  briefer  and  more  convenient  symbol.  The  ad- 
vantage of  such  verbal  signs,  which  are  always,  be  it 
remarked,  in  a  sense  phantasms  addressed  to  the  eye 
or  ear,  is  that  they  do  not  distract  us  with  the 
peculiarities  of  individual  objects,  and  allow  us  in 
thinking  to  proceed  only  on  the  common  qualities  of 
objects.  All  this  renders  the  notion  less  lively  and 
emotional,  —  unless  indeed  by  those  who  resort  to 
word-painting  to  raise  up  a  phantasm,  —  but  at  the 
same  time  better  fitted  for  the  conducting  of  rigid 
thought.  The  most  perfect  artifical  signs  for  the 
limited  end  in  view  are  those  employed  in  algebra. 


THE  LOGICAL    I^OTIOJ^-.  301 

in  which  meaningless  letters  denote  quantities  known 
or  unknown,  and  we  can  employ  them  according  to 
the    settled  laws  of  reasoning  in  quantity  without 
thinking  of  what  they  stand  for,  till  we  reach  the 
result,  when  we  translate  the  sign  into  what  it  signi- 
fies. When  we  lose  sight  for  the  time  for  what  the  sign 
stands  for,  this  is  what  constitutes,  properly  speak-' 
ing,   Symbohcal   Thought.     But  it  is  always  to  be 
understood  that  the   sign  does  stand   for  a  notion, 
and  has  always  a  tacit  reference  to  it ;    that  we  can 
predicate    of  the    sign   only  what  we  could   legiti- 
mately predicate  of  the  notion;    and  that   in  pass- 
ing it  on  from  premises  to  conclusion  in  a  chain  of 
reasoning,  we   must  be   sure  that  we   proceed   on 
principles  which  are  appHcable  to  the  thing  signified. 
And  in  order  to  determine  whether  we  are  or  are 
not   making  a  proper   predication,  we  can   always, 
and   should  often,  require  that  the  sign  should  be 
translated  into   the   notion,   and  the    notion   com- 
pared with  the  thing.-^ 

A  distinction  of  some  importance  may  be  drawn 
between  two  kinds  of  Concepts.  In  the  one  the 
class  is  determined  by  a  single    attribute,  or  by  it 


1  The  following   are  some  of  tlie  Notion.     IV.  In  order  to  determine 

Laws  of  Thought  involved  in  the  use  whether  we  are  malting  a  proper  pred- 

of  Signs  as  Instruments  of  Thought :  ication   as  to  the    Sign,  we  may  de- 

—  I.  Every  Logical  Term  stands  for  a  mand  at   any  time  that  the  Notion  be 

Notion,  which  may  be  a  Singular  Con-  substituted   for  it.      V.  In    order  to 

Crete,  an   Abstract,   or    a  Universal,  determine  whether  we  are  making  a 

II.  According  as  it  stands  for  one   or  proper  predication  as  to  the  Notion,  we 
other  of  these,  so  is  it  to  be  interpreted,  must  inquire  what  is  the  nature  of  the 

III.  We  can  predicate    of  the   Sign  Things  from  which  it  has  been  formed, 
only  what  might  be  predicated  of  the 


302  THE   LOGICAL   NOTION. 

together  with  the  attributes  implied  in  it.  Such 
are  the  classes  designated  by  adjectives,  as  gener- 
ous, flxithful,  virtuous,  —  pointing  to  one  quality 
of  an  object,  along  with  those  that  may  be  involved 
in  that  quality.  It  is  to  these  phrases  that  the 
epithet  '^  connotative  "  is  specially  applicable ;  they 
denote  an  attribute,  and  connote  objects  possessing 
it.  In  other  cases  the  Comprehension  of  the  class 
consists  of  an  aggregate  of  attributes.  Thus,  we 
cannot  fi-K  on  any  one  attribute  of  the  class  Man, 
and  derive  all  the  others  from  it.  Rationality  is 
one  quality,  but  he  has  many  others : 

"  Men  define  a  man 
The  creature  who  stands  frontward  to  the  stars, 
The  creature  who  looks  inward  to  himself, 
The  tool-wrifyht,  laughing  creature.     'Tis  enough; 
We'll  say  instead  the  inconsequent  creature  man, 
For  that's  his  specialty.     What  creature  else 
Conceives  the  circle,  and  then  walks  the  square  ?  " 

The  one  kind  of  notions  I  would  be  inclined  to  caU, 
when  it  is  necessary  to  draw  the  distinction  between 
them,  the  Generalized  Abstract,  because  in  it  we 
seize  on  a  single  quality,  and  put  all  the  objects 
possessing  it  into  a  class.  The  other  I  call  the 
Generalized  Concrete,  because  in  it  we  bring  to- 
gether, by  certain  resemblances,  individuals  with 
their  aggregate  of  qualities.  It  was  to  the  latter 
that  the  schoolmen  appropriated  the  phrase  Species ; 
I  think  they  would  scarcely  have  applied  it  to  the 
Generalized  Abstract  such  as   "  rational "   or  "  irra- 


THE  LOGICAL   NOTION.  303 

tional."  The  Generalized  Concrete  evidently  in- 
cludes all  natural  classes,  such  as  reptiles,  fishes, 
birds,  mammals,  in  the  animal  kingdom,  and  rosa- 
ceae,  cruciferas,  solanaceas  in  the  vegetable  kingdom ; 
the  objects  embraced  in  these  have  all  a  number  of 
common  qualities. 

It  is  of  unportance  to  keep  these  distinctions  in 
view  m  considering  the  nature  of  Definition.  In 
defining  the  Generalized  Abstract  Notion,  we  have 
only  to  bring  out  the  one  common  quality,  and  the 
work  is  completed.  But  in  attempting  to  define 
the  Generalized  Concrete,  we  cannot  ^^  on  any  one 
quahty  as  being  the  essential  one ;  and  it  often 
happens  that  the  common  attributes  are  so  numer- 
ous, that  it  would  be  vain  and  presumptuous  to 
attempt  to  specify  all  of  them.  Thus,  no  one  can 
tell  what  are  the  properties  embraced  in  Iiorse,  dog, 
metal,  mineral.  It  fortunately,  I  believe  providen- 
tially, happens  that  we  have  in  nature  classes  called 
Kinds,  the  nature  of  which  has  been  so  well  ex- 
pounded by  Mr.  MiU.  In  these,  one  of  the  Marks  is 
an  invariable  accompaniment,  and  therefore  a  sign 
of  the  others;  and  in  specifying  it  we  have  truly 
fixed  the  significates  of  the  notion,  that  is,  comprised 
all  the  objects  embraced  in  it  and  excluded  others. 
Thus  it  is  a  good  definition  to  say,  "  Man  is  a  rational 
animal,"  for  all  his  other  special  attributes  are  con- 
joined with  rationality.  If  we  call  the  attribute 
fixed  on  the  Differentia,  the  others  may  be  repre- 
sented as  Propria,  if  we  wish  to  retain,  after  amend- 


304  THE   LOGICAL   NOTION. 

ing  it,  the  distinction  of  Porphyry  between  Differen- 
tia and  Proprium. 

Mr.  Mill  has  offered  some  valuable  remarks  on 
Pefinition,  but  from  overlooking  the  distinction 
between  the  Extension  and  Comprehension  of  a 
Notion,  he  has  not  given  us  a  thoroughly  scientific 
account  of  the  logical  process.  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton is  right  in  saying,  after  older  logicians,  that  it 
is  effected  according  to  the  Comprehension  of  a 
Notion  j  that  is,  it  reflectively  brings  out  the  Marks 
by  which  those  who  spontaneously  formed  the  con- 
cept combined  the  objects.  From  overlooking  Ex- 
tension Mr.  Mill  has  omitted  Division,  a  subject 
which  ought  to  be  discussed  in  all  logical  treatises. 
Logical  Division  proceeds  according  to  the  Exten- 
sion of  a  Notion,  and  spreads  out  the  co-ordinate 
species  of  a  genus,  according  to  marks  added,  so  that 
the  species  exclude  one  another,  and  together  make 
up  the  genus. 


CHAPTER    XY 


LOGICAL    JUDGMENT. 


THERE  is  no  part  of  Logic  which  has  greater  need 
of  being  thoroughly  cleared  up  than  that  which 
relates  to  Judgment.  In  particular,  first,  what  pre- 
cisely are  the  things  compared,  and  in  regard  to 
which  the  affirmation  or  denial  is  made?  In  the 
common  logical  treatises  we  are  said  to  compare 
two  notions  and  declare  their  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment. Mr.  Mill  has  made  an  important  correction 
of  this  statement:  "Propositions  (except  when  the 
mind  itself  is  the  subject  treated  of)  are  not  asser- 
tions respecting  our  ideas  of  things,  but  assertions 
respecting  the  things  themselves.  In  order  to  be- 
Heve  that  gold  is  yellow,  I  must  indeed  have  the 
idea  of  gold  and  the  idea  of  yellow,  and  something 
having  reference  to  these  ideas  must  take  place  hi 
my  mind ;  but  my  behef  has  not  reference  to  the 
ideas,  it  has  reference  to  the  things."  [Logic,  i.  v.  1.) 
"Do  we  never  judge  or  assert  anything  but  our 
mere  notions  of  things?  Do  we  not  make  judg- 
ments and  assert  propositions  respectmg  actual 
thmgs  ?  "  (p.  346.)     There  is  truth  here.     But  is  the 

20  (305) 


306  LOGICAL   JUDGMENT. 

whole  truth  set  forth  ?  The  judgment  is  pronounced 
in  regard  to  objects,  but  then,  it  must  be  of  objects 
of  which  we  have  a  notion.  The  judgment  is  not 
pronounced  of  our  notions  as  mental  phenomena, 
but  neither  can  it  be  of  things  of  which  we  have 
had  no  notion,  —  of  such  we  can  make  no  predica- 
tion. He  tells  us  again  and  again,  "The  judgment 
is  concerning  the  fact,  not  the  concept."  But  then 
he  is  obliged  to  allow,  "  that  in  order  to  believe  that 
gold  is  yellow,  I  must,  indeed,  have  the  idea  ,  of 
gold,  and  the  idea  of  yellow,  and  something  hav- 
ing reference  to  these  ideas  must  take  place  in  my 
mind;"  and  he  adds,  that  in  order  to  believe,  "a 
previous  mental  conception  of  the  facts  is  an  indis- 
pensable condition."  I  ask,  should  not  this  indispen- 
sable condition  have  a  place  in  the  full  statement  of 
the  nature  of  propositions  ?  There  is  a  sentence  in 
which  he  has  got  at  least  a  momentary  view  of  the 
correct  doctrine:  "The  real  object  of  belief  is  not 
the  concept,  or  any  relation  of  the  concept,  but  the 
fact  conceived."  (p.  348.)  Yes,  the  facts  conceived 
are  what  we  compare.  If  we  could  get  philosophers 
to  reserve  the  word  "  conception "  for  the  mental 
operation,  and  apply  the  word  "  concept "  exclusively 
and  consistently,  not  to  the  mental  product,  as  Ham- 
ilton does,  but  to  the  things  conceived,  then  the 
proper  account  of  Judgment,  when  we  have  a  class- 
notion,  would  be,  the  act  in  which  we  compare  two 
concepts.  This  account  embraces  the  full  mental 
operation,  and  throws  us  back  first  upon  the  notions 


LOGICAL    JUDGMENT.  307 

tliat  we  may  judge  of  them,  and  these  throw  us 
back  on  the  thmgs  from  which  the  notions  have 
been  formed. 

This  leads  me  to  notice  another  misapprehension 
of  our  author's.  Here,  as  all  throughout  his  Logic, 
he  makes  us  look  to  names  rather  than  to  thoughts. 
But  surely  Locke  has  shown,  in  that  third  book 
of  his  Essay,  which  Mr.  Mill  so  commends,  that 
names  should  ever  carry  us  back  to  ideas,  which 
ideas,  as  Bacon  had  previously  shown,  should  ever 
carry  us  back  to  things.  Logic  has  to  do  primarily 
with  Thought  as  employed  about  Thmgs,  and  with 
Names  only  secondarily  and  incidentally,  as  being 
the  expression  of  Thoughts.  It  is  thus  only  that  we 
can  employ  the  laws  of  thought,  which  are  fixed,  to 
enable  us  to  examine  and  correct  language,  which  is 
variable.  But  Mr.  IVIill  reverses  this  order,  and 
makes  Logic  deal  primarily  with  the  proposition 
or  expression,  and  not  with  the  judgment  or  com- 
parison, (p.  357.) 

But  the  important  and  unsettled  question  is, 
What  is  the  precise  relation  between  the  two  Con- 
cepts or  Terms  in  Judgment?  When  it  is  said  to 
be  an  agreement  or  disagreement,  the  language  is 
far  too  vague  for  philosophic  ]3urposes.  Sir  WiUiam 
Hamilton  vacillates  in  the  account  given  by  him. 
His  common  representation  is  that  the  relation  is 
one  of  whole  and  parts.  "We  may  articulately 
define  a  judgment  or  proposition  to  be  the  product 
of  that  act  by  which  we  pronounce,  that,  of  two 


308  LOGICAL   JUDGMENT. 

notions  thought  as  subject  and  as  predicate,  the  one 
does  or  does  not  constitute  a  part  of  the  other, 
either  m  the  quantity  of  extension  or  in  the  quan- 
tity of  comprehension."  {Logic,  i.  p.  229.)  In  other 
places  the  relation  seems  rather  to  be  spoken  of  as 
one  of  equality,  and  he  would  interpret  ^^all  men 
are  mortal "  as  "  all  men  =  some  mortals."  Again, 
he  seems  to  make  the  relation  one  of  identity;  for 
he  says  that  the  law  of  identity  "  is  the  principle  of 
all  logical  affirmation  and  definition"  [lb.  p.  80), 
and  he  speaks  of  the  two  notions  being  "  conceived 
as  one."  {IK  p.  227.) 

It  is  not  very  easy,  amidst  Mr.  Mill's  criticisms  of 
others,  to  find  his  own  theory.  He  tells  us,  "Ex- 
istence, Co-existence,  Sequence,  Causation,  Resem- 
blance, one  or  other  of  these,  is  asserted  or  denied  in 
every  proposition  without  exception."  But  then  he 
explains  away  the  affirmations  and  denials  as  to  Ex- 
istence and  Causation;  for  Existence,  that  is,  nou- 
menon,  is  unknown  and  unknowable,  and  Causation 
is  unconditional  sequence.  There  remain  only  three 
relations,  and  the  judgment  is  a  recognition  of  a  re- 
lation "of  a  succession,  a  co-existence,  or  a  simili- 
tude between  facts."  (p.  353.)  But  he  has  a  way  of 
still  further  reducing  the  number  of  relations.  For 
propositions  which  assert  a  resemblance,  such  as 
"this  color  is  like  that  color,"  "might  with  some 
plausibility  be  brought  within  the  description  of  an 
affirmation  of  sequence,  by  considering  it  as  an  as- 
sertion that  the  simultaneous  contemplation  of  the 


LOGICAL   JUDGMENT.  309 

two  colors  is  followed  by  a  specij&c  feeling,  termed 
the  feeling  of  resemblance."  And  as  to  the  allega- 
tion that  the  propositions  of  which  the  predicate 
is  a  general  name,  affirm  or  deny  resemblance,  he 
says,  that  what  is  declared  is  the  possession  of  "  cer- 
tain common  pecuharities,"  "  and  those  peculiarities 
it  is  which  the  terms  connote,  and  which  the  prop- 
ositions consequently  assert,  not  the  resemblance." 
{Logic,  I.  V.  6.)  By  this  subtle  but  not  satisfactory 
process,  in  which,  as  usual,  he  reaches  simplicity 
by  overlooking  th9  pecuharities  of  the  phenomenon, 
he  makes  propositions  to  declare  "  that  a  certain  attri- 
bute is  either  part  of  a  given  set  of  attributes,  or  in- 
variably co-exists  with  them."  (p.  361.)  His  final 
reduction  is  thus  expressed :  "  Propositions  in  which 
the  conce|)t  of  the  predicate  is  part  of  the  concept 
of  the  subject,  or,  to  express  om-selves  more  phil- 
osophically, in  which  the  attributes  connoted  by 
the  predicate  are  part  of  those  connoted  by  the 
subject,  are  a  kind  of  Identical  Propositions :  they 
convey  no  information,  but  at  most  remind  us  of 
what,  if  we  understood  the  word  which  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  proposition,  we  knew  as  soon  as  the 
word  is  pronounced.  Propositions  of  this  kind  are 
either  definitions,  or  parts  of  definitions.  These 
judgments  are  analytical:  they  analyze  the  conno- 
tation of  the  subject-name,  and  predicate  separably 
the  different  attributes  which  the  name  asserts  col- 
lectively. All  other  affirmative  judgments  are  syn- 
thetical, and  affirm  that  some  attribute,  or  set  of 


310  LOGICAL   JVDGMJENT. 

attributes,  is,  not  a  part  of  those  connoted  by  the 
subjectoame,  but  an  invariable  accompaniment  of 
them."  (p.  359.)  This  analysis  accords  thoroughly 
with  Mr.  Mill's  psychological  theory,  and  helps  to 
prop  it.  It  makes  all  judgments  relate  to  attributes, 
and  simply  to  proclaim  either  an  identity,  or  co- 
existence among  them,  —  which  attributes  are  in 
the  end  sensations,  or  possibilities  of  sensation.  But 
it  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  revelations  of  con- 
sciousness, which  show  us  that  the  mind  pronounces 
judgments  not  as  to  abstract  attributes,  but  as  to 
things  with  attributes-  and  not  only  of  identity 
and  co-existence,  but  of  whole  and  parts,  of  resem- 
blance, of  space,  of  quantity,  and  active  property. 
(See  supra,  pp.  217,  218.) 

Much  clearness,  as  it  appears  to  me,  may  be  in- 
troduced into  this  subject  by  distinguishing  three 
classes  of  judgments,  corresponding  to  three  classes 
of  notions : 

(1.)  There  are  judgments  in  which  the  objects 
compared  are  Singular  Concretes;  as  when  by  the 
eye  I  see  two  marbles  and  judge  them  to  be  of 
the  same  size,  or  by  the  ear  hear  two  sounds  and  de- 
clare one  of  them  to  be  louder  than  the  other.  In 
the  order  of  time  these  are  the  first  judgments  pro- 
nounced by  the  mind.  It  is  by  a  succession  of  them, 
that  is,  by  observing  resemblances  among  a  number 
of  individual  objects  that  we  form  the  General  No- 
tion. It  is  to  these,  as  I  understand  his  doctrine, 
that  Dr.  Mansel  applies  the  term  Psychological  Judg- 


LOGICAL    JUDGMENT.  311 

inents.  (Proleg.  Log.,  p.  63.)  I  have  already  ex- 
pressed my  opinion^  that  the  relations  which  the 
mind  can  perceive  among  objects  are  very  numerous 
and  diversified,  —  much  more  so  than  Mr.  Mill  sup- 
poses. AYliat  is  the  nature  and  what  the  best  class- 
ification of  these  comparisons;  these  are  very  im- 
portant questions  in  psychology,  but  do  not  specially 
fall  under  the  science  which  treats  of  discursive 
thought. 

(2.)  There  are  judgments  in  which  we  compare 
Abstracts,  by  which  I  do  not  mean  mental  states  or 
modifications,  but  things  abstracted.  For  example, 
"  Honesty  is  the  best  policy,"  where  both  "  honesty  " 
and  "  the  best  poKcy "  are  Abstracts,  being  neither 
Singular  Concretes  on  the  one  hand,  nor  Common 
Concepts  on  the  other,  that  is,  they  do  not  denote 
separately  existing  things,  such  as  "this  man,"  nor 
an  mdefinite  number  of  objects,  like  "man."  Under 
this  fall  all  definitions  such  as  "  Logic  is  the  science 
of  the  laws  of  thought."  Here  both  the  subject, 
"  Logic,"  and  the  predicate,  "  the  science  of  the  laws 
of  thought,"  are  not  independently  existing  things 
on  the  one  hand,  nor  do  they  embrace  indefinite  ob- 
jects on  the  other.  In  this  same  class  I  place  judg- 
ments regarding  space,  time,  and  quantity,  such  as 
"the  zenith  is  the  point  of  the  visible  hemisphere 
directly  over  the  head  of  the  observer ; "  "  mid-day  is 
12  o'clock  in  the  day  3"  and  "  2  +  2  =  4."  Here  both 
the  terms  are  abstract.  We  never  met  with  such 
separate  things  as  2  -f-  2  or  4 ;  nor  can  we  describe 


312  LOGICAL   JUDGMENT. 

either  2  -|-  2  or  4  as  a  class  embracing  objects ;  in 
fact  we  cannot  say  of  such  abstract  notions  that 
thej  have  Extensions. 

In  all  such  judgments  the  relation  is  one  of  iden- 
tity or  of  equality.  The  judgments  are  convertible 
or  substitutive ;  that  is,  we  can  change  the  position 
of  the  termS;  or  substitute  the  one  for  the  other, 
without  any  change;  in  fact  we  can  make  either 
term  the  subject  or  the  predicate,  as  may  suit  our 
purpose.  Thus  we  reverse  the  order  given  above, 
and  say,  "the  science  of  the  laws  of  thought  is  logic; " 
"  the  point  of  the  visible  hemisphere  directly  over 
the  head  of  the  observer  is  the  zenith ; "  "  12  o'clock 
in  the  day  is  mid-day ; "  and  "  4  =  2  -|-  2."  Great 
clearness  is  introduced  into  this  part  of  Logic  by 
separating  these  judgments,  in  which  we  compare 
Abstracts,  from  those  in  which  we  compare  Singu- 
lars or  Concepts. 

(3.)  A  more  important,  but  a  more  complicated, 
class  of  judgments  remains  for  consideration.  It 
consists  of  those  in  which  there  is  an  attributive, 
and  in  fact,  or  by  implication,  a  Concept  or  a  class- 
notion.  This  language  requires  to  be  explained. 
When  we  say,  "this  cow  ruminates,"  we  have  ab- 
stracted an  attribute  and  ascribed  it  to  the  animal. 
In  this  proposition  the  subject  is  singular.  But  in 
judgments  of  this  kind  the  subject  may  be  a  class- 
notion  ;  thus  we  say,  "  cows  ruminate,"  meaning  that 
the  whole  class  do  so.  A  judgment  of  this  descrip- 
tion is  called  attributive.     One  of  the  terms  is,  prop- 


LOGICAL   JUDGMENT.  313 

erly  speaking,  the  subject,  and  the  other  the  predi- 
cate. And  the  terms  cannot  be  converted  simply; 
in  other  words,  the  predicate  cannot  be  made  the 
subject  without  Kmitation.  Because  all  cows  possess 
the  attribute  of  rumination^  we  cannot  say  all  rumi- 
nating things  are  cows. 

All  Attributive  judgments  are  judgments  in  Com- 
prehension, but  they  may  also  be  made  judgments 
in  Extension.  For  we  may  reckon  "  ruminant "  as  a 
class  embracing  not  only  the  cow  but  other  animals, 
such  as  the  sheep  and  the  deer.  It  will  be  admitted 
that  this  is  always  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  I 
do  not  affirm  that  this  is  always  done.  In  by  far 
the  greater  number  of  propositions  the  primary  and 
uppermost  sense  is  in  comprehension.  Thus,  when 
we  say  "  larks  sing,"  we  probably  mean  not  that  larks 
are  among  the  class  of  singing  birds,  but  that  they 
have  the  capacity  of  singing.  But  we  may  always 
interpret  in  Extension  the  proposition  which  is  pri- 
marity  in  Comprehension.  This  follows  from  the  ac- 
count given  in  last  chapter,  of  the  mutual  relation 
and  dependence  of  the  two.  When  we  have  a  mark, 
we  may  always  form  a  class,  embracing  the  objects 
possessing  the  mark.  The  mind  in  its  discursive 
operations  tends  to  go  on  from  Comprehension  to 
Extension.  When  the  predicate  of  a  proposition  is 
a  verb,  as  in  the  example  just  given,  the  thought  is 
in  Comprehension.  But  then  we  have  also  adjec- 
tives and  common  nouns  as  predicates.  When  we 
say  the  "man  hoards  money,*'  the  thought  is  in 


314  LOGICAL   JUDGMENT. 

Comprehension ;  but  we  also  say  that  ^^  he  is  penuri- 
ous/' and  the  thought  is  rising  to  Extension;  and 
when  we  say  "  he  is  a  miser,"  the  thought  is  in  Ex- 
tension as  well  as  Comprehension,  for  we  have  es- 
tablished a  class,  ^^  miser,"  to  which  we  refer  the 
individual.  Mr.  Mill  seems  to  get  a  momentary 
view  of  this ;  for  while  he  holds  that  all  judgments 
(except  where  both  the  terms  are  proper  names) 
are  really  judgments  in  Comprehension,  he  allows 
that  "  it  is  customary,  and  the  natural  tendency  of 
the  mind,  to  express  most  of  them  in  terms  of  Ex- 
tension." The  "tendency"  to  do  this  must  surely 
proceed  from  some  law  of  thought  as  applied  to 
things ;  and  the  possibility  of  doing  it  surely  implies 
an  intimate  relation  between  the  Comprehension  and 
the  Extension.  In  not  a  few  propositions  the  upper- 
most thought  is  in  Extension.  Thus,  when  the 
young  student  of  Natural  History  is  told  that  "  the 
crocodile  is  a  reptile,"  his  idea  is  of  a  class,  of  which 
he  may  afterwards  learn  the  marks.  As  in  the  other 
cases,  the  mind  tends  to  generalize  the  attribute, 
and  make  the  proposition  one  in  Extension,  so  in 
this  case  it  should  go  on  to  translate  the  idea  in  Ex- 
tension into  one  in  Comprehension.  That  proposi- 
tions can  always  be  interpreted  in  both  ways,  is  a 
clear  evidence  of  the  indissoluble  connection  of  the 
operations. 

It  appears  then  that  in  all  judgments  belonging  to 
this  head  the  relation  is  always  one  of  Comprehen- 
sion, and  may  also  and  always  be  one  of  Extension 


LOGICAL   JUDGMENT.  315 

likewise.  This  cannot  be  said  of  tlie  second  class,  or 
those  in  which  we  compare  mere  Abstracts.  We 
cannot  call  such  attributive  ;  thus  there  would  be  no 
propriety  in  saying  that  4  is  an  attribute  of  2  -|-  2. 
Nor  can  such  judgments  be  intelligently  explained 
in  Extension.  At  this  j^oint  we  see  that  Sir  William 
Hamilton  has  fallen  into  error,  from  looking  merely, 
in  his  Logic,  to  the  Conception  or  General  Notion, 
and  overlooking  the  Abstract  Notion.  He  makes 
all  logical  propositions  capable  of  being  interpreted 
both  in  Extension  and  Comprehension.  But  when 
we  afiirm  that  4  X  4  =  16,  we  have  no  General  No- 
tion, and  the  phrases  Extension  and  Comprehension 
are  not  applicable.  In  all  cases,  however,  in  which 
the  predicate  is  a  formed  class-notion  or  Concept, 
the  proposition  should  be  interpreted  both  w^ays. 
Not  only  so,  but  when  the  predicate  is  merely  attri- 
butive, it  is  stiU  possible  to  interpret  the  proposition 
in  both ;  and  we  shaU  see  in  next  chapter  that  in 
reasoning  its  uppermost  meaning  is  always  in  Ex- 
tension rather  than  Comprehension. 

At  this  point  we  see  the  error  of  Mr.  Mill,  as  at 
the  other  we  saw  that  of  Sir  AYilliam  Hamilton. 
Mr.  Mill  maintains  that  "the  supposed  meaning  in 
Extension  is  not  a  meaning  at  aU,  until  interpreted 
by  the  meaning  in  Comprehension ;  that  all  concepts 
and  general  names  w^hich  enter  into  propositions  re- 
quire to  be  construed  in  Comprehension,  and  that 
their  Comprehension  is  the  whole  of  their  meaning." 
Again, '-  The  Extension  of  a  concept  is  not,  like  the 


316  LOGICAL  JUDGMENT. 

Compreliension,  intrinsic  and  essential  to  the  con- 
cept ;  it  is  an  external  and  wholly  accidental  relation 
of  the  concept,  and  no  contemplation  or  analysis 
of  the  concept  itself  will  tell  us  anything  about  it." 
(pp.  362,  364.)  There  is  an  accumulation  of  mis- 
takes in  this  statement,  all  arising  from  the  inade- 
quate view  taken  by  him  of  the  elements  involved 
in  the  General  Notion.  We  have  seen  that  in  the 
General  Notion  there  are  objects  as  well  as  attri- 
butes; objects  to  combine  as  well  as  attributes  to 
combine  them.  In  all  propositions  falling  under 
this  head  the  Extension  has  quite  as  distinct  a  mean- 
ing (it  connotes  objects)  as  the  Comprehension 
(which  denotes  attributes) ;  and  both  are  "  intrinsic 
and  essential  to  the  concept."  Extension  is  in- 
volved in  every  concept,  and  should  always  be 
noticed  when  we  are  using  the  concept,  and  brought 
out  into  distinct  view  when  we  analyze  it.  Even  in 
cases  in  which  the  primary  sense  of  the  predicate  is 
attributive,  we  may  also  turn  it  into  a  class-notion  and 
explain  it  in  extension;  and  we  shall  see  that  we 
always  do  so  think  it  when  we  use  the  proposition 
as  a  premise  in  an  argument. 

Looking  upon  all  judgments  of  this  class  as  having 
both  Extension  and  Comprehension,  we  can  obtain 
from  any  given  proposition  a  set  of  what  have  been 
called  by  Kant  Syllogisms  of  the  Understanding,  and 
by  Hamilton  Immediate  Inferences,  or  what  I  call 
Implied  or  Transposed  Judgments.  Thus,  the  judg- 
ment being  given,  "All  men  are  responsible,"  we 


LOGICAL    JUDGMENT.  317 

can  by  Extension  derive  such  judgments  as  the  fol- 
lowing :  that  man  is  a  species  in  the  genus  responsi- 
ole ;  that  some  responsible  beings  are  men ;  that  any 
one  man  is  responsible ;  that  it  is  not  true  that  no 
men  are  responsible ;  or  that  some  men  are  not 
responsible;  that  men  of  genius  are  responsible 
with  their  genius ;  and  that  God  who  calls  men  to 
account  is  calling  to  account  responsible  beings. 
Again,  by  Comprehension  we  can  say,  that  responsi- 
bility should  always  accompany  our  notion  of  man ; 
that  responsibility  exists,  being  found  in  man  who 
really  exists ;  that  no  man  is  irresponsible  ;  that  ir- 
responsible beings  cannot  be  men ;  and  since  respon- 
sibility is  to  God,  man  being  responsible  is  responsi- 
ble to  God.  These  implied  judgments  bring  us  to 
the  very  verge  of  mediate  reasoning.  By  subalter- 
nation  we  declare  that  all  men  being  responsible, 
some  men  are  responsible :  there  is  but  a  step 
between  this  and  mediate  reasoning,  in  which  we 
argue  that  all  men  being  responsible,  the  New 
Zealanders  who  are  men,  that  is,  some  men,  are  re- 
sponsible. These  Transposed  Judgments  appeared 
in  the  old  Logic  under  the  heads  of  Opposition  and 
Conversion ;  and  in  the  New  Analytic  they  have  been 
drawn  out  fully  in  Archbishop  Thomson's  Laics  of 
Thought  (p.  iii.,  where,  however,  they  are  not  drawn 
by  Extension  and  Comprehension).  It  is  a  defect  in 
Mr.  Mill's  work,  professedly  A  System  of  Logic, 
Bafiocinatwe  and  Lnductive,  that  it  does  not  discuss 
such  topics. 


CHAPTER   XYI 


REASONING. 


IN  order  that  they  may  reason,  and  reason  vaHdly, 
it  is  not  necessary  that  persons  be  logicians. 
Man  reasons  spontaneously.  The  logician  reflects 
upon  the  natural  operation,  and  seeks  to  unfold  its 
nature  and  its  laws ;  and  he  strives  also  to  lay  down 
rules  fitted  to  guide  and  guard  us  as  we  reason. 
The  grand  question  to  be  determined  in  scientific 
logic  is,  what  is  the  regulating  principle  of  sponta- 
neous ratiocination?  On  this  subject  there  is  a 
general  agreement,  and  yet  considerable  diversity 
of  opmion,  among  logicians.  Almost  all  admit  that 
the  principle  (when  the  conclusion  is  affirmative) 
may  be  expressed,  "Things  which  agree  with  one 
and  the  same  agree  with  one  another."  But  this 
form  is  too  vague,  for  it  does  not  specify  the  nature 
of  the  aerreement.  And  so  lo^-icians  have  endeavored 
to  make  the  statement  more  definite.  According  to 
the  Dictum  of  Aristotle,  the  things  must  agree  in 
being  both  under  some  higher  class  or  genus.  The 
form  has  sometimes  been  put,  "  Things  are  the  same 
^hich  are  the  same  with  a  third."  Mr.  Mill  expresses 
(318) 


BEASOJ^IJS-G.  319 

it;  "  Things  which  co-exist  with  the  same  co- exist 
with  one  another."  The  distinctions  which  have 
been  drawn  in  the  two  last  chapters  in  regard  to  the 
Notion  and  Judgment  will  be  found,  if  followed  out, 
to  throw  light  on  some  of  these  points. 

First,  There  are  simple  cases  of  reasoning  ui 
which  the  terms  are  Singular  or  Abstract :  — 

Thom£is  a  Kempis  was  tlie  author  of  the  "  Imitation  of  Christ ;  ** 
Gerson  was  not  Thomas  h.  Kempis ; 
.*.  Gerson  was  not  the  author  of  the  "  Imitation  of  Christ." 

Or  the  unfigured  syllogism  of  Hamilton :  — 

Sulphate  of  iron  is  copperas  ; 
Sulphate  of  iron  is  not  sulphate  of  copper ; 
.♦.  Sulphate  of  copper  is  not  copperas. 

In  the  same  class  may  be  placed  all  reasoning  in 
which  the  proposition  are  definitions  or  substitutive : 
as,  "  Logic  is  the  science  of  the  laws  of  thought  • 
Ethics  is  the  science  of  the  laws  of  our  moral  nature ; 
therefore  Logic  is  not  Ethics."  Under  this  head  I 
put  all  quantitative  reasoning ;  as,  "  A  =  B  ;  B  =  C  ; 
therefore  A  =  C."  Li  such  examples  none  of  the 
notions  is  properly  a  class-notion  or  attributive.  As 
none  of  them  has  quantity  or  extension,  so  we  can- 
not speak  of  a  minor  or  major  term,  or  of  a  minor 
or  major  premise.  The  division  into  figures  has  no 
place ;  for,  as  any  one  will  at  c  nee  see  on  trial,  the 
middle  term  may  be  made,  as  we  nlease,  the  subject 
or  the  predicate  of  either  premise.  The  regulating 
principle  in  all  such  cases  is   either,  ^'  Things  are  the 


320  BEASONING. 

same  which  are  same  with  a  third,"  or  "  Things  which 
are  equal  to  the  same  are  equal  to  one  another." 
Much  confusion  is  avoided  by  alloting  reasoning  of 
this  description  to  a  separate  head.  As  there  is  no 
class-notion  the  Dictum  cannot  be  the  regulating 
principle. 

Second,  There  is  more  complex  reasoning  in 
which  there  is  an  attributive  predicate  or  a  class- 
notion.  In  this  the  old  Aristotelian  Dictum  remains, 
after  all  discussion,  the  fundamental  regulating  prin- 
ciple :  "  Whatever  is  predicated  of  a  class  may  be 
predicated  of  all  the  members  of  the  class."  No 
other  proposed  Dictum  has  lived  beyond  the  age  of 
its  inventor.  I  am  convinced  that  the  same  fate 
awaits  that  propounded  by  our  author.  [Logic, 
II  I-IV.) 

The  "  really  fundamental  axiom  of  ratiocination," 
as  announced  by  him,  is, "  Things  which  co-exist  with 
the  same  thing,  co-exist  with  one  another ; "  and  "  a 
thing  which  co-exists  with  another  thing,  with  which 
other  a  third  thing  does  not  co-exist,  is  not  co- 
existent with  that  third  thing."  But  the  phrase 
"  co-exist,"  if  limited  to  co-existence  in  respect  of 
time  or  space,  does  not  include  most  important  cases 
of  reasoning ;  and  if  widened  beyond  this,  it  becomes 
meaningless.  When  we  argue  that  the  man  hav- 
ing committed  murder  deserves  punishment,  the 
premises  and  the  conclusion  have  reference,  not  to 
space  or  time,  but  to  far  different  relations.  When 
we  infer  from  A  being  equal  to  B,  and  B  to  C,  that 


BEASONINQ.  321 

A  is  equal  to  C,  we  are  not  making  affirmations 
about  co-existence.  In  explanation,  he  tells  us  (p. 
203,  foot-note^  6tli  ed.),  "  the  co-existence  meant  is 
that  of  being  jointly  attributes  of  the  same  subject." 
This  statement  is  still  vague,  and  is  not  adequate, 
for  it  does  not  specify  what  is  "  the  same  subject," 
and  it  does  not  brmg  out  that  the  attribution  in- 
volves Extension  :  but  it  contains  partial  truth,  and 
it  has  a  meaning,  which  we  can  examine. 

This  new  Dictum  gives  him  the  following  univer- 
sal formula :  — 

Attribute  A  is  a  mark  of  Attribute  B ; 
A  given  object  has  the  mark  A ; 
.'.  The  given  object  has  the  attribute  B. 

But  what  does  this  first  premise  mean  when  we 
translate  it  from  abstractions  into  concrete  reahties  ? 
As  there  cannot  be  an  Attribute  existing  separately 
or  aj)art  from  objects,  it  must  mean,  "Whatever 
objects  have  the  attribute  A  have  the  attribute  B." 
And  what  is  this  but  the  major  premise  of  the  old 
syllogistic  formula?  The  second  premise  requires 
an  explanation.  "  A  given  object  has  the  mark  A : " 
this  object  may  be  one  object  or  a  class  of  objects. 
In  order  to  give  the  formula  a  meaning,  we  must 
interpret  it,  "  Whatever  individual  or  class  has  the 
attribute  A  has  the  attribute  B ;  a  given  object  or 
class  C  has  the  attribute  A ;  therefore  it  has  the 
attribute  B."  The  new  Dictum  and  new  Syllogistic 
formula  are  just  bad  versions  of  the  old  ones.  I 
call  them  bad  versions,  for  the  phrase  "co-exist" 

21 


322  BEASONING. 

does  not  bring  out  the  precise  relation  of  the  terms 
on  which  the  thought  proceeds;  and  the  phrase, 
"  Attribute  A/'  requires  to  be  interpreted  in  order  to 
have  a  relevant  signification. 

But  he  has  given  us  another  form,  which  he  repre- 
sents as  "  an  universal  type  of  the  reasoning  process. 
We  find  it  resolvable  in  all  cases  into  the  following 
elements :  Certain  individuals  have  a  given  attri- 
bute ;  an  individual  or  individuals  resemble  the  for- 
mer in  certain  other  attributes ;  therefore  they  re- 
semble them  also  in  the  given  attribute."  {Ih.  II.  m. 
7.)  It  may  be  observed  that  the  phrase  "co-exist" 
has  disappeared,  and  another  and  equally  vague  one 
has  taken  its  place  ;  it  is  a  "  resemblance  "  in  certain 
attribute!^,  and  in  other  attributes.  It  is  allowed 
that  this  is  not  "  conclusive  from  the  mere  form  of 
the  expression."  By  itself  it  would  sanction  falla- 
cious reasoning  quite  as  readily  as  valid.  "  AU  men 
have  immortal  souls ;  the  brutes  resemble  them  in 
certain  attributes  (as  instincts  and  bodily  organs) ; 
they  must  also  have  immortal  souls."  We  shall  see 
immediately  that  Mr.  Mill  allows  that  the  syllogism 
is  an  admirable  test  of  the  validity  of  reasoning, 
which,  it  is  conceded,  this  alleged  "  universal  type  " 
is  not.  It  wants  the  essential  testing  element,  the 
general  rule  that  guarantees  the  conclusion,  and 
which  in  the  syllogistic  formula  is  embodied  in  the 
major  premise,  —  the  necessity  of  which  is  pressed 
on  us  by  the  Dictum. 

But  may  there  not  be  reasoning  in  Comprehen- 


BEASOJSriNG.  323 

sion  as  well  as  in  Extension?  In  answering  this 
question  it  should  be  admitted  fully,  that  reasoning 
in  Extension  may  always  be  translated  into  reason- 
ing in  Comprehension.  The  reason  of  this  is  very 
obvious:  it  follows  from  the  account  given  of  the 
nature  of  the  Concept.  Extension  always  impHes 
Comprehension ;  that  is,  the  objects  in  the  class  are 
joined  in  the  class  by  the  possession  of  common 
marks : 

He  who  has  intelligence  and  free  agency  is  responsible ; 
Man  has  intelligence  and  free  agency ; 
.-.  Man  is  responsible. 

This  reasoning  in  Extension  may  be  put  in  Com- 
prehension : 

Responsibility  is  an  attribute  of  all  who  have  intelligence  and  free 

agency ; 
Intelligence  and  free  agency  is  an  attribute  of  man  ; 
.'.  Responsibihty  is  an  attribute  of  man. 

Mr.  Mill  maintains  that  all  reasoning  is  in  Com- 
prehension, and  not  in  Extension.  "  All  propositions 
into  which  general  names  enter,  and  consequently 
all  reasonings,  are  in  Comprehension  only.  Proposi- 
tions and  reasonings  may  be  written  in  Extension, 
but  they  are  ahvays  understood  in  Comprehension." 
(p.  363.)  I  have  granted  that,  so  far  as  propositions 
are  concerned,  spontaneous  thought  is  chiefly  in 
Comprehension.  In  simple  affirmation  and  denial, 
we  commonly  mean  to  do  nothmg  more  than  declare 
or  deny  that  an  object  or  class  of  objects  has  or  has 


324  BEASONING. 

not  a  certain  attribute,  but  without  turning  the  predi- 
cate into  a  class-notion,  or  inquiring  whether  there 
may  or  may  not  be  other  objects,  which  have  or  have 
not  the  same  attribute.  When  we  say  that  "the 
horse  is  warm-blooded,"  we  may  be  looking  exclu- 
sively to  the  attribute,  without  caring,  at  the  time, 
whether  there  are  other  warm-blooded  animals. 
But  it  seems  to  be  different  in  regard  to  reasoning, 
the  uppermost  thought  in  which  is  always  in  Ex- 
tension. It  seems  to  me  to  be  so  when,  not  know- 
ing whether  the  horse  is  or  is  not  warm-blooded, 
we  call  in  a  middle  concept,  and  argue  "that  the 
horse  being  a  mammal,  and  all  mammals  being 
warm-blooded,  the  horse  must  be  so."  Here  we 
place  the  horse  in  the  class  mammal,  and  mammals 
among  warm-blooded  animals,  and  thus  reach  the 
conclusion.  Again,  to  take  an  example  of  negative 
reasoning  (falling  naturally  into  the  second  figure) ; 
When  we  argue  that  "  the  rat,  not  bringing  forth  its 
young  by  eggs,  is  not  a  reptile,"  we  find  in  thought 
that  the  class  rats,  not  being  in  the  class  of  animals 
which  bring  forth  their  young  by  eggs,  cannot  be  in 
the  class  reptiles,  which  always  bring  forth  their 
young  by  eggs.  Here,  as  in  all  other  cases,  we  un- 
derstand the  attributive  terms  —  such  as  bringing 
forth  their  young  by  eggs  —  as  class-notions  in  order 
to  draw  a  conclusion.  This  is  seen  very  clearly 
when  we  have  to  determine  whether  our  conclusion 
should  be  universal  or  particular;  that  is,  of  the 
whole   class,  or  a   part.     We   argue   (in  the   third 


BEASONING.  325 

figure)  that  "  as  the  connection  of  soul  and  body, 
though  mcomprehensiblej  is  yet  to  be  beheved,  that 
therefore  —  not  all  things,  but  —  some  thmgs  to  be 
believed  are  incomprehensible^"  and  how  do  we 
reach  this  conclusion  ?  Because  in  thought  we  have 
made  a  class  of  "  things  to  be  beheved/'  and  found 
that  in  this  class  are  things  incomprehensible.-^ 

Such  considerations  convince  me  that  our  sponta- 
neous reasoning  is  in  Extension.  I  allow  that  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  has  furnished  a  valuable  contribution  to 
Logic  by  exhibiting  the  forms  of  reasoning  in  Com- 
prehension. But  I  look  on  these  as  secondary  and 
derived,  and  not  entitled  to  the  same  primary  rank 
as  those  in  Extension.  Most  logicians  —  teachers 
and  taught  —  have  shrunk  from  his  108  Modes  as 
being  an  oppressive  burden  on  the  mind,  both  on  its 
memory  and  its  intellectual  apprehension.  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that  aU  the  purposes  of  Logic  will  be 
accomplished  by  retaining  the  old  forms  of  reasoning 
in  Extension,  and  showing  how,  when  any  end  is  to 
be  sei'ved,  they  can  be  turned  into  the  forms  of 
Comprehension.  As  to  Mr.  MiU,  he  has  got  a  partial 
and  imperfect  view  of  reasoning  in  Comprehension, 
but  has  not  taken  the  trouble  of  showing  us  how  his 
theory  is  adequate  to  explain  the  processes  of  spon- 
taneous reasoning. 

He  utters  an  emphatic  denial  regarding  the  syl- 
logistic form  and  its  rules,  that  they  are  not  "  the 

1  Mr.  Kidd,  in  his  very  able  work,     conception  of   a   class   is   present  in 
A  Delineation  of  the  Primary  Princi-    every  instance  of  reasoning.'^ 
p/es  ofPieasoning,  shows,  p.  121,  "The 


326  BEASONING. 

form  and  the  rules  according  to  wliich  our  reason- 
ings are  necessarily,  or  even  usually;  made."  But  all 
wise  logicians  have  allowed  that  in  spontaneous 
reasoning  persons  have  not  before  them  the  Dictum 
of  Aristotle,  and  still  less  the  modes  and  figures '  of 
the  syllogism.  The  former  of  these  is  the  regula- 
tive principle  of  reasoning,  and  the  latter  are  ex- 
pressions constructed  to  test  the  vahdity  of  ratioci- 
nation. What  I  maintain  is  that  the  mind  in  all 
reasoning  grasps  the  three  notions,  that  is,  things 
apprehended,  and  the  relation  between  them.  We 
see  a  new  kind  of  leaf  that  never  fell  under  our 
view  before,  and  we  notice  that  it  is  netted  in  its 
veins,  and  we  infer  that  the  plant  on  which  it  grew 
must  be  dicotyledonous :  we  do  so  on  the  principle, 
gathered  probably  from  botanical  books,  that  all 
netted-veined  plants  are  dicotyledons ;  and  we  see 
the  relation  of  "  this  plant,  having  netted  leaves,  and 
being  dicotyledonous."  But  we  do  not  enounce  the 
Dictum,  nor  do  we  spread  out  major,  minor,  and 
conclusion.  We  leave  all  this  to  logicians,  who 
construct  a  reflex  science  out  of  a  spontaneous 
process. 

He  makes  two  most  important  admissions  in  favor 
of  the  syllogistic  analysis.  One  is  that  all  reasoning 
can  be  reduced  to  the  formula  of  the  syllogism  ;  and 
the  other,  that  this  formula  is  admirably  fitted  to  ex- 
pose invalid  reasoning.  The  value  of  the  syllogistic 
form,  and  of  the  rules  of  using  it  correctly,  is  said  to 
consist  "  in  their  furnishing  us  with  a  mode  in  which 


BEAbONING.  327 

those  reasonings  may  always  be  represented,  and 
which  is  admirably  calculated,  if  they  are  inconclu- 
sive, to  bring  their  inconclusiveness  to  light."  But  I 
ask,  how  does  it  happen  that  all  our  reasoning  can 
be  reduced  to  this  form  ?  How  is  it  that  it  comes 
to  test  so  admirably  the  conclusiveness  and  inclusive- 
ness  of  all  reasoning?  It  is  surely  strange  that 
there  is  a  rule  to  which  all  reasoning  is  conformable, 
and  which  acts  as  a  criterion  of  all  reasoninsr,  and 
yet  is  not  the  natural  law  of  reasoning.  I  beheve 
that  all  arguments  can  be  made  to  take  this  form, 
because  it  is  the  right  one.  I  believe  it  is  a  crucial 
test  of  the  soundness  or  unsoundness  of  all  argu- 
ments, because  it  is  the  law  of  thought,  springing 
from  the  mental  constitution  with  w^hich  om"  Maker 
has  endowed  us. 

I  suppose  Mr.  Mill  would  account  for  the  conform- 
ableness of  all  reasoning  to  the  syllogistic  form,  and 
for  its  aptness  to  act  as  a  test,  by  saymg  that,  though 
all  reasoning  is  naturally  in  Comprehension,  it  can 
be  represented  in  Extension.  But  if  this  be  so,  it 
would  show,  I  think,  that  propositions  and  reasoning 
must,  contrary  to  what  Mr.  Mill  alleges,  have  a 
meaning  in  Extension  as  well  as  in  Comprehension. 
And  if  reasoning  be  naturally  in  Comprehension, 
we  should  expect  that  formulae  drawn  out  on  that 
principle  must  be  better  fitted  than  those  derived 
from  Extension  to  exhibit  the  validity  or  invalid- 
ity of  arguments.  Mr.  Mill  has,  unfortunately,  not 
favored  us  with  a  development  of  the  forms  of  rea- 


328  BEASONINQ, 

soiling  according  to  Comprehension.  We  are  there- 
fore not  in  a  position  to  say  whether  these  would  or 
would  not  be  superior,  as  a  means  of  testing  infer- 
encCj  to  those  furnished  in  the  old  Logic.  I  am  con- 
vinced that  such  forms,  constructed  even  by  so  clear 
a  thinker  as  Mr.  MiU,  would  have  a  more  artificial, 
a  more  twisted  and  translated  look,  and  would  be 
far  less  fitted  to  expose  fallacies  in  reasoning.  I 
rather  think  that  we  should  have  to  translate  them 
back  into  Extension  before  we  could  fully  recognize 
their  meaning.  Looking  upon  reasoning  as  proceed- 
ing naturally  by  classification,  rather  than  attribu- 
tion, I  maintain  that  the  great  body  of  logicians, 
jB:om  Aristotle  downwards,  have  acted  properly  in 
drawing  out  their  formulae  according  to  Extension, 
and  that  it  is  when  they  are  thus  drawn  out  that 
they  are  most  easily  understood  and  readily  applied. 
Mr.  Mill  has  made  a  most  important  admission  (p. 
429):  —  "The  propositions  in  Extension,  being,  in 
this  sense,  exactly  equivalent  to  the  judgments  in 
Comprehension,  served  quite  as  well  to  ground  forms 
of  ratiocination  upon:  and  as  the  validity  of  the 
forms  was  more  easily  arid  conveniently  shown 
through  the  concrete  conception  of  comparing  classes 
of  objects,  than  through  the  abstract  one  of  recogniz- 
ing co-existence  of  attributes,  logicians  were  per- 
fectly justified  in  taking  the  course  which,  in  any 
case,  the  estabhshed  forms  of  language  would  doubt- 
less have  forced  upon  them."  The  two  circumstances, 
that  the  validity  of  the  forms  is  more  easily  and  con- 


BEASOITIJ^G.  329 

veniently  shown  by  comparing  "classes/'  and  that 
the  estabhshed  form's  of  language,  which  are  ex- 
pressions of  the  natm^al  processes  of  the  mind,  would 
have  forced  an  expression  according  to  classes  on 
logicians,  is  surely  a  presumption,  if  not  a  proof,  that 
the  forms  in  extension  are  the  development  of  spon- 
taneous thouo^ht. 

"  I  believe  that,  in  point  of  fact,  when  drawing  in- 
ferences from  our  personal  experience,  and  not  from 
maxims  handed  down  to  us  by  books  or  tradition,  we 
much  oftener  conclude  from  particidars  to  particulars 
directly,  than  through  the  intermediate  agency  of  any 
general  proposition."  Now,  nearly  all  pliilosophers 
have  allowed  that  the  mmd  begins  its  observations 
with  particulars,  or,  to  use  a  better  phrase,  singulars. 
Having  observed  a  number  of  individuals,  it  can 
reach  a  general  conclusion ;  but  it  is  only  by  a  pro- 
cess which  the  logician  should  fully  unfold.  Having 
observed,  or  heard  that  crows  everywhere  are  black, 
we  conclude  that  the  crow  which  we  hear,  without 
seeing,  is  black.  But  we  can  argue  thus  only  on  the 
condition  that  the  induction  is  such  as  to  justify  the 
general  proposition  that  all  crows  are  black.  The 
syllogism  is  so  admirable  a  means  of  bringing  to 
light  the  inconclusiveness  of  fallacious  reasoning, 
just  because  it  requires  the  general  proposition  to 
be  expressed  in  one  of  the  premises. 

"  All  inference  is  from  particulars  to  particulars ; 
general  propositions  are  merely  registers  of  such  in- 
ferences already  i  lade,  and  short  formulse  for  mak- 


330  BEASOmNG. 

ing  more."  He  thinks  that  the  error  of  the  syllo- 
gistic theory  arises  from  not  distinguishing  between 
"the  inferring  part  and  the  registering  part,  and 
ascribing  to  the  latter  the  functions  of  the  former." 
Now  I  admit  that  the  general  proposition  may  be 
the  record  or  register  of  a  previous  induction.  And 
if  there  has  been  reasoning  in  the  process  of  induc- 
tion by  which  this  has  been  reached,  there  must 
have  been  a  prior  general  proposition  got  by  an  ear- 
lier induction,  or  given  by  intuition.  But  in  any 
given  argument  we  do  not  look  to  the  previous  ac- 
cumulation of  particulars,  but  to  the  register  em- 
bodied in  a  general  proposition.  The  general  prop- 
osition is  certainly  no  part  of  the  inference^  but  it 
is  an  essential  part  of  the  assumption  from  which 
we  infer  the  conclusion,  and  should  therefore  have  a 
distinct  place  allotted  to  it  in  the  premises.  Mr. 
Mill  has  a  partial  view  of  the  truth  when  he  says 
{lb.  c.  iv.),  "In  drawing  this  inference,  we  conform 
to  a  formula  which  we  have  adopted  for  our  guid- 
ance in  such  operations,  and  which  is  a  record  of  the 
criteria  by  which  we  thought  we  had  ascertained 
that  we  might  distinguish  when  the  inference  could 
and  when  it  could  not  be  drawn."  In  any  given 
argument,  as  an  argument,  all  that  we  have  to  do  is 
to  look  to  this  register,  or  record,  or  general  prop- 
osition. K  doubts  arise  as  to  its  accuracy,  we  must 
go  back  on  the  processes  by  which  we  reached  it ; 
and  if  there  be  reasoning  in  the  processes,  we  must 
test  them  in  the  same  way.     But  our  record  being 


BEASONUS^'G.  331 

settled^  the  general  proposition  in  which  it  is  an- 
nouncecl  is  impHed  in  the  argument,  and  should 
therefore  have  a  place  in  tiie  formula  of  reasoning. 
We  have  already  noticed  that  "  universal  type  of  the 
reasoning  process,"  according  to  which  we  find  that 
"  certain  individuals  have  a  given  attribute,  and  that 
an  individual  or  individuals  resemble  the  former  in 
certain  attributes,  and  therefore  resemble  them  in 
the  given  attribute."  We  remarked  upon  the  vague- 
ness of  this  type  as  leaving  us  in  doubt  as  to  what 
are  the  "certain  attributes"  which  entitle  us  to 
infer  the  presence  of  the  "  given  attribute."  It  is 
the  general  proposition  embodied  in  the  major  prem- 
ise, which  spreads  out  the  rules  which,  when  we 
take  the  minor  premise  along  with  it,  entitles  us 
to  draw  the  conclusion. 

But  it  is  asked,  if  all  reasoning  implies  a  major 
proposition,  where  do  we  get  our  first  major,  that 
with  which  we  start?  Aristotle  did  not  overlook 
this  question,  and  he  answered  it.  He  tells  us  again 
and  again  that  the  beginning  of  demonstration  can- 
not be  demonstration,  and  that  all  demonstration 
carries  us  back  to  Intuitive  Eeason  (vovg,  see  Anal. 
Post,  I.  3,  22,  23).  In  certain  acts  of  reasoning, 
primitive  perceptions,  such  as  "the  effect  has  a 
cause,"  give  us  the  one  proposition,  and  ordinary 
observation  the  other,  and  the  two  necessitate  the 
conclusion.  But  in  far  the  greater  number  of  argu- 
ments the  general  proposition  is  the  result  of  a 
gathered  observation.     The  criteria  of  these  gath- 


332  BEASONING. 

ered  or  inductive  general  laws  will  come  under  our 
notice  in  next  chapter. 

"  The  child^  who,  having  burnt  his  fingers,  avoids 
to  thrust  them  again  into  the  fire,  has  reasoned  or 
inferred;  though  he  has  never  thought  of  the  general 
maxim,  Fire  burns.  He  knows  from  memory  that 
he  has  been  burnt,  and  on  this  evidence  believes, 
when  he  sees  a  candle,  that  if  he  puts  his  finger 
into  the  flame  of  it,  he  will  be  burnt  again.  He 
believes  this  in  every  case  which  happens  to  arise ; 
but  without  looking,  in  each  instance,  beyond  the 
present  case.  He  is  not  generalizing  -,  he  is  infer- 
ring a  particular  from  particulars.  In  the  same  way, 
also,  brutes  reason."  "  Not  only  the  burnt  child,  but 
the  burnt  dog  dreads  the  fire."  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  in  these  cases,  that  of  the  child  and  the 
dog,  the  process  is  very  much  one  of  the  association 
of  ideas  and  feelings.  The  fire  and  the  sensation 
have  been  together,  and  upon  the  fire  presenting 
itself  there  is  a  tendency  to  a  feeling  which  causes 
shrinking.  There  is  really  no  conclusion  from  ob- 
served, from  remembered,  from  gathered  particulars. 
Should  the  fire  only  once  have  burnt  the  child,  it 
will  turn  away  from  it,  possibly  without  remember- 
ing the  previous  case,  certainly  without  an  induction 
of  particulars,  or  an  inference  from  them. 

I  have  called  attention  to  the  circumstances  that 
while  Judgment  and  Association  are  not  the  same, 
they  do  yet  conspire  in  their  action,  (pp.  195,  196, 
222,  223.)     I  have   now  to  apply  this  remark   to 


BEASONING.  333 

reasoning  and  suggestion.  Inference  is  not  to  be 
confounded  with  mere  association.  In  all  reasoning 
there  is  comparison,  there  is  the  perception  of  a 
relation  between  thmgs  about  which  we  reason. 
Thus  we  argue,  "  A  deer,  being  horned,  is  ruminant." 
Here  the  mind  grasps  the  three  concepts  and  their 
relation  :  "  deer,"  "  being  horned,"  "  are  among  rumi- 
nant animals."  Unless  there  be  a  positive  percep- 
tion of  the  connection  of  the  things,  there  is  no  rea- 
soning. Herein  is  argument  at  once  distinguished 
from  association,  which  does  not  imply  any  connec- 
tion between  the  things  which  have  been  together 
in  the  mind,  any  comparison,  or  any  observed  rela- 
tion. But  while  the  two  mental  ojDcrations  are  not 
the  same,  association  greatly  helps  reasoning.  In 
all  inference  there  is  a  discovered  relation,  and  the 
related  things  may  often  have  been  together,  and 
thus  the  one  tends  to  suggest  the  others.  Some 
think  that  it  is  a  native  law  of  the  mind  that  cor- 
related things,  such  as  Hke  things,  and  cause  and 
effect,  call  up  each  other.  However  we  may  ac- 
count for  it,  whether  from  things  being  often 
together  or  an  original  tendency,  correlated  things 
come  up  simultaneously,  altogether  independent  of 
our  observing  the  relation.  Indeed,  it  is  often  the 
circumstance  that  they  have  come  up  together 
which  invites  or  constrains  us  to  notice  the  connec- 
tion. Now  all  this  helps  us  to  conduct  the  operation 
of  reasoning.  Thus  fire  suggests  the  burning  sensa- 
tion,  and  we  collect  cases  till  we  reach  the  general 


334  BEASOJS-IJ^G. 

truth  that  fire  burns,  and  then  the  process  may 
become  one  of  inference.  It  is  in  this  way  we  are 
to  account  for  the  readiness,  the  rapidity,  and  for 
what  is  often  called  the  unconsciousness  of  the 
reasoning  process.  The  laws  of  association  call  up 
correlated  objects,  and  the  mind  perceives  the  cor- 
relation and  draws  the  inference.  Thus  "  deer  "  sug- 
gests "horned;"  and  having  heard  that  horned 
animals  are  ruminant,  "  horned "  suggests  "  rumi- 
nant-" and  perceiving  the  class  relation  of  the 
terms,  we  draw  the  conclusion  that  horned  animals 
are  ruminant. 

I  believe  that  very  much  of  what  some  regard  as 
reasoning  in  the  brute  creatures  arises  from  mere 
association,  without  the  relation  of  the  things  being 
discovered.  In  like  manner  the  laws  of  suggestion 
operate  in  children  to  excite  fears  and  expectations, 
before  there  are  those  observed  relations  which 
must  enter  into  reasoning.  All  our  lives  we  act  on 
impulses  produced  by  mere  association,  without  any 
accompanying  argument.  A  loud  noise  will  raise  up 
fear,  without  our  having  inferred  that  it  proceeds 
from  a  cause  implying  danger.  The  person  who  has 
been  seriously  hurt  by  a  horse  or  dog  can  never  look 
on  a  horse  or  dog  without  a  feeling  of  tremor.  In 
such  mental  action  I  admit  that  there  is  no  class- 
notion,  no  general  proposition,  no  regulating  princi- 
ple of  Extension.  But  just  as  little  is  there  an  in- 
duction of  particulars,  or  attribution,  or  reasoning 
in  Comprehension;    there    is   no    such   process   as 


BEASONING,  335 

"Attribute  A  being  a  mark  of  Attribute  B;  and  C 
having  the  mark  A."  But  then  it  is  one  aim  of  in- 
tellectual teaching,  and  one  very  special  end  of 
Looic,  to  raise  us  above  the  animal  state  and  the 
infant  state ;  to  keep  us  from  being  driven  along 
passively  by  more  casual  associations  ;  and  train  the 
mind  to  look  narrowly  into  the  relations  of  things 
that  pass  before  it,  and  of  which  it  must  have  some 
conception,  that  it  may  thereby  reach  sound  conclu- 
sions which  can  be  justified.  In  all  such  processes 
of  real  reasoning,  it  will  be  found  that  there  is  a 
general  proposition  involved,  and  this  should  have  a 
place  in  the  formula  which  systematizes  the  spontar 
neous  operation. 

But  Mr.  Mill  tells  us  that  "in  every  syllogism 
considered  as  an  argument  to  prove  the  conclusion, 
there  is  a  petitio  pinncipiir  But  did  any  one  ever 
maintain  that  the  syllogism  is  "  an  argument  to 
prove  the  conclusion  ?  "  It  has  usually  been  repre- 
sented as  the  form  to  which  the  argument  can  be 
reduced.  The  petitio  priiicipii  is  a  fallacious  mode 
of  reasonmg;  but  the  syllogism  cannot  with  any 
possible  propriety  be  represented  as  a  mode  of 
reasoning,  vahd  or  fallacious,  for  it  is  not  reasoning, 
but  the  formula  of  reasoning.  I  suppose  Mr.  MiU 
meant  to  affirm  that  aU  reasoning  in  syllogistic  form 
involves  a  petitio.  If  so,  then  he  is  caught  in 
inextricable  toils,  for  he  admits  that  all  rea- 
soning can  be  reduced  to  syllogistic  form,  which 
seems  to  imply  that  it  involves  a  begging  of  the 


336  BEASONING. 

question.  The  petitio  principii  is  a  fallacy  in  which 
one  of  the  premises  is  either  the  same  as  the  con- 
clusion, or  depends  upon  it.  But  in  reasoning,  ac- 
cording to  the  syllogistic  analysis,  the  conclusion 
follows,  not  from  one  of  the  premises,  but  from  the 
two,  or  rather  from  the  relations  between  the  things 
compared  and  the  premises.  It  is  when  the  rela- 
tions predicated  in  the  two  propositions  are  brought 
before  the  mind  that  we  see  the  force  of  the  infer- 
ence. We  wish  to  determine  —  what  we  are  not 
expressly  told  in  the  gospels  —  whether  the  Baptist 
was  a  priest :  give  us  only  one  premise,  as,  that  "  the 
Baptist  was  the  son  of  a  priest,"  or,  that  "  the  sons 
of  priests  were  priests,  and  we  can  infer  nothing ; 
but  place  the  two  together,  and  the  conclusion 
is  necessitated.  The  one  of  these  premises  is  a 
particular  fact,  the  other  is  a  general  proposition,  and 
both  are  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  conclusion. 
Both  premises  are,  in  the  reasoning,  assumptions  — 
they  must  be  given  or  granted ;  but  neither  of  them 
is  an  assumption  of  the  conclusion  ;  the  two  are  as- 
sumptions which  warrant  the  conclusion.  As  to 
whether  the  assumptions  are  or  are  not  warranted,  this 
is  to  be  determined  by  a  previous  investigation,  to  be 
tested  by  the  criteria  of  induction,  intuition,  or  rea- 
soning. And  it  should  be  forever  pressed  on  Mr. 
Mill,  that  the  objections  he  brings  against  the  Dic- 
tum of  Aristotle  are  quite  as  applicable  to  his  own. 
"  Things  which  co-exist  with  one  and  the  same  thing 
co-exist  with  one  another  • "  this  is  quite  as  much  a 


BEASONING.  337 

triiisin  as  the  old  Dictum,  while  it  is  much  more 
vague ;  and  reasoning  proceeding  upon  it  must  be 
quite  as  liable  to  the  charge  of  being  a  begging  of 
the  question,  as  reasoning  according  to  the  syllogis- 
tic formula. 

It  should  not  be  omitted  that  Mr.  Mill  does  not 
enter  upon  any  special  consideration  of  the  nature 
of  Conditional  Eeasoning,  whether  Hypothetical  or 
Disjunctive.  This  is  a  great  defect  in  a  work  which 
professes  to  give  us  a  full  Logic  of  Inference.  There 
are  very  important  questions  started  as  to  the  regu- 
latmg  principle  of  Conditional  Arguments,  and  these 
should  be  discussed  in  every  logical  treatise  worthy 
of  these  advanced  times.  He  teUs  us,  in  his  "Ex- 
amination of  Hamilton,"  that  a  Hypothetical  Judg- 
ment is  "  a  judgment  concerning  judgments ; "  but 
he  does  not  attempt  to  enounce  the  principle  which 
connects  the  "judgment "  with  the  "judgments  "  with 
which  it  is  concerned.  He  further  lets  us  know  that 
he  looks  on  a  Disjunctive  Judgment  as  compounded 
of  two  or  more  Hypotheticals,  but  he  does  not  in- 
form us  what  is  the  relation  of  these  Hypotheticals 
to  one  another,  (pp.  454,  455.)  I  confess  I  should 
like  to  see  his  attributive  theory  of  reasoning  tried 
by  its  application  to  Conditional,  and  specially  to 
Disjunctive  reasoning.  When  we  argue  that  "the 
season  when  a  particular  event  took  place  not  hav- 
ing been  spring,  summer,  or  autumn,  must  have 
been  winter,"  we  seem  to  proceed  on  the  principle 
of  Division,  which  is  made  according  to  the  Exten- 

22 


338  BEASONING. 

sion  and  not  the  Comprehension  of  a  concept.  But 
I  allude  to  these  topics  here,  not  in  order  to  discuss 
them,  but  to  show  that  as  Mr.  Mill  has  avoided  the 
discussion,  he  cannot  be  said  to  furnish  a  full  system 
of  Logic. 


CHAPTER    XYII 


LAR   CLASSES    OF   OBJECTS. 


IAjM  inclined  to  justify  Mr.  Mill  in  introducing  into 
the  science  other  topics  besides  those  treated 
of  in  what  we  may  call  Primary  Logic.  The  effort 
made  by  certain  purists  to  exclude  such  matters  as 
Demonstration,  Induction,  and  Evidence  generally, 
must  failj  and  ought  to  fail.  It  is  of  vast  moment 
to  have  these  subjects  discussed  in  a  scientific  man- 
ner, and  Logic  is  the  field  for  the  discussion ;  and 
our  definitions  of  the  science  are  too  narrow  if  they 
exclude  them,  and  should  be  so  widened  as  to  give 
them  an  acknowledged  place.  In  treating  of  such 
topics,  or  at  least  two  of  them.  Induction  and  Evi- 
dence, our  author  occupies  a  far  more  distmguished 
place  than  he  does  in  Formal  Logic.  Still,  even  in 
this  department,  his  work,  while  possessed  of  great 
merits,  may  be  charged  with  grave  errors,  springing, 
I  beheve,  from  his  mistaken  views  of  fundamental 
truth. 

I  have  commented  already  (Chap,  xii.)  on  his  ac- 
count of  Necessary  Truth  generally.  His  defective 
appreciation  of  intuition  has  led  him  to  an  errone- 

r339) 


MO  SECONDABY  LOGIC, 

ous  exposition  of  the  nature  and  office  of  Mathe- 
matical Definitions  and  Axioms.  [Logic,  n.  v.-vii.) 
Definitions  are  represented  as  hypotheses,  and  the 
necessity  of  the  truths  derived  from  them  consists 
in  the  relation  between  the  supposition  and  the  con- 
clusions drawn  from  it.  "  Axioms  are  experimental 
truths  3  generahzations  from  observation.  The  prop- 
ositioUj  Two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space  — 
or  in  other  words,  Two  straight  lines  which  have 
once  met,  do  not  meet  again,  but  continue  to  di- 
verge —  is  an  induction  from  the  evidence  of  our 
senses." 

I  reckon  these  views  as  radically  erroneous.  Defi- 
nitions are  Abstracts,  that  is,  things  abstracted  from 
known  concrete  realities.  '  A  line  is  length  without 
breadth,'  that  is,  we  consider  the  length  without 
regarding  the  breadth.  '  A  superficies  has  breadth 
and  length  without  depth,'  that  is,  in  all  reasoning 
we  agree  to  look  to  the  length  and  breadth  without 
taking  the  depth  into  account.  But  Mr.  Mill  tells 
us  "  there  exist  no  real  things  exactly  conformable 
to  the  definition;"  there  exist  no  lines  without 
breadth,  no  surfaces  without  depth.  I  admit  that 
there  can  be  no  such  lines  or  surfaces  with  a  sepa- 
rate or  mdependent  existence.  But  still  they  have 
a  reahty;  they  have  a  reality  in  extended  objects  — 
which  have,  besides,  length  and  breadth.  Man's 
mind  is  so  constituted  that  he  can  think  about 
them,  and  draw  deductions  from  them.  But  he  tells 
us,  "  A  line,  as  defined  by  geometers,  is  wholly  in- 


SECONDABY  LOGIC.  341 

conceivable/'  where  the  word  that  covers  so  much 
confusion  appears  once  more,  and  in  his  latest  edi- 
tion. We  certainly  cannot  image  such  a  line,  but 
w^e  can  image  an  extended  object,  and  think  about 
its  length.  I  beheve  that  all  further  mathematical 
truths  are  derived  from  Definitions.  But  when  I 
say  so,  I  do  not  mean  that  they  are  obtained  from 
ideas  hi  the  mind,  but  from  things  abstracted  from 
concrete  realities,  and  having  a  reality  in  existing 
concrete  ol^jects.  As  there  is  a  reality  in  the  things 
defined,  so  there  is  also  a  reality  in  all  the  conclu- 
sions logically  drawn  from  them.  The  deductions 
derived  two  thousand  years  ago  from  the  definition 
of  the  ellipse,  are  found  to  be  reahzed  in  the  j^lane- 
tary  bodies,  so  far  as  they  move  in  eUiptic  orbits. 
I  cannot  see  how  this  should  follow,  unless  the  thmg 
defined  had  been  a  reality. 

Mr.  Mill  thinks  that  demonstrative  truths  follow 
from  Postulates  and  not  Definitions.  We  postulate 
that  there  may  be  a  line  with  length  without 
breadth,  and  get  deductions  from  our  assumptions. 
True,  in  all  deduction  the  premises  are  assumptions, 
but  in  mathematical  definitions  the  assumptions  are 
abstracted  realities.  Here,  as  in  so  many  other  de- 
partments, his  acuteness  has  given  him  a  partial 
view  of  the  truth,  and  he  says  that  "  our  reasonings 
are  grounded  upon  matters  of  fact  in  om*  defini- 
tions." When  I  say  that  mathematical  demonstra- 
tion is  founded  upon  definitions,  I  mean  upon  the 
matters  of  fact  or  things  defined,  which  no  doubt 


342  SECOND ABY  LOGIC. 

are  postulated,  but  postulated  as  realities,  giving  us 
corresponding  realities  in  all  legitimate  deductions 
from  th'em.     To  support  his  confused  theory,  he  is 
obliged  to  give  a  twofold  view  of  definitions.     The 
definition  of  a  triangle,  he  says,  obviously  comprises 
not  one  but  two  propositions  perfectly  distinguisha- 
ble.    The  one  is,  "  There  may  exist  a  figure  bound- 
ed by  three  straight  lines;"  and   the  other,  "this 
figure   may  be    termed  a  triangle."     But   there   is 
no  advantage    secured,  in  the  way  of  clearing  our 
thoughts  or  otherwise,  by  drawing  such  a  distinction ; 
for  demonstration  relates  throughout  not  to  the  word, 
but  the  thing,  a  figure  bounded  by  three  straight  lines. 
He  argues  that  definitions,  as  such,  are  the  premises 
only  in"  the  reasonings  which  relate  to  words,  and 
that  if  we  take  any  other  view,  "we  might  argue 
correctly  from  true  premises,  and  arrive  at  a  false 
conclusion."     Thus  let  the  definition  be,  "  A  dragon 
is  a  serpent  breathing  flame ; "  out  of  this  we  may 
carve  the  following  syllogism :  "  A  dragon  is  a  thing 
which  breathes  flame;   but  a  dragon  is  a  serpent: 
therefore,  some  serpents  breathe  flame,"  —  "  in  which 
both   premises    are    true,   and   yet   the   conclusion 
false."     But  surely  the   premises  are  here  true  or 
false   according  to  what  we   understand  as  to  the 
objects  compared.     If  we  are  speaking  throughout 
of  imaginary  things,  the  conclusion  is  true  in  the 
same  sense  as  the  premises  are.     If  we  are  speak- 
ing of  actually  existing  things,  both  the  premises 
and   the   conclusion  are  false.     After  what  I  have 


SECOND  AMY  LOGIC.  34S 

said  in  regard  to  necessary  truth  (Chap,  xii.),  it  is 
not  necessary  to  dwell  on  his  theory  of  Mathemati- 
cal Axioms.  They  are  represented  as  mere  general- 
izations of  an  outward  experience.  I  believe,  indeed, 
that  in  the  axiom  in  its  generalized  form  there  must 
be  generalization.  But  they  are  not  generaHzations 
of  an  outward  or  sensible  experience.  On  the  bare 
contemplation  of  a  whole  object,  say  a  table,  we 
declare  it  to  be  larger  than  a  part  of  it,  say  its  leg. 
1  do  so  at  once  on  the  mere  sight  or  thought  of  the 
object  as  known  to  me,  and  not  from  any  induction 
of  particulars  falling  under  my  experience  in  time 
past.  Perceiving  that  I  would  do  the  same  in  every 
like  case,  I  may  generalize  the  judgment  and  put  it 
in  the  form  of  an  axiom,  that  "  the  whole  is  greater 
than  its  part."  But  this  general  truth  is  not  the 
generalization  of  a  lengthened  experience ;  it  is  not 
reached  by  our  having  observed  a  thousand  times  or 
ten  thousand  times  that  a  whole  thing  is  greater 
than  a  part  of  the  same  thing :  we  see  it  at  once  on 
the  bare  inspection  of  any  one  thing;  our  convic- 
tion could  not  be  made  stronger  by  multiplying  ex- 
amples ;  and  we  cannot  allow  that  there  should  be 
an  exception.  I  may  have  observed  of  ten  thousand 
plants  with  netted  leaves,  that  they  have  all  sprung 
from  two  seed-lobes,  and  I  feel  justified  in  laying 
down  the  general  rule,  that  "  netted-leaved  plants 
are  dicotyledonous;"  but  the  law  is  reached  by  a 
gathered  experience.  I  do  not  assert  that  it  can 
have  no  exceptions ;  and  when  I  learn  that  there  is 


844  SECOND ABY  LOGIC. 

a  tribe  of  plants  (including  Arurtiy  etc.)  wliich  have 
netted  leaves,  and  yet  spring  from  one  seed-lobe,  I 
may  wonder  at  the  fact,  but  I  do  not  say  that  it 
is  impossible.  But  the  mind  having  discovered, 
from  its  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things,  that  the 
whole  is  greater  than  a  part,  I  cannot  be  made  to 
allow  that  there  is  anywhere  an  exception.  To 
apply  these  remarks  to  mathematical  truth:  In 
proceeding  with  its  demonstrations,  the  mind  pro- 
nounces its  judgments  immediately  on  the  objects 
defined  being  presented  to  it,  and  it  does  not  need 
the  axiom  in  its  generalized  form;  indeed  it  feels 
the  force  of  the  reasoning  quite  as  clearly  before  as 
after  the  maxim  is  announced.  In  learning  geome- 
try, the  beginner  seems  to  discover  the  truth  of  the 
axiom  from  the  judgment  pronounced  in  a  given 
case,  rather  than  to  recognize  the  validity  of  the 
argument  in  the  particular  example  by  the  maxim. 
Still  the  axiom  is  the  expression  of  the  regulating 
principle  of  reasoning,  and  it  serves  important  pur- 
poses to  enunciate  it  at  the  commencement  of  the 
demonstration.  It  is  one  of  the  greatest  defects  of 
Mr.  Mill's  work  on  Logic,  that  in  consequence  of 
mistaking  the  nature  and  functions  of  definitions 
and  axioms,  he  has  not  been  able  to  give  a  correct 
account  of  the  Method  employed  in  Demonstration. 
That  Method  I  call  the  Joint  Dogmatic  and  Deduc- 
tive. I  call  it  Dogmatic,  for  it  begins  with  assump- 
tions, with  truths  not  proven,  with  truths  perceived 
by  intuition;  and  I  call  it  Deductive,  for  it  draws 


SECOND ABY  LOGIC.        *  345 

other  truths  from  its  assumptions.  The  criteria  of 
its  assumptions  are  the  tests  of  intuitive  truth,  that 
is,  SeK-Evidence  and  Necessity;  the  criteria  of  its 
deductions  are  the  forms  of  reasoning. 

Mr.  Mill's  Book  on  Induction  is  far  the  most  valu- 
able part  of  his  Logic ;  it  contains  the  best  exposi- 
tion which  we  have  of  the  Method  of  Induction  in 
our  own  or  in  any  other  language.  His  Canons  of 
Causes  are  a  great  improvement  upon  the  Prerogar 
tive  Instances  of  Bacon,  and  are  an  advance  upon 
the  rules  proposed  by  Sir  J.  Herschel.  But,  while 
he  has  admirably  expounded  the  functions  of  Pre- 
rogative Instances  or  Canons  in  physical  science,  he 
does  not  seem  to  see  what  is  the  j)recise  logical  pur- 
pose, that  is,  the  purpose  in  thought,  served  by  them. 
Induction  consists  of  two  parts :  the  gathering  of 
individual  facts,  which,  however  numerous,  must 
always  be  hmited ;  and  the  derivation  from  them  of 
a  law  announced  in  a  general  proposition.  In  the 
first  of  these  there  is  no  special  exercise  of  reason- 
ing ;  the  whole  is  the  work  of  observation  and  trained 
sagacity.  But  in  the  derivation  of  the  law  from 
the  scattered  and  incomplete  facts  there  is  inference. 
Now,  what  is  it  that  justifies  the  inference  ?  If  there 
be  any  truth  in  the  Aristotelian  or  syllogistic  analy- 
sis, there  must  be  a  general  principle  involved, 
which,  when  the  reasoning  is  put  in  syllogistic  form, 
becomes  the  major  premise.  Now,  such  rules  as 
these,  involved  in  the  Prerogative  Instances  of  Ba- 
con, and  the  Canons  of  Mr.  Mill,  are  the  general 


346  ^        tiECONDABY  LOGIC. 

propositions  wliicli  supply  the  major  premise ;  and  the 
particular  set  of  facts  give  us  the  minor  premise  ;  and 
the  two  necessitate  the  conclusion.  I  drank  brandy 
on  Monday,  Wednesday,  and  Saturday,  and  had  a 
headache  the  succeeding  mornings  3  I  drank  no 
brandy  on  Sunday,  Tuesday,  Thursday,  and  Friday, 
and  had  no  headache  on  the  following  days.  When 
I  conclude  that  my  drinking  brandy  was  the  cause 
of  the  headache,  I  have,  as  my  major  premise,  such 
a  general  proposition  as  the  Canon  of  Difference  : 
"If,  in  comparing  cases  in  which  the  effect  takes 
place  with  other  cases  in  which  it  does  not  take 
place,  we  find  the  latter  to  have  every  antecedent  in 
common  with  the  former  except  one,  that  one  cir- 
cumstance is  the  cause,  or  a  part  of  the  cause ; "  and 
as  my  minor  premise,  the  facts  as  constituting  such 
a  case ;  and  the  conclusion  follows  syllogistically. 
The  excellence  of  Mr.  Mill's  Canons  is,  that  they  are 
the  simplest  and  most  complete  yet  enunciated  of 
the  general  principles  which  guide  us  in  rising  from 
the  collection  of  individual  facts  to  the  causes.  Had 
Mr.  Mill  clearly  perceived  that  there  is  reasoning  in 
all  induction,  he  would  have  been  prevented  from  re- 
versing the  natural  order  by  representing  the  rea- 
soning process  as  an  induction. 

But  the  discovery  of  causes  is  not  the  sole  end  of 
science.  In  some  departments  the  object  is  to  re- 
solve the  compounds  of  nature  into  their  elements. 
This  is  one  of  the  main  ends  sought  in  chemistry, 
and  also  in   psychology.     There    should,  therefore, 


SEGONDABY  LOGIC. 


347 


be  Canons  of  Composition^  as  well  as  Canons  of 
Causes. 

In  another  important  group  of  sciences^  those 
called  the  Classificatory  by  Dr.  Whewell,  the  end 
sought' is  not  the  discovery  of  Causes  or  of  Com- 
position, but  of  Classes ;  that  is,  Natural  Classes.^  I 
mention  these  things  to  show  that,  while  Mr.  Mill 
has  given  us  the  best  exposition  we  jQi  have  of  the 
Logic  of  Induction,  he  has  by  no  means  completed 


1  In  the  absence  of  an  attempt  by 
any  Logician  to  supply  them,  we  may 
give  the  fo lowing :  —  ( 1 . )  We  have  de- 
composed a  compound  when  we  have 
decomposed  it  in  separation  from  all 
other  substances.  (2.)  Having  found 
the  elements  of  a  compound  in  one 
case,  we  have  found  them  in  all.  A 
caution  requires  to  be  added,  that  the 
elements  reached  are  to  be  regarded 
as  such  merely  provisionally.  The 
first  rule  theoretically  guards  against 
a  mistake,  which  is  difficult  to  avoid  in 
practice.  The  second  shows  that  one 
decisive  experiment  may  settle  the 
whole  question  of  the  decomposition 
of  a  substance.  Hence  it  is  that  in 
Chemistry  we  may  not  require  a  large 
induction,  such  as  is  necessary  in  Nat- 
ural History  and  many  departments 
of  Natural  Philosophy.  As  Chemis- 
try did  not  exist  in  the  days  of  Bacon, 
he  does  not  seem  to  have  contemplated 
the  possibility  of  so  rapid  a  method  of 
reaching  a  law ;  and  his  rules  as  to  the 
necessity  of  a  wide  induction,  and  the 
gradual  rising  from  particulars  to  mi- 
nor, middle,  and  major  axioms  do  not 
apply  to  this  science,  at  least  in  its 
present  advanced  stage,  —  though  I 
rather  think  they  did  at  its  earlier 
stages,  before  the  nature  of  chemical 
affinity  had  been  ascertained.  The  cau- 
tion guards  us  against  concluding, 
when  we  have  reached  certain  compo- 


nents, we  must  have  got  the  ultimate 
elements.  Every  chemist  allows  that 
these  sixty  elements  are  to  be  esteemed 
such,  merely  till  there  has  been  a  suc- 
cessful decomposition  of  them. 

2  The  following  Canons  of  Classes 
may  serve  till  better  are  furnished  :  — 
(1.)  We  have  found  the  resemblance 
among  the  objects  in  many  and  varied 
cases.  (2.)  We  must  be  in  circum- 
stances to  say  that  if  there  be  excep- 
tions we  should  most  probably  have 
fallen  in  with  them.  These  two  rules 
will  prevent  us  from  drawing  rash  gen- 
eralizations from  a  few  cases,  or  cases 
confined  to  a  limited  region.  But  in 
order  to  determine  whether  the  class  is 
or  is  not  a  Natural  Class,  we  require  a 
more  important  rule.  (3.)  The  class 
maybe  regarded  as  a  natural  one  when 
it  is  one  of  Kinds ;  that  is,  when  the 
possession  of  one  mark  is  a  sign  of  a 
number  of  others.  Thus  we  may 
reckon  Mammal  as  a  Natural  Class ; 
for  though  founded  on  the  single  cir- 
cumstance of  the  animals  belonging  to 
it  suckling  their  young,  it  is  found  that 
this  characteristic  is  a  sign  of  others, 
—  as,  that  they  are  warm-blooded,  and 
that  their  heart  has  four  compartments. 
Such  Orders  as  Eanunculaceae,  Cruci- 
ferag,  Rosaceas,  are  obviously  Natural 
Classes,  for  the  plants  included  in  each 
have  a  nimiber  of  resembling  points. 


348  SEGONBABY  LOGIC. 

the   investigation.      Much  remains  to  be  done   by 
other  men  and  by  other  ages. 

There  has  been  an  important  discussion  between 
Dr.  Whewell  and  Mr.  Mill  as  to  whether  we  may 
now  expect  more  from  the  Method  of  Induction  or 
of  Deduction.  Mr.  Mill  maintains  that  in  most  de- 
partments of  science  our  hope  of  discovery  lies  more 
in  Deduction  than  in  the  Induction  of  Bacon.  On 
the  other  hand^  Dr.  Whewell  holds  that,  whatever 
may  be  the  case  with  the  social  sciences,  in  the 
physical  sciences  discoveries  may  be  expected  to  be 
made  in  time  to  come,  as  they  have  been  in  time 
past,  by  a  patient  induction.  Much  confusion  has 
crept  into  this  controversy  from  the  circumstance 
that  these  two  eminent  men  have  not  come  to  an 
agreement  as  to  what  is  involved  in  the  processes 
about  which  they  dispute.  According  to  Mr.  Mill, 
the  Deductive  Method  consists  of  three  operations : 
the  first,  one  of  direct  induction ;  the  second  of 
ratiocination;  and  the  third  of  verification.  [Logic, 
m.  xi.)  Now  of  these  three  steps,  the  first,  the  di- 
rect induction  of  particulars,  and  also  the  third,  the 
verification  by  facts,  are  essentially  inductive  -,  they 
consist  in  collecting  facts,  with  the  view  of  deter- 
mining the  law  of  the  facts.  What  Mr.  Mill  calls 
Deductive,  I  am  inclined  to  designate  the  Joint  In- 
ductive and  Deductive  Method.  In  those  depart- 
ments of  science  which  are  yet  in  their  infancy,  we 
must  trust  mainly  to  a  careful  collection  of  facts, 
and  allow  the  facts  to  suggest  the  law,  at  which  we 


SECOND ABY  LOGIC.  349 

may  not  yet  be  able  even  to  guess.  But  in  ad- 
vanced sciences  in  which  laws  have  been  estabhshed, 
and  are  ready  to  form  the  general  or  major  proposi- 
tion, advances  may  be  expected  mainly  from  the 
combination  of  Deduction  with  Induction.  Dr.  Whe- 
well  and  Mr.  Mill  have  both  done  much  to  unfold 
the  steps  of  this  Joint  Method.  But  much  yet  re- 
mains to  be  done,  by  showing  what  is  the  separate 
provmce  of  each,  and  how  they  may  be  combined 
so  as  best  to  yield  the  wished-for  results  in  the  dif- 
ferent departments  of  science. 


CHAPTER    XYIII. 

LOGICAL  DISCUSSIONS :    THE  PROVINCE  OF  LOGIC. 

IN  this  country  Formal  Logic  is  dealt  with  in  four 
different  ways  at  this  present  time. 

I.  By  some  it  is  reckoned  antiquated  and  ex- 
ploded, and  never  referred  to  without  a  sneer. 
Though  these  persons  are  not  likely  to  attend  to  me, 
or  favor  me  with  an  answer,  yet  I  beg  to  ask  them 
whether  it  would  not  be  very  desirable  to  have  a  Logic 
to  unfold  the  laws  of  thought,  and  direct  thought  in 
its  various  walks  —  in  which  it  is  so  apt  to  err  ?  If 
they  can  be  induced  to  reply  candidly  in  the  affirma- 
tive, I  would  then  invite  them  to  look  into  what 
earnest  and  able  thinkers  have  done ;  and  I  would 
show  them  how  the  Aristotelian  Logic  has  cast  up 
again  and  again,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to  suppress  it ; 
and  that  no  other  Logic  has  stood  longer  than  a 
single  age  :  in  particular,  no  one  now  sets  any  value 
on  the  attempts  that  were  made  to  construct  a 
logical  science  by  the  school  of  Locke  and  the 
school  of  Condillac. 

n.  There  are  those  who  accept  the  Aristotelian 
Logic  without  criticism   or  modification.     Most  of 

(350) 


LOGICAL   BISCUSSIOJSrS.  351 

these  are  inclined  to  accept  it  in  the  form  in  which 
it  is  put  by  Whately,  who,  by  his  new  and  fresh 
illustrations  and  examples,  threw  such  life  into  the 
bones  which  had  become  dry.  The  mastering  of 
"VVliately's  Elements  is  certainly  a  most  profitable 
gymnastic  to  all  young  men,  and  is  fitted  to  exer- 
cise a  salutary  influence  upon  their  intellectual 
habits,  which  is  likely  to  continue  with  them  all 
their  fives.  But  those  who  have  a  taste  for  the 
study  ought  not  to  content  themselves  with  such  an 
elementary  exposition ;  they  should  go  on  to  make 
themselves  acquainted  with  the  discussions  in  our 
day  in  regard  to  logical  forms ;  and  neither  young 
nor  advanced  students  must  be  allowed  to  forget 
that  we  have  now  a  Logic  of  Induction  quite  as 
important  as  the  Logic  of  Deduction. 

III.  There  is  a  British  modification  of  the  Logic 
of  Kant  which  has  able  sup23orters,  the  leader  hav- 
ing been  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  who  has  had  able  and 
learned  fellow-workers  in  Dr.  Mansel  and  Archbishop 
Thomson.  The  Logic  of  this  school  has  many  excel- 
lences. It  has  allotted  a  distinct  and  intelligible 
province  to  the  science,  which  is  described  as  that  of 
the  Laws  of  Thought.  It  has  so  defined  the  depart- 
ment as  to  make  it  embrace  the  Concept  and  the 
Judgment,  as  well  as  Eeasoning.  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton has  revived  the  distinction  between  the  Ex- 
tension and  Comprehension  of  the  Concept,  and  has 
evolved  and  applied  it  in  a  more  scientific  manner 
than  was  ever  done  before.     Not  satisfied  with  the 


352  LOGICAL   DISCUSSION'S: 

Dictum  of  Aristotle  as  the  one  and  universal  regulat- 
ing principle  of  reasoning,  the  school  is  seeking  to 
enunciate  a  wider  Canon,  and  important  minor  rules 
derived  from  it.  It  has  successfully  shown  that 
reasoning  may  be  put  in  the  form  of  comprehension  as 
well  as  Extension.  It  has  subjected  all  the  forms  of 
reasoning,  Categorical  and  Conditional,  to  a  sifting 
examination,  which  has  introduced  greater  scientific 
accuracy  into  the  technicaUties  of  Primary  Logic. 
With  unsurpassed  acuteness  and  erudition.  Dr.  Han- 
sel has  introduced  us  to  important  Aristotehan  and 
scholastic  distinctions.  Archbishop  Thomson  has 
given  us  an  admirable  chapter  on  Language  as  the 
instrument  of  thought,  has  clearly  expounded  the 
distinction  between  Substitutive  and  Attributive 
Judgments  (though  he  has  not  seen  what  is 
the  precise  nature  of  the  forms),  and  drawn 
out  a  comprehensive  scheme  of  Immediate  Infer- 
ences. 

But  on  the  other  hand  the  Logic  of  the  school  is 
tainted  throughout  with  the  false  metaphysics  of 
Kant,  and  should  not  be  accepted  without  important 
explanations  and  modifications.  It  proceeds  all 
along  on  the  principle  that  there  are  subjective 
forms  in  the  mind  itself,  which  impose  on  objects  as 
we  think  about  them,  much  that  is  not  in  the  objects 
themselves.  From  this  general  error  there  arise 
several  particular  ones. 

(1.)  The  school  represent  Logic  as  an  a  priori 
science.   Now  this  doctrine  cannot  be  allowed  without 


THE    PBOTLS'CE    OF  LOGIC:  353 

an  important  explanation  which  changes  the  whole 
theory.  It  is  all  true  that  the  mmd  in  logical 
thought  proceeds  accordhig  to  native  prmciples. 
But  the  prmciples,  as  general  rules,  are  not  before 
consciousness.  It  is  upon  the  bare  inspection  and 
comprehension  of  the  case  before  it  that  the  mind 
proceeds  in  the  exercises  of  thought.  It  being  un- 
derstood that  a  crocodile  is  a  reptile,  and  that  all 
reptiles  bring  forth  their  young  by  eggs,  we  at  once 
conclude  that  the  crocodile  must  do  so ;  but  without 
having  consciously  before  us  the  Dictum,  that  whal>- 
ever  is  predicated  of  a  class  may  be  predicated  of  aU 
that  is  contained  in  the  class.  It  needs  objects  to 
caU  the  native  capacities  of  the  mind  into  exercise. 
Not  only  so,  but  the  exercises  are  always  individual 
It  is  by  a  process  of  generalization  that  we  derive 
the  general  law  from  the  individual  cases;  and  as 
there  may  be  oversights  and  inaccuracies  in  the 
generahzation,  so  there  may  be  discussions  and 
disputes  about  the  expression  of  the  general  law. 
The  laws  of  thought  may  be  in  the  mind  a  j^riori, 
but  we  cannot  discover  and  unfold  them  a  j^rioin. 
In  order  to  find  the  general  principles  of  logical 
thought,  and  to  construct  a  science  of  Logic,  there 
must  be  a  careful  and  extensive  observation  of 
thought  as  directed  to  objects,  and  various  classes  of 
objects. 

(2.)  Kant  represents  Logic  as  "making  abstrac- 
tion of  all  content  of  the  coornition  of  the  understand- 
ing  and  of  the  difference  of  objects,  and  having  to  do 

23 


354  LOGICAL   DISCUSSIOI^S  : 

only  with  the  form  of  thought."  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
makes  a  like  statement :  "  Logic  is  conversant  with 
the  form  of  thought  to  the  exclusion  of  the  matter." 
(Logic,  I.  15.)  Now  this  account  contains  both  a 
truth  and  an  error.  It  is  quite  true  that  Logic  does 
not  look  to  the  objects  of  thought,  but  to  thought: 
but  it  is  equally  true  that  thought  must  be  employed 
about  objects.  If  Logic,  then,  considers  thought,  it 
must  consider  thought  as  employed  about  objects, — 
only  it  considers  the  thought  and  not  the  objects. 
Taking  this  view,  we  see  that  we  are  warranted 
(though,  perhaps,  Kant  was  not  according  to  his 
principles)  in  adopting  the  division  of  the  science, 
which  we  shall  explain  further  on  in  this  chapter, 
into  Universal  and  Particular  Logic. 

(3.)  From  the  same  mistaken  view  of  thought, 
the  whole  school  represent  the  Notion  or  Concep- 
tion as  being  formed  by  the  mind,  according  to  a 
priori  laws,  not  altogether  independent  of  objects, 
but  imposing  on  objects  what  is  not  in  them.  Ham- 
ilton speaks  of  "  an  act  of  thought  as  the  recogni- 
tion of  a  thing  as  coming  under  a  concept;"  and 
again,  "  Thought  is  a  knowledge  of  a  thing  through 
a  concept  or  general  notion,  or  of  one  notion 
through  another."  (lb.  p.  43.)  This  language  pro- 
ceeds on  the  idea  that  there  is  a  concept  prior  to  the 
thing,  above  the  thing,  and  ready  to  be  imposed 
upon  it,  so  as  to  shape  and  color  it.  But  surely  the 
correct  statement  is  not  that  thought  is  through  a 
concept,  but   that  a  concept  is  a  thought  formed 


THE   FBOVINCE    OF  LOGIC.  355 

on  the  contemplation  of  things.  The  General  No- 
tion is  fashioned  by  the  mind  on  the  apprehension 
of  objects,  by  putting  together  the  objects,  real  or 
potential,  having  common  properties. 

(4.)  The  whole  Kantian  school  omits  the  Abstract 
Notion  in  the  construction  of  logical  science.  Sir 
W.  Hamilton,  indeed,  gives  a  brief  but  correct  ac- 
count of  it  in  his  Metaphysics  (Lect.  xxxv.),  showing 
that  it  implies  comparison,  and  that  "  there  is  noth- 
ing necessarily  connected  with  generaUzation  in  ab- 
straction." But  in  his  Logic,  the  laws  which  he  lays 
do^yn  apply  only  to  the  Concept  or  General  Notion. 
This  omission  not  only  leads  to  a  defective  account 
of  Simple  Apprehension  in  the  first  part  of  Formal 
Logic,  but  makes  him  overlook  a  class  of  judgments 
and  a  species  of  reasoning  in  which  the  terms  are 
abstract. 

(5.)  In  consequence  of  neglecting  to  give  the  Ab- 
stract Notion  a  separate  place.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and 
Archbishop  Thomson  have  been  led  to  represent 
every  Notion  as  having  Extension  and  Comprehen- 
sion. Now,  these  are  properties  exclusively  of  the 
General  Notion.  The  Abstract  Notion,  say  tranquil- 
lity, cannot  be  said  to  have  Extension,  for  it  denotes 
not  objects,  but  an  attribute. 

(6.)  In  a  previous  chapter  I  have  shown  that  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  has  not  unfolded  fully  nor  accurately  the 
nature  and  the  relations  of  the  things  compared  in 
Logical  Judgment.  He  represents  the  comparison 
as  between  two  conceptions  or  concepts  as  mental 


356  LOGICAL   DISCUSSIOirS  : 

products,  whereas  it  is  between  concepts  as  things 
conceived.  He  vacillates  in  the  account  which  he 
gives  of  the  relation  discovered  between  the  con- 
cepts, speaking  of  it  at  times  as  being  identity^  at 
other  times  as  that  of  whole  and  parts,  and  in  some 
places  as  equality. 

(7.)  One  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  supposed  improve- 
ments in  Formal  Logic  consists  in  his  insisting  that 
the  predicate  should  always  be  quantified ;  that  is, 
declared  to  be  either  universal  or  particular.  Thus 
the  proposition,  "AH  men  are  mortal,"  he  would 
write,  "  All  men  are  some  mortals."  He  defends  this 
on  the  general  principle,  that  whatever  is  in  thought 
should  be  unfolded  in  the  statement  which  professes 
to  express  thouglit.  I  admit  the  principle,  but  I  do 
not  admit  that  it  requires  the  predicate  to  be  quan- 
tified. For  I  have  endeavored  to  show  that  in  by 
far  the  greater  number  of  propositions  the  upper- 
most thought  is  in  Comprehension,  and  we  do  not 
think  at  all  of  the  Extension.  When  we  say  "  The 
dog  barks,"  we  mean  that  the  dog  is  engaged  in  the 
act  of  barking,  and  we  may  not  think  of  a  class 
of  barking  animals ;  we  certainly  do  not  trouble 
ourselves  with  inquiring  whether  there  are  or  are 
not  other  animals  that  bark.  Even  in  propositions 
in  which  the  Extension  is  in  the  thought,  we  do  not 
always  settle  whether  the  subject  is  or  is  not  co- 
extensive with  the  predicate.  Thus,  when  we  say 
"Man  is  rational,"  we  may  not  have  determined 
whether  there  are  or  are  not  other  rational  beings 


THE   FBOYINCE    OF  LOGIC.  357 

besides  man.  It  is  sufficient  to  lead  us  to  form  the 
judgment  that  man  has  the  attribute  rationahty,  or 
that  he  is  in  the  class  rational,  whether  this  class  in- 
clude other  beings  or  not.  I  hold  that  in  the  vast 
majority  of  propositions  the  predicate  is  not  quanti- 
fied in  thought.  I  urge,  further,  in  opposition  to  the 
doctrine,  that  in  those  propositions  m  which  the 
terms  are  abstract,  the  predicate,  properly  speaking, 
has  no  quantity  or  extension,  for  it  is  not  a  class- 
notion.  When  we  say  that  3x3  =  9,  neither  sub- 
ject nor  predicate  has  an  indefinite  number  of  ob- 
jects embraced  in  it.  I  admit  that  in  reasoning, 
when  the  predicate  is  known  to  be  distributed,  we 
can  convert  the  subject  into  the  predicate,  and  the 
predicate  into  the  subject,  without  any  change,  and 
draw  a  conclusion  which  we  should  not  otherwise  be 
entitled  to  do.  Thus  when  we  have  it  demonstrated, 
both  that  "  all  equilateral  triangles  are  equiangular," 
and  that  "  all  equiangular  triangles  are  equilateral," 
we  can,  upon  a  given  triangle  being  found  equilate- 
ral, declare  it  to  be  equiangular.  Such  cases  are 
worthy  of  special  notice,  and  might  have  a  separate 
place  allotted  them  in  logical  treatises,  but,  bfemg  so 
hmited,  should  not  be  allowed  to  change  the  whole 
analytic  of  reasoning. 

(8.)  The  new  Canon  of  Reasoning  adopted  by  the 
school  is  very  vague.  It  is  thus  stated  in  the  Out- 
lines  of  the  Laics  of  Thought:  ''The  agreement 
or  disagreement  of  one  conception  with  another  is 
ascertained  by  a  third  conception,  inasmuch  as  this 


358  LOGICAL   DICUSSIONS  : 

wholly  or  by  the  same  part,  agrees  with  both,  or  with 
only  one  of  the  conceptions  to  be  compared."  (§  93.) 
Now,  the  phrase  "  agree  "  is  not  explicit ;  it  does  not 
specify  what  the  concepts  agree  or  do  not  agree  m. 
This  defect  may  be  remedied  by  distinguishmg  be- 
tween those  cases  in  which  the  terms  are  singular  or 
abstract,  and  those  in  which  one  at  least  is  general. 
In  the  former  the  regulating  principle  is  "things 
which  are  the  same  with,  or  equal  to,  one  and  the 
same  thing,  are  the  same  with,  or  equal  to,  one 
another."  In  the  latter,  in  which  we  have  a  general 
conception,  the  main  regulating  principle  is,  I  believe, 
the  Dictum,  which  the  founder  of  Logic  propounded. 
While  this  is  the  main  law  of  thought,  I  am  con- 
vinced that  there  may  be  others  involved,  such  as 
that  of  whole  and  parts,  and  of  division  in  all  dis- 
junctive reasoning.  A  thorough  analytic  of  logical 
forms  should  unfold  all  these  laws,  and  give  each  its 
separate  place. 

(9.)  Sir  W.  Hamilton  places  reasoning  in  Compre- 
hension on  the  same  level  as  reasoning  in  Exten- 
sion, or  rather  he  gives  it  a  prior  and  higher  posi- 
tion. I  have  stated  my  reasons  for  thinking  that  rea- 
soning is  primarily  in  Extension.  It  may,  indeed, 
always  be  translated  into  the  forms  of  Comprehen- 
sion, and  it  is  desirable  that  students  should  know 
how  to  do  this,  and  do  it  when  any  purpose  is  to  be 
served  by  it.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  burden  the 
mind  with  the  numerous  modes  which  appear  when 
we  insist  on  always  quantifying  the  predicate,  and 


THE   PEOVINCE    OF  LOGIC.  359 

join  on  the  same  footing  reasoning  in  Comprehen- 
sion and  reasoning  in  Extension. 

lY.  There  is  a  large  class  who  accept  implicitly 
the  Logic  of  Mr.  Mill.^  These  consist  chiefly  of 
persons  who  are  disgusted  with  the  scholastic  Logic 
as  being  so  abstract  and  technical,  and  are  not  pre- 
pared  to  give  their  adherence  to  the  Kantian  refor- 
mation, as  they  feel  that  its  forms  keep  us  too  far 
removed  from  things.  Now,  I  rejoice  to  proclaim 
that  there  are  remarks,  as  true  and  important  as 
they  are  fresh,  scattered  throughout  Mr.  Mill's 
treatise.  In  Book  First  he  has  many  useful  observa- 
tions on  Naming,  which  make  us  regret  the  more 
that  they  are  indissolubly  mixed  up  with  sensational 
metaphysics.  His  Book  on  Induction  is  by  far  the 
most  valuable  part  of  his  work,  though  it  is  much 
injured  by  doubtful  speculations  as  to  the  nature  of 
our  belief  in  causation.^  There  are  practical  lessons 
of  much  utility  conveyed  in  his  Book  on  Fallacies, 
only  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  in  pointing  out  with 
so  much  keenness  and  relish  the  errors  of  the  old 
philosophy,  he  leaves  unnoticed  the  still  more  glaring 
fallacies  of  the    nescience  and    association   schools. 

1  I  should  here  have  referred  to  the  cussion.  Students  would  feel  it  to  be 
very  able  attempt  of  Prof.  De  Morgan  a  great  advantage  to  have  his  book  on 
and  the  late  Prof.  Boole  to  give  us  a  Induction  in  a  separate  form,  and 
mathematical  theory  of  reasoning,  with  the  discussions  on  Intuitions  left 
But  it  would  take  us  altogether  out  of  out.  This  would  leave  them  at 
our  present  line  of  thought  to  discuss  liberty  to  get  their  Formal  Logic 
it  thoroughly,  and  I  think  it  better  not  elsewhere,  and  to  resort  to  his  corn- 
to  enter  upon  it.  plete  work  when  they  want  to  know 

2  I  regret  to  see  that  in  the  later  edi-  his  theory  of  the  mind  and  his  other 
tions  Mr.  Mill  is  crowding  his  work  opinions. 

with  still  more  of   metaphysical  dis- 


360  LOGICAL   DlSCUSSIOirS : 

His  closing  Book  is  very  defective  as  a  full  Logic  of 
the  mental  and  social  sciences,  more  particularly  in 
not  estimating  what  is  involved  in  man's  essential 
freedom ;  but  is  of  value  as  the  commencement  of  a 
discussion  which  must  grow  in  interest  and  impor- 
tance. I  propose  to  sum  up  the  defects  of  the  work 
as  gathered  from  the  survey  taken  in  the  last  four 
chapters. 

(1.)  He  denies  that  Logic  is  entitled  to  be 
regarded  as  a  separate  science.  "  So  far  as  it  is  a 
science  at  all,  it  is  a  part  or  branch  of  Psychology ; 
differing  from  it  on  the  one  hand  as  a  part  differs 
from  the  whole,  and  on  the  other,  as  an  Art  differs 
from  a  Science."  (p.  388.)  Now,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  Logic  is  closely  connected  with  Psychology,  is 
in  fact  largely  dependent  on  it  for  some  of  its 
elementary  truths.  The  same  may  be  said  of 
Metaphysics,  or  the  science  of  the  laws  of  intuition ; 
of  Esthetics,  or,  as  I  prefer  calling  it,  Kalology,  the 
science  of  the  laws  of  the  Feelings ;  and  Ethics,  the 
science  of  the  laws  of  our  motive  and  moral  nature. 
It  is  no  doubt  one  part  of  the  office  of  Psychology 
to  gather  from  an  observation  of  the  operations  of 
the  mind  the  laws  of  discursive  thought,  as  it  is  also  to 
find  out  the  laws  of  our  immediate  perceptions,  of 
our  emotional  and  moral  nature.  But  having  ascer- 
tained that  there  are  such  laws,  and  shown  how  they 
act  in  the  mind,  it  does  not  seek  in  a  special  way  to 
formalize  them,  to  inquire  into  their  relation  to 
external   things,  or  to  apply  them  to  scientific  or 


THE   PBOVIIfCE    OF  LOGIC.  361 

practical  ends.  Psychology  leaves  all  tliis  very  ap- 
propriately to  the  other  mental  sciences,  which  are 
no  doubt  her  daughters,  but  have  th^r  separate 
households,  where  they  are  married  to  their  different 
objects,  each  with  its  own  alliances.  In  particular. 
Logic  strives  to  give  a  strictly  scientific  form  and 
expression  to  the  mode  of  the  mind's  procedure  in 
apprehending,  judging,  and  reasoning,  and  in  gather- 
ing laws  and  cause ;  and  from  these  it  draws  rules 
for  the  guidance  of  thought  in  its  various  walks  of 
investigation.  Logic  has  the  proper  characteristics 
of  a  science ;  it  is  systematized  truth,  systematized 
natural  truth. 

(2.)  He  does  not  give  its  j)roper  place  to  the  ele- 
ment of  thought.  No  doubt  he  has  done  great  ser- 
vice to  the  study,  by  caUing  our  attention  to  the 
objects  of  thought,  which  the  scholastic  and  Kantian 
logicians  had  very  much  decHned  to  look  at.  But 
Lo™  has  not  to  do  with  thing's  as  thino^s.  This  it 
leaves  to  other,  and  what  have  been  called  material, 
or  real,  or  what  in  such  a  connection  might  be  called 
objective,  sciences.  Logic  has  to  do  not  with  objects, 
but  with  thought  as  employed  about  objects.  If 
this  distinction  is  not  kept  constantly  in  view,  the 
logician  is  ever  tempted  to  mix  up  physical  or  psy- 
chological questions  with  those  that  properly  belong 
to  Logic. 

(3.)  He  makes  Logic  treat  of  Names,  Propositions, 
and  Arguments,  and  not,  as  our  more  philosophical 
logicians  make  it,  with   Simple  Apprehension,  Judg- 


362  LOGICAL   DISCUSSIOJSS  : 

ment,  and  Reasoning.  Every  one  allows  that  Appre- 
hensions may  be  expressed  in  Names,  Judgment  in 
Propositions,  and  Reasoning  in  Arguments,  and  that 
Logic  should  look  to  these  incidentally  as  the  ex- 
pression of  thought.  But  the  science  should  deal 
primarily  and  throughout  with  the  laws  of  thought, 
always  as  applied  to  things,  leaving  the  laws  of  lan- 
guage to  a  special  department  of  science  now  being 
formed.  It  is  to  be  remembered,  that  as  a  term 
may  consist  of  one  word,  or  twenty  words,  we 
cannot  by  merely  looking  at  words  so  much  as 
know  what  the  term  is  ;  and  that  we  cannot  make 
an  intelligent  predication  in  a  proposition  without 
knowing  the  meaning  of  the  terms :  all  which  shows 
that  Logic  should  expound  thought  rather  than 
names.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten  that  the  laws  of 
thought  constitute  the  fixed  element,  while  the 
names  or  phrases  differ  not  only  in  their  sound,  but 
in  what  they  express  and  embrace  in  different 
languages.  And  then  the  forms  of  language  are 
often  defective,  and  not  unfrequently  erroneous,  and 
need  to  be  amended  by  the  invariable  and,  I  believe, 
unerring  laws  of  thought ;  which  we  should  endeavor 
so  to  analyze  and  formalize  as  to  aid  the  advancing 
Science  of  Language,  —  which  will  again,  as  it  makes 
progress,  greatly  help  the  Science  of  Thought. 

(4.)  In  looking  at  language  instead  of  thought, 
he  has  given  a  very  imperfect  account  of  the  topics 
usually  expounded  in  the  first  part  of  Formal  Logic, 
that  which  deals  with  Simple  Apprehension.    Instead 


THE   PBOYINCE    OF   LOGIC.  363 

of  examining  tlie  various  classes  of  apprehensions, 
and  carefully  distinguishing  them,  he  confines  his 
own  attention  and  that  of  his  readers  to  the  name 
and  its  connotation,  without  i-egard  to  the  notion 
which  the  name  expresses,  or  bringing  out  accurately 
what  thmgs,  or  aspects  of  things,  the  notion  em- 
braces in  its  different  forms. 

Owing  to  his  defective  psychology,  he  has  no  ade- 
quate idea  of  the  capacity  of  the  mind  to  discover 
relations  among  things,  and  he  has  failed  to  give  us 
a  full  or  accurate  exposition  of  the  relation  of  the 
two  apprehensions  m  logical  Judgment.  He  makes 
us  look  not  at  the  act  of  comparison,  which  is  surely 
the  primary  and  main  element,  but  at  the  attribute 
connoted,  overlooking,  in  the  General  Notion,  the 
class  of  objects  combined  by  the  attribute,  and  the 
mental  concept  combining  them. 

(5.)  The  error  goes  up  into  his  analysis  of  reason- 
ing, and  makes  him  give  a  very  partial  exhibition  of 
the  process,  in  which  he  sees  only  the  attribute,  and 
overlooks  the  general  conception  and  general  prop- 
osition, which  are  involved  in  the  validity  of  the 
inference. 

(6.)  Mr.  Mill  has  given  us  the  most  valuable  con- 
tribution since  the  days  of  Bacon  to  one  important 
department  of  Logic,  that  which  treats  of  Induc- 
tion. But  still  there  are  very  grave  mistakes  in  his 
exposition  of  the  topics  that  fall  under  Particular  or 
Secondary  Logic.  These  spring  from  his  erroneous 
theory  of  Demonstration,  more   particidarly  of  the 


364  LOGICAL   DISCUSSIONS: 

nature,  functions,  and  value  of  mathematical  defini- 
tions and  axioms ;  from  his  mixing  false  metaphysics 
with  his  logical  exposition  of  causation;  from  his 
not  seeing  that  the  discovery  of  the  Decomposition 
of  compounds  and  of  Natural  Classes  are  among  the 
ends  aimed  at  in  science,  and  requiring  Special 
Canons :  and  finally,  from  an  imperfect  view  of  the 
nature  of  the  phenomena  of  the  mind,  which  it  is 
the  office  of  Psychology  to  co-ordinate,  and  for  the 
aid  of  which  Logic  should  furnish  a  method. 

It  now  only  remains  to  gather  from  this  discussion 
what  is  the  Province  of  the  science  of  Logic.  It 
has  to  do  with  thought:  but  what  is  meant  by 
thought  in  such  an  application  ?  It  must  evidently 
be  so  explained  as  not  to  include  the  motive  ex- 
ercises of  the  mind,  and  to  exclude  intuition,  in 
which  we  perceive  objects  or  truths  at  once,  and 
which  has  always  been  allotted  to  Metaphysics.  By 
thought,  in  the  technical  sense  in  which  the  word  is 
used  in  Logic,  is  meant  Discursive  Thought,  in  which 
we  proceed  from  something  given  or  allowed  to 
something  else  derived  from  it.  It  implies  a  process, 
which  must  have  laws.  In  order  to  construct  the 
science  of  Logic,  we  must  endeavor  to  gather  the 
laws  of  thought,  by  a  careful  observation  of  the 
operations  of  thought. 

Kant  has  a  twofold  division  of  the  science,  as 
Logic  of  the  universal  or  of  the  particular  use  of 
the  understanding.     "The  first  contains  the  abso- 


THE   FBOYINCE    OF  LOGIC.  365 

lutely  necessary  laws  of  tliouglit,  without  which  no 
use  whatever  of  the  understanding  is  possible,  and 
gives  laws  therefore  to  the  understanding,  without 
regard  to  the  difference  of  objects  on  which  it  may 
be  employed.  The  Logic  of  the  particular  use  of 
the  understanding  contains  the  laws  of  correct  think- 
ing upon  a  particular  class  of  objects."  {Kritik  of 
Pure  Beason,  Meiklejohn's  trans.,  p.  46.)  This  lan- 
guage is  not  unexceptionable,  more  particularly  as 
pointing  to  laws  independent  of  the  observation  of 
objects  •  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  Kant,  in  consist- 
ency with  his  account  of  the  science,  which  makes 
abstraction  of  all  content  of  the  cognition,  that  is, 
of  all  relation  of  cognition  to  its  object"  {Ih.  p.  49), 
could  adopt  such  a  division.  But  if  we  take  the 
proper  view  of  thought,  as  always  engaged  with  ob- 
jects, then  we  can  accept  and  justify  the  arrange- 
ment. We  have,  first,  a  Universal,  or,  as  I  prefer 
calling  it,  a  Primary  Logic  (identical  with  what  is 
commonly  designated  Formal  Logic),  conversant 
with  the  laws  of  thought,  not  independent  of  objects, 
but  whatever  he  the  objects.  We  have,  secondly, 
a  Particular,  or,  as  I  would  call  it.  Secondary  Logic, 
considermg  the  operations  of  thought  as  directed  to 
particular  classes  of  objects,  say  to  intuitive  percep- 
tions, as  in  demonstration;  and  the  collection  of 
scattered  facts,  external  or  internal,  as  m  Induction. 
Under  the  first  head  Logic  treats  of  Simple  Appre- 
hension, Judgment,  and  Eeasoning,  which,  no  doubt, 
all  look  to  objects,  but  are  the  same  for  all  objects. 


366  LOGICAL   DISCUSSION'S: 

It  lias  to  consider,  first,  our  apprehensions.  Some  of 
these  are  of  objects  singular  and  concrete,  what  we 
may  call  Percepts,  as  being  immediately  perceived 
by  the  mind.  Some  of  them,  again,  are  of  Abstracts, 
or  parts  considered  as  parts  of  a  whole,  more  par- 
ticularly of  attributes  of  objects.  Others  are  of  Con- 
cepts, or  of  things  having  common  attributes,  and 
joined  in  a  class  which  embraces  all  the  objects  pos- 
sessing the  attributes.  All  Concepts  have  both  Ex- 
tension and  Comprehension.  Logic  does  not  deal 
immediately  with  the  formation  of  Percepts,  which 
are  intuitive  ;  but  it  evolves  the  laws  involved  in  the 
construction  of  Abstracts  and  Concepts.  In  Judg- 
ment we  compare  two  of  these  Percepts,  Abstracts, 
or  Concepts.  This  process  also  has  laws,  such  as, 
when  the  things  compared  are  Abstracts  the  relation 
is  one  of  identity  or  of  equivalence;  and,  when 
there  is  a  general  notion,  the  relation  is  both  of  Com- 
prehension and  Extension.  There  are  also  laws  in- 
volved in  Reasoning,  in  which  we  compare  two  of 
our  apprehensions  by  means  of  a  third.  These  are 
derived  very  much  from  the  nature  of  the  apprehen- 
sions compared.  Thus,  in  cases  in  which  we  com- 
pare Abstracts,  the  regulating  principle  is  that  of 
identity  or  equality,  "things  which  are  the  same 
with  a  third,  or  equal  to  a  third,  are  the  same  with, 
or  equal  to  one  another."  But  when  there  is  a  class- 
notion  involved  —  and  there  is  so  wherever  there 
is  attribution,  —  then  we  must  proceed  according 
to  the  class-notion,  and  the  regulating  principle  is, 


THE   PBOVINCE    OF  LOGIC.  367 

"whatever  is  predicated  of  a  class  may  be  predi- 
cated of  all  that  is  contained  in  that  class."  While 
these  are  the  main  ruling  principles  involved  in  all 
cases  of  reasoning,  there  may  also  be  other  princi- 
ples implied  in  all  cases,  or  m  special  cases.  Thus 
the  principle  of  whole  and  parts  is  involved  when 
we  include  an  individual  in  a  class,  or  a  species  in  a 
genus.  The  Comprehension  of  the  Notion  is  to  be 
taken  along  with  us,  when  we  translate  reasoning  in 
Extension,  so  as  to  make  Comprehension  the -upper- 
most thought.  A  prmciple  of  Division,  that  the  co- 
ordinate sub-classes  must  make  up  the  class,  is  in- 
volved in  all  Disjunctive  Reasoning :  thus  when  we 
argue  that  this  man,  being  either  a  knave  or  a  fool, 
and  not  being  a  fool,  must  be  a  knave,  it  is  hnplied 
that  knave  and  fool  make  up  the  class  to  which  this 
man  must  belong. 

Taking  this  view  of  Logic,  we  do  not  separate  it 
so  entirely  from  realities  as  the  scholastic  logicians 
did,  and  as  the  Kantian  logicians  still  do.  It  has 
not,  indeed,  to  do  with  things  directly.  Many  of 
Mr.  Mill's  discussions  would  lead  us  to  think  that  it 
has,  and  we  are  thus  involved  in  questions  wdiich 
can  be  settled  only  by  the  sciences  —  material  or  men- 
tal^ which  deal  with  objects.  Logic  has  to  do  not 
with  objects,  but  with  thought  as  directed  to  objects. 
This  account  makes  it  quite  competent  for  Logic  to 
consider  not  only  Apprehension,  Judgment,  and 
Reasoning,  which  are  the  same  for  all  objects  but 
also  Thought  as  directed  to  particular  classes  of  ob- 


368  LOmCAL   DISCUSSIONS: 

jects.  The  great  body  of  thinkers  in  modern  times 
have  felt  that  Logic  ought  to  embrace  other  topics 
besides  those  treated  of  in  Formal  Logic ;  in  par- 
ticular that  it  ought  not  to  exclude  the  Method  of 
investigation  propounded  by  Bacon.  The  exposition 
I  have  given  makes  it  include  not  only  Induction 
but  other  modes  of  discovering  truth. 

It  may  consider  thought  as  proceeding  in  the  way 
of  Demonstration.  Here  all  that  is  assumed  in  start- 
ing, and  all  that  is  assumed  throughout,  must  be  seen 
to  be  true  intuitively.  The  Method  of  Investigation 
is  what  I  call  the  Joint  Dogmatic  and  Deductive. 
It  is  Dogmatic,  in  that  it  assumes  •  but  then  it  should 
assume  only  what  is  seen  to  be  true  on  the  bare  con- 
templation of  the  nature  of  objects.  It  is  Deductive, 
in  that  it  derives  other  truths  from  these  assump- 
tions by  a  process  of  reasoning.  But  this  Method  is 
applicable  only  within  a  very  limited  range,  only  so 
far  as  we  have  an  immediate  intuition  of  the  nature 
of  things.  In  most  walks  of  investigation  Demon- 
stration is  not  available.  What  we  have  before  us 
are  individual  and  scattered  facts,  falling  under  the 
senses  or  the  consciousness.  It  is  out  of  these  that 
we  must  gather  the  law.  So  far  as  we  observe  and 
co-ordinate  the  facts  with  the  view  of  rising  to  their 
law,  whether  this  be  a  class  or  a  cause,  or  the  consti- 
tution of  compound  objects,  the  Method  pursued  is 
the  Inductive.  In  this  process  we  gather  the  facts 
and  tabulate  them,  and,  without  "  anticipating  "  na- 
ture,  we  allow  the  facts  to  suggest  the  law,  which  is 


THE   PBOVIKCE    OF   LOGIC.  369 

accepted  only  when  it  embraces  and  explains  all  the 
facts.  But  as  science  advances,  by  this  method  we 
reach  laws  which  may  be  regarded  as  at  least  pro- 
visionally established^  and  we  inquire  —  in  certain 
departments  with  the  powerful  aid  of  Mathematics 
—  what  consequences  would  follow  from  these  laws  ? 
Another,  and  a  very  powerful  Method,  now  becomes 
applicable.  I  call  it  the  Joint  Inductive  and  De- 
ductive, in  which  we  inquire  what  results  must  fol- 
low from  certain  supposed  laws,  and  then  compare 
these  with  facts  got  by  observation  or  experiment. 
In  all  our  advanced  sciences  this  must  now  be  the 
principal  mode  of  investigation. 

I  am  mclined  to  think  that  Whately  is  right  when 
he  represents  Logic  as  both  a  Science  and  an  Art. 
It  is  a  science,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  sj^stematized  body 
of  natural  truth.  It  is  reared  by  the  observation 
and  co-ordination  of  the  spontaneous  operations  of 
discursive  thought.  But  it  may  also  become  an  art, 
or  a  body  of  precepts  drawn  out  to  enable  us  to 
accomplish  a  particular  end,  that  is,  to  think  cor- 
rectly, and  expose  confused  thought  or  invalid  rea- 
soning. It  should  aim  at  nothing  less  than  the 
discovery  of  the  laws  of  thought  operating  in  the 
mind  as  it  contemplates  objects.  When  we  have 
accurately  apprehended  and  expressed  them,  we 
may  then  apply  them  to  test  and  correct  actual 
thought.  For  this  purpose  we  may  derive  from 
them  rules,  and  put  these  in  various  formulse,  which 
admit  of  a  ready  and  useful  application  to  our  every- 

24 


370  LOGICAL   DISCUSSIOJ^S: 

day  tliinking,  and  to  scientific  investigation.  In  par- 
ticular, Logic  is  of  great  use  in  clearing  our  notions ; 
it  shows  what  notions  are  singular  and  what  universal ; 
what  concrete  and  what  abstract  ;  and  guards  us 
against  using  a  general  term  as  if  it  were  a  singular 
concrete.  It  cannot  teU  us  what  judgments  are  true 
and  what  false  (this  must  be  done  by  the  depart- 
ments of  knowledge  which  deal  with  objects),  but  it 
tells  us  what  is  the  precise  relation  between  the  Per- 
cepts, Abstracts,  and  Concepts  compared,  and  thus 
places  our  notions  in  such  a  light  that  we  are  better 
able  to  say  whether  a  given  proposition  is  true  or 
false.  Again,  the  syllogistic  analysis  lets  us  see  that 
in  reasoning  we  have  to  look  to  the  relation  of  three 
notions.  Percepts,  Abstracts,  or  Concepts;  and  that 
when  one  of  the  notions  is  a  Concept,  we  always 
need  by  implication  a  general  proposition ;  and  the 
formulae  derived  from  this  analysis  unfold  the  various 
possible  forms  of  reasoning,  and  enable  us  to  test 
our  own  inferences  and  those  of  others.  In  the 
Secondary  (but  not  less  important)  Logic,  there 
can  be  tests  laid  down,  such  as  those  of  self-evi- 
dence, necessity,  and  catholicity,  sufficient  to  decide 
readily  and  certainly  what  truths  are  intuitive,  and  so 
entitled  to  become  assumptions  in  Demonstration; 
while  the  processes  of  deduction  from  intuitive  truth 
may  all  be  tested  by  the  syllogism.  The  Canons  of 
Causes  enunciated  by  Mr.  Mill  settle  for  us,  when  we 
are  entitled  to  argue  that  we  have  discovered  the 
cause  of  a  given  phenomenon ;  and  I  hope  that  in 


THE    PBOVINCE    OF   LOGIC.  371 

due  time  we  shall  have  Canons  of  Decomposition 
and  Canons  of  Classes,  to  determine  when  we  have 
reached  the  elementary  constitution  of  bodies  (pro- 
visionally), and  when  we  have  discovered  natural 
classes.  We  have  already  some  Canons  of  Historical 
Investigation  to  aid  us  in  finding  whether  the  evi- 
dence is  sufficient  to  estabhsh  the  alleged  facts,  and 
these   Canons  should  be    adopted   into   Logic,  and 
made   as   succinct   and   comprehensive  as  possible. 
Logic  has  thus  a  wide  and  most  important  field  as 
an  art ;  it  furnishes  guiding  rules  and  tests  in  every 
path  of  inquiry.     It  is  thus  fulfilling  some  of  the 
old  pretensions  made  in  its  behaE    I  do  not  like  the 
phrase,  "  Art  of  Thinking,"  for  men  think  spontane- 
ously, without  any  science  or  art ;  but  Logic  supplies 
rules  to  guard  against  confused  and  erroneous  think- 
ing.   It  is  in  a  special  sense  the  "  Science  of  Method; " 
that  is,  of  the  Method  to  be  pursued  in  discovering 
scientific  and  historical  truth.     It  is  the  "  Science  of 
Sciences,"  not  because  superior  to  other  departments 
of  knowledge,  but  because  it  supphes  rules  to  guide 
and  guard  in  every  other  science. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

WHAT  IS  TRUTH?     CRITERIA   OF  TRUTH. 

IT  is  very  evident  that  Mr.  Mill  has  a  pleasure  in 
seeing  himself  and  his  opinions  reflected  in  the 
convictions  and  writings  of  young  men.  On  the 
other  side,  the  youth  who  give  themselves  up  to  his 
guidance  seem  as  if  they  could  look  only  straight 
before  them  in  the  path  in  which  he  leads  them,  and 
as  if  they  were  incapable  of  taking  a  comprehensive 
view  of  things  lying  on  either  side.  As,  however, 
they  will  be  obliged  to  do  so  sooner  or  later,  it  might 
be  as  well  if  they  now  stopped  for  a  little,  in  order 
to  look  round  them  and  inquire  whither  he  is  lead- 
ing, and  where  he  is  to  leave  them  ?  What  have  we 
left  us  according  to  this  new  philosophy  ?  We  have 
sensations ;  we  have  a  series  of  feelings  aware  of  it- 
self, and  permanent,  or  rather  prolonged;  and  we 
have  an  association  of  sensations,  and  perceived  re- 
semblances, and  possibilities  of  sensations.  The 
sensations  and  associations  of  sensation  generate 
ideas  and  behefs,  which  do  not,  however,  either  in 
themselves  or  their  mode  of  formation,  guarantee 
any  reality.     We  have  an  idea  of  an  external  mate- 

(372) 


CBITEBIA    OF    TBUTH.  373 

rial  world ;  but  Mr.  Mill  does  not  affirm  that  there  is 
such  a  world,  for  there  are  laws  of  the  series  of  feel- 
ings which  would  produce  the  idea,  whether  the 
thing  existed  or  not;  and  our  belief  in  it  may  be 
overcome,  — just  as  our  natural  belief  in  the  sun 
rising  is  made  to  give  way  before  the  scientific  con- 
viction that  it  is  the  earth  that  moves.  He  thinks 
he  is  able  by  a  process  of  inference  to  reach  the 
existence  of  other  beings  besides  ourselves.  But 
the  logic  of  the  process  is  very  doubtful.  I  beheve 
that  neither  Mr.  MiU  nor  any  other  has  been  able  to 
show  how  from  sensations,  individual  or  associated, 
we  could  ever  legitimately  infer  the  existence  of  any- 
thing beyond.  What  he  claims  to  have  found  is, 
after  all,  only  other  ^^  series  of  feelings." 

But  have  we  not,  it  is  said,  a  body  of  scientific 
truth,  for  which  Mr.  Mill  has  done  as  much  as  any 
living  man,  by  showing  how  it  may  be  best  arranged? 
I  acknowledge  that  in  the  view  of  those  who  believe 
in  the  reality  of  things,  and  who  further  beheve  in 
a  God  who  made  and  arranged,  and  still  upholds 
them,  this  systematized  truth  is  a  glorious  body,  — 
like  the  sun  itself,  with  a  central  solidity  which 
keeps  it  firm,  while  it  holds  other  bodies  circling 
roimd  it,  and  with  a  gloriously  illuminated  atmos- 
phere, scattering  light  and  heat  all  around.  But 
what  is  all  this  when  interpreted  in  philosophic  ac- 
curacy ?  It  is  simply  possibihties  of  sensations,  com- 
ing in  groups,  and  in  regular  succession,  and  with  re- 
semblances which  can  be  noticed.     And  is  this  the 


374  WHAT  IS    TBUTH? 

sum  of  what  has  been  gained  by  the  highest  science 
of  the  nineteenth  century  ?  As  we  contemplate  it, 
do  we  not  feel  as  if  the  sohd  heart  of  truth  and  the 
radiating  Hght  were  both  gone,  and  as  if  we  had 
left  only  a  series  of  systematic  vibrations  in  an  un- 
known ether  ?  Does  this  satisfy  the  convictions  and 
the  longings  of  man  ?  Does  not  the  intelligence  de- 
clare that  it  has  something  deeper  than  this  ?  Does 
not  the  heart  crave  for  something  higher  than  this  ? 
And  when  the  youths,  who  are  led  on  so  pleasantly 
by  the  clear  enunciations  of  Mr.  Mill,  stop  at  any 
time  to  inquire  what  he  has  given  them,  must  they 
not  feel  that  they  are,  after  all,  in  darkness,  with 
only  a  camera  obscura  displaying  figures  before 
them,  always  according  to  sternly  scientific  laws? 
If  they  are  satisfied  with  this,  are  they  not  in  the 
act  abnegating  the  deeper  capacities,  and  refusing 
to  follow  the  higher  aspirations  of  their  souls,  which, 
for  want  of  proper  exercise,  will  become  dry,  and 
shrunk,  and  withered?  And  if  they  are  not  satis- 
fied, —  as  our  higher  minds  will  certainly  not  be,  — 
how  piteous  must  be  the  wail  of  disappointment  and 
anguish  coming  from  the  depths  of  their  bosoms,  as 
they  crave  for  truth  on  the  one  hand,  and  feel  that 
they  can  never  catch  it  on  the  other  ?  I  do  fear  for 
the  consequences,  when  our  promising  youths  awake, 
and  in  despair  of  attaining  truth,  are  tempted  to 
plunge  into  deeper  and  yet  deeper  darkness.  For- 
tunately such  a  state  of  things  —  the  deeper  instincts 
of  human  nature  being  so  strong  —  cannot  continue 


CBITERIA    OF    TBUTR.  375 

for  any  length  of  time;  and  however  lamentable 
may  be  the  experience  and  history  of  individuals, 
the  hour  of  thickest  darkness  will  be  found  to  excite 
the  cry  for  the  returning  light. 

"  By  nature/'  says  Aristotle,  "  man  is  competently 
organized  for  truth;  and  truth  in  general  is  not 
beyond  his  reach."  Truth  is  usually  defined  as 
the  agreement  of  our  ideas,  or  apprehensions,  with 
things.  Profound  thinkers  have  assumed,  or  labored 
to  prove,  that,  on  the  one  hand,  man  has  ideas ;  that, 
on  the  other  hand,  there  are  things ;  and  that  man 
can  reach  ideas  which  correspond  with  things.  Let 
us  inquire  what  view  must  be  taken  of  truth  by 
those  who  follow  out  Mr.  Mill's  system  to  its  conse- 
quences ? 

Mr.  Mill  acknowledges  that  we  have  ideas.  But 
he  takes  great  pains  to  show  that  these  originate  in 
sensations,  and  grow  out  of  sensations,  according  to 
the  laws  of  the  association  of  sensations.  I  am  not 
sure  whether  he  acknowledges  the  existence  of  ma- 
terial things  out  of,  and  independent  of,  sensations. 
He  often  uses  language  which  seems  to  imply  that 
he  does;  but  his  system  all  tends  the  other  way. 
This  is  certain,  that  even  if  body  exists  we  can  never 
know  anything  of  it,  except  as  "  the  possibility  of 
sensations."  All  that  we  know  of  objects  is  the  sen- 
sations which  they  give  us,  and  the  order  of  the  oc- 
currence of  those  sensations.  "There  is  not  the 
slightest  reason  for  beHeving  that  what  we  call  the 
sensible  qualities  of  the  object  are  a  type  of  any- 


376  WHAT  IS    TEUTH? 

thing  inherent  in  itself,  or  bear  any  affinity  to  its 
own  nature.  A  cause  does  not,  as  such,  resemble  its 
effects ;  an  east  wind  is  not  like  the  feeling  of  cold, 
nor  is  heat  like  the  steam  of  boiling  water :  why  then 
should  matter  resemble  our  sensations  ? "  {Logic,  I. 
m.  7.)  Then  as  to  the  internal  world :  all  that  we 
know  of  it  is  a  series  of  feelings,  with  a  prolongation 
in  time,  which  again  is  identical  with  a  series  of 
muscular  sensations.  {Supra,  p.  145.)  I  suppose  he 
would  further  say,  —  though  I  do  not  remember  any 
passage  in  which  he  does  say  it,  —  that  we  do  not 
know  what  is  the  nature  of  these  sensations.  As 
things  are  thus  unknown,  and  must  be  unknown  with 
our  present  faculties,  and  in  the  condition  in  which  we 
are  placed,  so  man  seems  to  be  precluded  from  reach- 
ing any  truth  beyond  the  consciousness  of  present 
sensations,  and  the  possibility  of  other  sensations. 
But  some  have  defined  truth  as  the  accordance, 
not  of  our  own  ideas  with  things,  but  of  our 
ideas  with  one  another.  This  is  a  view  which 
I  do  not  think  worth  the  pains  of  defending.  It 
is  quite  compatible  with  the  existence  of  a  uni- 
versal system  of  delusion  and  deception,  provided 
always  that  this  system  were  consistent  with  itself 
Give  a  mathematician  such  a  false  assumption  as 
that  matter  attracts  other  matter  inversely  ac- 
cording to  the  distance  (and  not  the  square  of 
the  distance),  and  he  might  construct  from  it  an 
imaginary  world,  every  part  of  which  would  be  in 
agreement  with  every  other,  but  no  part  in  accord- 


CBITEBIA    OF    TBUTH,  377 

ance  with  the  reahty  of  things.  It  is  imaginable 
that  the  truth  which  man  discovers  is  all  of  this 
description:  a  consistency  between  an  unfounded 
hypothesis,  and  the  results  following  from  it  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  our  idea.  Some  ideal  philoso- 
phers would  be  content  with  such  a  view  of  truth. 
But  then  they  think  that  this  consistency  is  given 
by  the  laws  of  reason,  and  that  man  can  actually 
reach  truth,  not  it  may  be  in  congruity  with  phe- 
nomenal things,  but,  with  the  principles  of  reason  — 
some  of  them  would  say  absolute  and  eternal  reason. 
But  truth  thus  imderstood  is,  according  to  our 
author's  system,  quite  as  much  beyond  the  reach  of 
man  as  truth  in  the  other  sense.  For  any  accord- 
ance that  there  may  be  between  our  ideas  might  be 
produced,  not  by  independent  reason,  or  consequen- 
tial reasoning,  but  by  the  association  of  ideas,  by  the 
laws  of  contiguity  or  resemblance.  When  two  phe- 
nomena have  been  very  often  experienced  in  con- 
junction, and  have  not,  in  any  single  instance,  oc- 
curred separately,  either  in  experience  or  in  thought : 
"^Yhen  the  bond  between  the  two  ideas  has  thus 
been  firmly  riveted,  not  only  does  the  idea,  called  up 
by  association,  become,  in  our  consciousness,  insep- 
arable from  the  idea  which  suggested  it,  but  the  facts 
or  phenomena  answering  to  these  ideas  come  at  last 
to  seem  inseparable  in  existence :  things  which  we 
are  unable  to  conceive  apart  appear  incapable  of  ex- 
isting apart."  (p.  191.)  Thus  2  and  2  havmg  been 
associated  in  our  experience  with  4,  we  give  them  a 


378  WHAT  IS    TBUTR? 

relation  in  the  nature  of  things ;  but  if  2  and  2  had 
been  followed  by  the  appearance  of  5,  we  should 
have  had  a  like  assurance  of  2  -|-  2  and  5  being 
equal.  Truth  in  Mr.  Mill's  philosophy  is  not  even 
a  logical  or  rational  consistency  between  ideas;  it 
can  be  nothing  more  than  an  accordance  of  our 
ideas  with  sensations,  and  laws  of  the  association  of 
sensation;  which  sensations  come  we  know  not 
whence,  and  are  associated  by  resemblances,  exist- 
ing we  know  not  how,  or,  more  frequently,  by  con- 
tiguity, implying  no  relation  of  reason,  no  con- 
nection in  the  nature  of  things,  and  very  possibly 
altogether  fortuitous,  or  absolutely  fatalistic. 

We  see  now  the  issues  in  which  the  doctrine  of 
the  relativity  of  knowledge,  as  held  by  Mr.  Mill, 
lands  us.  The  geometrical  demonstrations  of  Euchd 
and  Apollonius  and  Newton  may  hold  good  only 
within  our  experience,  and  "a  reasonable  distance 
beyond."  The  mathematics  taught  in  Cambridge 
may  differ  in  their  fundamental  principles  from  those 
taught  in  the  corresponding  university  of  the  planet 
Jupiter ;  where  two  and  two  may  make  five,  where 
two  straight  lines  may  enclose  a  space,  and  where 
the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  may  be  more  than 
two  right  angles.  Mr.  Mill  is  exceedingly  indignant 
at  Dr.  Mansel  for  maintaining  that  the  Divine 
morality  is  not  to  be  measured  by  human  morality, 
declaring  that  "  it  is  simply  the  most  morally  perni- 
cious doctrine  now  current."  (p.  90.)  But  I  can  dis- 
cover no  ground  on  which  the  rebuker  can  stand,  in 


CBITEBIA    OF    TBUTH.  379 

pronouncing  such  a  judgment  on  Dr.  Mansel's  appli- 
cation of  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge. 
Any  one  with  half  the  acuteness  of  Dr.  Mansel  could 
show  that  if  two  and  two  may  make  ^Ye,  it  is  also 
supposable  that  lying  may  be  a  virtue,  and  veracity 
a  vice,  in  other  worlds;  and  that  God  (if  there  be 
a  God)  may  commend  deceit  in  the  constellation  of 
the  Plough,  even  as  He  encourages  truthfulness  in 
our  world ;  and  this  doctrine,  I  rather  think,  is  quite 
as  "morally  pernicious"  as  any  now  current,  and 
certainly  much  more  so  than  that  entertained  by  Dr. 
Mansel,  who  holds  resolutely  (whether  consistently 
or  not)  by  an  absolute  morality,  which  does  not 
change  with  times  or  circumstances.^ 

Some  represent  Mr.  Mill  as  falling  back  upon  the 
position  of  Berkeley.  And  1  suppose  we  may  reckon 
Mr.  Mill  as  favoring  all  the  negative  statements  of 
Berkeley ;  but  he  has  discarded  all  those  grand 
views  and  elevating  sentiments  which  render  his 
system  so  attractive  to  certain  mmds.  No  consistent 
thinker  can  stay  at  the  place  taken  up  by  the  Irish 
metaphysician ;  he  had  to  give  way  before  the 
Scotch  one,  —  who  used  the  arguments  against  the 
independent  existence  of  matter,  to  undermine  our 


i"We    can    point    to    a    doctrine  forth  there  as  right."  {London  Quarterly 

which  cannot  be  less  morally  perni-  Review,  Jan.  1S6G.)     A  very  able  con- 

cious  than  Mr.  Mansel's,  than  which  tributor   to  that  periodical  has  antici- 

none  indeed  can  be  more  morally  per-  pated  Mr.  Mill  in  many  of  his  objec- 

nicious."     "  If   in    some  other  world  tions    to  Hamilton's    philosophy,  but 

two  and  two  may  make  five  ;  in  some  rejects  Mr.  Mill's  philosophy  as*a  sub- 

other  world  what  we  regard  as  virtue  stitute. 
may  be  vice,  and  our  wrong  may  come 


380  WHAT  IS    TBUTH? 

belief  in  the  independent  existence  of  mind.^  Our 
author's  system,  both  in  its  premises  and  conclusion, 
has  many  striking  analogies  to  that  of  Hume.  Does 
the  one  begin  with  sensations,  these  are  very  much  the 
same  as  the  impressions  of  the  other.  The  later  meta- 
physician is  only  following  the  elder,  in  laboring  to 
show  we  get  our  ideas  out  of  sensations  and  impres- 
sions, by  means  of  association.  They  concur  in  not 
knowing  very  well  what  to  make  of  time  and  space ; 
but  neither  allows  them  any  separate  reality.  Both 
hold  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  substance ;  that 
all  we  can  know  of  mind  is,  that  it  is  a  bundle  of 
states  or  a  series  of  feelings,  to  which  we  give  some 
sort  of  unity  or  permanence,  not  justifiable  by  reason 
or  any  higher  principle ;  and  that  body  is  an  un- 
known something,  from  which  we  suppose  we  get 
our  sensations.  Both  deny  that  we  have  any  intui- 
tive conviction  as  to  cause  and  effect;  and  both 
make  the  relation  between  these  to  consist  in  invari- 

1  Some  are  looking  with  extreme  ception  of  things  and  necessary  truth  ? 
anxiety  to  the  course  which  the  pupils  Or,  abandoning  the  position  taken  by 
of  Hamilton  may  adopt  at  this  crisis  Hamilton,  and  defended  by  him  in 
in  the  history  of  philosophic  thought,  many  a  brave  fight,  are  they  to  be- 
lt is  clear,  from  their  published  writ-  take  themselves  to  the  lines  occupied 
mgs,  that  Dr.  Cairns  and  Dr.  Calder-  by  Kant  or  by  Berkeley,  and  which 
wood  will  be  prepared  to  defend  have  been  found  so  utterly  untenable  ? 
natural  realism,  and  the  veracity  of  If  they  take  the  latter  course,  it  will  be 
our  native  convictions.  But  what  line  seen  by  every  shrewd  observer  that 
is  to  be  taken  by  those  who  occupy  they  cannot  stand  one  hour  before  the 
chairs  of  philosophy,  and  have  students  keen  play  of  Mr.  Mill's  musketry,  or 
under  them  1  I  am  convinced  that  Mr.  Spencer's  heavy  artillery.  Those 
they  cannot  now  stand  where  their  illus-  of  their  pupils  who  may  try  to  stand 
trious  master  endeavored  to  stand,  —  on  the  sliding-scale,  will  only  thereby 
halfway  between  Reid  and  Kant —  be  made  to  fall  more  rapidly  to  the 
between  realities  and  forms.  Are  base  —  where  the  school  of  Mill  will 
they  to  fall  back  on  an  intuitive  per-  welcome  them. 


CBITEBIA    OF    TEUTR.  381 

able  or  unconditional  conjunction,  within  the  hmits 
of  experience.  Both  admit  some  sort  of  original 
power :  Hume  stands  up  for  innate  instincts ;  and 
Mr.  Mill  for  an  ultimate  behef  in  memory-  and  it 
should  be  added  that  neither  knows  very  well  what 
to  make  of  these  inborn  principles.  Both  derive 
our  motives  originally  from  sensations  of  pleasure 
and  pain  •  and  both,  it  is  well  known,  were  clear 
and  eloquent  expounders  of  the  utilitarian  theory  of 
morals.  Nor  is  it  unworthy  of  being  mentioned, 
that  both  pomt  not  unobscurely  to  changes,  which 
they  think  ought  to  be  made,  in  the  marriage  relar 
tion.  It  should  be  admitted  that  with  these  promi- 
nent points  of  correspondence  there  are  also  points 
of  difference.  Hume's  account  of  the  relations  which 
the  mind  of  man  can  discover  is  much  more  com- 
prehensive than  that  of  Mill.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  pleasant  to  find  that  the  writer  of  this  century 
assumes  a  higher  moral  tone  than  the  writer  of 
the  last;  both,  however,  concurring  in  overlooking 
or  despising  the  special  Christian  graces.  But  the 
main  difference  lies  in  this,  that  Hume  discovers 
flagrant  contradictions  in  human  intelligences; 
whereas  the  other  maintains  that  the  most  certain 
principles  reached  by  us,  being  all  the  product  of 
cuxumstances,  might  have  to  give  way  before  new 
circumstances  or  in  other  conditions.  Hume  had  to 
say,  that  "  the  intense  view  of  these  manifold  contrar 
dictions  and  imperfections  in  human  reason  has  so 
wrought  upon  me  and  heated  my  brain,  that  I  am 


382  WHAT  IS    TBUTH? 

ready  to  reject  all  belief  and  reasoning,  and  can 
look  upon  no  opinion  even  as  more  probable  or  likely 
than  another."  The  modern  author  is  saved  from  all 
such  contradictions;  for  if  one  set  of  experiences 
showed  him  that  two  and  two  make  four,  and  another 
that  two  and  two  make  fiye,  he  would  proclaim  both 
true  in  the  different  conditions.  The  consequence 
is,  that  the  one  is  an  avowed  sceptic  or  professed 
pyrrhonist,  —  at  least  in  many  parts  of  his  writings, — 
delighting  to  play  off  one  dogmatist  against  another ; 
whereas  the  other  is  a  supporter  of  the  doctrines  of 
nescience  and  relativity,  holding  that  we  can  never 
reach  truths  which  may  not  be  modified  or  set  aside 
in  other  times  and  circumstances.  I  am  not  sure 
which  of  the  issues  is  the  more  blank :  I  rejoice  that 
I  do  not  feel  myself  required  to  make  a  choice  be- 
tween them. 

I  hold  that  human  intelligence  begins  with  truth, 
and  if  it  proceeds  properly  it  ends  with  truth  ;  which 
may  at  times  be  mysterious,  but  never  contradictory ; 
which  may  be  indefinitely  enlarged,  but  cannot  be 
upturned  or  reversed.  In  the  course  of  these  dis- 
cussions we  have  gathered  the  means  of  trying  the 
supposed  verities  proffered  for  our  acceptance.  There 
is  to  us  no  one  absolute  criterion  of  all  truth ;  but 
there  are  tests  of  the  various  kinds  of  truth,  both 
of  those  with  which  we  start,  and  of  those  which  we 
reach  in  our  progress.  Of  Intuition  itself  we  have 
tests  in  self-evidence,  necessity,  and  universality. 
Of  Reasoning  we  have  stringent  tests  in  the  forms 


CBITEBIA  OF  TBUTH.  383 

of  the  syllogism.  By  these  two  combined  we  can 
try  Demonstration,  which  consists  in  a  union  of  in- 
tuition and  deduction.  We  have  tests,  too,  of  truths 
reached  in  physical,  in  psychological,  and  in  histor- 
ical investigation,  by  the  Collection  of  Facts.  These 
are  to  be  found  m  the  Canons  of  Induction  and  in 
the  Canons  of  Verification  -,  which  we  may  confi- 
dently expect  to  be  more  and  more  perfected  in 
their  formalization  and  expression  as  the  separate 
departments  of  knowledge  make  progress. 

It  is  admitted  that  these  criteria  demand  that  we 
leave  unanswered  many  questions  which  the  ques- 
tioning mind  of  man  can  put.  Whatever  alleged 
truth  cannot  stand  such  tests  should  be  regarded  as 
unsettled,  and  allowed  to  lie  for  the  present  in  the 
land  of  darkness.  As  we  use  the  criteria  we  shall  be 
led  to  see  that  there  are  very  stringent  limits  set  to 
man's  power  of  acquiring  knowledge.  But  we  shall 
see  at  the  same  time  how  wide  is  the  field  of  inquiry, 
and  even  of  certainty,  thrown  open  to  us.  Geology 
can  carry  us  back  in  the  history  of  our  earth  to 
periods  removed  from  us  by  millions  of  years.  As- 
tronomy, aided  by  mathematics,  lets  us  know  of  the 
existence  of  bodies  millions  of  miles  away ;  and, 
aided  by  chemistry,  gives  us  an  insight  into  the  com- 
position of  the  atmosphere  of  a  body  so  far  removed 
from  us  as  the  sun.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten  that, 
by  the  observation  of  the  evidences  of  design  in 
nature,  combined  with  the  principle  of  cause  and 
effect,  and  our  moral  convictions,  we  can  rise  to  a 


384  WHAT  IS  TEUTHf 

most  reasonable  belief  in  the  existence  of  an  Al- 
mighty and  All-Perfect  God.  Man  should  ever  claim 
this  wide  field  as  an  inheritance,  and  allow  no  one, 
on  any  pretence,  to  deprive  him  of  it.  And  having 
such  an  inheritance  he  should  be  glad  and  grateful, 
—  the  more  so  as,  attending  always  to  the  tests  ap- 
pointed to  guide  and  guard,  he  can  indefinitely  widen 
and  extend  his  possessions. 


CnAPTER  XX. 

UTILITARIANISM. 

IN  specifying  the  influences  under  whicli  Mr.  Mill's 
opinions  were  formed,  I  might  have  referred  to 
Jeremy  Bentham  and  his  utihtarian  theory,  as  hav- 
ing not  a  little  swayed  the  opmions  of  the  young 
thinker,  either   directly,  or   indirectly  through  his 
father,  who  was  a  friend  of  Bentham's.     But  in  this 
treatise  I  meant  to  look  more  to  Mr.  MiU's  general 
philosophic  system  than  his  specially  ethical  views ; 
and  however  eminent  as  a  jurist,  Bentham  had  no 
name  as  a  metaphysician.     Our  author's  philosophy 
is  essentially  a  combination  of  that  of  Mr.  James 
Mill  and  of  M.  Comte,  —  however,  the  utilitarianism 
of  the  older  Mill  and  of  Bentham  thoroughly  fits 
into  the  system.     It  would  require  a  volume  mstead 
of  a  chapter  to  discuss  historicaUy,  psychologically, 
and  ethically  the  utHitarian  theory.     We  can  touch 
here  only  on  a  few  points  intimately  connected  with 
the  preceding  discussions. 

I.  Can  Mr.  Mill's  psychological  theory  account  for 
the  pecuhar  idea  and  conviction  which  we  have  m 
regard  to  moral  good  and  evil  ?     He  admits  that  the 
25  (385) 


386  TJTILITABIANfSM. 

mature  man  in  the  advanced  stages  of  society  lias  a 
conscience  and  moral  ideas :  let  us  inquire  how  he 
generates  them.  And  first,  let  us  try  to  ascertain 
what  he  makes  the  original  motive  powers  or  springs 
of  action  in  the  mind  of  man.  "  The  utilitarian  doc- 
trine is,  that  happiness  is  desirable,  and  the  only 
thing  desirable,  as  an  end."  (p.  51.)  It  is  clear  that 
he  makes,  as  every  other  philosopher  does,  the  desire 
of  23ersonal  pleasure  a  primary  motive  to  action. 
But  I  am  not  sure  whether  he  makes  the  desire  of 
promoting  the  happiness  of  other  beings  also  an 
originating  appetence  in  man.  There  are  passages 
which  look  as  if  he  did,  or  at  least  wished  to  be  re- 
garded as  doing  so.  In  rearing  his  theory  he  is 
ever  appealing  to  "  the  social  feelings  of  mankind  -, " 
and  he  maintains  with  Bentham,  that  man  is  urged 
to  the  "  greatest  happiness  "  principle  both  "  by  in- 
terest and  sympathy."  (pp.  45,  47.)  "  The  idea  of 
the  pain  of  another  is  naturally  painful ;  the  idea  of 
the  pleasure  of  another  is  naturally  pleasure."  [Dis, 
p.  137.)  I  am  sure  that  the  great  British  moralists, 
who  lived  at  the  beginning  of  last  century,  have 
succeeded  in  demonstrating  that  man  is  not  in  his 
nature  and  constitution  an  utterly  selfish  being,  but 
is  capable  of  being  swayed  by  a  desire  to  promote 
the  welfare  of  others;  and  the  arguments  of  Shaftes- 
bury, Hutcheson,  and  Butler  have  been  repeated 
and  strengthened  by  the  Scottish  school  of  philoso- 
phers generally,  including  Reid,  Stewart,  and  Brown, 
and  by  M.  Cousin,  and  the  Eclectic  school  of  France. 


UTILITABIANISM.  38T 

But  these  writers  have  shown  that  the  same  facts 
and  arguments  which  lead  us  to  admit  an  original 
principle  of  sympathy,  require  us  also  to  call  in  a 
cognitive  and  a  motive  moral  power. 

He  allows  as  a  psychological  fact  that  virtue  may 
become  "a  good  in  itself,  without  looking  to  any 
end  beyond  it,"  and  that  the  mind  is  not  in  a  right 
state  unless  it  love  virtue  ^^  as  a  thing  desirable  in 
itself"  (p.  53.)  In  indignantly  repelling  the  ob- 
jections of  Dr.  Sedgwick,  he  maintains,  "It  is  a  fact 
in  human  nature  that  we  have  moral  judgments  and 
moral  feelings.  We  judge  certain  actions  and  dis- 
positions to  be  right,  others  wrong :  this  we  call  ap- 
proving and  disapproving  them.  We  have  also  feel- 
ings of  pleasure  in  the  contemplation  of  the  former 
class  of  actions  and  dispositions,  —  feelings  of  dis- 
like and  aversion  to  the  latter ;  which  feelings,  as 
everybody  must  be  conscious,  do  not  exactly  resem- 
ble any  other  of  our  feelings  of  pain  or  pleasure. 
Such  are  the  phenomena;  concerning  their  reality 
there  is  no  dispute."  He  then  seeks  to  account  for 
the  phenomena  by  his  famous  principle  of  the  chem- 
istry of  the  association  of  ideas.  "  The  only  color 
for  representing  our  moral  judgments  as  the  result 
of  a  peculiar  part  of  our  nature,  is  that  our  feehngs 
of  moral  approbation  and  disapprobation  are  really 
peculiar  feelings.  But  is  it  not  notorious  that  pe- 
culiar feelings,  unlike  any  others  we  have  experi- 
ence of,  are  created  by  association  every  day?"  {Dis. 
pp.  139, 140.)    He  instances  the  desire  of  power,  the 


388  UTILITABIANISM. 

feelings  of  ambition,  of  envy,  of  jealousy,  and  of  the 
miser  towards  his  gold.  Now,  as  to  some  of  these 
appetencies,  I  believe  them  to  be  natural.  We  see 
them  working  strongly  in  certain  individuals,  show- 
ing that  they  are  elements  of  their  inborn  character. 
We  see  them  descending  hereditarily  from  father  or 
mother,  to  son  or  daughter  or  grandchild ;  and  we 
find  them  stronger  in  certain  families  and  races  than 
in  others.  As  the  love  of  power  is  a  native  appe- 
tence by  which  men  may  be  swayed,  surely  the  con- 
science and  the  fblt  obligation  to  do  that  which  is 
right  may  be  the  same. 

But  our  present  question  is  one  not  so  much  of 
mere  appetency  or  desires  as  of  moral  perceptions, 
judgments,  and  sentiments.  I  grant  that  persons 
may  be  led  by  mere  prudence  to  attend  to  the  du- 
ties of  an  outward  morality,  and  by  a  kindly  dispo- 
sition to  relieve  distress,  altogether  irrespective  of  a 
moral  sense.  But  there  is  a  very  special  obligation 
felt  in  regard  to  those  actions  which  we  call  moral, 
and  which  does  not  bear  on  other  parts  of  our  con- 
duct ;  we  are  convinced  that  we  ought  to  attend  to 
them,  and  that  if  we  neglect  to  do  so  our  conduct  is 
blameworthy.  Whence  the  very  peculiar  and  pro- 
found ideas  denoted  by  the  phrases  "obligation," 
"ought,"  "blameworthy."  Take  the  perception  of 
conscience,  that  deceit  is  a  sin.  Take  the  conviction, 
that  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  tell  a  lie  when  we  might 
be  tempted  to  do  so.  Take  the  judgment,  that  the 
person  who  has  committed  the  act  is   guilty,  con- 


UTILITABIANISM,  389 

demnable,  punishable.     Take  the  feehng  of  remorse, 
which  rises  when  we  contemplate  ourselves  as  having 
told  a  falsehood.     We  have  here  a  series  of  mental 
phenomena   quite  as  real  and  quite  as  worthy  of 
being   looked  at,  as  our  very  sensations,  or  behefs 
of  the  reality  of  the  past  in  memory,  or  our  expectar 
tion  of  the  future.    I  am  convinced  that  as  these  last 
are  admitted  to  be  ultimate  (see  Q,  a,  t),  so  are  the 
others    also.     "This    instinct,"    says   Isaac    Taylor, 
"  flushes  in  the  cheek  of  every  sensitive  child,  and 
it  prevails  over  the  laborious  sophistications  of  the 
philosopher.    This  belief  is  cherished  as  an  inestima- 
ble jewel  by  the  best  and  purest  of  human  beings  ; 
and  it  is  bowed  to  in  dismay  by  the  foulest  and  the 
worst ;  its  rudiments  are  a  monition  of  eternal  truth, 
whispered  in  the  ear  of  infancy ;   its  articulate  an- 
nouncements are  a  dread  fore-doom  ringing  in  the 
ears  of  the  guilty  adult.      You  say  you  can  bring 
forward  a  hundred  educated  men,  who,  at  this  time, 
will  profess  themselves  to  be  no  believers  in  a  moral 
system  ;    but  I  will   rebut   their  testimony  by  the 
spontaneous  and  accordant  voices  of  as  many  mil- 
lions of  men  as  you  may  please  to  call  for  on  the 
other  side." 

I  have  already  examined  the  general  theory  which 
generates  a  new  idea  by  means  of  an  association  of 
sensations,  and  have  shown  how  little  truth  there  is 
in  it.  (pp.  195-201.)  Give  us  mere  sensations,  say  of 
sounds,  or  colors,  or  forms,  or  of  pleasure  and  pam, 
and  they  will  never  be  anything  else  in  the  repro- 


390  TJTILITABIANISM 

duction  of  them  than  the  ideas  of  sounds,  colors, 
forms,  pleasm^es,  or  pains,  —  unless,  indeed,  there  be 
some  new  power  introduced,  and  this  new  element 
in  itself,  or  in  conjunction  with  the  sensations,  be 
fitted  to  produce  a  new  idea,  and  that  very  idea.  In 
none  of  its  applications  is  the  theory  seen  to  fail  so 
utterly,  as  in  the  attempt  thus  to  produce  our  moral 
perceptions.  Provided  we  once  had  the  ideas,  the 
laws  of  association  might  show  how  they  could  be 
brought  up  again ;  how  in  the  reproductipn  certain 
parts  might  sink  into  shadow  and  neglect,  while 
others  came  forth  into  prominence  and  light ;  and 
how  the  whole  feeling,  by  the  confluence  of  diflerent 
ideas,  might  be  wrought  into  a  glow  of  intensity ; 
but  the  difficulty  of  generating  the  ideas,  such  ideas, 
ideas  so  full  of  meaning,  is  not  thereby  surmounted. 
The  idea  I  have  of  pain  is  one  thing,  and  the  idea  I 
have  of  deceit,  that  it  is  morally  evil,  condemnable, 
deserving  of  pain,  is  an  entirely  different  thing  — 
our  consciousness  being  witness.  On  the  supposition 
that  there  is  a  chemical  power  in  association  to  cre- 
ate such  ideas  as  those  of  duty  and  merit,  sin  and 
demerit,  this  chemical  power  would  be  a  native 
moral  power ;  not  the  product  of  sensations,  but 
a  power  above  them,  and  adapted  to  transmute 
them  from  the  baser  into  the  golden  substance. 

It  will  be  needful  at  this  place  to  correct  a  misap- 
prehension into  which  Mr.  Mill  has  fallen.  He  rep- 
resents the  intuitive  school  of  morals  as  holding 
that  "  the  principles  of  morals  are  evident  a  priori^ 


UTILITABIAJSriSM.  391 

(p.  3.)  Now  I  admit  that  influential  members  of 
the  school  have  used  language  fitted  to  warrant  this 
statement.  But  there  are  others,  and  these  the 
wisest  defenders  of  intuition,  who  have  given  a 
different  accoimt.  Our  intuitions  are  perceptions  of 
individual  objects  or  individual  truths ;  and  in  order 
to  reach  an  axiom  or  "  principle  of  morals,"  there  is 
need  of  a  discursive  process  of  generalization.  Our 
author  makes  the  intuitive  agree  with  the  inductive 
school,  in  holding  that  "the  morality  of  an  indi- 
vidual action  is  not  a  question  of  direct  perception, 
but  of  the  application  of  law  to  an  individual  case." 
The  proper  account  is  that  the  law  is  generahzed 
out  of  our  direct  perceptions.  On  the  bare  contem- 
plation of  an  ungrateful  spirit,  the  conscience  at 
once  declares  it  to  be  evil,  apart  from  the  conscious 
apprehension  or  application  of  any  general  principle. 
The  enunciation  of  the  law  is  a  reflective  and  not 
a  spontaneous  process,  and  is  undertaken  when 
we  wish  to  construct  a  code  of  morals  or  a  science 
of  ethics.  This  representation  saves  the  mtuitive 
theory  of  morals  from  many  of  the  specious  ob- 
jections urged  against  a  different  version.  Our 
moral  intuitions  are  not  a  priori  forms,  which  the 
mind  imposes  on  objects,  but  immediate  perceptions 
of  qualities  in  certain  objects,  that  is,  in  the  volun- 
tary dispositions  and  actions  of  intelligent  beings. 
Taking  this  view  of  them,  I  believe  they  can  stand 
the  tests  which  settle  what  truth  is  intuitive.  They 
are  self-evident :  on  the  simple  apprehension  of  dis- 


392  UTILITABIAWISM. 

interested  love  we  declare  it  to  be  good  and  com- 
mendable. They  may  be  described^  if  we  properly 
explain  the  statement,  as  necessary :  give  us  a  cor- 
rect representation  of  a  deed  of  intentional  deceit 
for  a  selfish  end,  and  we  condemn,  and  cannot  be 
made  to  commend  it.  They  have,  in  a  sense,  even 
catholic  consent  in  their  favor :  all  men  will  condemn 
deceit  if  it  is  properly  laid  before  them,  but  the 
deceit  may  be  so  painted  as  that  we  do  not  see 
its  true  nature,  and  then  we  give  our  approval, — 
not  of  the  deceit,  but  of  its  accompaniments.  Man- 
kind can  be  so  deceived  as  to  give  diverse  judgments 
on  moral  actions,  only  by  the  blinding  influence  of 
sin,  disguising  and  distorting  the  real  nature  of 
things. 

II.  Does  utilitarianism  embrace  sufficient  sanctions 
to  induce  us  to  approve  virtue  and  condemn  vice  ? 
Our  author  labors  to  show  that  the  motives  usually 
supposed  to  lead  to  virtue  are  left  untouched  by  this 
theory.  But  this  is  not  the  question,  the  main  ques- 
tion; and  if  any  defender  of  a  priori  morals  had 
been  guilty  of  such  an  ignoratio  elenchi,  we  can  con- 
ceive that  the  acute  logician  would  have  exposed  it 
with  extraordinary  zest.  The  question  is  not  about 
sanctions  which  other  systems  may  employ,  but  it  is, 
Does  utilitarianism  contain  within  itself  a  body  of 
motives,  or  motive  powers,  fitted  to  lead  to  virtuous 
conduct  ?  If  it  does  not,  if  it  is  obliged  to  make  us 
look  elsewhere  for  motives,  then  it  is  without  one  of 
the  essential  constituents  of  an  adequate  theory  of 


UTILITABIAJS-ISM.  393 

morals.  Utilitarianism  bids  us  seek  to  promote  the 
greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number.  "But 
why  should  I  strive  to  attain  this  end  ? "  asks  the 
inquiring  youth.  Practically,  and  in  reference  to 
his  future  conduct,  theoretically,  and  as  interested  in 
the  science  of  ethics,  he  insists  on  a  reply.  "  Why 
should  I  give  up  my  immediate  ease  and  comfort  and 
expected  enjoyments,  and  restrain  my  strong  native 
impulses  and  indulged  habits  in  order  to  look  after 
others,  who  may  be  quite  able  to  look  after  them- 
selves ?  "  '^  Or  why,  at  the  best,  may  I  not  content 
myself  with  attendmg  to  the  feelings  and  immediate 
wishes  of  the  few  persons  in  my  family  or  circle, 
with  whose  welfare  my  own  is  bound  up,  or  of  the 
single  person  to  whom  I  am  attached?"  As  he 
presses  these  questions  he  will  not  be  satisfied  to  be 
told  that  other  ethical  systems  have  sanctions,  and 
that  utilitarianism  leaves  them  where  it  found  them. 
But  let  us  look  at  those  sanctions  with  which  it  is 
said  the  theory  does  not  meddle.  We  may  find,  as 
to  some  of  the  guaranties  or  sureties  to  which  we 
are  referred,  that  their  credit  is  undermined,  and 
that  they  are  rendered  bankrupt,  by  the  principles 
of  the  new  philosophy.  Mr.  Mill  tells  us,  that  if 
persons  beheve  that  there  is  a  God,  they  may  still 
have  the  motives  derived  fi:om  their  religion  to  in- 
duce them  to  practise  morality.  This  starts  the 
question,  what  religion  has  our  author's  system  left 
us?  It  is  clear  that  utilitarianism  deprives  us  of 
one  of  the  arguments  which  has  been  felt  by  pro- 


394  UTILITABIANISM. 

found  thinkers  to  carry  the  greatest  weight,  that 
derived  from  the  moral  law  in  the  heart  arguing  a 
moral  lawgiver.  Nor  is  it  to  be  forgotten,  that  our 
greatest  moralists  have  not  been  in  the  way  of 
appealing  first  to  the  Divine  power  or  will,  as  a 
motive  to  lead  us  to  do  good,  but  have  rather  sought, 
by  the  principles  of  an  independent  morality,  to 
show  that  we  ought  to  obey  God.  We  may  omit 
entering  further  into  this  inquiry  at  present,  as  the 
whole  subject  of  the  relation  of  Mr.  Mill's  philoso- 
phy to  natural  theology  will  come  to  be  discussed 
in  next  chapter.  But  we  must  look  here  at  some 
other  sanctions  which  it  is  supposed  utilitarianism 
has  left  untouched. 

"The  internal  sanction  of  duty,  whatever  our 
standard  of  duty  may  be,  is  one  and  the  same,  a 
feeUng  in  our  own  mind ;  a  pain  more  or  less  intense 
attendant  on  violation  of  duty,  which  in  properly 
cultivated  moral  natures  rises,  in  the  more  serious 
cases,  into  shrinking  from  it  as  an  impossibility ; " 
and  "  the  ultimate  sanction,  therefore,  of  all  morality 
(external  motives  apart)  being  a  subjective  feeling 
in  our  own  minds,"  he  thinks  that  utilitarianism  has 
as  poAverful  a  sanction  as  any  other  theory  can  have, 
(pp.  40,  41.)  But  it  is  not  fair  to  represent  those 
who  hold  the  opposite  theory  as  making  the  ultimate 
appeal,  standard,  and  sanction,  to  be  in  "  feeling,"  in 
mere  "  subjective  feeling,"  a  "  feeling  of  pain "  at- 
tendant on  the  violation  of  duty.  It  cannot  be  said 
to  consist  in  "  feeling,"  except  we  use  the  phrase  in 


UTILITABIANISM.  395 

SO  wide  and  loose  a  sense  as  to  include  all  mental 
operations,  and  the  native  principles  of  action  from 
which  they  spring.  It  should  not  be  represented  as 
a  mere  '^  subjective  feehng,"  for  it  points  to  and  im- 
plies an  objective  reality,  a  real  good  and  evil  in  the 
voluntary  acts  of  intelHgent  beings,  independent  of 
om^  sense  of  it,  being  in  fact  the  object  to  which  the 
sense  looks.  Still  less  should  it  be  regarded  as  a 
mere  ^'  feeling  of  pain : "  it  has  been  shown  again 
and  again,  by  morahsts,  that  the  feeling  of  pain  rises 
in  consequence  of  a  prior  perception  of  the  evil  of 
sin.  According  to  our  most  esteemed  moralists,  the 
mind,  in  looking  at  moral  good  and  evil,  is  exercis- 
ing a  higher  attribute  than  mere  feeling  or  emotion. 
By  some  it  is  represented  as  a  Sense  looking  to  and 
discerning  a  moral  quality  —  as  the  eye  discerns 
color  and  surface.  More  frequently  it  is  described 
as  Keason,  or  as  analogous  to  Reason,  and  the  Moral 
Reason,  which  perceives  at  once  the  good  and  the  evil, 
and  distinguishes  between  them,  declaring  the  doing 
of  the  one  and  the  avoiding  of  the  other  to  be  obliga- 
tory on  all  intelligent  beings,  and  the  one  to  be 
of  gcod  desert  and  reward  able,  and  the  other  of  evil 
desert  and  punishable ;  and  the  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  pain  is  the  consequent  and  not  the  essence  of  the 
conviction. 

But  then  the  feeling,  which  is  the  essence  of  con- 
science, is  "  all  encrusted  over  with  collateral  associa- 
tions, derived  from  sympathy,  from  love,  and  still 
more  from  fear ;   from  all  the  forms  of  religious  feel- 


896  TJTILITABIANISM. 

ing;  from  the  recollections  of  childhood  and  of  all 
our  past  life ;  from  self-esteem,  desire  of  the  esteem 
of  others,  and  occasionally  even  self-abasement." 
"Its  binding  force  consists  in  the  existence  of  a 
mass  of  feeling,  which  must  be  broken  through  in 
order  to  do  what  violates  our  standard  of  right,  and 
which,  if  we  do  nevertheless  violate  that  standard, 
will  probably  have  to  be  encountered  afterwards  in 
the  form  of  remorse."  (p.  41.)  He  reckons  this  com- 
plicated feeling  as  furnishing  quite  as  strong  a  sanc- 
tion, and  one  quite  as  likely  not  to  be  violated,  as 
that  which  might  be  awakened  by  a  distinct  moral 
faculty.  Now,  I  concede  at  once,  that  other  and 
secondary  motives  may  and  should  gather  and  cling 
round  our  primary  conviction  of  duty,  to  aid  and 
strengthen  it.  But  meanwhile,  as  the  centre,  and  in 
the  last  resort,  as  the  support  of  them,  there  should 
be  recognized  obligations  of  morality.  The  intelli- 
gent youth,  when  he  comes  to  rise  beyond  his  educa- 
tional beliefs,  and  to  think  for  himself,  will  not  be 
satisfied  with  the  mere  existence  of  the  mass  of 
feeling ;  he  will  ask.  Is  it  justifiable,  is  it  binding  ? 
If  satisfied  on  this  point,  then  he  will  feel  himself 
called  on  to  encourage  all  these  associations,  and  to 
live  under  their  influence.  But  if  not  satisfied,  if 
taught  they  have  no  obligation  in  reason  or  the 
nature  of  things,  then  why  should  he  not  uncoil 
them,  as  he  does  some  other  hereditary  preposses- 
sions; or  even  if  he  should  be  inclined  to  retain 
them,  will  they  not  be  apt  to  give  way  before  the 


UTILITABIANISM.  397 

strong  and  seductive  temptations  which  are  ever 
assailing  him  ?  Let  it  be  observed  of  many  of  these 
associations  which  have  been  gathered,  and  senti- 
ments which  have  been  gendered,  that  they  have 
been  generated  in  individuals,  or  grown  up  in  a 
state  of  society,  entertaining  and  cherishmg  the  be- 
lief that  there  is  an  indej)endent  rule  of  duty. 
Such,  for  example,  are  our  "  religious  feelings ; " 
such,  too,  our  "  remorse  -, "  such  our  "  self-abase- 
ment," —  they  arise  mainly  from  the  promptings  of 
a  conscience,  which  carries  with  it  its  own  authority 
and  its  own  sanctions.  Eemove  the  support  which 
bears  them  —  as  the  stake  bears  up  the  vine  —  and 
they  will  speedily  fall,  or  rather  will  never  rise  to 
any  height.  Let  the  school  beware  lest,  in  striving 
to  destroy  the  inborn  sense  and  native  perceptions 
of  good  and  evil,  they  be  not  doing  as  much  as 
within  them  lies  to  cut  down  the  tree  that  has  borne 
the  fruit;  or,  to  use  a  still  more  familiar  image, 
to  kill  the  hen  that  has  laid  the  golden  eggs.  And 
as  to  the  "  recollections  of  childhood  and  of  our  past 
lives,"  and  the  feelings  of  "sjrmpathy"  and  "self- 
esteem,"  and  "  the  desire  of  the  esteem  of  others," 
these  can  foster  virtuous  sentiment  and  lead  to  vir- 
tuous conduct  only  where  there  is  a  high  moral  and 
religious  standard  in  the  family,  and  in  the  commu- 
nity, and  may  tend  the  opposite  way  in  other  states 
of  society;  as,  for  instance,  that  which  existed  in 
ancient  Eome  in  the  decline  of  the  empire,  or  among 
the  educated  classes  in  France  in  the  age  before  the 


898  UTILITABIANISM. 

Revolution,  or  which  may  be  found  in  certain  circles 
in  Paris  at  this  present  time.  The  vessel,  which 
is  sailing  along  gracefully  with  its  present  structure, 
may  be  speedily  dissolved  and  its  crew  wrecked, 
w^hen  a  magnet  (to  refer  to  a  well-known  fable)  has 
been  applied,  which  draws  out  the  bolts  that  kept 
the  parts  together. 

I  deny  that  the  two  kinds  of  sanction  are  on  the 
same  footing  and  of  equal  strength.  The  one  sort 
is  derived  fi-om  a  mere  agglomeration  of  feelings, 
which  are  generated  by  associations  created  inde- 
pendentty  of  our  choice,  and  mainly  by  outward  con- 
tiguities. Some  of  these,  such  as  those  mentioned 
by  Mr.  Mill,  may  be  laudable,  and  may  tend  to 
promote  virtuous  conduct.  But  others,  though  aris- 
ing from  like  associations,  produced  by  the  same  cir- 
cumstances, may  be  of  an  opposite  character.  Such 
are  the  fears  which  spring  from  a  degraded  super- 
stition with  its  horrid  ceremonials;  such  are  the 
animal  lusts  that  may  grow  up  along  wdth  a  purer 
love ;  such  are  the  jealousy,  malice,  and  envy  gen- 
dered by  the  rivalries  of  trade  and  fashion;  such 
are  the  expectations  excited  when  large  pleasure 
and  profit  to  ourselves  or  others  may  be  had  by  one 
bold  deed  of  selfishness;  and  such  is  the  despair 
awakened  when  there  has  been  a  failure  in  the 
favorite  ends  of  a  man's  life.  These  feelings,  grow- 
ing from  the  same  root  of  associations  and  circum- 
stances, will  tend  to  moral  evil  as  the  others  do 
to   good;   and   surely  it  is   of  moment  to  have  a 


UTILITARIANISM.  399 

moral  obligation  above  either,  and  calling  on  us 
while  we  allow  the  one  to  disallow  the  other.  How 
vastly  inferior  must  be  the  sanction  supplied  by  this 
conglomeration  of  associations  to  that  which  the 
higher  moral  theory  furnishes,  when  it  declares  that 
certain  affections,  such  as  gratitude,  and  love,  and 
justice,  are  themselves  good,  and  that  certain  other 
affections,  such  as  ingratitude  and  malice  and  deceit, 
are  evil  in  their  very  nature ;  that  the  mind  is  or- 
ganized to  discern  the  distinction  between  good  and 
evil,  just  as  it  discovers  the  difference  between  truth 
a.nd  error ;  that  the  moral  power  by  which  it  does 
this  is  not  only  in  the  mind,  but  claims  to  be  su- 
preme there ;  that  it  implies  and  points  to  a  God 
who  IS  the  guardian  of  the  law,  and  will  call  every 
man  to  account  for  the  deeds  done  in  the  body, 
wnether  they  have  been  good  or  evil. 

in.  Does  utilitarianism  furnish  a  sufficient  test  of 
virtuous  acts  and  of  virtuous  motives  ?  It  tells  us 
that  a  good  deed  is  one  tending  to  promote  the 
greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number.  But  in 
the  comphcated  affairs  of  this  world,  the  most  far- 
sighted  cannot  know  for  certain  what  may  be  the 
total  consequences  of  any  one  act;  and  the  great 
body  of  mankind  feel  as  if  they  were  looking  out  on 
a  tangled  forest,  and  need  a  guide  to  direct  them. 
Utilitarian  moralists,  hke  Bentham,  may  draw  out 
schemes  of  tendencies  for  us ;  but  the  specific  rules 
have  no  obliging  authority,  and,  even  when  under- 
stood and  appreciated,  are  difficult  of  application, 


400  VTILITABIANISM. 

and  are  ever  bringing  us  into  cross  avenues  into 
wliicli  we  may  be  led  by  self-deceit.  With  no  other 
standard  than  ultimate  tendency,  the  timid  will  ever 
be  afraid  to  act  as  never  clearly  seeing  their  way, 
while  the  bold  will  ever  be  tempted  at  critical  junc- 
tures, and  in  order  to  gain  ends  which  are  dear  to 
them,  and  which  they  have  identified  with  the  good 
of  their  country,  —  as  when  Julius  Caesar  crossed 
the  Eubicon,  and  Louis  Napoleon  ventured  on  his 
coup  d'etat,  —  to  commit  crimes  in  the  name  of 
virtue.  I  am  aware  that  on  any  theoretical  system 
men  will  commit  sin ;  but  on  this  system  they  will 
commit  crimes  of  the  highest  order,  and  justify 
themselves  as  they  do  so,  on  the  ground  of  the 
great  advantages  to  be  secured  by  themselves  and 
others. 

Mr.  Mill's  defence  of  the  theory  proceeds  on  the 
principle,  that  there  may  be  a  distinction  drawn  be- 
tween the  virtuousness  of  the  act  and  the  virtuous- 
ness  of  the  agent.  "  He  who  saves  a  fellow-creature 
from  drowning  does  what  is  morally  right,  whether 
his  motive  be  duty,  or  the  hope  of  being  paid  for 
liis  trouble ;  he  who  betrays  the  friend  that  trusts 
him  is  guilty  of  a  crime,  even  if  his  object  be  to 
serve  another  friend  to  whom  he  is  under  greater 
obligations."  (p.  26.)  The  test  of  a  virtuous  act  is 
beneficial  tendency,  but  what  is  the  test  of  the  vir- 
tuous motive  ?  Is  it,  too,  beneficial  tendency  ?  Is 
the  agriculturist  who  improves  the  soil,  so  as  to 
make  it  feed  more  men  and  cattle  than  it  did  before. 


UTILITABIANISM.  401 

or  the  master  manufacturer  who  sets  up  a  large 
public  work  which  gives  food  to  thousands,  necessa- 
rily virtuous,  and  this  in  proportion  to  the  good 
done,  and  though  in  the  depths  of  his  heart  he  may 
be  influenced  by  no  other  consideration  than  the 
love  of  gain  ?  We  do  run  a  considerable  risk  in 
these  times  of  the  prevalence  of  a  cosmopolitanism, 
originating  in  a  deejDcr  selfishness,  and  prosecuted  in 
a  spirit  of  self-righteousness,  and  going  on  to  over- 
whelm and  supersede  the  gentler  and  the  humbler 
private  and  domestic  virtues,  which  our  fathers  so 
valued  before  utilitarianism  was  heard  of  But  Mr. 
Mill  is  too  wise  a  man  to  make  beneficial  tendency 
a  test  of  excellence  in  the  agent.  "  The  motive  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  morality  of  the  action, 
though  much  with  the  worth  of  the  agent."  He 
tells  us  that  it  is  a  misapprehension  of  the  utilitarian 
mode  of  thought  to  conceive  it  as  implying  so  wide 
a  generality  as  the  world  or  morality  at  large,  and 
he  says  of  M.  Comte,  that  "  he  committed  the  error 
which  is  often,  but  falsely,  charged  against  the  whole 
class  of  utilitarian  moralists :  he  required  that  the 
test  of  conduct  should  also  be  the  exclusive  motive 
to  it."  [Comte  and  Posit,  p.  138.)  It  is  not  very 
clear  what  constitutes  a  virtuous  agent,  according  to 
our  author.  The  following  statement  is  sufl&ciently 
vague,  and  yet  it  is  the  clearest  I  can  find  on  a 
point  which  should  not  be  left  in  uncertainty  for  a 
moment:  "The  great  majority  of  good  actions  are 
intended  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  world,  but  for 


402  UTILITABIANISM. 

that  of  individuals,  of  which  the  good  of  the  world 
is  made  up :  and  the  thoughts  of  the  most  virtuous 
man  need  not  on  these  occasions  travel  beyond  the 
particular  persons  concerned,  except^  so  far  as  is 
necessary  to  assure  himself  that  in  benefiting  them 
he  is  not  violating  the  rights,  that  is,  the  legitimate 
and  authorized  expectations,  of  any  one  else."  (p. 
27.)  There  is  some  truth  here,  but  it  is  surely  far 
from  being  the  full  truth.  The  impelling  motive  of 
an  action  entitled  to  be  called  virtuous  is  love,  lead- 
ing us  to  perform  that  which  is  right ;  that  is,  ac- 
cording to  moral  law,  the  law  of  God.  The  love 
is  a  well-spring  ready  to  burst  forth,  and  the  law 
is  the  channel  provided  in  which  the  stream  may 
flow.  Without  the  love,  there  is  no  virtue ;  and 
without  the  love  regulated  by  law,  there  is  no 
virtue  —  in  the  agent.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  M. 
Comte  that,  separating  himself  from  cold  utilita- 
rianism, he  reckoned  love  as  of  the  essence  of  ex- 
cellence :  but  it  is  an  evidence  of  the  narrowness 
and  bigotry  which  so  distinguished  him,  that  he 
does  not  see  that  he  has  derived  this  principle  from 
Christianity,  which  he  represents  as  deriving  all 
its  motives  from  the  selfish  fear  of  hell  and  hope 
of  heaven. 

And  what  ma.kes  an  action  sinful  according  to 
this  philosophy?  It  is  stiU  more  difficult  to  find 
what  is  the  answer  to  that  question.  Sin  is  quite 
as  much  a  fact  of  consciousness  and  of  our  moral 
nature   as   even   virtue.      "Thou   shalt   not   kill;" 


VTILITABIANISM.  403 

"  Thou  slialt  not  commit  adultery ; "  "  Thou  shalt  not 
steal;"  "Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  mtness,"  —  these 
laws  are  clear,  and  the  violation  of  them  is  sin  ac- 
cording to  Scripture,  and  according  to  conscience. 
But  what  is  sin  according  to  utihtarianism  ?  It  is 
acknowledged  not  to  be  the  mere  omission  to  look 
to  the  general  good.  AYhat  then  does  it  consist  m  ? 
Mr.  Mill  speaks  of  "reproach"  being  one  of  the 
checks  on  evil;  but  when  is  reproach  justifiable? 
Not  knowing  what  to  make  of  sin,  the  system  pro- 
vides no  place  for  repentance.  The  boundary  hue 
between  moral  good  and  evil  is  drawn  so  uncertainly, 
that  persons  will  ever  be  tempted  to  cross  it  without 
allowing  that  they  have  done  so,  —  the  more  so  that 
they  are  not  told  what  they  should  do  when  they 

have  crossed  it. 

TV.  Does  utilitarianism  embrace  all  the  virtues? 
In  answering   this  question,  it   should    at   once  be 
allowed  that  the  system  contains  an  important  body 
of  truth ;  it  errs  only  so  far  as  it  professes  to  embrace 
and  unfold  the  whole  of  morals.    It  is  a  duty  devolv- 
ing on  all  to  promote   the   happiness  of  their  fel- 
lows.    So  far  as  the  system  recommends  this,  it  can 
have  nothing  erroneous,  —  it  should  be  added  that 
it   has  nothing    original      But  even  at  this   point, 
where  it  is  supposed  to  be  strongest,  it  is  found  to 
fail  when  we  narrowly  examine  it.     For  whence  can 
utilitarianism  draw  its  motive  and  obligation  to  con- 
strain us  to  look  after  the  general  happiness  ?     He 
says,  "  No  reason  can  be  given  why  the  general  hap- 


404  UTILITABIANISM. 

piness  is  desirable,  except  that  each  person,  so  far  as 
he  beheves  it  to  be  attainable,  desires  his  own  hap- 
piness." (p.  52.)  But  it  would  need  more  acuteneSvS 
than  even  Mr.  Mill  is  possessed  of  to  show  that  this 
principle  requires  us  to  promote  the  best  interests 
of  others.  It  is  proper  to  refer  to  this  here ;  but 
I  need  not  dwell  upon  it,  as  I  have  urged  it  under 
another  head. 

Utilitarianism  has  a  special  merit  in  all  questions 
of  jurisprudence.  The  reason  can  be  given.  The 
end  of  legislation  is  not  the  maintenance  of  the  law 
of  God,  but  the  promotion  of  the  interests  of  the 
nation.  But  even  in  this  department  a  higher 
morality  has  a  place,  though  only  a  negative  one. 
The  governing  power  is  not  entitled  to  enact  what 
is  in  itself  sinful,  on  the  pretence  of  adding  to  the 
pleasures  of  the  community.  The  people  of  this 
country  are  right  in  their  religious  and  moral  in- 
stincts when  they  declare  that  on  no  pretence  what- 
ever should  the  Government  take  upon  itself  the 
licensing  of  places  of  prostitution,  even  on  the  pre- 
tence of  regulating  them,  and  restraining  the  evils 
that  flow  from  them.  Nor  is  the  magistrate  at  lib- 
erty to  punish  an  act  unless  it  be  sinful ;  for  example, 
he  would  not  be  justified  in  punishing  a  person,  who, 
without  meaning  it,  had  brought  infectious  disease 
into  a  city,  whereby  ten  thousand  inhabitants  had 
perished ;  whereas  he  would  be  required  to  inflict 
a  penalty  for  the  theft  of  a  very  small  sum  from  a 
rich  man  who  never  felt  the  loss.    Why  the  differ- 


UTILITABIANISM.  405 

ence  ?  Plainly  because  the  former  act  is  not  a  sin, 
that  is,  implied  no  e\al  disposition,  whereas  the  other 
does.  But  while  the  civil  government  should  punish 
only  when  sin  has  been  committed,  and  has  thus  to 
look  to  the  moral  law,  it  does  not  punish  sin  as  sin, 
but  as  inflicting  injustice  on  others,  and  injurious  to 
the  best  interests  of  society.  The  utilitarian  theory, 
as  develo23ed  by  Bentham,  has,  consequentially  and 
historically,  been  the  means  of  alleviating  the  harsh- 
ness of  our  penal  code,  and  giving  a  more  benignant 
aspect  to  legislation  generally. 

Mr.  Mill  has  given  a  contribution  to  public  ethics 
in  his  treatise  on  Liberty.  The  work  is  stimulating 
in  its  spirit,  but  at  the  same  time  far  from  being 
satisfactory  in  its  results.  It  might  have  been  ex- 
pected in  a  renewed  discussion  on  such  a  subject, 
after  all  that  has  been  written  during  the  last  two 
centuries,  that  we  should  have  had  some  principles 
laid  down  to  guide  us  as  to  the  moral  limits  to  be 
set  to  the  expression  of  sentiment,  and  the  attempt 
to  create  a  public  feeling  against  what  we  believe  to 
be  evil.  A  gentleman,  let  me  suppose,  settles  in  my 
neighborhood,  of  polite  manners,  of  cultivated  mind, 
and  apparently  of  general  beneficence.  But  he  has 
a  wife  and  a  mistress,  and  maintains  that  he  is  justi- 
fied in  having  both,  and  might  allowably  have  more. 
What  is  to  be  my  demeanor  towards  him  ?  Am  I 
to  ask  him  to  my  house,  and  introduce  him  to  my 
sons  and  my  daughters?  Am  I  never  to  speak  against 
him  and  his  conduct,  never  to  warn  my  family  against 


406  TJTILITABIANI8M. 

being  influenced  by  his  example  ?  Am  I  to  hasten 
to  elect  him  to  places  of  honor  and  trust  in  the  par- 
ish or  in  the  town  ?  Or,  if  I  decline  thus  to  coun- 
tenance him,  am  I  to  be  declared  intolerant  ?  Eising 
beyond  such  personal  to  public  questions,  am  I  not 
to  protest  against  a  public  evil,  and  seek  to  create  a 
public  sentiment  against  it  ?  If  I  am  not  at  liberty 
to  do  this,  Mr.  Mill  is  laying  down  a  doctrine  of  lib- 
erty which  is  interfering  with  my  liberty.  Such 
questions  as  these  start  points,  on  which  many  anx- 
ious to  cultivate  a  spirit,  not  only  of  toleration,  but 
what  is  far  higher,  of  charity,  are  anxious  to  have 
light,  which  is  not  vouchsafed  in  this  treatise. 

The  spirit  which  it  is  fitted  to  engender  is  that  of 
"  individualism ; "  and  when  it  has  had  time  to  pro- 
duce its  proper  fruits,  it  will  be  found  to  have  raised 
up  a  body  of  young  men  who  reckon  it  a  virtue  to 
be  peculiar  in  their  opinions,  and  rather  commenda- 
ble to  be  eccentric.  The  spirit  of  hero-worship  pro- 
duced indirectly  by  German  pantheism,  and  directly 
by  the  writings  of  Carlyle,  has  happily  lost  its  sway 
over  our  young  men,  and  is  now  to  be  found,  in  some 
of  the  remains  of  it,  only  among  literary  gentlemen 
of  respectable  middle  age.  But  we  are  sure  to  be 
flooded  in  the  coming  generation  with  something 
still  more  intolerable,  in  ambitious  youths  each  af- 
fecting to  strike  out  a  path  of  his  own,  in  opinion 
and  sentiment,  speculative,  practical,  and  religious. 
This  spirit,  as  it  runs  to  excess,  will  be  quite  as  de- 
leteriouS;  and  will  be  more  foolish  and  ofiensive  than 


TJTILITABIANISM.  40T 

the  old  habit  >f  subjection  to  authority  or  reverence 
for  the  great.  The  genuine  temper  is  not  a  prostra- 
tion before  antiquity  or  before  genius  on  the  one 
hand ;  but  just  as  httle  is  it  a  love  of  novelty  or  a 
love  of  change  on  the  other :  it  is  a  love  of  inde- 
pendence, which;  believmg  that  truth  in  all  impor- 
tant matters  is  attainable,  sets  out  earnestly  in 
search  of  it ;  not  rejectmg  the  old  because  it  is  old, 
or  accepting  the  new  because  it  is  new,  but  willing 
to  take  hght  from  whatever  quarter  it  may  come. 

While  giving  to  utility  an  important  place,  I  deny 
that  it  is  the  only  thing  to  be  looked  at  as  a  good, 
as  a  test,  or  as  a  standard.  Take  the  duties  we  owe 
to  God,,  the  love  and  reverence  we  should  cherish 
towards  Him,  and  the  worship  we  should  pay  Him 
in  private  and  in  public.  Surely  man's  moral  nature 
justifies  him  in  holding  that  there  are  such  duties : 
but  on  what  foundation  can  utihtarianism  rest  them  ? 
Is  it  on  beneficial  tendency  to  the  mdividual  or 
to  society  ?  So  far  as  the  individual  is  concerned, 
the  salutary  influence  is  produced  on  his  spirit  only 
when  he  pays  the  service,  because  it  is  right.  If  he 
is  constrained  to  render  it  from  any  other  motive, 
it  will  rather  chafe  and  irritate,  and  end  in  unbehef 
and  rebellion.  And  as  to  worship  paid  to  God 
merely  for  the  good  of  the  community,  it  is  the 
very  consummation  of  public  hypocrisy  —  which  in 
the  end  would  deceive  no  one.  The  defenders  of 
the  utilitarian  theory,  in  the  form  given  to  it  by 
Bentham,  have  never  attempted  to  build  upon  it 


408  UTILITABIANISM. 

a  code  of  religious  duties.  I  believe  that  any  at- 
tempt of  this  description  would  only  show  that 
the  foundation  was  not  broad  or  deep  enough  to 
bear  such  a  superstructure.  The  same  may  be  said 
of  not  a  few  of  the  duties  we  owe  to  our  fellow- 
men.  Take  gratitude  for  undeserved  favors.  I 
would  not  choose  to  found  it  on  the  mere  desire 
to  promote  our  own  happiness  or  that  of  the  person 
from  whom  the  benefit  has  come :  in  order  to  be 
a  virtue,  it  must  spring  from  a  sense  of  the  duty 
we  owe  to  the  benefactor. 

There  are  symptoms  of  a  renewed  attempt  being 
made  in  our  age  to  construct  a  morality  without 
a  godliness.  I  speak  of  it  as  a  renewed  attempt,  for 
it  has  been  tried  before.  In  the  second  century, 
when  Paganism  was  losing  its  hold  of  educated 
minds,  and  young  Christianity  was  advancing  with 
such  rapid  strides,  an  attempt  was  made  by  the  Neo- 
Platonic  School  of  Alexandria  to  construct  a  the- 
ology, and,  by  the  Stoic  School  of  Eome  a  morality, 
higher  than  that  of  the  Bible.  Every  student  of 
history  knows  how  these  schemes  were  soon  seen  to 
terminate  in  a  humiliating  failure.  The  Neo-Platonic 
ecstasy  evaporated  into  empty  air,  and  the  Stoic 
self-sufficiency  hardened  into  offensive  pride ;  and 
neither  offered  any  effectual  resistance  to  the  tri- 
umphant march  of  a  religion  suited  in  every  way  to 
the  wants  of  man's  nature.  Analogous  projects  have 
been  devised  and  are  being  recommended  in  our  day. 
For  some  time  past  the  God  of  the  Bible  has  been 


UTILITABIANISM.  409 

represented  as  not  sufficiently  pure  —  as  being  too 
anthropomorphic;  and  mystic  thinkers  have  sought 
to  picture  to  us  a  God  of  a  more  spiritual  and  ethe- 
real character.  This  style  of  thinking  in  Germany 
has  issued  from^  or  culminated  in,  a  shadowy  panthe- 
ism, which,  followed  to  its  logical  and  practical  con- 
sequences—  as  it  ^viU  be  in  this  country  —  must 
identify  God  with  the  evil  as  well  as  with  the  good, 
or  in  fact  make  evil  only  a  form  of  good.  And  now 
it  looks  as  if  we  are  to  have  persons  presenting 
to  us  a  morality  higher  and  broader  than  that  of  the 
New  Testament. 

After  speaking  in  very  exalted  terms  of  the  doc- 
trines and  precepts  of  Christ,  Mr.  Mill  asserts  "  that 
many  essential  elements  of  the  highest  morality  are 
among  the  things  which  are  not  provided  for,  nor  in- 
tended to  be  provided  for,  in  the  recorded  deliver- 
ances of  the  Founder  of  Christianity,  and  which 
have  been  entirely  thrown  aside  in  the  system  of 
ethics  erected  on  the  basis  of  those  deliverances  by 
the  Christian  church.  And  this  being  so,  I  think  it 
a  great  error  to  persist  in  attempting  to  find  in 
the  Christian  doctrine  that  complete  rule  for  our 
guidance,  which  its  author  intended  to  sanction  and 
enforce,  but  only  partially  to  provide."  "I  believe 
that  other  ethics  than  any  which  can  be  evolved 
from  exclusively  Christian  sources,  must  exist  side 
by  side  with  Christian  ethics  to  produce  the  moral  re- 
generation of  mankind."  {Liberty,  pp.  91-92.)  Now, 
it  may  be  admitted  that  the  precepts  of  the  Word 


410  UTILITABIANISM, 

of  God  do  not  contain  specific  directions  as  to  what 
mankind  should  do  in  the  infinitely  varied  positions 
in  which  they  may  be  placed.  The  Christian  system 
first  shows  the  sinner  how  he  may  be  delivered  from 
the  burden  of  past  sin,  which  so  weighs  him  down 
in  his  efibrts  after  regeneration.  It  then  furnishes 
motives  to  induce  him  to  perform  the  duties  which 
devolve  upon  him.  It  enjoins,  as  the  regulating 
principle  of  our  conduct,  love  to  God  and  love  to 
man.  It  lays  down  many  and  varied  precepts  as  to 
how  we  should  feel  and  what  we  should  do,  in  very 
many  and  varied  situations,  and  supplies  numerous 
warnings  against  evil,  and  examples  of  good.  Speak- 
ing as  unto  wise  men,  it  leaves  the  rest  to  ourselves, 
to  the  motives  which  it  has  called  forth,  and  the 
royal  law  of  love,  which  is  its  grand  moving  and 
ruling  principle. 

Mr.  Mill  is  not  very  specific  as  to  what  he  sup- 
poses the  code  of  Christian  morality  to  be  deficient 
in.  He  complains  of  our  "  discarding  those  secular 
standards  (as,  for  want  of  a  better  name,  they  may 
be  called)  which  heretofore  co-existed  with  and 
supplemented  the  Christian  ethics."  But  I  believe 
this  has  been  provided  for  in  such  passages  as  these, 
scattered  everywhere  :  "  Whatsoever  things  are  true, 
whatsoever  things  are  honest,  whatsoever  things  are 
just,  whatsoever  things  are  pure,  whatsoever  things 
are  lovely,  whatsoever  things  are  of  good  report ;  if 
there  be  any  virtue,  and  if  there  be  any  praise,  think 
on  these  things."    Narrow  Christians  may  have  over- 


UTILITABIANISM.  411 

looked  some  of  these  graces  and  virtues  ;  but  in 
order  to  correct  them,  we  do  not  require  to  go  be- 
yond the  Scriptures  themselves.  He  fixes  on  one 
department  of  duty  which  he  supposes  to  be  neglect- 
ed in  the  Word  of  God,  and  that  is  the  duty  we  owe 
to  the  State  :  "  In  the  purely  Christian  ethics,  that 
grand  department  of  duty  is  scarcely  noticed  or  ac- 
knowledged." I  am  amazed,  I  confess,  at  this  charge. 
The  history  of  ancient  Israel,  recorded  in  the  Old 
Testament,  exhibits  the  most  fervent  patriotism  in 
every  page.  How  nobly  does  it  burst  forth  in  the 
exclamation  of  the  Psalmist,  "If  I  forget  thee,  0 
Jerusalem,"  etc.  Paul  has  caught  the  same  spirit: 
"  Brethren,  my  heart's  desire  and  prayer  for  Israel  is, 
that  they  might  be  saved."  We  find  it  burning  and 
flammg  in  the  bosom  of  our  Lord  himself:  "  0  Jeru- 
salem, Jerusalem,  how  often  would  I  have  gathered 
thy  children  together,  even  as  a  hen  gathereth  her 
chickens  under  her  wings,  but  ye  would  not."  The 
Word  of  God  requires  obedience  from  the  subject : 
"  Render  therefore  to  all  their  dues ;  tribute  to  whom 
tribute  is  due,  custom  to  whom  custom,  fear  to  whom 
fear,  honor  to  whom  honor."  But  he  adds,  "  It  is 
essentially  a  doctrine  of  passive  obedience ;  it  hicul- 
cates  submission  to  aU  authorities  thought  estab- 
lished, who  indeed  are  not  to  be  actively  obeyed 
when  they  command  what  religion  forbids,  but  who 
are  not  to  be  resented,  far  less  rebelled  against,  for  any 
amount  of  wrong  to  ourselves."  I  admit  that  the 
Bible  does  not  give  minute  rules  as  to  when  subjects 


412  TJTILITABIANISM. 

may  claim  the  right  to  refuse  obedience,  —  nor  do  I 
know  of  any  moral  code  that  does.  But  it  prescribes 
the  function  of  governors :  "  A  minister  of  God  to 
thee  for  good,  sent  for  the  punishment  of  evil-doers, 
and  for  the  praise  of  them  that  do  well."  I  do  be- 
Heve  that  Christians  are  not  at  liberty  to  rebel 
merely  because  of  wrong  done  to  themselves  per- 
sonally. But  when  the  governor  commands  what  is 
evil  in  itself;  when  the  government  ceases  to  fulfil 
its  proper  office.  Christians  have  thought  themselves 
entitled,  always  with  excessive  reluctance,  to  resist, 
and  have  drawn  their  warrant  from  the  Word  of 
God.  So  at  least  thought  the  Huguenots  of  France, 
and  the  Puritans  of  England,  and  the  Covenanters  of 
Scotland,  and  the  Bishops  at  the  Revolution  Settle- 
ment ;  and  their  descendants,  who  have  inherited 
the  blessings  secured  through  them,  have  been 
proud  of  the  example  they  set. 

Mr.  Mill  and  his  school  have,  unfortunately,  not 
drawn  out  this  code  of  morality,  which  is  to  be  purer 
and  nobler  than  the  Christian.  But  we  may  gather 
what  it  would  be  from  occasional  statements.  With 
perhaps  some  few  additions,  it  would  probably  be 
such  as  we  find  in  the  Meditations  of  Marcus  Aure- 
lius  Antoninus,  the  Roman  emperor  who  so  rigorously 
opposed  the  progress  of  Christianity.  Mr.  Mill  says 
of  his  writings,  that  "  they  are  the  highest  ethical 
product  of  the  ancient  mind,"  and  that  they  "  differ 
scarcely  perceptibly,  if  they  differ  at  all,  from  the 
most  characteristic  teachings  of  Christ."  [Ih.  p.  49.) 


UTILITABIANISM.  413 

Surely  Mr.  Mill  forgets  that  Jesus  began  his  pubhc 
teaching  by  "  iDreaching  the  gospel  of  the  kingdom 
of  God,  and  saying,  The  time  is  fulfilled,  and  the 
kingdom  of  God  is  at  hand :  repent  ye,  and  believe 
the  gospel"  (Mark  i.  14,  15);  that  the  first  beati- 
tude and  the  second  beatitude  in  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount  are,  "Blessed  are  the  poor  in  sphit;"  "Blessed 
are  they  that  mourn  ; "  and  the  prayer  comma^nded 
is  that  of  the  pubhcan,  "  God,  be  merciful  to  me  a 
sinner."  I  have  met  with  no  such  injunctions,  no 
such  spirit,  in  the  Meditations  of  Antonmus.  This 
work  of  the  heathen  emperor  was  much  read  by  the 
moral  school  of  divines  last  century;  and  the  pre- 
cepts enjoined  were  those  they  recommended.  We 
know  the  result.  The  self-righteous  system,  whether 
recommended  by  the  stoic  morahsts  in  ancient  times, 
or  by  the  rationalists  of  last  century,  was  favorably 
regarded  by  a  few  persons  belonging  to  the  middle 
class,  mostly  in  comfortable  worldly  circumstances, 
and  not  in  a  position  to  be  much  in  fear  of  poverty, 
or  the  deeper  trials  of  life.  In  them  it  produced  or 
favored  a  spirit  of  self-sufficiency  and  pride,  which 
tended  to  make  their  characters  hard  and  unlovely, 
and  exposed  them  often  to  grievous  falls,  from  which 
it  could  not  lift  them.  And  as  to  the  great  body  of 
the  people  of  aU  classes,  but  especially  the  poor,  the 
tried  and  the  unfortunate,  they  turned  away  fi:om  it 
with  loathing,  as  not  adapted  to  then?  wants  and  cir- 
cumstances, pretending,  as  it  did,  to  keep  up  by  their 
own  strength  those  who  felt  that  they  needed  higher 


414  UTILITABIANISM. 

support,  and  providing  no  means  of  raising  the 
lapsed  or  comforting  the  mourner.  I  do  not  allow 
that  it  would  be  an  elevation  of  morality  to  set  aside 
the  peculiar  Christian  graces  of  penitence,  meekness, 
and  humility,  and  to  substitute  for  them  a  sense  of 
honor,  a  sense  of  our  own  merits,  and  a  spirit  of  self- 
sufficient  independence. 


CHAPTER    XXL 

NATURAL     THEOLOGY. 

THE  School  of  M.  Comte,  both  in  its  French  and 
British  departments,  is  essentially  a  Sect,  sepa- 
rated from  other  philosophies,  and  with  very  narrow 
sympathies.  It  has  been  made  so  partly  by  the  cir- 
cumstance that  its  adherents  were  at  first  few,  and 
had  to  meet  not  only  with  opposition  but  with  con- 
tempt from  the  leading  metaphysicians  of  the  age ; 
but  it  is  so  essentially,  because  it  has  cut  itself  off 
from  the  streams  which  flow  down  from  the  past, 
and,  like  a  pool,  it  has  no  connection  with  anything 
beyond  itself  Though  no  longer  a  small  body,  and 
though  by  their  mtellectual  power  and  perseverance 
they  have  compelled  their  opponents  to  respect 
them,  the  disciples  have  still  the  exclusiveness  of  a 
sect :  they  read  one  another,  they  quote  one  another, 
and  they  criticise  one  another ;  they  are  incapable 
of  appreciating  any  other  philosophy.  The  two  arti 
cles  of  their  creed,  and  the  two  points  that  imite 
them,  are  the  theory  of  nescience,  and  that  of  the 
steps  by  which  knowledge  has  made  progress.     I 

415 


416  NATUBAL    THEOLOGY, 

have  been  examining  the  first  all  throughout  this 
work.     Before  I  close  I  must  notice  the  other. 

The  famous  law  of  sociology,  as  developed  by  M. 
Comte,  is  about  as  rash  a  generalization  as  was  ever 
made  by  a  Presocratic  physiologist,  a  mediaeval 
schoolman,  or  a  modern  German  speculator.  It 
realizes  the  description  given  by  Bacon  of  empiri- 
cists, who  are  represented  as  rising  at  once  from 
a  Hmited  observation  of  facts  to  the  highest  and 
widest  generalizations.  The  theory  contains  a  small 
amount  of  truth  which  it  has  misunderstood  and 
perverted.  In  the  early  ages  of  the  world,  and  in 
simple  states  of  society  at  all  times,  mankind  are  in- 
clined to  see  God  or  the  gods  as  acting  without  any 
secondary  instrumentality,  in  operations  which  are 
found  subsequently  to  take  place  according  to  natu- 
ral law.  The  reason  of  this  is  very  simple  and  very 
obvious,  and  has  often  been  noticed :  it  is  that  man- 
kind are  prompted  by  the  native  principle  of  causa- 
tion to  seek  for  a  cause  to  every  event,  while  they 
have  not  so  large  an  experience  as  to  enable  them 
to  discover  the  uniformity  in  the  cosmos.  This  state 
of  society  constitutes  what  M.  Comte  calls  the  Theo- 
logical Era  ;  which,  however,  does  not  imply  that 
men  are  more  disposed  to  see  God  in  his  works,  and 
to  worship,  love,  and  obey  him,  than  in  other  ages  ; 
but  simply  that  they  believe  him  to  act  or  interpose 
by  a  free  operation,  independent  of  all  physical 
causation. 

As  observation  widens  and  intelligence  advances. 


NATUBAL    THEOLOGY,  417 

men  learn  to  abstract  and  generalize  upon  the  phe- 
nomena of  nature.  They  are  apt  to  do  so  in  the 
first  instance  —  as  being  the  easiest  method  —  by 
mere  mental  force  or  inward  cogitation.  Not  hav- 
ing learned  to  perform  experiments,  they  cannot  dis- 
tinguish between  the  various  subtle  powers  and  ele- 
ments which  operate  in  nature,  nor  to  make  what 
Bacon  calls  the  necessary  "rejections  and  exclu- 
sions." Generalizing  the  obvious  facts,  they  repre- 
sent the  sun  and  stars  as  moving  daily  roimd  the 
earth,  and,  as  they  find  they  cannot  thus  explain  the 
w^hole  phenomena,  they  give  a  special  motion  to  the 
moon  and  planets,  and  call  in  eccentrics  and  epicy- 
cles. Or,  abstracting  what  seems  common  in  the 
obvious  operations  of  earthly  agents,  they  represent 
the  components  of  the  universe  as  being  the  fiery, 
the  aerial,  the  aqueous,  and  the  sohd  powers ;  and 
speak  of  certain  bodies  being  in  their  very  nature 
light  and  others  heavy.  This  is  what  is  called  the 
Metaphysical  Era.  Not  that  mankind  are  then  in- 
chned  to  cultivate  metaphysics  in  any  proper  sense 
of  the  term,  or  more  than  any  other  department  of 
inquiry ;  but  simply  that  they  hasten  to  grasp  the 
operations  of  nature  within  and  without  them  by 
mental  acts,  and  have  not  learned — what  it  required 
a  Bacon  to  tell  us  —  that  investigation  must  proceed 
gradually,  and  by  means  of  enlarged  observation 
and  careful  experiment.  So  far  from  being  in  any 
pecuHar  sense  a  metaphysical  age,  it  sought  to  pene- 
trate into  all  the  departments  of  nature,  and  inquired 

27 


418  WATUBAL    THEOLOGY. 

into  tlie  origin  and  structure  of  the  universe,  and  the 
movements  of  the  celestial  bodies.  It  did  enter  upon 
metaphysical  subjects,  but  it  was  as  it  rushed  into 
physiological  and  astrological  speculations  ;  and  it 
discussed  them  all  in  the  same  spirit.  The  Presocratic 
schools,  for  example,  did  inquire  into  the  nature  of 
knowing  and  being,  and  the  human  soul ;  but  it  was 
as  they  inquired  into  the  primary  principle  or  ele- 
ments of  the  universe.  They  satisfied  themselves 
with  a  few  common  observations,  and  then  proceed- 
ed to  apply  thought  to  them.  In  pure  metaphysical 
questions  they  distinguished  in  a  rude  way  between 
Sensation  and  Eeason,  and  when  this  division  was 
found  insufficient,  they  called  in  a  vague  intermedi- 
ate principle  called  Opinion  or  Faith.  Such  ages 
have  no  special  title  to  be  called  the  Metaphysical 
Era :  they  treat  physics  and  metaphysics  in  the  same 
undistinguishing  and  uncertain  manner.  Nor  are 
they  to  be  regarded  as  necessarily  non-theological 
ages.  No  doubt  there  were  curious  questions  started, 
which  could  not  be  settled,  as  to  the  relation  be- 
tween these  rapidly  generalized  and  abstract  powers, 
and  the  gods  who  ruled  in  heaven.  There  were  thus 
stirred  theological  questions  which  tended  to  under- 
mine the  old  superstitions,  and  to  prepare  the  way 
for  a  better  era.  It  was  at  this  time  —  "  the  fulness 
of  time "  —  that  Christianity  was  introduced  as  a 
seed  into  a  soil  ploughed  to  receive  it. 

In  the  natural  advancement  of  intelligence,  es- 
pecially after  the  great  awakening  of  thought  in  the 


NATUBAL    THEOLOGY,  419 

sixteenth  century,  it  was  felt  that  the  old  methods 
were  waxing  old,  and  must  soon  vanish  away.  These 
methods  are  happily  described  by  Bacon  as  the  "Ra- 
tional "  so  presumptuous,  the  "  Empirical "  so  narrow, 
and  the  "  Superstitious  "  which  made  religion  accom- 
plish what  could  be  done  only  by  science.  At  this 
time  there  appeared  such  men  as  Galileo  practising 
careful  experiment,  and  Bacon  himself  to  expound 
the  general  principles  of  the  true  mode  of  pro- 
cedure—  of  which  method  the  Positive  Philosophy 
is  merely  a  monstrous  outgrowth.  This  Era  should 
be  called  the  Inductive.  It  may  be  quite  as  meta- 
physical as  the  previous  ones,  only  it  will  conduct 
the  investigations  in  a  new  spirit  and  mode,  that  is, 
according  tp  the  Method  of  Induction.  This  new 
spirit  (though  the  method  was  not  yet  properly  un- 
derstood) sprang  up  in  the  seventeenth  century,  and 
was  fostered  by  such  men  as  Descartes,  who  taught 
us  to  look  into  the  mind  to  discover  its  operations, 
and  by  Locke,  who  appealed  to  experience.  Since 
that  time  an  inductive  mental  science,  distracted 
from  time  to  time  by  an  ambitious  a  priori,  or  by 
a  narrow  empuical  philosophy,  has  run  parallel  to 
physical  science.  Nor  is  this  era  necessarily  an  un- 
theological  one.  Never  were  questions  of  divmity 
discussed  so  keenly  as  in  the  ages  when  the  induc- 
tive spirit  sprang  up,  and  was  apphed  to  the  study 
of  the  human  mind.  And  I  beheve  that  there  is  as 
much,  and  as  intense,  religious  feehng  in  oiu"  country 
at  this  present  time  as  there  ever  was  in  any  country 


420  NATUBAL    THEOLOGY. 

since  man  appeared  on  the  earth;  and  sooner  or 
later  there  will  be  a  tremendous  reaction  against  the 
present  attempt  to  deaden  the  religious  instincts 
among  our  young  men  by  a  cold  unbelief.  No  doubt 
educated  men  cannot  now  see  the  constant  interpo- 
sitions of  God  which  were  noticed  in  early  ages; 
but  it  is  because  they  take  an  enlarged  and  enlight- 
ened view  of  the  course  of  nature,  which  they  re- 
gard as  ordered  by  God  in  infinite  wisdom,  and  as 
the  expression  of  His  will,  and  not  requiring  to 
be  interfered  with.  It  is  all  true  that  men  with  a 
proud  and  self-dependent  spirit  may  now  find  it 
easier  to  disbelieve  in  a  personal  God,  and  to  hand 
over  the  universe  to  unconscious  natural  law.  But 
the  truth  is,  persons  who  do  not  like  to  retain  a  pure 
and  holy  God  in  their  hearts,  had  at  all  times  an 
outlet.  That  outlet  was  furnished  in  ancient  times 
by  superstition,  which  degraded  the  Divine  character, 
and  in  modern  times  by  infidelity,  which  denies  His 
existence  or  His  constant  operation. 

It  is  a  pleasant  circumstance  to  reflect  upon,  that 
nearly  all  the  great  philosophers  of  ancient  and 
modern  times  have  been  anxious  to  show  that  their 
systems  favor  religion.  There  is  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  Ionian  physiologists  recognized  the 
Divine  existence  and  the  Divine  agency :  certainly 
Anaxagoras,  who  seems  to  have  been  the  greatest 
of  them,  allotted  the  all-important  place  in  his 
system  to  the  Divine  Intelligence.  The  founder  of 
the  Eleatic  School,  Xenophanes.  while  he  ridiculed 


NATUBAL    THEOLOGY.  421 

the  popular  mythology^  represented  God  as  the  es- 
sential existence.     We  know  little  of  the  Pythago- 
rean system,  but  it  is  clear  that  it  had  a  Zeus  as  the 
centre  of  the   order  which  it  delighted  to  unfold. 
The  two  great  truths  which  Socrates  held  by  firmty, 
amidst  his  doubts  and  his  love  of  dialectic,  were  the 
providence  of  God,  and  the  tendency  of  virtue    in 
the    government    of   God    to    promote    happiness. 
When  Plato  rises  above  the  intellectual  g;yTnnastic 
which  he  is  so  dehghted  to  exercise,  it  is  to  merge 
his  philosophy  in  a  theology  in  which  the  God  is 
represented  as  forever  contemplating  eternal  ideas, 
and  developing  all  things  according  to  them.     Even 
Aristotle,  cold  though  he  be  m   his  references  to 
divine  subjects,  falls  back  on  God  as  the  principle 
and  ground  of  all  things.    In  the  Stoic  system  there 
was  a  fiery  deity,  who  pervaded  all  nature,  and  con- 
tmued  unchanged  amidst  the  periodical  conflagra- 
tion of  all  things.     Cicero  wishes  everywhere  to  be 
thought  a  pure  theist;  and  the  later  Latin  Stoics, 
such  as  the  philosophic  emperor,  were  more  religious 
than  the  Greek  founders  of  the  school.     Medieval 
scholasticism  consisted  essentially  in  the  application 
of  Logic  to  Theology.     In  the  reaction  of  the  six- 
teenth and  seventeenth  centuries,  philosophic  think- 
ers delighted  to  show  that  their  systems  could  bear 
up  and  confirm  true  rehgion.      Bacon  excluded  final 
causes   from   physics,   but   gave   them   and   formal 
causes  a  place  in  the  higher  field  of  metaphysics, 
which  stand  next  to  and  support  theology  at  the 


422  NATUBAL    THEOLOGY, 

apex  of  the  pyramid.  Descartes  maintained  that 
the  mind  has  an  idea  of  the  infinite  and  perfect, 
which  imphes  the  existence  of  an  infinitely  perfect 
Being.  Locke  wrote  much  on  rehgious  subjects,  and 
in  the  Fourth  Book  of  his  Essay ^  he  shows  that  his 
system  leads  to  a  reasonable  belief  in  the  existence 
of  a  spiritual  Being.  The  founders  of  the  German 
School;  Leibnitz  and  Kant,  embraced  the  existence 
of  God  as  essential  parts  of  their  philosophies,  and 
in  this  they  were  followed  by  the  ideal  pantheists, 
Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel.  The  Scottish  School, 
from  Hutcheson  to  Hamilton,  including  Brown,  has 
been  at  great  pains  to  expound  and  defend  the  great 
truths  of  natural  religion. 

It  is  surely  an  ominous  circumstance,  that  in  this 
the  nineteenth  century  there  should  arise  a  system 
of  philosophy,  supported  by  very  able  men,  and  with 
very  extensive  ramifications  and  applications,  espe- 
cially in  social  science,  but  which  contains  within  it 
no  argument  for  the  Divine  existence,  or  sanctions 
to  religion.  The  founder  of  the  school  was  an 
avowed,  indeed  a  rabid,  atheist ;  and  1  am  not  aware 
that  any  of  his  French  followers  have  made  any  pro- 
fession of  religion,  —  most  of  them  are  favorers  of 
a  materialism,  which  does  not  admit  of  a  spiritual 
God.^  The  British  branch  of  the  school  seems,  with 
one  accord,  and  evidently  on  a  system,  to  decline 
uttering  any  certain  sound  on  the  subject;  they  cer- 

1  A  vigorous  opposition  is  being  of-  M.  Cousin,  M.  Rerausat,  and  M. 
fered  to  the  prevailing  Materialism  by  Janet  (see  his  Materialisme  Contem- 
a  number  of  able  French  writers,  as    porain). 


NATUBAL    THEOLOGY.  423 

tainly  do  not  pretend  that  their  philosophy,  em- 
bracing though  it  does,  all  mental,  moral,  and  social 
problems,  requires  us  to  believe  in  the  existence  of 
God,  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  or  a  day  of 
judgment.  Mr.  Mill's  method  of  dealing  with  the 
subject  is  uniform,  and  evidently  designed.  Though 
fond  of  uttering  opinions  on  most  other  topics,  he 
declines  saying  what  are  his  convictions,  or  whether 
he  has  any  convictions,  in  regard  to  religious  truth. 
He  satisfies  himself  with  declaring,  that  if  you  believe 
in  the  existence  of  God,  or  in  Christianity,  I  do  not 
interfere  with  you.  He  does  not  pretend  that  his 
philosophy  does  of  itself  give  any  aid  or  sanction  to 
rehgion ;  but  if  we  can  get  evidence  otherwise,  he 
assures  us  that  he  does  not  disturb  us. 

Without  saying  that  it  has  convinced  him,  he 
speaks  with  great  respect  of  the  argument  from  de- 
sign in  favor  of  the  Divine  existence,  and  advises  us 
to  stick  by  it,  rather  than  resort  to  a  priori  proof 
The  advice  is  a  sound  one.  The  greater  number, 
even  of  metaphysicians,  are  in  doubts  whether  there 
has  ever  been  an  a  jjriori  argument  constructed  by 
Anselm,  by  Descartes,  by  Leibnitz,  or  by  Clarke, 
which  can  of  itself  prove  the  existence  of  God,  apart 
from  the  observation  of  the  traces  of  wisdom  and 
goodness  in  the  Divine  workmanship.  The  reaction 
agamst  the  argument  from  final  cause,  which  has 
been  fostered  by  the  German  metaphysics  for  the 
last  age,  is  far  from  being  a  wise  or  a  healthy  spirit 
and  sentiment.     The  proof  from  design  is  that  which 


424  NATUBAL    THEOLOGY, 

ever  comes  home  with  most  force  to  the  unsophisti- 
cated mind. 

But  the  important  question  is  not  about  our  au- 
thor's personal  predilections  and  convictions^  but  is,  — 
Does  his  philosophy  undermine  the  arguments  for 
the  existence  of  Deity,  and  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  and  a  day  of  accounts  ?  It  is  clear  that  many 
of  the  old  proofs  cannot  be  advanced  by  those  who 
accept  his  theory.  The  argument  from  cathohc  con- 
sent can  have  no  value  on  such  a  system.  That 
derived  from  the  moral  faculty  in  man,  so  much  in- 
sisted on  by  Kant  and  Chalmers,  is  no  longer  avail- 
able when  it  is  allowed  that  the  moral  law  has  no 
place  in  our  constitution,  and  that  our  moral  senti- 
ments are  generated  by  inferior  feelings  and  associ- 
ated circumstances.  But  then,  he  tells  us,  that  the 
Design  argument  "would  stand  exactly  where  it 
does."  (p.  210.)  I  doubt  much  whether  this  is  the 
case.  I  see  no  principles  left  by  Mr.  Mill  sufficient 
to  enable  us  to  answer  the  objections  which  have 
been  urged  against  it  by  Hume.  Kant  is  usually 
reckoned  as  having  been  successful  in  showing,  that 
the  argument  from  design  involves  the  principle  of 
cause  and  effect.  We  see  an  order  and  an  adapta- 
tion in  nature,  which  are  evidently  effects,  and  we 
look  for  a  cause.  Has  Mr.  Mill's  doctrine  of  causa- 
tion left  this  proof  untouched  ?  Suppose  that  we 
allow  to  him  that  there  is  nothing  in  an  effect  which 
of  itself  implies  a  cause ;  that  even  when  we  know 
that  there  is  a  cause,  no  light  is  thereby  thrown  on 


NATTJBAL    THEOLOGY.  425 

the  nature  of  that  cause ;  that  the  causal  relation  is 
simply  that  of  invariable  antecedence  within  the 
limits  of  our  experience;  and  that  beyond  our  ex 
perience  there  may  be  events  without  a  cause,  —  I 
fear  that  the  argument  is  left  without  a  foundation. 
And  there  are  other  questions  pressing  on  our  notice, 
and  demanding  an  answer.  Can  God  be  shown  to 
be  infinite  on  the  principles  of  this  philosophy  ?  If 
so,  what  are  these  principles  ?  If  God  exists  as  a 
designer^  is  He  also  a  moral  governor?  Will  He 
call  His  creatures  to  account,  and  reward  those  who 
do  good,  and  punish  those  who  do  evil  ?  Is  this 
world  the  only  world  to  us,  or  is  there  another  ?  It 
is  clear  that  the  argument  drawn  from  the  abiding, 
the  substantial,  and  spiritual  nature  of  the  soul  is 
entirely  cut  off  by  a  philosophy  which  makes  mmd 
a  mere  series  of  feelings.  The  more  convincing  ar- 
gument from  God's  justice  calling  His  responsible 
creatures  to  account,  can  have  little  or  no  force  in  a 
system  which  admits  no  independent  morality. 

I  should  like,  I  confess,  to  have  the  proof  and  the 
doctrine  of  natural  religion  drawn  out  according  to 
this  philosophy.  The  argument  for  the  being  of  a 
God  founded  on  any  native  principles  is  unavailable, 
but  we  are  allowed  to  weigh  the  a  j^osteriori  evi- 
dence. It  is  conceivable  that  the  adherents  of  the 
system  may  thread  their  way  through  the  series  of 
feehngs  and  possibilities  of  sensations,  and  as  they 
do  so  discover  traces  of  what,  if  done  by  man,  would 
be  reckoned  design  and  beneficence :  but  whether 


426  NATUBAL    THEOLOGY. 

these  phenomena  within  our  experience  entitle  us  to 
argue  that  there  is  a  Being  beyond  who  has  caused 
them,  is  a  question  in  regard  to  which  some  are  wait- 
ino:  for  Hs^ht  to  come  from  the  head  of  the  school  or 
some  other  quarter.  Those  who  believe  that  an 
effect  of  itself  implies  a  cause,  have  no  hesitation  in 
concluding  that  the  design  in  nature  implies  a  de- 
signer ;  and  those  who  look  on  man  as  having  a 
moral  nature,  and  constrained  by  inward  principles 
to  believe  in  infinity,  can  clothe  the  designer  with 
moral  and  infinite  perfections.  But  there  are  not  a 
few,  both  of  those  who  oppose  and  those  who  sup- 
port Mr.  Mill,  who  cannot  see  that  his  system  war- 
rants us  in  reaching  any  such  result.  And  there  is 
the  more  puzzling  inquiry,  whether  there  is  proof 
that  the  thread  or  prolonged  throb  of  consciousness 
exists  after  its  external  bodily  conditions  or  possibili- 
ties have  been  evidently  dissolved  by  death.  These 
are  questions  which  some  of  our  youths,  who  have 
committed  themselves  to  this  philosophy,  are  sporting 
with  in  utter  levity,  and  which  are  wringing  the 
hearts  of  others  till  feelings  more  bitter  than  tears 
burst  from  them :  and  what  are  they  to  do,  in  this 
transition  state,  with  the  old  undermined  and  the 
new  not  yet  constructed  ? 

I  have  carefully  refrained  throughout  this  work 
from  urging  any  argument  from  consequences,  or 
from  rehgious  considerations,  against  the  philosophy 
I  am  examining.  I  have,  to  the  best  of  my  ability, 
and  with  an  anxious  desire  to  reason  fairly,  met  my 


NATURAL    THEOLOGY.  427 

distinguislied  opponent  on  the  ground  of  conscious- 
ness, and  of  legitimate  inference  from  it.   But  neither 
he  nor  I,  neither  those  who  follow  nor  those  who  op- 
pose him,  can  avoid  looking  at  the  results.     Scepti- 
cism, as  Hume  dehghts  to  show,  can  produce  no  mis- 
chief in  the  common  secular  affairs  of  life,  because 
there  man  is  ever  meeting  with  circumstances  which 
keep  him  right  in  spite  of  his  principles  or  want  of 
principles.    But  it  is  very  different  in  those  questions 
which  fall  to  be  discussed  in  higher  ethics  and  theol- 
ogy. A  man  will  not  be  tempted  by  any  sophistry  to 
doubt  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect  when  he  is 
thirsty  and  sees  a  cup  of  water  before  him;  in  such  a 
case  he  will  at  once  put  forth  his  hand  and  take  it, 
knowing  that  the  beverage  will  refresh  him.    But  he 
may  be  led  by  a  wretched  sophistry  to  deny  the  neces- 
sary relation  of  cause  and  effect  when  it  would  lead 
him  upward  from  God's  works  to  God  himself,  or  to 
seek  assurance  and  peace  in  him.    Hence  the  import- 
ance of  not  allowing  fundamental  truth  to  be  assailed : 
not  because  the  attack  will  sway  any  one  in  the 
common  business  of  life,  but  because  it  may  hold 
back    and  damp  our  higher  aspirations,  moral  and 
rehgious.     I  put  no  question  as  to  the  rehgious  con- 
victions of  its  supporters ;  but  I  may  surely  ask  — 
What  is  the  religion  left  us  by  the  new  philosophy  ? 

M.  Comte  provided  a  religion  and  a  worship  for 
his  followers.  He  had  no  God,  but  he  had  a  "  Grand 
Etre,"  in  Collective  Humanity,  or  "the  continuous 
resultant  of  all  the  forces  capable  of  voluntarily  con- 


428  MATUBAL    THEOLOGY, 

curring  in  the  universal  perfectioning  of  the  world/' 
— being  in  fact  a  deification  of  his  system  of  science 
and  sociology.  In  the  worship  he  enjoined  he  has 
nine  sacraments,  and  a  priesthood,  and  public  honors 
to  be  paid  to  the  Collective  Humanity ;  but  with  no 
public  liberty  of  conscience,  or  of  education,  in  sacred 
or  indeed  in  any  subjects.  The  religious  observances 
were  to  occupy  two  hours  every  day.  Mr.  Mill  tells 
us,  "Private  adoration  is  to  be  addressed  to  Col- 
lective Humanity  in  the  persons  of  worthy  individual 
representatives,  who  may  be  either  living  or  dead, 
but  must  in  all  cases  be  women ;  for  women,  be- 
ing the  sexe  aimant,  represent  the  best  attribute  of 
humanity,  that  which  ought  to  regulate  all  human 
life,  nor  can  Humanity  possibly  be  symbolized  in  any 
form  but  that  of  a  woman.  The  objects  of  private 
adoration  are  the  mother,  the  wife,  and  the  daughter, 
representing  severally  the  past,  the  present,  and  the 
future,  and  calling  into  active  exercise  the  three  so- 
cial sentiments,  —  veneration,  attachment,  and  kind- 
ness. We  are  to  regard  them,  whether  dead  or  alive, 
as  our  guardian  angels, '  les  vrais  anges  gardiens.'  If 
the  last  two  have  never  existed,  or  if,  in  the  particu- 
lar case,  any  of  the  three  types  is  too  faulty  for  the 
of&ce  assigned  to  it,  their  place  may  be  supplied  by 
some  other  type  of  womanly  excellence,  even. by  one 
merely  historical.  {Comte  and  Fosit.,ip.  150.)  The 
Christian  religion  surely  does  not  suffer  by  being 
placed  alongside  this  system,  which  is  one  of  the 
two  new  religions  which  this  century  has  produced, 


NATUBAL    THEOLOGY.  429 

—  the  other  bemg  Mormonism.  The  author  clung 
more  and  more  fondly  to  this  faith  and  ceremonial 
as  he  advanced  in  years.  His  English  followers  are 
ashamed  of  it,  and  ascribe  it  to  his  lunacy,  —  as  if 
he  had  not  been  tinged  with  madness  (as  his  poor 
wife  knew,  all  his  life),  and  as  if  his  whole  system 
had  not  been  the  product  of  a  powerful  but  constitu- 
tionally diseased  intellect. 

He  denounces  his  English  followers,  because  they 
did  not  adopt  his  moral  and  social  system ;  he  char- 
acterizes the  conversion  of  those  who  have  adopted 
his  positivity  and  rejected  his  religion  as  an  abor- 
tion; and  declares  that  it  must  proceed  from  im- 
potence of  intellect,  or  insufficiency  of  heart,  com- 
monly from  both  !  {Polit.  Posit. ^  tome  i.  pref  p.  xv. ; 
m.  p.  xxiv.)  There  is  a  basis  of  wisdom  in  this  com- 
plaint. All  history  shows  that  man  is  a  religious, 
quite  as  certainly  as  he  is  a  feeling,  and  a  rational 
being.  But  what  has  the  British  School  provided 
to  meet  man's  religious  wants  ?  As  yet  they  have 
furnished  nothing.  But  Mr.  Mill,  who  always  weighs 
his  words,  and  who  is  too  skilful  a  dialectician  to  say 
more  than  he  means,  evidently  points  to  something 
which  is  being  hatched,  and  may  some  day  burst 
forth.  While  he  has  the  strongest  objection  to  the 
system  of  poHtics  and  morals  set  forth  in  the  Poli- 
tique Positive,  he  thinks  "it  has  superabundantly 
sho^vn  the  possibility  of  giving  to  the  service  of  hu- 
manity, even  without  the  belief  in  a  Providence, 
both  the  psychological  power  and  the  social  ef&cacy 


430  IJATUBAL    THEOLOGY, 

of  a  religion :  making  it  take  hold  of  linman  life, 
and  color  all  though t,  feeling,  and  action,  in  a 
manner  of  which  the  greatest  ascendency  ever  ex- 
ercised by  any  religion  may  be  but  a  type  and  fore- 
taste." (  Util,  p.  48.)  More  specifically  in  his  latest 
work  he  says,  that  "  though  conscious  of  being  in  an 
extremely  small  minority,"  —  a  circumstance  which 
is  sure  to  catch  those  "  individualists  "  who  are  bent 
on  appearing  original  —  ^'we  venture  to  think  that 
a  religion  may  exist  without  belief  in  a  God,  and 
that  a  religion  without  a  God  may  be,  even  to  Chris- 
tians, an  instructive  and  profitable  object  of  contem- 
plation." {Comte  and  Posit,  p.  133.)  He  tells  us, 
that  in  order  to  constitute  a  religion,  there  must 
be  "a  creed  or  conviction,"  "a  belief  or  set  of  be- 
liefs," "a  sentiment  connected  with  this  creed,"  and 
a  "cultus."  I  confess  I  should  like  excessively  to 
see  this  new  religion,  with  its  creed  and  its  cultus, 
fully  developed.  It  would  match  the  theologies, 
with  their  ceremonial  observances,  projected  by  doc- 
trinaires in  the  heat  of  the  French  Revolution. 
There  is  no  risk  of  the  British  School  setting  up 
a  religion  and  a  worship  so  superbly  ridiculous  as 
that  of  M.  Comte,  but  I  venture  to  predict  that 
when  it  comes,  it  will  be  so  scientifically  cold,  and 
so  emotionally  blank,  as  to  be  incapable  of  gathering 
any  interest  around  it,  of  accomplishing  any  good  — 
or,  I  may  add,  inflicting  any  evil. 

Leaving  the  religion  to  develop  itself  in  the  future, 
let  us  ascertain  what  we  have  without  it  in  the  phil- 


NATTJBAL    THEOLOGY.  431 

osophic  system.  Within,  we  have  a  prolonged  series 
of  feehngs ;  without,  we  have  a  possibihty  of  sensa- 
tions ;  both  regulated  by  the  most  unbending  laws 
of  necessity,  within  the  limits  of  experience  and  a 
reasonable  distance  beyond ;  and  beyond  that  heyond, 
—  if  there  be  such,  —  a  land  of  darkness  and  eternal 
silence.  This  is  the  cold  region  into  which  thought, 
as  it  moves  on  in  its  orbit,  has  brought  us,  in  the 
third  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century.  And  is 
this,  then,  what  is  left  us  after  all  the  dialectic  con- 
flicts, and  as  the  result  of  all  the  scientific  discoveries 
of  the  last  two  thousand  five  hundred  years  that 
have  elapsed  since  reflective  thought  was  awakened  ? 
We  know  how  keenly  some  patriotic  and  high-minded 
Frenchmen  feel  when  they  are  obliged  to  contem- 
plate the  present  state  of  their  country,  and  to  con- 
fess how  great  the  humiUation  implied  in  the  bloody 
revolutions  through  which  they  have  passed,  ending 
in  a  military  despotism,  which  restrains  on  all  hands 
liberty  of  thought  and  action.  I  am  sure  that  a  hke 
feehng  will  rise  up  in  many  noble  and  hopeful  minds 
when  they  are  made  to  see  that  all  these  discussions, 
philosophic  and  religious,  in  the  past,  that  all  these 
throes  and  convulsions  of  opinion  and  sentiment 
have  left  us  only  a  series  of  feehngs  and  a  possibihty 
of  sensations,  beginning  we  know  not  with  what, 
and  carrying  us  we  know  not  whither,  —  all  that  Ave 
are  sure  of  being,  that  the  sensations  and  feelings 
are  conveyed  along  pleasantly  or  unpleasantly,  and 
ranged  into  companies  suitably  or  unsuitably,  and 


482  NATUBAL    THEOLOGY. 

our  very  beliefs  generated,  by  a  fatalistic  law  of  con- 
tiguity and  resemblance.  Some  may  be  content 
with  this  lot,  as  being  caught  in  the  toils  and  despair- 
ing of  an  escape  :  but  there  will  be  others,  —  I  ven- 
ture to  say  nobler  and  better,  — ^who  feel  that  they 
must  be  delivered  from  this  mental  bondage  at  all 
hazards,  and  will  hasten  to  attempt  it  even  at  the 
risk  of  new  conflicts  and  new  revolutions.  It  should 
not  after  all  be  so  difficult  for  humble  and  sincere 
men  to  escape  from  this  net  which  sophistry  would 
weave  around  them.  Let  them  follow  those  intui- 
tions and  ultimate  beliefs,  the  existence  and  the 
veracity .  of  which  Mr.  Mill  has  acknowledged,  — 
while  he  has  declined  to  pursue  them  to  their  con- 
sequences ;  let  them  gather  around  them  a  body  of 
acquired  observations  with  their  appropriate  senti- 
ments;  and,  as  they  do  so,  they  will  reach  a,  body 
of  truth,  practical,  scientific,  and  religious,  sufficient 
to  stay  the  intellect  and  satisfy  the  heart,  —  while 
what  still  remains  unknown  will  only  incite  to  fur- 
ther explorations,  and  lead  to  new  discoveries. 


APPENDIX. 


Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Philosophy.  —  See  p.  20. 

I  HAVE  taken  exception  to  certain  doctrines  of  Hamilton  in  the  Method  of 
Divine  Government  (m.  d.  g.)  ;  in  the  Noiih  British  Review,  Nos.  liv.  and  lix. 
(n.  b.  r.)  ;  in  Dublin  University  Magazine,  Aug.  1859  (d.  u.  m.)  ;  in  Intuitions 
of  the  Mind  (i.  m.)  ;  in  Supernatural  in  Relation  to  Natural  (s.  n.)  ;  in  Appen- 
dix to  Stewart's  Outlines  (s.  o.) ;  and  now  in  this  work  (d.  f.  t.) 

1.  His  Method. —  n.b.r.  liv.  427;  i.m.  96;  d.f.t.  42. 

2.  His   ambiguous    use    of    Consciousness.  —  n.b.r.   liv.   428 ; 

D.U.3I.  159,  160;  i.ii.  96;  d.f.t.  32-38. 

3.  His    omission    among    the    Reproductive   Powers    {Metaph. 

vol.  ii.),  of  the  E-ecognitive  Power  by  which  we  beHeve 
the  remembered  event  to  have  fallen  under  our  notice  in 
time  past.  —  d.u.m.  160 ;  d.f.t.  188. 

4.  His  view  of  Time  and  Space.  —  n.b.r.  liv.  429;  i.m.    178, 

179. 

5.  His  doctrine  of  Unconscious  Mental  Operations.  — d.u.m.  161, 

162;  D.F.T.  211-214. 

6.  His   unsatisfactory  way  of  appealing   to  Faith  without    ex- 

plaining its  nature.  —  n.b.r.  lix.  150,  151  ;  i.m.  168-173  ; 
S.N.  355. 

7.  His  view  of  aU  Knowledge  implying  Comparison.  —  i.m.  207- 

210;  D.F.T.  237. 

8.  His  defective  view   of  the   Relations  which  the   mind    can 

discover.  —  d.u.m.  162,  163;  i.m.  211. 

9.  His  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge.  —  m.d.g.  536- 

589  ;  N.B.R.  liv.  428-429  ;  d.u.m.  163,  164;  i.m.  109, 340- 
341 ;  s.O.  132  ;  d.f.t.  233-237. 
10.   His  doctrine  of  Nescience.  —  m.d.g.   520 ;  n.b.r.  liv.  430- 
431  •,  I.M.  342-345  ;  d.f.t.  234. 

(483) 


434  APFENDIX, 

11.  His  defective  doctrine  as  to  our  idea  of  the  Infinite.  — m.d.g, 

534;  N.B.R.  Uv.  430,lix.  150,  154,  156;   i.m.  193-197; 
S.N.  141. 

12.  His  axiom  that  truth  lies  between  two  extremes.  —  i.m.  304, 

338. 

13.  His  doctrine  of  Substance.  —  i.m.  146,  148. 

14.  His  doctrine  of  Causation.  — m.d.g.  529,   530 ;    n.b.r.   Uv. 

430;  D.u.M.  164. 

15.  The  application  by  Dr.  Mansel  of  the  doctrine  of  Relativity 

to  Moral  Good   and  Evil.  —  n.b.r.  lix.  157;    s.N.  356, 
357. 

16.  His  view  of  the  Theistic  Argument.  —  m.d.g.  520  ;  n.b.r.  liv. 

431,  lix.  152 ;  s.N.  355  ;  s.o.  140. 


n. 

REPLY  TO  MR.  MILL'S  STRICTURES  IN  HIS  THIRD  EDITION. 


Article  I.     Mr.  MilVs  Philosophic  Predecessors,  (p.  14.) 

I  REQUIEE,  before  entering  on  the  discussion,  to  refer  to 
one  or  two  personal  matters,  these  fortunately  not  involving 
any  offensive  personal  feeling.  I  had  spoken  of  Hobbes, 
Hartley,  Hume,  and  Brown  as  Mr.  Mill's  philosophic  ances- 
tors, and  of  Mr.  James  Mill  and  M.  Comte  as  having  had 
influence  on  the  young  thinker,  and  of  M.  Comte  as  having 
led  him  to  regard  it  as  "  impossible  for  the  mind  to  rise  to 
first  or  final  causes,  or  to  know  the  natiu-e  of  things"  {Ex- 
aminatio7i  of  MilVs  Philosophy,  p.  8).  I  did  so,  because 
M.  Comte,  the  great  defender  of  that  doctrine,  had  ex- 
pounded his  views  before  Mr.  Mill  had  published  anything. 
But  Mr.  Mill  tells  us  :  "  The  larger  half  of  my  System  of 
Logic,  including  all  its  fundamental  doctrines,  was  written 
before  I  had  seen  the  'Le  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive.' 
That  work  was  indebted  to  M.  Comte  for  many  valuable 
thoughts,  but  a  short  list  would  exhaust  the  chapters,  and 
even  the  pages  which  contain  them  "  (p.  267) .  I  suppose  he 
means  to  include  not  merely  his  System  of  Logic,  but  the 
fuller  exposition  which  we  have  in  some  of  his  other  works, 
in  which  he  has  expounded  doctrines  identical  with  those 
held  by  M.  Comte,  and  usually  fathered  upon  him.  He  as- 
sures us,  however,  in  regard  to  the  general  doctrine  of  Nesci- 
ence, as  I  call  it,  he  was  familiar  with  it  "  before  I  was  out 
of  my  boyhood,  from  the  teachings  of  my  father.  Ever  since 
the  days  of  Hume,  that  doctrine  has  been  the  general  property 
of  the  philosophic  world.  From  the  time  of  Brown,  it  has 
entered  into  popular  philosophy."  This  statement  does  not 
differ  essentially  from  mine,  only  it  ascribes  less  to  M.  Comte, 


436  APPENDIX. 

and  more  to  Mr.  James  Mill,  who  is  represented  as  teaching 
the  doctrine  to  his  son  from  boyhood.  I  leave  this  statement 
without  comment,  except  that  I  must  protest  against  repre- 
senting Brown,  who  argued  for  the  existence  of  God  from 
the  traces  of  design,  as  discarding  either  first  or  final 
causes. 

Mr.  Mill  admits  (p.  319)  "Dr.  M'Cosh's  work  is  unim- 
peachable in  respect  of  candor  and  fairness."  I  accept  the 
compliment.  I  did  intend  to  act  fairly  towards  my  distin- 
guished opponent ;  and  carefully  abstained  from  quibbling 
and  captiousness,  when  strongly  tempted  to  indulge  in  it  by 
what  seemed  the  severe  criticism  of  Mr.  Hamilton.  Esteem- 
ing moral  higher  than  intellectual  qualities  (so  deified  by 
Buckle  and  others  of  the  school),  I  value  this  testimony 
higher  than  I  would  have  done  a  laudation  of  my  abilities. 
But  the  compliment  is  followed  by  a  charge,  that  "  he  can- 
not be  relied  on  for  correctly  apprehending  the  maxims  and 
tendencies  of  a  philosophy  different  from  his  own,"  and  he 
complains  that  "  he  has  not  been  able,  even  a  little  way,  into 
the  mode  of  thought  he  is  combating"  (p.  250).  All  I 
have  to  say  here  is,  that  if  I  have  not  been  able  to  do  so,  it 
must  be  owing  to  some  hebetude  of  intellect ;  for  I  was 
reared  in  favorable  circumstances  for  understanding  the  sys- 
tem and  its  tendencies.  Albeit  some  years  younger  than 
Mr.  Mill,  I  was  brought  up  intellectually  in  a  position  not 
so  widely  different  from  those  in  which  he  was  trained.  The 
first  professor  of  mental  science  who  impressed  me  favorably, 
which  he  did  by  his  cool  intellectual  power,  was  Mr.  James 
Mylne  of  Glasgow  University,  who  following  Destutt  de 
Tracey,  derived  all  our  ideas  from  sensation,  memory,  and 
judgment.  The  first  metaphysical  work  I  read  w^ith  admi- 
ration, was  the  Lectiu^es  of  Thomas  Brown.  At  a  prema- 
turely early  age,  I  had  perused  the  philosophic  works  of 
Hume.  I  read  James  Mill's  Analysis  at  the  time  it  came 
out,  and  also  Sir  James  Mackintosh's  Dissei^tation,  in  which 
he  attempts  to  resolve  conscience  into  the  association  of  ideas. 
All  along,  indeed,  I  had  a  suspicion  that  the  refined  analysis 


MR.   MILVS  PHILOSOPHIC  PREDECESSORS.       437 

of  these  writers  was  far  too  subtile,-  and  that  they  must  be 
overlooking  some  of  the  deepest  and  most  characteristic 
phenomena  of  the  mind.  Still,  these  were  the  men  (not 
to  speak  of  ancient  philosophers)  for  whom,  in  my  juvenile 
years,  I  had  an  admiration,  rather  than  towards  Reid,  or 
even  Stewart  or  Locke ;  and  I  believe  I  entered  a  good  way 
into  their  modes  of  thought  and  their  systems.  But  on  ma- 
ture and  independent  reflection,  I  had  found  my  way  out 
of  their  subtilties,  and  this  before  I  knew  anything  of  Ham- 
ilton, who  turned  the  tide  in  public  sentiment.  At  a  time 
when  the  Philosophie  Positive  was  known  to  few  in  this 
country,  I  read  it  with  care,  and  I  saw  at  once  that  it  would 
come  to  be  a  power  in  this  century,  quite  equal  to  Hobbes 
in  the  seventeenth  and  of  Hume  in  the  eighteenth  centuries  ; 
and  I  noticed  it  in  my  first  published  work  (^MetJiod  of  Di- 
vine Government,  B.  H.  c.  ii..  Note  D).  On  my  first 
reading  Mill's  Logic,  which  was  not  for  some  time  after  its 
publication,  I  saw  that  the  philosophy  in  which  I  had  been 
brought  up  was  involved  throughout.  The  literary  work  on 
which  I  was  engaged  at  the  time  when  INIill's  Examination 
of  Hamilton  came  out,  was  an  expository  and  critical  ac- 
count of  Hume's  philosophy  for  this  Revieiv,  and  intended  to 
find  a  place  in  a  contemplated  work  on  the  Scottish  philoso- 
phy ;  and  the  book  came  out  in  time  to  enable  me  to  bring 
out  in  a  set  of  foot-notes,  the  curious  correspondence  between 
the  philosophy  of  Hume  and  that  of  Mill.  I  mention  these 
things,  to  show  that  I  should  be  quite  prepared  to  enter  a 
considerable  way  into  Mr.  Mill's  mode  of  thought.  But  by 
painful  cogitation  I  had  wrought  myself  out  of  it,  and  be- 
lieved I  had  discovered  the  fundamental  fallacies  of  the  whole 
philosophy.  The  one  qualification  which  I  possessed  for  the 
task  of  examining  Mr.  jNIill,  lay  in  my  having  been  trained 
in  much  the  same  school,  and  having  risen  above  it ;  and  I 
thought  it  right  to  give  to  the  world,  with  an  application  to 
the  very  able  work  which  appeared,  the  arguments  which  had 
convinced  myself,  and  which  I  had  expounded  for  years  to 
my  college  classes. 


438  APPENDIX. 

Mr.  Mill  is  often  alleging  against  those  who  oppose  him, 
that  they  are  not  able  to  place  themselves  "  at  the  point  of 
view  of  a  theory  different "  from  their  own.  But  has  Mr.  Mill 
never  put  to  himself  the  question,  "  May  I  not  have  fallen  into 
the  sin  I  have  laid  to  the  charge  of  my  opponents  ?  Have  I 
ever  thoroughly  entered  into  and  sympathized  with  that  high- 
souled  philosophy  which  was  introduced  by  Plato,  which  was 
continued  by  men  like  Augustine,  Anselm,  Descartes,  Cud- 
worth,  Leibnitz,  Jacobi,  and  Kant,  and  Cousin;  and  in  a 
lower  key,  by  Aristotle,  Buffier,  Reid,  Stewart,  and  Hamil- 
ton? "  I  admire  greatly  the  ability,  dialectic  and  deductive, 
of  Mr.  Mill.  It  is  peculiarly  a  clear,  a  penetrating  under- 
standing ;  but  it  is  not  distinguished  by  wide  sympathies  and 
philosophic  comprehensiveness.  He  does  admire  Plato  and 
Coleridge  ;  but  it  is  because  the  former  had  so  much  of  the 
search-spirit  and  the  undermining  dialectic  ;  and  because  the 
latter  was  dissolving  the  old  philosophy  and  theology  of  Brit- 
ain. I  am  convinced  that  he  has  seen  so  many  contradic- 
tions in  Hamilton,  because  he  could  not  always  take  into 
view  the  full  sweep  of  his  massive,  but  at  times  ill-constructed 
system.  When  he  commends  an  opponent,  as  he  does  Ham- 
ilton often  and  Mansel  at  times,  it  is  when  he  sees  they  are 
travelling  towards  the  point  which  he  himself  has  reached. 
It  is  surely  conceivable  that  he  may  have  been  so  filled  with 
his  own  system,  inherited  from  a  beloved  father,  and  cher- 
ished resolutely  at  the  time  when  the  tide  was  all  against  him, 
and  that  it  may  now  bulk  so  largely  before  his  eyes,  as  to 
make  him  to  some  extent  incapable  of  appreciating,  or  even 
thoroughly  comprehending,  those  who  look  on  things  from 
a  different  point  of  view. 

I  do  believe,  that,  because  of  my  philosophic  experience, 
I  am  able,  at  least,  to  look  at  both  sides  of  the  question.  I 
claim  to  understand  the  "  maxims  "  of  this  philosophy,  —  ex- 
cept, indeed,  that  I  confess  to  a  difficulty  in  apprehending 
how,  on  his  principles,  he  reaches  the  idea  of  extension,  or 
a  reasonable  conviction  of  the  existence  of  his  fellow-men. 
Possibly  I  may  be  able  to  judge  of  the  "  tendencies  "  of  it 


RESEMBLANCE   TO   CON  DILL  AC.  439 

as  coolly  and  impartially  as  those  who  have  constructed  it. 
He  has  himself  characterized  the  Sensational  philosophy  of 
France,  as  "the  shallowest  set  of  doctrines  which  were  ever 
passed  oiF  upon  a  cultivated  age  as  a  complete  psychological 
system,  the  ideology  of  Condillac  and  his  school ;  a  system 
which  affected  to  resolve  all  the  phenomena  of  the  human 
mind  into  sensation,  by  a  process  which  essentially  consisted 
in  merely  calling  all  states  of  mind  however  heterogeneous 
by  that  name"  (Discuss,  vol.  i.  p.  410).  But  Condillac, 
as  a  philosophic  thinker,  a  scholar,  and  a  writer,  was  equal 
to  Mr.  Mill,  and  was  quite  as  acute  in  arguing  against 
Descartes  and  Malebranche,  as  Mill  is  against  Whewell 
and  Hamilton,  and  had  much  the  same  kind  of  influence 
in  France  a  hundred  years  ago  that  Mr.  Mill  is  now  ex- 
ercising in  England.  I  am  convinced  that  Condillac  had  no 
idea  that  any  evil  consequences  would  follow  from  his  phil- 
osophic theories.  Most  of  his  works  were  written  for  the 
purpose  of  training  a  prince  of  Parma  :  he  believes  that 
there  is  a  God  ;  "  that  the  laws  which  reason  prescribes  to 
us  are  the  laws  which  God  has  imposed  on  us  ;  and  that  it 
is  here  that  the  morality  of  actions  is  completed.  There  is, 
therefore,  a  natural  law ;  that  is  to  say,  a  law  which  has  its 
foundation  on  the  will  of  God"  (Traite  des  Animaux, 
c.  vii.) .  I  admit  that  the  two  systems,  that  of  Condillac  and 
that  of  Mill,  are  not  the  same;  but  it  could  be  shown  that 
they  have  a  much  closer  correspondence  in  themselves,  and 
in  their  logical  and  practical  consequences,  than  Mr.  Mill 
will  be  disposed  to  allow.  Both  derive  our  ideas  from 
sensation  ;  but  Mr.  Mill  takes  credit  for  adding  association, 
and  says  we  get  our  ideas  from  sensation  by  association.  But 
it  can  be  shown  that  Condillac  had  not  overlooked  associa- 
tion. I  find  Dugald  Stewart  remarking,  "  Condillac's  earliest 
w^ork  appeared  three  years  before  the  publication  of  ^  Hart- 
ley's Theory.'  It  is  entitled  ^JSssai  sicr  VOrigine  des  Co7i- 
7iaissances  Humaine,  Oiivrage  ou  Von  reduit  a  un  seul 
princijoe  tout  ce  qui  concerne  V entendement  humcdn.^  This 
seid  prmcipe  is  the  association  of  ideas.     The  account  which 


440  APPENDIX. 

both  authors  give  of  the  transformation  of  sensations  into 
ideas  is  substantially  the  same"  (^Dissert.,  P.  ii.,  S.  6), 
But  the  truth  is,  both  had  been  anticipated  by  Hutcheson, 
who  had  expounded  the  general  doctrine,  and  by  Hume,  who 
had  used  the  doctrine  of  associations  to  account  for  beliefs 
supposed  to  be  innate.  Certain  it  is,  that  Condillac  speaks 
of  association  of  ideas  which  are  the  effect  of  a  foreign  im- 
pression :  "  Celles-la  sont  souvent  si  bien  ciment^es,  qu'il 
nous  est  impossible  de  les  detruire."  "  En  general  les  im- 
pressions que  nous  ^prouvons  dans  differentes  circonstances 
nous  font  lier  des  idees  que  nous  ne  sommes  plus  maitres  de 
separer."  Mr.  Mill  will,  I  believe,  be  astonished  to  find 
here  his  father's  law  of  Inseparable  Association.  Not  only 
so,  but  he  accounts  by  this  law,  like  Mr.  Mill,  for  what  is 
supposed  to  be  huie  ou  naturel  (see  "  Connaissances  Hum.," 
c.  ix.).  I  doubt  much  whether  Mr.  Mill  is  entitled  to  as- 
sume such  airs  in  denouncing  the  sensational  school  of 
France.  His  ideas,  generated  out  of  sensation  by  associa- 
tion, do  not  differ  so  widely  after  all  from  the  "transformed 
sensations  "  of  Condillac.  Both  philosophies,  when  we  trace 
them  sufficiently  far  down,  are  found  to  rest  on  nothing  more 
solid  than  sensations  with  their  associations ;  only  Mr. 
Mill  is  driven  at  times  to  bring  in  something  inexplicable,  of 
which  nothing  can  be  known.  Let  Mr.  Mill's  philosophy 
have  as  long  time  to  work  as  that  of  Condillac  had,  from 
the  middle  of  last  century  to  the  French  Revolution,  and 
through  the  imperial  sway  of  Bonaparte,  and  I  believe  that 
"  sensation  plus  association  "  will  not  be  found  to  have  any 
more  elevating  effect  on  prevailing  thought  and  sentiment 
than  "  transformed  sensations "  had ;  only  I  cherish  the 
hope  that  in  this  country  the  tendency  will  be  counteracted 
by  the  higher  philosophy  and  theology  still  abiding  among 
us. 


HIS    GENESIS   OF  MIND.  441 


Article  II.     Mr.  MiWs  Theory  of  Mind.  ■  (pp.  88-111.) 

It  foils  in  with  the  order  of  my  examination  to  begin  with 
his  account  of  mind,  which  he  had  resolved  into  "  a  series  of 
feelings  with  a  background  of  possibilities  of  feeling,"  re- 
quiring the  farther  statement  that  it  is  "  a  series  aware  of 
itself  as  past  and  future."  He  had  acknowledged  that  this 
"reduces  us  to  the  alternative  of  believing  that  the  Mind, 
or  Ego,  is  something  different  from  any  series  of  feelings  or 
possibilities  of  them,  or  of  accepting  the  paradox  that  some- 
thing which,  ex  hi/pothesi,  is  but  a  series  of  feelings,  can  be 
aware  of  itself  as  a  series  ;  "  that  his  theory  on  this  subject 
has  "intrinsic  difficulties,  and  that  he  is  here  ftice  to  face 
with  a  final  inexplicability."  Now  he  has  told  us  (Logic, 
III.  iv.  1),  that  "the  question.  What  are  the  laws  of  na- 
ture ?  may  be  stated  thus  :  what  are  the  fewest  and  simplest 
assumptions  which,  being  granted,  the  whole  existing  order 
of  nature  would  result  ?  "  Now  I  believe  that  the  single  and 
simple  assumption  to  be  made  on  this  subject  is,  that  in 
every  conscious  act  there  is  a  knowledge  of  self  as  acting, 
and  in  every  remembrance  of  a  past  experience  of  self,  as 
having  had  the  experience.  Here  we  are  face  to  face  with 
a  final  fact,  which  needs  no  explicability.  But  Mr.  Mill 
will  not  state  it  thus,  and  he  is  flitting  round  and  round  the 
point  without  alighting  on  it.  He  affirms  that  there  "  is  no 
ground  for  believing  that  the  Ego  is  an  original  presenta- 
tion of  consciousness."  Now  I  admit  that  an  abstract  Ego 
is  not  given  in  self-consciousness ;  but  the  concrete  Ego  is  ; 
that  is,  the  Ego  as  thinking,  feeling,  or  in  some  other  act. 
He  allows,  in  his  new  edition,  that  he  does  not  profess  to 
have  adequately  accounted  for  the  belief  in  mind.  Let  us 
see  how  he  seeks  to  bear  up  his  theory  in  the  Appendix 
which  he  has  added  :  — 

"The  fact  of  recognizing  a  sensation,  of  being  reminded  of  it, 
and,  as  we  say,  remembering  that  it  has  been  felt  before,  is  the 
simplest  and  most  elementary  fact  of  memory ;  and  the  inexplicable 


442  APPENDIX. 

tie  or  law,  the  organic  union  (as  Professor  Masson  calls  it),  which 
connects  the  present  consciousness  with  the  past  one,  of  which  it 
reminds  me,  is  as  near,  I  think,  as  we  can  get  to  a  positive  con- 
ception of  Self.  That  there  is  something  real  in  this  tie,  real  as 
the  sensations  themselves,  and  not  a  mere  product  of  the  laws  of 
thought,  without  any  fact  corresponding  to  it,  I  hold  to  be  un- 
dubitable."  "  Whether  we  are  directly  conscious  of  it  in  the  act 
of  remembrance,  as  we  are  of  succession  in  the  fact  of  having 
successive  sensations,  or  whether,  according  to  the  opinion  of  Kant, 
we  are  not  conscious  of  self  at  all,  but  are  compelled  to  assume  it 
as  a  necessary  condition  of  memory,  I  do  not  undertake  to  decide. 
But  this  original  element,  which  has  no  community  of  nature  with 
any  of  the  things  answering  to  our  names,  and  to  which  we  cannot 
give  any  name  but  its  own  peculiar  one  without  implying  some 
false  or  ungrounded  theory,  is  the  Ego  or  Self.  As  such,  I  ascribe 
a  reality  to  the  Ego  —  to  my  own  mind  —  different  from  that  real 
existence  as  a  Permanent  Possibility,  which  is  the  only  reality  I 
acknowledge  in  matter."  "  We  are  forced  to  apprehend  every  part 
of  the  series  as  linked  with  the  other  parts  by  something  in  com- 
mon, which  is  not  the  feelings  themselves  any  more  than  the  succes- 
sion of  the  feelings  is  the  feelings  themselves  ;  and  as  that  which  is 
the  same  in  the  first  as  in  the  second,  in  the  second  as  in  the  third, 
in  the  third  as  in  the  fourth,  and  so  on,  must  be  the  same  in  the 
first  and  in  the  fiftieth,  this  common  element  is  a  permanent  ele- 
ment. But  beyond  this,  we  can  affirm  nothing  of  it  except  the 
states  of  consciousness  themselves." —  (pp.  256,  257.) 

There  are  plenty  of  assumptions  and  admissions  in  this  pas- 
sage, far  more  than  the  defender  of  intuitive  psychology  is 
oblio^ed  to  make.  There  is  an  "oriofinal  element,"  to  which 
he  ascribes  a  "reality,"  and  a  real  existence;  a  "permanent 
element,"  somethino;  common  to  the  feelin2:Si  "which  is  not 
the  feelings  themselves  ;  "  the  same  in  the  first  and  fiftieth 
state  of  consciousness,  and  to  which  we  can  give  no  other 
name  than  the  Ego,  or  Self.  Now  what  is  this  but  the  per- 
manent mind  or  Ego  of  the  metaphysicians,  with  its  various 
modifications,  revealed  by  consciousness?  I  certainly  do  not 
stand  up  for  the  doctrine  of  Kant,  according  to  whom  we  are 
not  conscious  of  self,  but  are  required  to  assume  it  as  a  con- 
dition.     I  prefer  a  much  simpler  doctrine,  —  that  we  are 


HIS  THEORY  OF  MIND.  443 

conscious  of  self  in  every  mental  act,  conscious  of  self  griev- 
ing in  every  feeling  of  grief,  of  self  remembering  in  every 
act  of  memory.  Admit  this  clearly  and  frankly,  and  I  am 
satisfied.  But  I  am  satisfied  because  in  this  we  have  two 
great  truths,  —  that  man  knows,  and  that  he  knows  real  exist- 
ence, that  is,  self,  as  existing.  But  the  disciple  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Nescience  —  that  is,  of  the  doctrine  that  we  can  know 
nothinsf  of  the  nature  of  thins^s  —  ever  draws  back  from  such 
a  plain  statement,  as  inconsistent  with  his  favorite  theory ; 
and  he  talks  instead  of  an  "inexplicable  tie,"  or  "law,"  or 
"organic  union,"  or  "link  to  connect  the  facts," — language 
which  is  metaphorical  at  the  best,  and  never  does  express  the 
fact,  which  is  a  very  simple  one,  though  full  of  meaning. 

We  are  here  at  the  place  where  Mr.  Mill  is  in  greatest 
difficulties,  and  feels  himself  to  be  so.  He  tells  us  that  "the 
one  fact  which  the  Psychological  Theory  cannot  explain,  is 
the  fact  of  Memory  (for  Expectation  I  hold  to  be,  psycho- 
logically and  logically,  a  consequence  of  Memory)."  I  have 
shown,  I  think,  that  he  is  for  ever  assuming,  without  per- 
ceiving it,  other  primordial  facts  ;  and  that  there  are  other 
facts  equally  entitled  to  be  regarded  as  primordial,  and,  on 
the  same  ground,  "  no  reason  can  be  given  for  it  which  does 
not  presuppose  the  belief,  and  assume  it  to  be  well  grounded." 
But  let  us  specially  inquire,  What  is  involved  in  the  assump- 
tion of  memory?  I  had  objected,  that  Mr.  Mill  was  not 
able  to  give  an  account  of  the  genesis  of  the  idea  which,  as 
consciousness  attests,  we  have  of  Time.  Let  us  look  at  the 
account  he  now  gives  of  the  idea  (p.  247),  and  then  we  shall 
be  prepared  to  look  at  the  way  in  which  he  generates  it.  He 
tells  us  that  by  Time  is  to  be  "  understood  an  indefinite  suc- 
cession of  successions."  This  does  not  make  the  matter 
clearer :  the  more  so,  as  he  has  no  things  to  succeed  each 
other  except  sensations,  which  are  only  for  the  moment. 
"  The  only  ultimate  facts  or  primitive  elements  in  Time  are 
Before  and  After,  which  (the  knowledge  of  opposites  being 
one)  involve  the  notion  of  Neither  before  nor  after  —  i.e,^ 
simultaneous."   I  do  not  look  on  this  account  as  a  correct  one 


444  APPENDIX. 

of  the  facts  of  our  experience.  We  get  the  idea  of  Time  as  a 
prhnitive  fact  in  memory  :  we  remember  every  event  as  hap- 
pening in  time  past,  and  can  then  abstract  the  time  from  the 
event.  I  certainly  do  not  give  in  to  the  principle  that 
"the  knowledge  of  opposltes  is  one,"  for  I  hold  that  the 
knowledge  of  opposltes  is  the  knowledge  of  opposltes,  — 
that  is,  of  things  opposed ;  and  I  do  not  allow  that  Before 
and  After  are  opposltes  :  they  are  rather  continuous.  But 
we  are  more  interested  to  inquire.  What  account  does  he 
give  of  our  idea  and  conviction  as  to  this  infinite  Succes- 
sion of  Successions ;  this  Before,  and  After,  and  Simul- 
taneous? His  answering  is  hesitating,  and  it  is  unsatis- 
factory. It  brings  out  the  weak  points  of  the  theory,  and 
the  awkwardness  of  the  attempt  made  to  bolster  it  up.  He 
admits,  "  I  have  never  pretended  to  account  by  association 
for  the  idea  of  Time."  "  Neither  do  I  decide  whether  that 
inseparable  attribute  of  our  sensations  is  annexed  to  them  by 
the  laws  of  the  mind  or  given  in  the  sensations  ;  nor  whether, 
at  this  great  height  of  abstraction,  the  distinction  does  not 
disappear."  He  admits  that  Time  is  the  inseparable  attribute 
of  our  sensations.  He  admits  that  we  have  the  idea.  We 
ask.  Whence  it  comes  ?  Let  us  look  at  the  alternatives  be- 
tween which  he  hesitates.  Our  idea  of  Time  "  may  be  given 
in  the  sensations  themselves."  Observe  how  he  is  giving  to 
the  sensations  a  new  and  a  totally  diverse  element,  in  the 
very  manner  of  the  school  of  Condillac.  An  idea  implying 
indefinite  successiveness,  —  a  Before  and  an  After, —  all  given 
in  sensations,  which  \ye  thought  were  confined  to  the  pres- 
ent !  !  Surely  this  beats  anything  found  in  the  "  shallowest 
set  of  doctrines  ever  passed  oflp  upon  a  cultivated  age,"  and 
"  which  consisted  in  merely  calling  all  states  of  mind,  how- 
ever heterogeneous,  by  that  name," — that  is,  the  name  of 
sensations.  If  he  take  the  other  alternative,  then  he  is  giv- 
ing to  the  mind  the  power  of  generating  in  the  course  of  its 
exercise,  a  totally  new  idea  —  a  view  utterly  inconsistent  with 
his  own  empirical  theory,  and  the  very  view  of  Leibnitz,  who 
makes  intellectus  ipse  a  source  of  ideas.     No  wonder  that  he 


HIS  THEORY  OF  BODY.  445 

seems  unwilling  to  be  fixed  on  either  horn,  and  would  fain 
mount  up  into  some  height  of  abstraction,  where  the  distinc- 
tion may  disappear.  But  the  facts  do  not  lie  In  any  great 
height  of  abstraction,  but  in  the  low  level  of  our  every-day 
consciousness,  and  can  be  expressed  only  by  giving  sensation 
its  proper  place,  and  time  its  proper  place,  both  being 
equally  primordial  facts. 

Article  in.     Mr.  iriWs  Theory  of  Body,  (jDp.  112-158.) 

I  now  come  to  a  more  perplexing  subject,  in  which  I  admit 
there  is  room  for  difference  of  opinion,  though  no  room  for 
that  of  Mr.  Mill ;  that  is,  the  idea  and  the  conviction  which 
we  have  in  regard  to  Body.  As  the  conclusion  of  his  subtile 
disquisitions,  he  had  defined  Matter  as  the  Permanent  Possi- 
bility of  Sensation.  In  the  added  Appendix,  he  declares 
clearly  that  there  is  no  proof  that  we  perceive  it  by  our 
senses,  or  that  the  notion  and  belief  of  it  come  to  us  by  an 
original  law  of  our  nature  ;  and  that  "  all  we  are  conscious 
of,  may  be  accounted  for  without  supposing  that  we  perceive 
Matter  by  our  senses,  and  that  the  notion  and  belief  may 
have  come  to  us  by  the  laws  of  our  constitution,  without 
being  a  revelation  of  any  objective  reality." 

He  admits  (p.  245)  that  his  opponents  have  referred  his 
theory  to  the  right  test,  in  aiming  to  show  that  "its  attempt 
to  account  for  the  belief  in  matter  implies  or  requires  that  the 
belief  should  always  exist  as  a  condition  of  its  own  produc- 
tion. The  objection  is  true,  if  conclusive."  But  he  adds, 
"  They  are  not  very  particular  about  the  proof  of  its  truth ; 
they  one  and  all  think  their  case  made  out,  if  I  employ  in 
any  part  of  the  exposition  the  language  of  common  life."  I 
deny  for  myself  that  I  have  tried  to  make  out  my  case  by  such 
an  argument.  I  have  Indeed  expressed  a  wish  that  he  would 
"  employ  language  consistent  with  his  theory,  and  we  should 
then  be  in  a  position  to  judge  whether  he  is  building  it  up 
fairly."  I  believe  that  any  plausibility  possessed  by  it  is  de- 
rived from  his  expressing  it  in  common  language,  which 


446  APPENDIX. 

enables  him  to  introduce,  surreptitiously  and  unconsciously, 
the  ideas  wrapt  up  in  it.  When  he  and  Mr.  Bain  speak  of 
"a  sweep  of  the  arm,"  and  "a  movement  of  the  eye,"  it  is 
difficult  for  others,  perhaps  even  for  themselves,  to  think  of 
the  arm  and  the  eye  as  mere  momentary  sensations,  as  unex- 
tended,  and  as  not  moving  in  space.  I  was  convinced  that 
if  the  theory  were  only  expressed  in  language  not  implying 
extension  in  the  original  sensation,  its  insufficiency  would  at 
once  be  seen.  He  has  now,  in  a  long  appendix,  labored  to 
construct  his  theory  in  language  consistent  with  it,  and  the 
baldness  of  it  at  once  appears. 

My  objection  proceeded  on  a  far  deeper  principle  than  the 
language  employed  by  Mr.  Mill.  I  appealed  to  conscious- 
ness, not  as  Hamilton  would  have  done,  to  settle  the  whole 
question  at  once,  but  to  testify  to  a  matter  of  fact,  which  Mr. 
]\Iill  would  admit  to  fall  immediately  under  its  cognizance. 
Consciousness  declares  that  we  have  now  an  idea  of  some- 
thing extended  ;  extended  on  three  dimensions,  —  length, 
breadth,  and  depth ;  and,  I  may  add,  of  extended  objects 
moving  in  space.  It  is  admitted,  then,  that  we  have  this 
idea,  and  I  defy  Mr.  Mill  to  revolve  this  idea  into  any  ele- 
ment allowed  by  him,  —  in  fact,  into  any  element  not  involv- 
ing extension.  He  tells  us  that  the  whole  variety  of  the  facts 
of  nature,  as  we  know  it,  is  given  in  the  mere  existence  of 
our  sensations,  and  in  the  laws  or  order  of  their  succession. 
But  from  which  of  these  does  he  get  extension  ?  Surely  not 
from  mere  sensation,  which,  as  not  being  extended,  cannot 
give  what  it  does  not  possess.  As  certainly  not  from  laws 
or  order  in  successive  sensations,  which,  as  they  do  not  pos- 
sess it  individually,  cannot  have  it  in  their  cumulation,  any 
more  than  an  addition  of  zeros  could  give  us  a  positive  num- 
ber. We  have  one  more  primordial  fact,  not  only  not  ac- 
counted for  by  his  theory,  but  utterly  inconsistent  with  it. 

We  must  examine  his  account  of  matter  a  little  more 
narrowly.  It  is  a  possibility  of  sensations.  Whence  this 
dark  background  of  possibilities  which  he  cannot  get  rid  of, 
which  he  cannot  get  behind,  to  which,  Indeed,  he  cannot  get 


EIS   THEORY  OF  BODY.  4:4:1 

up?     To  account  for  the  phenomena,  he  says,  they  come  in 
groups,  and  by  rigid  laws  of  causation.      Whence  these  co- 
existing groups  and  unvariable  successions?     Do  they  come 
in  obedience  to  mental  laws,  say,  to  the  laws  of  association  ? 
These  laws  are  represented  by  him  as  being  contiguity  and 
resemblance.     Do  these  create  the  groups  and  successions? 
I  scarcely  think  that  Mr.  Mill  will  assert  that  they  do.     I 
remember  when  travelling  in  the  midst  of  a  group  of  sensa- 
tions called  the  Alps,  thinking  only  of  my  wretchedly  wet 
condition,  I  was  suddenly  startled  by  a  group  and  succession 
of  sensations  such  as  I  had  never  experienced  before,  and 
which  I  referred  to  an  avalanche  falling  a  mile  off.     Whence 
this  effect?     It  was  not  produced  by  any  volition  of  mine. 
Surely,  Mr.  Mill  will  not  argue  that  it  was  produced  by  con- 
tiguity or  resemblance,  or  any  of  the  known  laws  of  associa- 
tion.     Whence,  then?      If  he  says  something  w^ithin  me, 
then  I  say  we  have  here  a  set  of  laws  of  a  very  curious  and 
complex  character,  unnoticed  by  the  theorist.     But  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  facts  cannot  be  explained  by  laws  within  me. 
The  law  of  cause  and  effect  is,  that  the  same  co-existino- 
agencies  are  followed  by  the   same  consequences.      But  I 
might  be  under  the  same  group  of  sensations  as  I  was  when 
the  avalanche  fell,  without  the  sounds  which  I  heard  follow- 
ing.    Does  not  this  require  us  to  posit  something  out  of  the 
series   of  sensations   to   account  for  the   phenomena  in   the 
series  ;    and  this  something  obeying  laws  independent  alto- 
gether of  our  sensations  and  associations.     If  we  once  posit 
such  an  external,  extra  serial  agency,  we  cannot  withdraw  it 
when  it  becomes  inconvenient ;  we  must  go  on  with  it,  we 
must  inquire  into  all  that  is  involved  in  it  by  the  laws  of  in- 
duction.    This  was  the  argument  that  convinced  Brown,  — 
who,  however,  called  in  to  guarantee  it  an  intuitive  convic- 
tion of  cause  and  effect,  that  there  must  be  an  external  world. 
Whether  the  argument  is  convincing,  on  the  supposition  that 
the  belief  in  causation  is  not  intuitive,  I  will  not  take  it  upon 
myself  to  say.     I  am  not  sure  that  the  infant  mind  could 
arrive,  in  the  midst  of  such  complications,  at  a  knowledge  of 


448  APPENDIX. 

the  law  of  cause  and  effect.  Finding  many  sensations  not 
following  from  any  law  in  the  mind,  it  could  not,  I  believe, 
reach  a  law  of  invariable  succession.  But  then,  it  is  said,  it 
would  refer  them  to  something  out  of  the  mind.  But  with 
an  experience  only  of  something  in  the  mind^  how  could  it 
argue  any  thing  out  of  the  mind,  of  which  outness  it  has  as 
yet  no  idea  in  the  sensations  or  order  of  sensations  ?  Would 
it  not,  in  fact,  be  shut  up  in  the  shell  of  the  Ego,  and  find  in 
that  Ego  most  of  its  sensations  without  a  cause  ?  Or  rather, 
would  not  an  infant  mind,  endowed  with  only  the  powers 
allowed  by  Mr.  Mill,  speedily  become  extinguished?  But  if 
it  could  live,  and  discover  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  as  Mr. 
Mill  thinks,  that  law  seems  to  require  us  to  believe  in  an 
external  something,  obeying  laws  of  co-existence  and  succes- 
sion independent  of  the  series  of  sensations,  and  we  should 
have  to  take  this  with  all  its  logical  consequences.  This 
gives  us  Matter  not  as  a  possibility  of  sensations,  but  an  ex- 
ternal something  obeying  laws  of  co-existence  and  succession, 
and  the  cause  of  sensations  in  us. 

The  theory  would,  after  all,  be  utterly  inadequate,  for  it 
would  not  account  for  the  most  prominent  thing  in  our  con- 
ception of  matter  ;  namely,  that  it  is  extended,  which  we  could 
never  argue,  or  apprehend,  or  even  imagine,  if  we  knew  it 
merely  as  the  cause  of  unextended  sensations.  I  therefore 
reject  it  entirely.  But  the  consequences  I  have  sketched  in 
last  paragraph  follow,  if  we  adopt  the  theory.  Under  this 
view,  I  was  entitled  to  point  out  an  oversight  in  Mr.  Mill's 
account  of  the  properties  of  matter,  which  he  represents  as 
being  resistance,  extension,  and  figure  ;  thus  omitting,  I  said, 
those  powers  mentioned  by  Locke,  by  which  one  body  oper- 
ates upon  another.  "  Thus  the  sun  has  a  power  to  make  wax 
white,  and  fire  to  make  lead  fluid."  When  I  said  so,  I  had 
entered  a  good  way,  notwithstanding  his  insinuation  to  the 
contrary,  into  the  cloud  of  Mr.  Mill's  mode  of  thought,  — 
farther,  perhaps,  than  I  was  welcome.  He  now,  in  replying 
to  me  (p.  248),  is  obliged  to  talk  of  one  group  of  possibili- 
ties of  sensations,  "destroying   or  modifying  another  such 


EIS   THEORY  OF  BODY.  449 

group  ;  "  and  this  certainly  not  by  laws  of  sensation  or  asso- 
ciation, but  by  laws  acting  independently  of  any  discoverable 
cause  in  the  series  which  constitutes  mind.  We  have  now- 
got,  by  logical  consequence,  from  Mr.  Mill's  theory,  a  con- 
siderably complicated  view  of  Matter,  as  a  group  of  causes 
obeying  laws  of  co-existence  and  unconditional  succession, 
and  one  group  influencing  another,  or  destroying  it,  and  all 
independent  of  any  volitions  of  mine,  or  laws  in  my  mind. 
The  idea  is,  after  all,  inadequate,  as  it  does  not  include  exten- 
sion ;  but  it  is  certainly  utterly  inconsistent  with  his  theory, 
that  the  notion  and  belief  of  Matter  "  may  have  come  unto  us 
by  the  laws  of  our  constitution,  without  being  a  revelation  of 
any  objective  reality." 

This  is  confirmed  by  the  language  he  uses  in  answering 
Mr.  O.  Hanlon.  He  admits  "  that  there  is  a  sphere  beyond 
my  consciousness  ;  "  and  "  the  laws  which  obtain  in  my  con- 
sciousness also  obtain  in  the  sphere  beyond  it."  This,  of 
course,  refers  to  our  conviction  as  to  there  being  other  minds 
as  well  as  our  own  (p.  253).  I  am  not  sure  that  his  argu- 
ment for  the  existence  of  such  minds  is  conclusive. 

"  I  am  aware,  by  experience,  of  a  group  of  Permanent  Possi- 
bilities of  Sensation,  which  I  call  my  body,  and  which  my  expe- 
rience shows  to  be  an  universal  condition  of  every  part  of  my  thread 
of  consciousness.  I  am  also  aware  of  a  great  number  of  other 
groups,  resembling  the  one  that  I  call  my  body,  but  which  have  no 
connection,  such  as  that  has,  with  the  remainder  of  my  thread  of 
consciousness.  This  disposes  me  to  draw  an  inductive  inference, 
that  those  other  groups  are  connected  with  other  threads  of  con- 
sciousness, as  mine  is  with  my  own.  If  the  evidence  stopped  here, 
the  inference  would  be  but  an  hypothesis,  reaching  only  to  the 
inferior  degree  of  inductive  evidence  called  Analogy.  The  evidence, 
however,  does  not  stop  here ;  for,  having  made  the  supposition  that 
real  feelings,  though  not  experienced  by  myself,  lie  behind  these 
phenomena  of  my  own  consciousness,  which,  from  the  resemblance 
to  my  body,  I  call  other  human  bodies,  I  find  that  my  subsequent 
consciousness  presents  those  very  sensations,  of  speech  heard,  of 
movements  and  other  outward  demeanor  seen,  and  so  forth,  which, 
being  the  efi'ects  or  consequents  of  actual  feelings  in  my  own  case, 

29 


450  APPENDIX. 

I  should  expect  to  follow  upon  those  other  hypothetical  feelings,  if 
they  really  exist :  and  thus  the  hypothesis  is  verified.  It  is  thus 
proved  inductively,  that  there  is  a  sphere  beyond  my  consciousness  : 
i.e.,  that  there  are  other  consciousnesses  beyond  it ;  for  there  exists 
no  parallel  evidence  in  regard  to  matter." 

Now,  I  am  not  sure  that  an  infant  mind,  with  only  the 
furniture  allowed  by  Mr.  Mill,  and  without  a  knowledge 
direct  or  by  legitimate  inference  of  body,  and  apart  from  an 
intuitive  law  of  cause  and  effect,  could  conduct  such  a  pro- 
cess. The  actual  attainments  of  every  mature  mind  show, 
by  a  legitimate  inference,  that  there  must  be  more  capacities 
and  inlets  of  ideas  than  Mr.  Mill  supposes.  But,  passing 
this,  let  us  examine  the  legitimacy  of  the  process.  There  is 
first  the  difficulty,  already  urged,  of  getting  out  of  the  sensa- 
tions which  have  no  outness,  to  the  conception  of  an  "outer 
sphere."  Then,  is  it  not  conceivable  that  the  notion  and 
belief  in  regard  to  other  people's  mind  may  have  come  to  us 
by  the  laws  of  our  constitution,  without  implying  any  objec- 
tive reality  ?  And  if  so,  are  we  not,  by  the  law  of  parcimony, 
shut  up  to  a  solitary  egoism  as  the  more  philosophical  theory  ? 
that  is,  I  may  look  on  myself  as  a  series  of  sensations  aware 
of  itself,  with  possibilities  of  sensation  in  groups  and  succes- 
sions, among  which  I  place  what  would  be  called,  in  the  lan- 
guage I  employ,  my  fellow-creatures.  No  doubt,  another 
hypothesis  may  be  made,  and  seems  to  have  its  verifications  ; 
but  the  simple  hypothesis,  which  exj)lains  all  by  the  laws  of 
my  constitution,  is  to  be  preferred,  if  it  explains  the  phe- 
nomena of  other  people's  minds,  as  I  believe  it  to  do  quite  as 
satisfactorily  as  it  does  our  notion  ot  and  belief  in  Matter. 
If  we  draw  back  from  this,  and  stand  upon  the  hypothesis 
and  verification,  then  I  urge  that  a  like  process  requires  me 
to  postulate,  that  these  groups  of  possibilities  in  my  body 
and  beyond  it  have  an  objective  reality  independent  of  me, 
and  obeying  laws  of  their  own,  and  not  laws  of  my  constitu- 
tion. Of  the  conceivable  conclusions  reached,  Mr.  Mill's 
seem  to  me  the  most  hesitating  and  incongruous.  He  must, 
I  suspect,  either  logically  remain  for  ever  within  the  sphere 


EXPERIMENTAL   CASES.  451 

of  the  Ego,  with  possibilities  he  knows  not  what;  or,  if  he 
once  go  beyond  it,  he  must  include  not  only  other  minds, 
but  material  objects  following  laws  independent  of  our  sub- 
jective constitution  or  perceptions. 

Article  IV.     SJxperimejital  Physiological  Cases,  (pp.  152-180.) 

"We  have  now  to  look  at  the  attempts  which  Mr.  Mill  has 
made  to  turn  aside  the  force  of  the  reported  experimental 
cases  which  I  had  urged  against  him.     To  prove  that  the  eye 
is  immediately  cognizant,  not  merely  of  color,  but  of  surface, 
I  had  adduced  the  case  reported  by  Dr.  Franz,  of  Leipsic, 
which  Mr.  Mill  seems  never  to  have  heard  of  before,  though 
it  was  given  in  the  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Society  for 
1841.     A  youth  born  blind  had  his  sight  restored  at  the  age 
of  seventeen  ;  and  when  a  sheet  of  paper,  on  which  two  strong 
black  lines  had  been  drawn,  the  one  horizontal  and  the  other 
vertical,  was  placed  before  him  at  the  distance  of  about  three 
feet,   on  opening  his  eye,  "after  attentive  examination,  he 
called  the  lines  by  their  right  denominations."     What?  asks 
Mr.  Mill.     It  is  clear  he  called  them  horizontal  and  vertical, 
having  got  the  terms   by  his  mathematical  education,   and 
knowing  what  were  the  things  by  the  sense  of  touch.     Mr. 
Mill  allows  (pp.  287-290)  that  this  case,  if  fairly  reported, 
would  require  a  considerable  modification  of  his  doctrine,  and 
that  it  looks  like  an  experimental  proof,  that  something  which 
admits  of  being  called  extension  "  may  be  perceived  by  sight 
at  the  very  first  use  of  the  eyes."     But  he  tries  to  throw 
doubts  on  the  accuracy  of  the  report,  evidently  because  it  runs 
counter  to  his  theory.    It  is  a  suspicious  circumstance,  he  says, 
that  the  youth  knew  a  cube  and  a  sphere  placed  before  him 
not  to  be  drawings,  of  which  he  could  have  no  idea,  — as  if 
he  could  not  have  had  some  idea  of  what  persons  seeing  meant 
by  drawings,  through  the  descriptions  which  they  had  given. 
And  if  there  be  any  truth  in  the  case  at  all,  it  is  clear  that 
the  youth  perceived  at  once  vertical  and  horizontal  lines, 
squares,   circles,  triangles,   and  the  difference  between  the 


452  APPENDIX. 

cube  and  the  sphere.  Mr.  Nimneley's  case  proves  the  same 
thing  :  the  boy  could  at  once  perceive  "  the  differences  in  the 
shape  of  objects,"  though  he  could  not  tell,  as  to  the  cube  and 
the  sphere,  which  was  which.  It  appears  that,  in  this  case,  it 
was  some  time  before  the  boy  could  identify  his  perceptions 
of  touch  with  those  of  sight.  This  is  in  accordance  with  what 
I  have  stated.  The  youth  in  Dr.  Franz's  case  could  do  it 
more  rapidly  than  the  boy  in  Nunneley's  case,  because  the 
former  had  a  mathematical  training ;  but  even  he  required 
examination  and  consideration,  so  that  the  two  cases  exactly 
correspond.  There  is  nothing  odd  in  the  circumstance  that 
Franz's  youth  could  not  form,  from  what  he  saw,  "the  idea 
of  a  square  and  disc,  until  he  perceived  a  sensation  of  what  he 
saw  in  the  points  of  his  fingers,  as  if  he  really  touched  the 
object ; "  for  it  was  thus  he  identified  the  perceptions  which 
he  was  now  receiving  with  those  which  he  formerly  had.  Mr. 
Mill  will  only  admit  after  all,  that,  though  the  youth  is  re- 
ported as  seeing  lines,  circles,  triangles,  yet  this  "does  not 
prove  that  we  perceive  extension  by  sight,  but  only  tliat  we 
have  discriminative  sensations  of  sight  corresponding  to  all 
the  diversities  of  superficial  extension ;  "  —  as  if  Hamilton 
had  not  demonstrated  that  discriminate  sensations  of  color 
imply  the  perception  of  bounding  lines,  and  therefore  of 
figure.  I  do  not  know  if  the  history  of  speculative  philosophy 
affords  a  more  startling  case  of  the  determination  of  a  theorist 
not  to  found  his  theory  on  facts,  but  to  twist  the  facts  to  suit 
his  theory,  which  he  is  determined  to  adhere  to  at  all  hazards. 
This  may  be  the  proper  place  for  referring  to  the  now 
famous  case  of  Platner,  which  both  Hamilton  and  Mill  have 
been  using,  but  which  in  fact  helps  neither,  and  perplexes 
both.  Platner,  without  giving  a  detail  of  the  facts,  comes  to 
the  conclusion  that  "  touch  is  altogether  incompetent  to  afford 
us  the  representation  of  extension  and  space,  and  is  not  even 
cognizant  of  local  exteriority,"  and  that  a  person  born  blind 
could  have  no  idea  of  extension.  These  observations  do  not 
agree  with  those  of  any  other  person  I  am  acquainted  with. 
Mr.  Mill  was  obliged  to  say,  that  Platner  "  had  put  a  false 


EXPEBIMENTAL   CASES.  453 

color  on  the  matter,  when  he  says  his  patient  had  no  percep- 
tion of  extension."     He  now  tells  us  that  he  does  not  agree 
with  Platner,  that  "the  notions  of  figure  and  distance  come 
originally  from  sight"  (p.  280).     But  if  Platner's  case  does 
no^  prove  this,  it  proves  nothing.     I  believe  it  does  prove 
nothino'.     It  is  quite  inconsistent  with  the  simple  experiments, 
which,^vith  the  aid  of  Mr.  Kinghan,  I  wrought  on  young 
children  born  blind.     I  have  an  idea  that  Platner  was  led 
astray  by  not  distinguishing  between  the  idea  of  extension, 
which  is  original  both  to  sight  and  touch,  with  the  power  of 
measuring  it,  which  is  acquired.     Mr.  Mill  admits  all  that  I 
claim,  and  all  that  Platner  denies,  "that  a  person  born  blind 
can  acquire,  by  a  mere  gradual  process,  all  that  is  in  our 
notion  of  space,  except  the  visible  picture,"  that  is,  the  color 
in  the  picture. 

To  show  that  we  intuitively  know  our  bodily  frame  as 
extended,  by  the  sense  of  touch,  I  had  quoted  at  length  from 
the  cases  adduced  by  MiiUer.     According  to  that  illustrious 
physiologist,  we  localize  our  affections  received  by  the  senses  ; 
and  the  law  of  our  nature  is,  that,  in  touch  or  feeling,  we 
place  the  sensation  at  the  spot  where  the  nerve  normally  ter- 
minates.    It  is  thus,  I  believe,  that  we  acquire  a  knowledge 
of  our  frame  as  having  one  part  out  of  another,  and  as  ex- 
tended.    All  this  I  hold  to  be  original  and  intuitive,  — so 
strongly  so,  that  persons  who  have  their  limbs  cut  off,  have, 
ten  or  twenty  years  after,  a  sense  of  the  integrity  of  the  limb. 
Mr.  :Mill  says  he  can  explain  this  by  association  of  ideas.     I 
deny  that  he  can ;  for  surely  such  a  length  of  time  was  suffi- 
cient to  destroy  the  old  association,  which  had  nothing  to 
keep  it  alive,  and  to  create  a  new  one.     He  tells  me,  that, 
according  to  my  theory,  the  pain  should  have  been  felt  in  the 
stump.     I  believe,  on  the  contrary,  that,  after  so  long  an 
experience  without  a  limb,  this  should  have  been  the  case, 
according  to  Mr.  Mill's  theory.     My  theory  — no,  not  my 
theory,  but  Miiller's— is,  that  there  is  an  original  law  which 
leads  us  to  localize  the  affection  at  the  spot  where  the  nerve 
in  its  healthy  and  proper  action  terminates.     When,  in  the 


454  APPENDIX. 

restoration  of  a  nose,  a  flap  of  skin  is  turned  clown  from  the 
forehead,  and  made  to  unite  with  the  stump  of  the  nose,  the 
new  nose  thus  formed  has,  as  long  as  the  isthmus  of  skin  by 
which  it  maintains  its  connections  remains  undivided,  the  same 
sensations  as  if  it  were  still  in  the  forehead.  This,  Mr.  Mill 
says,  should  not  be,  according  to  my  theory ;  and  there  is  a 
good  deal  of  self-complacent  chuckling  over  me,  as  if  my 
facts  overthrew  my  theory.  This  implies  a  misunderstanding 
of  the  facts.  According  to  the  law,  as  I  have  expounded  it, 
as  long:  as  the  nerve  is  imbedded  in  the  isthmus  of  skin  taken 
from  the  forehead,  it  should  be  felt  in  the  forehead.  Mr.  Mill 
takes  care  not  to  quote  the  further  fact,  that  is,  "when  the 
communication  of  the  nervous  fibres  of  the  new  nose  with 
those  of  the  forehead  is  cut  off  by  the  division  of  the  isthmus 
of  skin,  the  sensations  are  of  course  no  longer  referred  to  the 
forehead ;  the  sensibility  of  the  nose  is  at  first  absent,  but  is 
gradually  developed."  According  to  the  association  theory, 
the  affection  should  have  been  felt  in  the  forehead,  not  till 
the  isthmus  was  cut,  but  till  the  old  association  was  gone  ;  and 
this,  according  to  Mr.  Mill,  might  not  have  been  for  twenty 
years.  Be  it  observed,  that,  when  the  flesh  is  cut  off"  from  the 
forehead,  and  the  nerve  comes  to  have  its  normal  position  in 
the  nose,  the  sensation  is  felt  there.  My  theory  is  thus  sim- 
ply the  expression  of  the  facts.  But  whatever  doubt  there 
may  be  about  these  phenomena,  there  can  be  none  about 
other  facts  which  I  have  adduced.  Whatever  dispute  there 
may  be  as  to  cases  in  which  there  has  been  an  association 
formed  between  a  limb  once  existing  but  now  lost,  there  can 
be  none  as  to  persons  who  never  had  the  limb,  and  in  whose 
case  the  association  could  not  have  been  formed,  but  who  are 
reported  as  having  a  sense  of  it.  Professor  Valentin  men- 
tions cases  which  I  have  quoted,  which  show,  "that  individu- 
als who  are  the  subjects  of  congenital  imperfection,  or  the 
absence  of  the  extremities,  have,  nevertheless,  the  internal 
sensations  of  such  limbs  in  their  perfect  state."  It  is  curious 
that  Mr.  Mill  has  taken  no  notice  of  these  decisive  cases 
which  I  have  adduced  as  setting  the  whole  question  at  rest. 


EXPERIMENTAL   CASES.  455 

Mr.  Mill  dilates  on  two  cases,  to  which  I  have  referred  with- 
out attaching  much  importance  to  them.  The  shrinking  of 
the  frame  when  boiling  Hquid  is  poured  down  the  throat, 
seems  to  show  that  we  localize  the  pain  at  a  spot  of  which 
we  cannot  know  the  site  by  touch  or  experience.  Mr.  Mill 
thinks  the  action  purely  automatic  (p.  303).  Ncjw  I  am 
disposed  to  think  that  there  may  be  an  action  of  the  will  di- 
rected to  the  seat  of  sensation.  I  believe  that  at  a  very  early 
age,  and  long  before  they  have  any  acquired  perceptions  of 
locality,  they  will  indicate  vaguely  the  seat  of  the  pain.  My 
instance  may  not  be  the  best,  it  is  rather  negative  :  "  if  a  child 
is  wounded  in  the  arm,  it  will  not  hold  out  the  foot."  This 
should  not  be  construed  as  meaning  that  the  infant  will  sys- 
tematically hold  out  its  foot ;  for  this  would  suppose  that  it 
has  much  more  knowledge  than  it  can  yet  have  of  mother  or 
doctor  watching  it.  But  at  an  early  age,  there  are  apparently 
voluntary  movements  which  enable  the  mother  and  doctor 
to  discover  the  seat  of  the  pain.  I  agree  with  Mr.  Mill, 
"there  are  some  difficulties,  not  yet  completely  resolved,  re- 
specting the  localization  of  our  internal  pains,  for  the  solution 
of  which  we  need  more  careful  and  intelHgent  observation  of 
infants."  The  question  is  set  at  rest,  not  by  such  a  case, 
which  I  am  prepared  to  abandon,  if  disproven,  without 
the  least  injury  to  my  argument,  but  by  the  fact  reported 
by  Professor  Valentin,  which  Mr.  Mill  has  declined  to 
notice.* 

*  In  a  foot-note  I  had  uttered  a  sentence  in  regard  to  a  case  quoted  by  Mill  from 
Hamilton,  who  gets  it  from  Maine  de  Biran,  who  takes  it  from  a  report  of  Key  Regis 
in  regard  to  a  patient,  who,  though  he  retained  a  sense  of  pain,  had  lost  the  power 
of  localizing  the  feeling.  I  pronounced  the  case  "  valueless,  as  evidently  the  functions 
of  the  nervous  apparatus  were  deranged."  Mr.  Mill  allows  that  this  single  case  is 
not  conclusive  (p.  295);  and  with  this  I  would  have  been  satisfied,  had  he  not  gone 
on  to  argue  from  it  that  "  localization  does  not  depend  on  the  same  conditions  with 
the  sensations  themselves."  Be  it  so;  in  the  normal  state,  the  nerves  localize  the 
feeling.  "  The  patient,  as  he  gradually  recovered  the  use  of  his  limbs,  gradually  also 
recovered  the  power  of  localizing  his  sensations."  I  do  not  attach  much  importance 
to  the  following  reports  of  the  experience  of  insane  persons ;  but  they  are  worthy 
of  being  mentioned,  as  showing  how  intimately  our  abiding  perception  of  our 
bodily  frame  is  bound  up  with  the  skin  sense  and  its  localizing  tendency.  "  A  woman," 
whose  case  Esquirol  tells,  "  had  complete  anaesthesia  of  the  surface  of  the  skin :  she 
believed  that  the  devil  had  carried  off  her  body.    A  soldier  who  was  severely 


456  APPENDIX. 

Mr.  Mill  thinks  that  the  eye  originally  gives  us  only  color 
and  not  extension.  He  does  not  allow  — though  the  cases 
now  adduced  seem  to  prove  it  —  that  we  have  original  per- 
ceptions of  our  bodily  frame  as  affected.  How,  then,  ac- 
cording to  him,  do  we  get  the  idea  of  extension?  Following 
Dr.  Brown,  he  thinks  that  we  get  it  by  the  sweep  of  the 
arm  in  space;  and  he  quotes,  with  approbation,  Professor 
Bain's  method  of  working  out  this  hypothesis.  In  my  Exam- 
ination of  Mill^  I  endeavored  to  meet  this  by  psychological 
considerations,  and  showed  that  a  sweep  of  the  arm  or  leg, 
considered  merely  as  a  group  of  sensations  without  exten- 
sion, could  not  give  us  the  idea  of  extension.  I  was  not 
aware  then  that  a  German  metaphysician,  in  examining  the 
theory  of  Brown,  had  entirely  disproved  it  by  an  experi- 
mental case.  According  to  this  theory,  a  person  born  without 
arms  or  legs  could  have  no  idea  of  space ;  but  Schopen- 
hauer has  brought  forward  the  case  of  Eva  Lauk,  an 
Esthonian  girl  fourteen  years  old,  born  without  arms  or  legs, 
but  who,  according  to  her  mother,  had  developed  herself 
intellectually  quite  as  rapidly  as  her  brothers  and  sisters,  and 
without  the  use  of  limbs  had  reached  a  correct  judgment  con- 
cerning the  magnitude  and  distance  of  visible  objects  quite 
as  quickly  as  they.*  Such  a  fact  as  this  undermines  the 
theory  of  the  mode  in  which  we  gain  our  idea  of  extension, 
and  with  it  the  whole  philosophic  superstructure  which  Mill 
and  'Bain  have  been  rearing  with  such  labored  and  ill-spent 
ingenuity.  The  cases  adduced  by  Miiller,  and  that  reported 
by  Franz,  show  how  it  is  we  get  our  idea  of  extension  ; 
we  get  it  by  the  immediate  perception  of  our  bodily  frame  in 

wounded  at  the  battle  of  Austerlitz  considered  himself  dead  from  that  time ;  if  he 
were  asked  how  he  was,  he  invariably  replied,  that  '  Lambert  no  longer  lives ;  a 
cannon-ball  carried  him  away  at  Austerlitz.  What  you  see  here  is  not  Lambert, 
but  a  badly  imitated  machine,' —  which  he  failed  not  to  speak  of  as  it.  The 
sensibility  of  his  skin  was  lost."  —  Maudsley:  Physiology  and  Pathology  of  the 
Mind,  p.  242. 

*  My  attention  was  called  to  this  case  by  Mr.  Bleeck,  in  his  3fr.  J.  S.  3filVs 
Psychological  Theory.  It  is  quoted  by  Schopenhauer  in  his  Die  Welt  als  Wille,  vol. 
ii.  c.  4,  and  is  taken  from  Froriej^s  Neue  Notizen  aus  dem  Gebiete  der  Natur,  July, 
1838. 


ASSOCIATION  NOT  A   SOURCE   OF  IDEAS.         457 

feeling,  and,  by  means  of  the  eye  perceiving  the  colored  and 
extended  surface  before  it.  There  is  an  impression  among 
many  that  somehow  Mr.  Mill  and  Mr.  Bain  have  physiology 
on  their  side.  I  confidently  affirm  that  their  peculiar  philoso- 
phy is  not  supported  by  a  single  reported  case,  and  that  most 
of  the  reported  cases  are  entirely  against  them. 


Article  V.      Can  Association  generate  New  Ideas'^  (pp.  190-207, 

218-224.) 

I  now  turn  to  the  discussion  of  a  point  of  perhaps  greater 
importance  than  any  other  started  by  Mr.  Mill's  philosophy. 
It  relates  to  the  power  of  association  to  generate  new  ideas, 
and  to  produce  belief,  —  in  fact,  to  take  the  place  of  judg- 
ment or  the  comparison  of  things.  It  is,  perhaps,  the  most 
fatal  of  all  the  errors  in  Mr.  Mill's  speculations.  It  was  on 
this  account  I  dwelt  so  much  on  it,  —  more  than  any  other 
of  Mr.  Mill's  critics. 

The  two  principal  elements  out  of  which  Mr.  Mill  gen- 
erates all  our  ideas,  are  sensation  and  association.  I  have 
found  fault  with  him  for  never  telling  us  what  is  involved  in 
sensation.  We  have  seen  in  this  paper  that  he  is  not  sure 
whether  time  may  not  be  involved  in  it, — a  view  which 
would  entirely  change  its  nature.  He  never  sees  what  is 
really  involved  in  sensation,  which  is  never  felt  except  a  sen- 
sation of  self.  But  I  have  a  still  greater  complaint  against 
him  for  never  telling  us  precisely  what  association  can  do, 
and  what  it  cannot  do.  He  everywhere  ascribes  to  it,  in  lan- 
guage derived  from  material  action,  a  chemical  power  :  two 
ideas  coming  together  may  generate  a  third,  different  from 
either  of  the  original  ones.  This  is  making  association  a  source 
of  new  ideas.  In  other  words,  he  gives  to  mere  association 
a  power  which  the  a  'priori  philosophers  have  given  to  the 
intellect ;  and  surely  wdth  much  more  justice,  for  even  on  the 
supposition  that  association  is  the  occasion  of  the  new  idea, 
the  new  idea  must  proceed  from  some  mental  capacity  joined 
with  association.     Mr.  Mill  does  not  render  anv  account  of 


458  APPENDIX. 

the  law,  and  the  limit  of  this  power,  supposed  to  be  in  asso- 
ciation. It  is  a  chemical  power,  but  then  the  chemist  can  tell 
us  what  is  the  nature  and  the  law  of  the  chemical  power ; 
he  says,  Put  one  proportion  of  oxygen  and  another  proportion 
of  hydrogen  in  a  certain  relation,  and  water  is  the  product. 
But  j\Ir.  ]Mill  never  ventures  to  express  any  such  definite  law  ; 
he  leaves  every  thing  vague  and  loose.  He  finds  certain  pecul- 
iar ideas  in  the  mind,  such  as  those  we  have  in  regard  to  beauty 
and  moral  good  ;  and  he  satisfies  himself  with  saying  that  they 
are  generated  by  sensations  and  ideas,  which  have  in  them- 
selves no  such  qualities.  I  see  no  reason  which  he  has  for 
claiming  for  his  system  of  generalizing  ideas  out  of  sensation 
by  associations,  such  a  superiority  over  Condillac's  "trans- 
formed sensations." 

I  have  denied  that  association  is  ever  a  source  of  new  ideas. 
I  have  admitted  that  as  the  issue  of  "  long  and  repeated  con- 
junction, ideas,  each  it  may  be  with  its  own  peculiar  feeling, 
succeed  each  other  with  incalculable  rapidity,  so  that  we  can- 
not distinguish  between  them,  and  that  they  may  coalesce  in 
a  result."  "But  in  the  ao'oflomeration  there  seems  to  be 
nothing  but  the  ideas,  the  feelings,  and  their  appropriate  im- 
pressions coalescing ;  there  is  no  new  generation  —  no  gen- 
eration of  an  idea,  nor  in  the  separate  parts  of  the  collection." 
At  this  point  Mr.  Mill  meets  me  (pp.  342-3).  He  is  obliged 
to  concede  that  "  facts  in  the  case  of  ideas  cannot  be  appealed 
to,  for  they  are  the  very  matter  disputed."  It  clears  the 
ground  very  much  to  have  this  admission.  It  is  implied  that 
there  are  new  ideas  generated  by  the  action  of  the  mind ;  and 
Mr.  Mill  ascribes  to  association  what  our  profounder  philoso- 
phers have  ascribed  to  the  intellect,  —  making  their  case  more 
parallel  to  that  of  the  chemists,  who  give  to  their  elements  a 
chemical  power  quite  different  from  the  mechanical.  Not 
able  to  get  proof  from  ideas,  he  says,  "There  are  abundant 
instances  in  sensation." 

" I  had  thought,"  he  says,  "that  such  an  experiment  as 
that  of  the  wheel  with  seven  colors,  in  which  seven  sensa- 
tions following  one  another  very  rapidly,  become,  or  at  least 


ASSOCIATION  NOT  A  SOURCE   OF  IDEAS.         459 

generate  one  sensation,  and  that  one  totally  different  from 
any  of  the  seven  sufficiently  proved  the  possibility  of  what 
Dr.  M'Cosh  denies ;  but  he  v^rites  as  If  he  had  never  heard 
of  the  experiment ;  "  and  he  refers  to  the  ribbon  of  light  pro- 
duced by  waving  rapidly  a  luminous  body.  Now,  it  so  hap- 
pens that  I  had  produced  the  ring  when  a  boy,  by  a  lighted 
piece  of  paper;  in  my  college  days,  I  had  seen  the  experi- 
ment of  the  seven  colors  ;  and  in  my  mature  life,  I  have 
seen  a  w^heel  in  rapid  motion  appearing  stationary  when 
made  visible  by  instantaneous  electric  light.  But  I  looked 
on  these  as  experiments,  not  in  regard  to  mental  states,  but 
simply  about  light,  and  the  way  In  which  it  affects  our  bodily 
organs.  The  wheel  under  electric  light  looks  stationary,  not 
as  the  result  of  successive  sensations  of  motion,  for  we  have 
not  been  percipient  of  the  motion,  but  because  we  see  it  only 
for  the  instant.  In  the  ribbon  of  flaming  color,  the  impres- 
sion produced  by  each  of  the  rays  lingers  for  a  certain  short 
time,  till  the  impression  produced  by  those  that  rapidly  fol- 
low mixes  with  it,  and  the  figure  on  the  retina  becomes  a 
continuous  circle.  In  the  same  way  with  the  seven  colors, 
the  organic  affections  mingle  and  become  one,  and  are  trans- 
mitted as  one  to  the  mind,  which  ceases  to  have  a  sensation 
of  the  seven  colors,  and  has  the  sensation  of  one.  This  is 
not  a  case  of  seven  separate  mental  sensations  generatino'  a 
new  one.  As  long  as  the  wheel  with  the  seven  colors  ro- 
tates slowly,  so  that  there  is  time  for  the  one  set  of  rays  to 
disappear  from  the  retina  before  the  other  overtakes  them, 
there  are  seven  sensations,  but  no  eighth  generated  by  the 
seven.  If  the  wheel  is  seen  by  instantaneous  light,  seven 
colors  are  seen,  but  no  eighth.  Mr.  Mill  has  stated  the 
facts  precisely  in  an  analogous  case  furnished  by  the  sense 
of  hearing  (p.  618)  :  "  When  a  number  of  sounds  in  per- 
fect harmony  strike  the  ear  simultaneously,  we  have  but  a 
single  impression,  —  we  perceive  but  one  mass  of  sound." 
Mr.  Mill  was  bound  to  produce  a  case  of  two  or  more  sep- 
arate mental  affections  producing  a  new  one  never  before  ex- 
perienced ;  and  he  has  produced  simply  a  case  of  the  blending 


460  APPENDIX. 

of  rays  of  light  in  retinal  or  nervous  action.     Again  facts 
fail  him,  and  he  is  left  with  a  baseless  hypothesis. 


Article  VI.     ImpossiUUty  of  reaching  Positive  Truth, 
(pp.  224-230.) 

This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  the  now  notorious 
examples  which  he  adduces  of  the  most  certain  principles  of 
arithmetic  and  geometry  being  believable  in  other  circum- 
stances :  that  is,  in  the  possibility  of  our  believing  that  2  -f-  2 
may  be  5  ;  that  parallel  lines  may  meet ;  that  any  two  right 
lines  being  produced  will  meet  at  two  points ;  and  that  two 
or  more  bodies  may  exist  in  the  same  place.  These  cases  are 
taken  from  Essays  by  a  Barrister,  who  did  not  profess  to  be 
a  metaphysician,  who  did  not  know  what  to  make  of  them, 
except  that  he  thought  they  were  fitted  to  lessen  our  assurance 
of  the  certainty  of  objective  truth.  Mr.  Mill  now  makes  the 
folio  win  2:  sin  ovular  addition  to  his  statement  of  the  two  first  of 
these  cases  :  "  Hardly  any  part  of  the  present  volume  has  been 
so  maltreated  by  so  great  a  number  of  critics,  as  the  illustra- 
tions here  quoted  from  an  able  and  highly  instructed  contem- 
porary thinker  ;  which,  as  they  were  neither  designed  by  their 
author,  nor  cited  by  me,  as  any  thing  more  than  illustrations, 
I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  take  up  space  by  defending. 
When  a  selection  must  be  made,  one  is  obliged  to  consider 
what  one  can  best  spare"  (p.  87).  This  is  surely  far  from 
satisfactory.  Does,  or  does  he  not,  give  up  the  cases?  If 
he  does,  he  should  have  said  so  in  all  honesty,  and  nobody 
would  have  thought  the  less  of  him.  But  he  seems  still  in- 
clined to  retain  them  as  illustrations,  but  does  not  think  it 
necessary  to  defend  them.  I  do  hold,  that  Mr.  Mill's  prin- 
ciples do  lead  to  these  consequences,  which  have  staggered  so 
many,  and  made  them  review  the  principles  which  lead  to 
such  results, — implying  that  man  can  reach  no  truth  which 
might  not  be  falsehood  in  other  circumstances.  But  as  Mr. 
Mill  does  not  care  to  defend  them,  I  do  not  feel  that  I  am 
called  to  continue  my  assault. 


EIS  DOCTRINE   OF  RELATIVITY.  461 

"  The  geometry  of  visibles  has  been  noticed  only  by  Dr. 
M'Cosh,  who  rejects  it  as  founded  on  the  erroneous  doctrine 
(as  he  considers  it) ,  that  we  cannot  perceive  by  sight  the 
third  dimension  of  space."     This  is  not  a  full  statement  of 
the  ground  of  my  rejection.     My  language  is,  "  These  infer- 
ences can  be  deduced  only  by  denying  to  vision  functions 
which  belong  to  it,  and  ascribing  to  it  others  which  are  not 
intuitive  or  original."    I  hold  it  to  be  one  of  the  functions  of 
sight  to  give  us  a  right  line  and  a  curved  line.     Such  cases 
as  those  of  Franz  clearly  show,  that  by  sight  alone  we  can 
perceive  two  straight  lines ;  and,  having  once  seen  them,  we 
never  could  be  made  to  believe  that  they  could  meet  at  two 
points  and  enclose  a  space  ;  or  that  a  straight  line  being  con- 
tinued could  return  itself  again.     Those  who  see  colors  must 
perceive  the  boundaries  of  colors,  and  these  being  often  curved, 
would  give  us  the  idea  of  a  curved  line  ;  and  I  am  sure  they 
would  be  obliged  to  look  on  a  straight  line  returning  into 
itself  as  a  curve,  and  not  a  right  line.     So  much  for  his  deny- 
ing to  vision  functions  which  belong  to  it,  which  was  my  main 
argument.     But  again,  he  ascribes  to  it  functions  which  are 
not  intuitive  or  original :  for  I  hold  that  it  is  not  the  function 
of  vision,  but  of  touch,  to  reveal  to  us  impenetrability ;  and 
a  creature  with  sight,  but  not  touch  (even  if  it  could  live  or 
reason  at  all) ,  could  argue  nothing  as  to  bodies  either  pene- 
trating, or  not  penetrating,  each  other,  or  passing  through 
each  other,  "  without  having  undergone  any  change  by  this 
penetration." 

In  looking  at  these  acknowledged  consequences,  I  had  ven- 
tured to  point  out  the  dangerous  tendency  of  a  doctrine  which 
strips  man  of  the  power  of  reaching  positive  truth,  and  of 
pronouncing  judgment  on  the  reality  of  things.  Because  1 
have  done  so,  he  represents  me  as  "preaching ; "  but  preach- 
ing to  one  who  is  "already  converted,"  "an  actual  missionary 
of  the  same  doctrine."  I  am  here  tempted  to  remark,  that 
Mr.  Mill  himself  "preaches"  at  times,  as  in  those  passages  in 
which  he  charges  Dr.  Mansel's  doctrines  as  being  "simply 
the  most  morally  pernicious  doctrine  now  current,"  and  hurls 


462  APPENDIX. 

at  him  that  tremendous  passage,  "I  will  call  no  being  good 
who  is  not  what  I  mean  when  I  apply  that  epithet  to  my  fel- 
low-creatures ;  and  if  such  a  being  can  sentence  me  to  hell, 
for  not  so  calling  him,  to  hell  I  will  go."     My  preaching  on 
this  occasion  has  evidently  had  some  effect ;  it  has  hit  a  point 
in  which  Mr.  Mill  seems  to  be  sensitively  tender.     I  am  con- 
vinced that  he  has  never  seriously  weighed  the  logical  and 
practical  tendency  of  his  doctrine  of  nescience ;  it  looks  as  if 
there  are  times  when  he  is  unwilling  to  look  at  the  conse- 
quences.   He  tells  us  that,  in  his  Logic,  he  has  been  instruct- 
ing his  readers  to  form  their  belief  exclusively  on  evidence. 
But  did  he  never  hear  a  preacher  waxing  longest  and  loudest 
on  the  points  of  his  doctrine  which  he  felt  to  be  the  weakest 
and  most  vulnerable  ?     In  regard  to  ordinary  mundane  mat- 
ters, Mr.  Mill  is  very  careful  to  bid  us  look  for  evidence  ;  but 
the  evidence,  in  the  last  resort,  is  found  to  be  baseless,  thus 
rendering  the  whole  superstructure  insecure  in  the  estimation 
of  all  who  are  bent  on  looking  beneath  the  surface.     He  cor- 
rects Mr.  Grote  when  he  seems  to  say,  that  truth  is  to  every 
man  what  seems  truth  to  him ;  but  his  own  doctrine  is  equally 
unsatisfactory  when  we  follow  it  to  its  foundation.     "We 
grant,"  he  says,  "  that,  according  to  the  philosophy  which  we 
hold  in  common  with  Mr.  Grote,  the  fact  itself,  if  knowable 
to  us,  is  relative  to  our  perceptions,  to  our  senses,  or  our 
internal  consciousness ;  and  our  opinion  about  the  fact  is  so 
too  :  but  the  truth  of  the  opinion  is  a  question  of  relation 
between  these  two  relatives,  one  of  which  is  an  objective  stan- 
dard for  the  other"   (Dissert.,  vol.  ii.  art.  Grote's  Plato). 
That  is,  we  are  to  have  witnesses ;  but  our  conviction,  nay, 
truth  itself,  leans  on  the  deposition  of  witnesses,  each  of  which 
supports  the  other,  but  each  of  which  may  be  a  liar.     The 
earnest  and  logical  mind  is  made  to  feel  that  in  all  matters 
bearing  on  the  depths  of  philosophy,  and  the  heights  of  reli- 
gion, and  fitted  to  bear  it  up  above  this  cold  earth,  it  has 
nothing  left  on  which  to  lean. 


AMBIGUITY  OF  THE   WORD   CONCEIVE.         463 

Article  VII.     Ambiguity  of  the  word  Conceive,  (pp.  251-258.) 

In  my  Examination  I  had  been  at  great  pains  to  point  out 
the  ambiguity  in  the  word  "  conceive,"  and  the  paronymoua 
words  "conception,"  "conceivable,"  and  "inconceivable."  It 
is  of  essential  importance,  if  we  would  avoid  senseless  logo- 
machy, to  determine  the  meaning  in  which  we  employ  the 
phrase  Avhen  we  use  man's  power  of  conception  as  a  test  of 
necessary  truth,  or  his  incapacity  of  conception  as  a  test 
of  error.  I  distinguished  three  senses  of  the  word  :  (1)  image 
in  the  phantasy,  as  when  we  picture  Mont  Blanc;  (2)  the 
generalized  notion,  as  "mountain;"  (3)  native  cognition, 
belief,  or  judgment,  in  regard  to  objects  ;  and  I  showed  that 
it  is  only  when  used  in  the  third  sense  that  it  can  be  legiti- 
mately employed  as  a  test  of  truth.  I  showed  that  it  was  not 
in  this  sense  that  Antipodes  were  supposed  by  our  fathers  to 
be  inconceivable,  but  because  they  seemed  to  be  contrary 
to  experience,  —  a  prepossession  which  gave  way  before  far- 
ther experience.  I  am  not  aware  that  any  one  ever  objected 
to  Antipodes  on  the  ground  of  a  native  cognition,  belief,  or 
judgment.  I  charged  Mr.  Mill  with  taking  advantage,  of 
course  unconsciously,  of  the  ambiguity  of  the  phrase.  Any 
apparent  success  which  he  may  have  had,  in  explaining  neces- 
sity of  conception  by  association,  arises  solely  from  his  show- 
ing how  one  image  suggests  another, — how,  for  instance, 
darkness  suggests  ghosts,  or  a  precipice  the  danger  of  falling. 
I  was  quite  aware  that  Mr.  Mill,  in  answering  Hamilton,  had 
shown  that  the  phrase  had  several  meanings ;  but  then,  I 
asserted,  that  he  himself  was  led  astray,  and  was  leading 
astray  his  readers,  by  the  ambiguity.  As  my  work  was 
passing  through  the  press,  I  observed  that,  in  the  sixth 
edition  of  his  Logic  (I.  pp.  303-306),  lately  published,  he 
had  charged  Mr.  Spencer  as  deriving  "  no  little  advantage  " 
from  the  ambiguity,  and  alleges  that  the  popular  use  of  the 
word  "sometimes  creeps  in  with  its  associations,  and  j^revent 
him  from  maintaining  a  clear  separation  between  the  two. ' 
I  simply  noticed  this  m  afoot-note,  and  added,  that  IVlr.  Mill 


464  APPENDIX. 

"continues  to  take  advantage  of  the  ambiguity,  which  is 
greater  than  he  yet  sees."  Mr.  Mill  thinks  this  "curious" 
(p.  88).  The  note  was  hastily  written,  and  I  admit  my 
meaning  was  not  so  clear  as  I  have  now  endeavored  to  make 
it. 


Article  VIII.     Mr.  MilVs  Logical  Views,     (pp.  286-371.) 

The  only  subject  remaining  to  be  discussed  is  his  defence 
of  his  own  logical  views,  and  his  criticism  of  mine.  He  is 
pleased  to  say  (p.  388),  that  "the  chapter  of  Dr.  M'Cosh, 
headed  the  ^Logical  Notion,'  contains  much  sound  philoso- 
phy." But  he  complains  of  "the  persistent  impression  which 
the  author  keeps  up,  that  I  do  disagree  with  him."  Now,  I 
believe  that  our  views  do  disagree,  and  I  was  anxious  to  point 
out  the  mistakes  in  a  work  which  is  of  such  value  and  influ- 
ence as  Mr.  Mill's  Logic.  Mr.  Mill  is  a  nominalist,  and 
looks  at  the  name,  its  denotation,  and  connotation,  instead  of 
the  mental  exercise  ;  whereas,  I  am  a  conceptualist  (though, 
certainly,  not  in  the  sense  in  which  many  are),  and  have 
labored  to  bring  out  the  process  of  mind  involved  in  the 
notion,  judgment,  and  reasoning. 

We  differ  in  regard  to  the  General  Notion,  or  Common 
Term.  I  hold,  that  every  such  notion  or  term  has  both  exten- 
sion and  comprehension,  or  intension,  — that  is,  both  objects 
and  attributes,  —  whereas,  he  looks  solely  at  the  comprehen- 
sion, or  the  attributes.  I  had  said,  that  I  think  it  desirable 
to  have  a  phrase  to  denote  the  class  of  things  comprised  in 
the  general  notion,  and  that  the  best  word  I  can  think  of  is 
Concept.  In  opposition  to  this,  he  says  the  word  "class" 
is  sufficient.  But  the  word  class  is  rather  significant  of  an 
objective  arrangement,  existing  independent  of  my  notice  of 
it,  —  say,  of  the  class  Rosaceas,  which  had  an  existence  in 
nature  before  naturalists  had  observed  it,  or  given  a  name  to 
it.  He  admits,  that.  In  order  to  belief,  "  a  previous  mental 
conception  of  the  facts  is  an  indispensable  condition,"  and 
"that  the  real  object  of  belief  is  the  fact  conceived."     Now, 


EIS  LOGICAL    VIEWS.  465 

the  word  Concept  stands  with  me,  not  for  the  class,  but  for 
the  class  conceived,  and  is  the  best  I  can  think  of.  He  has  a 
glimpse  of  the  truth  when  he 'speaks  of  extension  (p.  421) 
"  as  a  name  for  the  aggregate  of  objects  possessing  the  attri- 
butes included  in  the  concept."  He  tells  us  (p.  372),  "that 
concepts  cannot  be  thought  as  being  universal,  but  only  as 
being  part  of  the  thought  of  an  individual."  Here,  again, 
conceive,  or  "think,"  used  in  the  sense  of  image;  whereas, 
it  should  be  employed  in  the  sense  of  judge.  A  concept  is 
a  notion  of  an  indefinite  number  of  objects  (extension)  pos- 
sessing common  properties  (comprehension) ,  the  notion  being 
such  as  to  include  all  objects  possessing  the  common  proper- 
ties.    It  is  thus  emphatically  universal. 

^Ye  differ,  also,  in  regard  to  Abstract  Notions.  "It  is 
evident  that  the  existence  of  abstract  ideas  —  the  conception 
of  the  class  qualities  by  themselves,  and  not  as  embodied  in 
an  individual  —  is  effectually  precluded  by  the  law  of  insepa- 
rable association."  I  acknowledge,  that,  in  the  sense  of 
"  imao'ino',"  we  cannot  have  a  conception  of  an  attribute  apart 
from  a  concrete  object.  But,  in  the  sense  of  "think  of,"  we 
can  apprehend  a  part  as  a  part,  an  attribute  as  an  attribute  ; 
and  this  is  what  I  mean  by  abstraction.  I  think  it  of  great 
moment  to  distinguish  between  the  abstract  and  general 
notions,  which  the  Kantian  logicians,  German  and  British, 
—  departing  from  certain  older  logicians,  — everywhere  con- 
found. "Kationality"  is  an  abstract  term,  denoting  an  attri- 
bute, and  is  different  from  "man,"  which  is  a  general  notion 
connecting  objects.  By  drawing  this  distinction,  and  carry- 
ing it  out  consequentially,  we  throw  light  on  logical  judg- 
ment, and  settle  some  of  the  questions  discussed  in  the  present 
day.  There  are,  I  hold,  judgments  in  which  we  compare 
mere  abstracts,  and  in  which  there  is  no  general  notion  in- 
volved. Such  judgments  are  always  convertible  or  substitu- 
tive (called  equipollent  by  certain  older  logicians),  — that  is, 
we  can  turn  the  subject  into  the  predicate,  and  the  predicate 
into  the  subject,  without  any  change,  which  we  cannot  do 
in  comparing  universal  notions.     Because  "  men  are  mortals," 

30 


466  APPENDIX, 

we  cannot  say,  therefore,  "mortals  are  men  ;  "  but  if  "honesty 
is  the  best  policy,"  we  can  say,  "the  best  policy  is  honesty," 
because  both  terms  are  abstract. 

I  have  represented  Numbers  as  Abstract  Notions,  and  the 
judgments  involving  them  as  being  convertible  in  conse- 
quence. Thus  3X3  being  9,  we  can  say,  9  is  3  X  3.  But 
Mr.  Mill  says  that  the  terms  are  general.  "The  objects  em- 
braced in  9  are  nine  apples,  nine  marbles,  nine  hours,  nine 
miles ,  and  all  the  other  aggregations  of  which  9  can  be  predi- 
cated. Every  numeral  is  the  name  of  a  class,  and  a  most 
comprehensive  class,  consisting  of  things  of  all  imaginable 
qualities."  Now,  it  was  a  disadvantage  under  which  I  la- 
bored in  criticising  Mr.  Mill's  "  Formal  Logic,"  that  I  was 
not  able  to  expound  my  own  views  with  sufficient  fulness. 
But  I  have  all  along  explained  to  my  college  classes  that  the 
same  phrase  may  stand  for  an  abstract  and  a  general  notion. 
I  hold,  that  numerals,  1,  2,  3,  are  primarily  abstract  qualities 
of  things,  —  a  quality  of  that  one  thing,  of  these  two  things, 
or  three  things.  It  is  because  they  are  so  that  the  propo- 
sitions comparing  them  are  convertible.  But,  then,  we  very 
often  turn  abstract  names  into  general  ones  (as  we  also  do 
general  ones  into  abstract  ones),  and  we  do  speak  of  1,  2,  3 
as  standing  for  a  class.  We  so  employ  them  when  we  say, 
"3X3  make  9,"  which  we  can  only  convert  by  saying, 
"  some  things  making  9  are  3  X  3,"  —  for  6  +  3  also  make  9. 
There  is  surely  a  profound  distinction  here,  with  far-reaching 
consequences  ;  but  this  is  not  the  place  for  the  further  devel- 
opment of  it. 

As  not  seeing  that  Extension,  as  well  as  Comprehension, 
is  involved  in  all  our  general  notions,  and  so  in  all  our  judg- 
ments involving  general  notions,  Mr.  Mill  has  not  been  able 
to  give  a  clear  account  of  the  Proposition.  He  says  (p.  420) , 
"all  men,"  and  the  "class  men,"  are  "expressions  which 
point  to  nothing  but  attributes  ;  they  cannot  be  interpreted 
except  in  comprehension."  Now,  I  have  admitted  that  in  the 
greater  number  of  propositions  the  uj^permost  thought  and 
sense  are  in  comprehension,  and  I  am  represented  as  "having 


EIS  LOGICAL   VIEWS.  467 

partially  just  conceptions  on  the  subject."  But  I  hold  that, 
in  all  judgments  of  the  kind  he  is  speaking  of,  there  is  thouo-ht 
in  extension,  and  that  they  can  be  interpreted  in  extension, 
and  have  a  meaning  in  extension.  When  I  say,  "Gorillas 
are  not  men,"  I  mean,  are  not  included  in  the  class  men ; 
and  in  many  other  propositions  the  uppermost  thought  is  in 
extension.  Of  course,  as  the  one  implies  the  other,  the  prop- 
osition has  also  a  meaning  in  comprehension. 

This  is  the  proper  place  for  correcting  a  misapprehension 
of  Mr.  Mill's,  as  to  what  constitutes  the  principle  of  identity, 
which,  he  thinks,  should  be  expressed  thus  (p.  466)  :  "What- 
ever is  true  in  one  form  of  words,  is  true  in  every  other  form 
of  words  which  convey  the  same  meaning."  He  applies  this 
to  what  "  Kant  terms  Conclusions  of  the  Understanding,  and 
Dr.  M'Cosh,  Implied  or  Transposed  Judgments."  "They 
are  not  conclusions,  nor  fresh  acts  of  judgment,  but  the 
original  expressed  in  other  words."  But  this  is  not  an  ade- 
quate account.  The  law  of  identity  requires  that  the  relation 
of  the  things  compared  should  be  considered  the  same,  not 
merely  under  different  expressions,  but  in  different  circum- 
stances, positions,  and  forms.  It  being  given  us  that  "all 
men  have  a  conscience,"  we  are  sure  it  cannot  be  true  that 
"  no  man  has  a  conscience,"  or  that  "  some  men  have  not  a 
conscience."  These  are  not  the  same  propositions  expressed 
in  other  words ;  they  would  be  felt  to  be  true  and  implied., 
though  not  expressed  in  words  at  all. 

There  is  one  other  logical  point  in  which  Mr.  Mill  and  I 
differ  theoretically.  I  hold  that  in  reasoning  there  is  always 
thought  in  Extension ;  always  a  general  principle  involved, 
constituting  the  major  premises  when  the  argument  is  fully 
unfolded.  In  his  own  Formula,  there  is  a  major  premise  : 
"Attribute  A  is  a  mark  of  attribute  B,"  which  means,  when 
properly  interpreted,  "  Whatever  object  possesses  attribute  A 
has  also  attribute  B,"  clearly  a  proposition  involving  Exten- 
sion ;  nay,  actually  thought  of  in  Extension.  It  is  only 
when  we  have  such  a  generalized  maxim  that  the  particular 
case  constituting  the  minor  premise  warrants  the  conclusion. 


468  APPENDIX. 

"  The  gorilla  cannot  speak ;  "  this  cannot  give  us  the  conclu- 
sion, "the  gorilla  is  not  a  man,"  unless  we  proceed  on  the 
general  principle  that  "  all  beings  placed  in  the  class  man  are 
possessed  of  speech."  So  far  as  our  views  bear  on  the  prac- 
tical evolution  of  logical  formulae,  I  believe  Mr.  Mill  and  I 
are  at  one.  We  both  think  that  the  old  logical  formula, 
which  are  in  Extension,  may  be  allowed  to  keep  the  place 
which  they  have  had  for  ages  ;  and  we  both  think  that  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  has  done  good  sendee  to  logic  by  showing  us  how, 
when  any  good  purpose  is  to  be  served  by  it,  we  may  turn 
reasonino:  in  Extension  into  the  form  of  reasoninsr  in  Com- 
prehension.  I  cannot  agree  with  him,  however,  when  he 
gives  as  a  reason  for  allowing  the  reasoning  in  Extension  to 
remain,  that  "  concrete  language,  requiring  for  its  formation  a 
lower  degree  of  abstraction,  was  earliest  formed,  took  posses- 
sion of  the  field,  and  is  still  the  most  familiar"  (p.  484).  I 
am  not  sure  that  thought  in  Extension  is  more  concrete  than 
thought  in  Comprehension.  I  hold  that  reasoning  is  sponta- 
neously in  Extension,  and  that  it  is  thus  that  the  forms 
assumed  this  shape,  took  possession  of  the  field,  and  are  still 
most  familiar.  When  we  argue  that  "  the  Eed  Indians  are 
responsible  because  they  are  human  beings,"  we  put  the  major 
in  the  form,  "human  beings  are  responsible,"  not  because 
"responsible"  is  more  concrete  than  "possessing  responsi- 
bility," but  because  we  must  have  a  general  law,  and  put  "  all 
human  beings  in  the  class  of  beings  possessing  responsibility." 
The  premises  as  propositions  may  be  thought  of  primarily  in 
Comprehension,  —  the  Extension,  however,  being  always  in- 
volved; but  in  reasoning,  the  Extension  involved  must  be 
actually  thought  of  in  order  to  give  us  the  major  proposition. 
The  formula  in  Extension,  in  the  ordinary  syllogistic  analysis, 
is  thus  the  expression,  not  of  artificial,  but  of  spontaneous 
reasoning. 


MR.  MILL'S  OMISSIONS.  469 

Article  IX.     3fr.  MilVs  Omissions. 

I  have  now  faced  Mr.  Mill  at  all  the  points  in  which  he  has 
seen  fit  to  meet  me.*  But  I  cannot  close  the  discussion  with- 
out referring  to  the  points  at  which  he  has  not  deigned  to 
meet  me.  I  had  said  a  good  deal  about  his  mode  of  pro- 
cedure, and  criticised  his  "Psychological  Method,"  showing 
how  it  should  be  adopted  only  with  important  exj^lanations 
and  modifications  ;  in  particular,  that  we  are  at  liberty  to 
proceed  on  this  method  only  on  the  condition  that  we  care- 
fully look  at  all  that  is  in  the  idea,  and  that  we  explain  it  all 
by  the  theory.  Again,  I  had  shown  that  Mr.  Mill,  w^iile 
seeming  to  explain  all  our  ideas  by  sensation  and  association, 
had  been  obliged  to  call  in  as  many  assumed  metaphysical 
principles  as  Reid  and  Hamilton.  I  had  collected  his  admis- 
sions into  heads  ;  I  had  shown  that  they  are  utterly  inconsis- 
tent with  his  apparently  association  theory ;  and  that,  if 
logically  followed  out,  they  must  carry  him  much  farther 
than  he  is  disposed  to  go.  On  none  of  these  points  does  he 
offer  a  word  of  explanation.  I  had  criticised  his  doctrine  of 
causation,  showing  that  what  he  explains  by  experience  is  not 
our  conviction  as  to  cause  and  effect,  but  in  the  uniformity  of 
nature.  I  had  reviewed  with  considerable  care  his  very 
defective  account  of  mathematical  axioms  and  definitions, 
and  of  demonstration.  I  had  examined  his  genesis  of  our 
idea  of  moral  good,  and  his  whole  utilitarian  theory.  I  had 
invited  him  to  say  whether  he  thinks  a  conclusive  argument 
for  the  existence  of  God  could  be  constructed  on  his  prin- 
ciples.    It  is  curious  that,  while  he  has  seen  fit  to  meet  me 


*  I  am  glad  he  has  called  attention  (p.  76)  to  my  complaint  of  the  vagueness  of 
the  distinction  between  knowledge  and  faith.  He  acknowledges  that  the  distinction, 
as  drawn  by  me,  agrees  with  the  cases  to  which  I  have  applied  it,  and  says  that 
every  definition  of  belief  must  include  these  cases.  But,  then,  he  sees  a  difficulty  in 
carrying  it  through  the  entire  region  of  thought.  I  am  satisfied,  if  it  holds  good 
in  the  region  in  which  I  have  employed  it,  that  is,  in  regard  to  primitive  cognitions  in 
which  the  objects  are  present,  and  primitive  beliefs,  in  which  we  are  convinced  of 
their  existence,  though  they  are  not  present.  But  even  in  other  regions,  it  calls 
attention  to  the  circumstance  that  in  our  very  scientific  knowledge  there  is  belief 
involved,  —  always,  however,  with  other  mental  exercises,  such  as  judgment. 


470  APPENDIX. 

on  other  points,  some  of  them  in  no  way  essential  to  my  argu- 
ment, he  has  not  noticed  these  all-important  criticisms.  I 
am  perhaps  not  justified  in  arguing  that  my  positions  must 
therefore  be  unassailable ;  but  it  will,  at  least,  be  allowed 
that,  since  no  attack  has  been  made  upon  them  by  my  acute 
opponent,  I  am  not  required,  for  the  present,  to  offer  any 
further  defence. 


k^^ 


